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England and Wales High Court (Patents Court) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Patents Court) Decisions >> Ahmad v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2025] EWHC 936 (Pat) (22 April 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 936 (Pat)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 936 (Pat)
Case No: HP-2024-0000041

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS & PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PATENTS COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
22 April 2025

B e f o r e :

THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR
____________________

Between:
OTHMAN BIN AHMAD
Claimant
- and -

THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS
Defendant

____________________

The Claimant appeared in person by remote link
Dr Stuart Baran (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 10 April 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
    .............................
    THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR

    Mr Justice Mellor :

    Introduction

  1. By a claim form dated 21 November 2024, the Claimant, Othman Bin Ahmad (who is resident in Sabah, Malaysia but with an address for service in Poole in Dorset) brought this action against the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks. The Claimant is aggrieved that he was not granted a patent on his application no. GB1412516.5.
  2. The brief details of claim on the claim form give a flavour of his claim.
  3. '1.The Comptroller-general of Patents, later referred as UKIPO, filed in UKIPO in 2014 had maliciously delayed the approval process of my patent, An Optimum Hybrid Vehicle, GB1412516.5, by replying late to the request for Substantive Search as well as response to the ridiculous reasons for rejections dated, 7 August 2015, only on 30 June 2020, and other illegal and corrupt actions including destroying documents, as shown by missing from IPSUM.
    2. On 30-09-2024, a complaint was sent to UKIPO for missing documents in IPSUM despite receipts received by email, but to date, still no report on the implications. It is fair to assume that the missing documents led to the refusal to grant. I was unaware so did not file for reinstatement in 2021..
    3. I also claim all losses due to the unjustified refusal to grant this patent, including losses due to patent infringement by car companies, and refund of fees for rejected Reinstatement form 14. Refer to attached documents: Statement of Claim.'
  4. Due to his allegations of malice and corruption against the Defendant, which are repeated in his Statement of Claim and other documents, I wish to make it clear at the outset that I have found all these allegations to be totally without any merit or substance. Not only are they unsupported, none of these allegations should ever have been made. Mr Ahmad's status as a litigant in person does not excuse the making of these utterly meritless allegations in circumstances where the personnel at the UKIPO were simply conducting the normal business of the examination of Mr Ahmad's application for a patent in accordance with the rules and practices of the UKIPO and under the provisions of the Patents Act 1977 ('PA77' or 'the Act').
  5. The principal application I have to deal with is the application by the Defendant:
  6. i) to strike out the Statement of Claim and the Claim Form on two bases: first, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a), that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim;

    ii) for summary judgment, pursuant to CPR 24.2.

  7. The Defendant also advanced a second ground for strike out, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c), on the basis that there has been a failure to comply with a rule. Having analysed the allegations under this ground, it was clear to me that it added nothing to the ground under 3.4(2)(a), so I do not propose to lengthen this judgment further by discussing it.
  8. The Application was supported by the Witness Statement of Christopher Daley of the Government Legal Department. In the course of his witness statement, Mr Daley commented on each paragraph in the Claimant's Statement of Case but did so in order to make the Defendant's position clear to the Claimant. The Claimant responded in his witness statement. Each side filed a very useful Skeleton Argument and I was also supplied with the Application Bundle, an Authorities Bundle plus an 'evidence bundle' from the Claimant which contained an extensive 'Expert Report' from the Claimant.
  9. Although certain statements in the Claimant's documents were not entirely clear on first reading, the Claimant attended the hearing by remote link and represented himself and I benefitted from his oral submissions in which he made his points very clearly.
  10. Dr Baran represented the Comptroller-General. He made it clear that he had set out matters fully in his Skeleton Argument so that the Claimant could fully understand the Defendant's position. Furthermore, in oral argument, Dr Baran was mindful of his position representing a public body and was at pains to identify any possible argument which might be made on the Claimant's behalf, based not only on the established facts, but also on various of the Claimant's assertions, whether supported or not.
  11. Having considered all the materials and submissions made to me, I am left in no doubt that I must strike out this action in its entirety because no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim are disclosed, whether in the Statement of Claim or in any of the materials. For good measure, it would also have been appropriate to grant summary judgment in favour of the Defendant. I certify this action as totally without merit and award costs against the Claimant, which I assess summarily later.
  12. In order to explain my reasons, I must first set out the relevant facts, the vast majority of which are not disputed. I will highlight where certain possible disputes of fact arise, but I will explain why none of them stand in the way of the strike-out or the grant of summary judgment.
  13. The facts

  14. On 15 July 2014, Mr Ahmad filed an application for a patent. The application was given number GB1412516.5 and was entitled "Optimum Hybrid Vehicle".
  15. The UKIPO carried out a search, and gave its initial report on 21 January 2015. The Examiner commented that on the basis of that search, the application appeared to lack novelty (s. 2 PA77) and an inventive step (s. 3 PA77), so that the patent application therefore did not appear to be allowable in its present form.
  16. The first Examination Report in relation to the Claimant's application came very considerably later; it is dated 30 June 2020. As Dr Baran submitted, this delay is regrettable, but at the time it was not an atypical delay because of a considerable backlog of applications. The position is now much improved. The compliance date was set to 12 months from the date of the first examination report, pursuant to r. 30(2) Patents Rules 2007 ("PR07").
  17. By that Examination Report, the Examiner raised objections to the Claimant's patent application for at least:
  18. i) lack of novelty (s. 2 PA77) and

    ii) obviousness/lack of inventive step (s. 3 PA77).

  19. The Claimant received that report and engaged with it; indeed, over the course of the rest of 2020 and into 2021 he proffered amendments in order to seek to overcome the Examiner's objections. That, of course, was entirely normal.
  20. What turned out to be the last examination report and accompanying cover letter, each dated 16 July 2021, were provided to the Claimant by email on 21 July 2021. The latest reply date was clearly set out in both this 'Last Examination Report' and in the Letter as 6 August 2021.
  21. Furthermore, the Letter cannot have left Mr Ahmad in any doubt as to his options. In addition to enclosing the Examiner's further examination report, it also explained as follows:
  22. 'Opportunity to request a hearing
    You are invited to request to be heard by a Hearing Officer ( a Senior Officer who has not previously been involved with your application) who will consider the issues afresh. If you wish to request a hearing you should do so in writing by the latest date for reply given above.
    You would have the opportunity, in this event, to present your opinion personally. Alternatively you can request that the Hearing Officer make a decision based on the papers on file.
    If you respond with further amendments or arguments but do not request a hearing, I may pass your application to a Hearing Officer to consider. In this instance the Hearing Officer will make a decision about whether your application complies with the requirements of the act, based on the papers on file. If the Hearing Officer decides that your application does not meet the requirements of the Act your application may be refused under section 18(3).
    Compliance period
    The maximum, unextended period allowed for complying fully with the requirements of the Act ended on 30 June 2021. If you want to continue with the application by responding to my enclosed report by filing amendments, you should therefore also file a Patents Form 52 and the required fee for an extension of two months. You should also note that you are not automatically entitled to a further extension of time for complying with the requirements of the Act beyond 30 August 2021.'
  23. Mr Ahmad was pursuing at least one other application at the UKIPO at this time. It is not in dispute that on 23 July 2021, the UKIPO received from Mr Ahmad a set of documents including 2 covering letters, some amended and replacement pages and a fee sheet, and under the reference number 1412516.5, and I was provided with a record of the Electronic Filing Receipt.
  24. However, it was Mr Daley's evidence, having made enquiries of the relevant personnel at the UKIPO, that those documents did not concern application GB1412516.5 at all, and instead related to another application being pursued by Mr Ahmad. The documents were transferred and logged onto the file relating to that other application.
  25. However, I should pick up two points Mr Ahmad made in his witness statement in response to that of Mr Daley. First, in [9] of his statement, Mr Daley said 'the Claimant did not file a response engaging with that examination report' [i.e. the Last Examination Report]. Mr Ahmad says in [10] of his statement, that 'is a complete lie', referring to the acknowledgement of receipt.
  26. The second point is that Mr Ahmad went on in [10] to say this:
  27. 'Please not [sc.note] that the response is not just a reply to the examiner's report but also include amendment sheets and replacement sheets. Claiming that these documents refer to "different patent application altogether". I have 6 patents applied for. 3 already granted after August 2021, one before August 2021. GB1402217.2, Optimum Collision, was terminated on 25 June 2021 despite having sent documents that the examiner kept on saying that he had not received it, while I saw it in IPSUM. So please tell me which patent was it wrongly sent to? Why was I not informed about this transfer of files or even wrongly sent files? They are all illogical for me who have 4 patents already granted by UKIPO to not send the correct files. These files were not small, because they include amendments sheets and replacement sheets also. The entire package went missing from IPSUM. Supposed to be transferred somewhere, but never told where to. This proves that the Defendant is lying.'
  28. On this application, Mr Ahmad had the opportunity to present documents responding to the Last Examination Report (i.e. that dated 16 July 2021). His evidence contained three 'Skeleton Arguments' filed in response to various examination reports, containing his detailed response to each one. In respect of this Last Examination Report, his evidence also contains what appears to be the text of a covering email which, in material part, reads as follows:
  29. 'UKIPO,
    Date: 22 July 2021, reference: Optimumhybrid
    Subj: Cover Letter for Response to Report on 16 July 2021 for Application No.GB1412516.5
    This cover letter is to inform the UKIPO that I, Othman bin Ahmad, the inventor of the components and processes described in the patent filing above, formally requests that the substantive search be settled in a court of law with a view of getting award for damages as a result of the unreasonable delay and illegal comments in doing the substantive search which has incurred damages to me.
    The subsequent response will depend on the actions taken by UKIPO in addressing and reducing the damages that I have incurred. The request for damages will be considered if the UKIPO can offer some relief in the form of waiving the extension fee that is not due to my actions because:
    A) UKIPO has failed to send the search reports on time, delaying for around 6 months to the point of nearly being considered for abandonment and
    B) The repeated ridiculous and therefore malicious comments that are illegal and against all the guidelines with lots of fraud being committed such as falsifying the phrases in my Claims and inserting phrases that I never wrote. What is worse, many of my arguments were not addressed and yet, similar objections were repeated.
    My response is included in the form of a skeleton argument that should be acceptable to the crown court. Please note that the Examination Report, despite being dated 16 July 2021, was only received on the 21 July 2021, as shown by my email. I object to this practise because it is a form of fraud.
    The marked amendments and clean replacement pages of the entire patent description are submitted for reference purposes. My responses to the examination report is also attached for reference purposes also because I do not intent to pay for the extension fee.
    I shall write a formal complaint to UKIPO by using its customer feedback system and would like a written response to my complaints, which may be used for any court case.'
  30. One of Mr Ahmad's skeleton arguments is dated 22 July 2021 and appears on first sight to be a response to the Last Examination Report and therefore relating to GB1412516.5. As already mentioned, the Defendant's evidence was that the UKIPO received no response from Mr Ahmad which engaged with the Last Examination Report. There is therefore a clear conflict of evidence which I cannot resolve on either limb of the Defendant's application, and I must proceed on the assumption that Mr Ahmad's evidence is correct – that he sent a response to the Last Examination Report.
  31. In his witness statement, Mr Daley also responded to an allegation which the Defendant understood Mr Ahmad to be making, namely, that he had responded to seek a hearing in relation to this application. Mr Daley reports that the UKIPO did not receive any such response. I understood from Mr Ahmad's oral submissions that he accepts he did not request a hearing, but either way it makes no difference to the outcome on these applications.
  32. In his chronology, Mr Ahmad says he filed a complaint with the UKIPO dated 8 September 2021, but no copy of this complaint was produced. The Defendant accepts that Mr Ahmad filed a complaint in September 2024 but has no record of a complaint in September 2021. I was told that the Defendant has a record that something was filed by Mr Ahmad in September 2021, but says it was not taken to be, nor taken forward as a complaint. Once again, I will proceed on the assumption that Mr Ahmad did file a complaint in September 2021.
  33. In relation to this application, the further communications were as follows. The UKIPO sent an official letter dated 20 December 2021 referring to GB1412516.5 which was short and to the point:
  34. 'You have not filed a reply to the report under Section 18(3) dated 16 July 2021.
    As your patent application was not in order for grant on 30 August 2021 it has now been treated as having been refused.
    Any comments you wish to make about the termination of your application should be sent to this Office marked "Urgent".'

    That letter did not provoke any response from Mr Ahmad in the immediate term.

  35. In fact, almost 3 years elapsed before Mr Ahmad communicated further in relation to this application:
  36. i) Mr Ahmad filed his complaint with the UKIPO on 30 September 2024.

    ii) His Skeleton Argument suggests he filed a reinstatement application on 3 November 2024 (but years out of time, as I discuss below).

    iii) Then he emailed the claim form in this action on 29 November 2024, accompanied by his 'Statement of Claim'.

  37. Mr Ahmad responded very promptly to the Last Examination Report – he received it by email on 21 July 2021 and responded on 22 July 2021. It is somewhat surprising, to say the least, that he did not follow that up, other than by filing his complaint in September 2021. It is a matter of speculation as to why he did not, but the text of his email (as quoted above) rather indicates he realised he had reached the end of the road in his attempts to persuade the UKIPO to grant a patent on this application – but this is not material to my decisions on the Defendant's applications and I do not take it into account.
  38. The Statement of Claim and accompanying documents.

  39. Mr Ahmad's Statement of Claim (of some 5 pages) was accompanied by an 'Additional Explanations' document and his lengthy expert report. I will refer, as briefly as possible to the relevant parts of those documents.
  40. As I mentioned above, Mr Daley made observations on the Statement of Claim in his evidence, and Dr Baran took me through the Statement of Claim in the course of his submissions. I can summarise them as follows:
  41. i) [1]-[4] identify the parties.

    ii) [5]-[6] are not relevant

    iii) [7] identifies the filing of GB1412516.5.

    iv) [8] accuses the Defendant of having 'maliciously' delayed the approval process of the patent, but this is a reference to the delay between 7 August 2015 and 30 June 2020.

    v) [9]-[14] are not relevant.

    vi) In [15], Mr Ahmad said 'Frustrated by the ridiculous comments by UKIPO, I requested to be diverted to the court procedures as I had experienced with GB/1521173.3 CH-2019-OOO27O, in my last response on 22 July 2021. I received letters of application not on order by 30 august 2021, despite my request to proceed to the usual channel i.e. hearing officer and later crown court.'

    vii) [16] is not relevant.

    viii) [17] refers to the complaint filed on 30 September 2024, but concludes with this: 'It is fair to assume that the missing documents led to the refusal to grant. I was unaware so did not file for reinstatement.'

    ix) [18] purports to establish Mr Ahmad as a qualified expert.

    x) The next heading is PARTICULARS OF PATENT ACT 1977 VIOLATION, but, as Dr Baran submitted, no particular provision is identified as having been violated.

    xi) [19] alleges 'UKIPO is most probably biased and worst corrupt in making ridiculous reasons for rejections, such as not responding to my answers that are mostly based on cases as quoted by the MOPP.'

    xii) [20] alleges 'GB1412516.5 was considered as refused on 20 December 2021, so this court claim is still within the limitation period of 3 years for the court to reconsider my application for grant due to the unjustified refusal.' This is misconceived.

    xiii) [21]-[28] make a series of allegations that the patent was not obvious (some based on US law). As to these:

    a) [21]-[22] are background facts to Mr Ahmad's arguments.
    b) [23]-[24] are just conclusory. They say in effect: "these are some tests in law; therefore the patent was not obvious", with no reference to any facts, nor to any aspect of his patent application or prior art.
    c) As Dr Baran submitted, [25] is a garbled and incorrect statement of part of the UKIPO's Manual of Patent Practice ("MoPP"), which in any event is a guideline without the force of law.
    d) [26]-[27] provide aspects of US judgments. Even if these were correct, and even if there were provided any explanation of how they read onto Mr Ahmad's patent application, statements of US law cannot help with any question about the UKIPO's refusal of his UK patent.
    e) [28] is incoherent and unarguable.

    xiv) [29] refers to the grant of what I understand to be an equivalent patent in Malaysia, but that is not relevant.

    xv) [30]-[31] make allegations of infringement. These are obviously not made against the Defendant, even though Mr Ahmad seeks to make the Defendant liable.

    xvi) [32] repeats [17], but is followed by another [17] which alleges 'Plaintiff had given numerous complaints and correspondences warning about violations of Patents Act 1977 section 18 and related sections, as well as other laws, to the Defendant regarding the violation of the patenting procedures for GB1412516.5 but the Defendant had not given satisfactory responses to the Plaintiff, with responses such as "still processing".'

    xvii) The next heading is PARTICULAR OF GENERAL DAMAGES and seeks damages for loss of goodwill (a) as a professional engineer (b) as a director of 'companies that make cars' (c) of a university in Sabah and (d) of the people of Sabah as producer of high technology products.

    xviii) Then the PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES seek a royalty of 10%, R&D costs, interest and costs.

    xix) Under PARTICULARS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES Mr Ahmad appears to allege he is entitled to punitive damages because '(1) defendant is oppressive with evidences of corruption 2) unresponsiveness of the defendant is designed to maximise its overall profits from corruption which exceeds any compensation for the plaintiff and (3) within authorised actions. [sic]

    xx) Finally, Mr Ahmad seeks an injunction against 'further violations of the patent'.

  42. I return to the content of the Statement of Claim later.
  43. Dr Baran drew my attention to passages in Mr Ahmad's 'Additional Explanations' document which are revealing (emphasis added):
  44. i) In a section on the first page where Mr Ahmad discusses his experience with various other applications, he says this: 'I forgot about the reinstatement procedure in 2021 because I do not have any evidence and strong reasons…'

    ii) On p9 of the document, he said this:

    However my response dated 22 July 2021 is missing from IPSUM despite receiving acknowledgement via emails.
    It is therefore surprising and unfair that GB1412516.5 was considered as refused because the application was not ready for grant by 30 August 2021, dated 20 December 2021. Although there was a request for comments, I was clueless because I had sent my comments, objections and complaints before 30 August 2021 but had fallen to deaf ears. My immediate reaction was to proceed to legal proceedings. I was not sure reinstatement procedure was even possible because I thought I did not respond on time or whatever reasons not really specified.
  45. The due date for the filing of the Defendant's defence fell on 25 December 2024 and Mr Ahmad agreed an extension until 8 January 2025.
  46. On 8 January 2025, Mr Daley filed an Application Notice in the same form as that I am dealing with, but the filing of it was rejected because the Application Notice was not signed. This error was brought to Mr Daley's attention on 9 January 2025, promptly rectified and the compliant signed Application Notice was filed and issued on 9 January 2025. This incident gives rise to the second Application Notice which I deal with at the end of this Judgment.
  47. Applicable legal principles

    Procedural aspects

  48. There was no dispute as to the applicable legal principles relating to strike out or summary judgment and it is unnecessary to lengthen this judgment by setting out those principles. I record however that my attention was drawn to the relevant rules in the CPR (to which I have referred above) and to the latest case law on each provision:
  49. i) On strike-out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) (no reasonable grounds for the claim), [47]-[51] in the Judgment of Thompsell J. in Jukic v BBC [2025] EWHC 221 (Ch).

    ii) On summary judgment, Price v Flitcraft [2020] EWCA Civ 850 per Floyd LJ at [39], adopting the summary from the judgment of Lewison J (as he then was) in Easyair v Opal Telecom [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15].

  50. I should mention the distinction between the test for a strike out and for summary judgment because it is capable of having a role in this case. I need only refer to this passage from the judgment of Thompsell J in Jukic:
  51. '98.  However, there are distinctions between the two tests, as was pointed out by Master Marsh (sitting in retirement) in MF TEL SARL v Visa Europe Limited [2023]1336 (Ch) he pointed out at [34(3)] that:
    "The test for striking out as it has been interpreted leaves no scope for the statement of case showing a claim that has some prospect of success. The claim must be unwinnable or bound to fail. Under CPR rule 24.2 it is not good enough for a point to be merely arguable, it must have a real prospect of success. An application to strike out might fail whereas the same application for summary judgment might succeed."
    99.  A further difference (noted at [10(1)] in the same judgment) is that for the purposes of the application under CPR rule 3.4(2)(a) the court will usually proceed on the basis that the pleaded facts are true, whereas evidence, and in particular, witness statements, may have a greater bearing on an application under CPR rule 24.2 as on such applications the court may be required to exercise a judgment about the quality of the evidence.
    100.  The evidential burden is on the applicant to establish that there are grounds to believe that the respondent has no real prospect of success and that there is no other compelling reason for a trial (see para.2(3) of Practice Direction 24 and para 24.3.3 of the White Book, page 674). That standard of proof is high. If credible evidence is adduced in support of the application, then the respondent assumes an evidential burden of proving some real prospect of success or some other compelling reason for a trial.

    Relevant provisions of the Patents Act

  52. I referred above to the Official Letter of 20 December 2021. As Dr Baran stressed, that was a deemed refusal, arising from an automatic and mandatory provision of the PA77. It involved no decision or exercise of discretion on the part of the Comptroller or any of his officers. The relevant provision is s. 20(1) Patents Act 1977:
  53. 20.-(1) If it is not determined that an application for a patent complies before the end of the prescribed period with all the requirements of this Act and the rules, the application shall be treated as having been refused by the comptroller at the end of that period, and section 97 below shall apply accordingly. (emphasis added)
  54. For completeness, s. 97, to which that provision refers, is the one in relation to appeals from decisions of the Comptroller. The relevant sub-section is s. 97(1):
  55. 97.-(1) Except as provided by subsection (4) below, an appeal shall lie to the Patents Court from any decision of the comptroller under this Act or rules except any of the following decisions, that is to say—
    (a) a decision falling within section 14(7) above;
    (b) a decision under section 16(2) above to omit matter from a specification;
    (c) a decision to give directions under subsection (1) or (2) of section 22 above;
    (d) a decision under rules which is excepted by rules from the right of appeal conferred by this section.
  56. So far as reinstatement is concerned, s.20A provides, in relevant part, as follows:
  57. 20A.-(1) Subsection (2) below applies where an application for a patent is refused, or is treated as having been refused or withdrawn, as a direct consequence of a failure by the applicant to comply with a requirement of this Act or rules within a period which is—
    (a) set out in this Act or rules, or
    (b) specified by the comptroller.
    (2) Subject to subsection (3) below, the comptroller shall reinstate the application if, and only if—
    (a) the applicant requests him to do so;
    (b) the request complies with the relevant requirements of rules; and
    (c) he is satisfied that the failure to comply referred to in subsection(1) above was unintentional.
    (3) The comptroller shall not reinstate the application if—
    (a) an extension remains available under this Act or rules for the period referred to in subsection (1) above; or
    (b) the period referred to in subsection(1) above is set out or specified—
    (i) in relation to any proceedings before the comptroller;
    (ii) for the purposes of section 5(2A)(b) above; or
    (iii) for the purposes of a request under this section or section 117B below.
    […]
  58. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, a reinstatement of the application could only have been made if the applicant had requested one: s. 20A(2)(a).
  59. As to s. 20A(2)(b) and its reference to the "relevant requirements of rules", the latter are found in the Patents Rules 2007. Of those, r.32 provides (emphasis added):
  60. Reinstatement of applications under section 20A
    32.—
    (1) A request under section 20A for the reinstatement of an application must be made before the end of the relevant period.
    (2) For this purpose the relevant period is twelve months beginning immediately after the date on which the application was terminated.
    (3) The request must be made on Patents Form 14.
    (4) Where the comptroller is required to publish a notice under section 20A(5), it must be published in the journal.
    (5) The applicant must file evidence in support of that request.
    (6) Where that evidence does not accompany the request, the comptroller must specify a period within which the evidence must be filed.
    (7) Where, on consideration of that evidence, the comptroller is not satisfied that a case for an order under section 20A has been made out, he must notify the applicant accordingly.
    (8) The applicant may, before the end of the period of one month beginning immediately after the date of that notification, request to be heard by the comptroller.
    (9) Where the applicant requests a hearing, the comptroller must give him an opportunity to be heard, after which the comptroller shall determine whether the request under section 20A shall be allowed or refused.
    (10) Where the comptroller reinstates the application after a notice was published under paragraph (4), he must advertise in the journal the fact that he has reinstated the application.
  61. Finally, I must refer to s.116 of the Act:
  62. 'Immunity of department as regards official acts
    116. Neither the Secretary of State nor any officer of his—
    (a) shall be taken to warrant the validity of any patent granted under this Act or any treaty or international convention to which the United Kingdom is a party; or
    (b) shall incur any liability by reason of or in connection with any examination or investigation required or authorised by this Act or any such treaty or convention, or any report or other proceedings consequent on any such examination or investigation.' (emphasis added)
  63. Dr Baran and the Defendant were not aware of any case law dealing with this provision, but I agree it is broadly worded and means what it says. Dr Baran made the following points:
  64. i) First, "the Secretary of State" means any one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State: Sch. 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978. For present purposes, the Comptroller acts under the supervision of the Secretary of State for Department of Science, Innovation and Technology, and the UKIPO officials in turn are authorised by the Comptroller. So the immunity applies to such officers of the UKIPO – and indeed, it would be odd if it did not, since they are the people carrying out substantially all the acts and functions provided for by the Act, this provision would have no real effect if it did not apply to the Comptroller and his hearing officers.

    ii) Part (b) of the provision is the applicable one here. The UKIPO's actions in respect of Mr Ahmad's application are set out in documents comprising searches, examinations and examination reports all carried out pursuant to the PA77. They plainly fall within "any examination or investigation required or authorised by this Act […], or any report or other proceedings consequent on any such examination or investigation."

    iii) These proceedings, if advanced, would be "proceedings consequent on" such an "examination or investigation", since Mr Ahmad's essential complaint appears to be about how the examination and investigation were conducted and treated.

    iv) What this means is that the Comptroller attracted no liability – and so Mr Ahmad has no cause of action – in relation to any of those acts carried out on his behalf in relation to the examinations and investigations about which Mr Ahmad complains.

  65. The appropriate response to an examination with which the applicant disagrees is to appeal from the decision under s. 97. One can see readily why the law is arranged this way: otherwise, every time that the Patents Court, for example, found a patent to be invalid, claims could be made against the Comptroller for having carried out an "incorrect" examination or an incomplete search when that patent was prosecuted.
  66. Dr Baran submitted it is clear why s. 116 looks as it does, and why the scope of the immunity in relation to the prosecution steps of a patent is broad – because there lies an appeal from any decision to refuse a patent in any case. I agree.
  67. Strike out

  68. I turn to apply those provisions to the facts here. Normally, I would approach an application under CPR3.4(2)(a) on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the Claimant were true. This case is unusual in that Mr Ahmad has made a series of allegations in his Statement of Claim for which there is no support whatsoever, namely:
  69. i) The allegation in [8] that the Defendant 'maliciously' delayed.

    ii) The allegation in [15] that the Defendant had made 'ridiculous' comments.

    iii) The allegations of bias and corruption in [19] and under the Particulars of Punitive Damages.

    iv) I also bear in mind that all three of these categories are reflected in the Brief Details of the Claim on the Claim form.

  70. In respect of these allegations, I am entitled to find, even on an application to strike out, that they are untrue or at the very least unsupported and meritless and I do so.
  71. Leaving those points aside, as Dr Baran submitted, the Defendant's answers to Mr Ahmad's claims and complaints operate at a number of levels such that, even if everything is assumed in Mr Ahmad's favour, the net result remains that he has failed to formulate any claim which could possibly succeed.
  72. No response was recorded as received by the UKIPO to the last Examination Report, so, as the Official Letter of 20 December 2021 said, the application was deemed to be refused.
  73. The termination of the application was effective on 31 August 2021 (one day after the two month extension window elapsed following 30 June 2021). By operation of r. 32 (under s.20A) the applicant is then given a generous, but fixed, deadline within which to seek reinstatement. In Mr Ahmad's case, it was a deadline of 31 August 2022: twelve months after the application was terminated on 30 August 2021. That period is set by r. 32(1) and –(2) PR07, and is not extendable: see r. 108(1) PR07 and its Sch. 4 Part 1.
  74. Against (a) those consequences and (b) the allegations made in the Statement of Claim (as summarised above) I agree that it is clear that no proper cause of action is formulated on the face of the pleadings. Certainly, there is no sustainable case that can possibly enjoy any prospect of success. In summary:
  75. i) To the extent Mr Ahmad complains about the actual substance of the Examiner's view that the patent was not allowable, that should have been the subject of an appeal under s.97 from a decision – which appeal he never filed, is not argued or formulated in his PoC, and would now be years out of time, as an appeal should have been brought within 21 days of the deemed refusal.

    ii) To the extent his complaint is instead about the actions that the UKIPO took in relation to the searches and examination of his application, there is no cause of action formulated. In any event, if he had managed to formulate one, the Comptroller would enjoy immunity against such a claim pursuant to s. 116 PA77.

    iii) As for the deemed refusal of his application under s.20(1), this occurred because the UKIPO did not consider that any response to the final Examination Report had been filed. As Dr Baran submitted, much of Mr Ahmad's complaint made in his Statement of Claim appears to be directed at the Comptroller for deeming the patent refused, rather than at the substantive objections to the patent application.

    iv) There is nothing in that complaint, since the UKIPO personnel did nothing but convey the inevitable and mandatory effect of the statute, in the circumstances appearing to the UKIPO at the time. Mr Ahmad had been advised of his options, but did not take any of them up.

    v) There is no argument expressed to be seeking a reinstatement under s. 20A PA77, and in any event such a request for reinstatement would now also be years out of time.

    vi) More generally, there is no answer – even putative answer – disclosed in the Statement of Claim to the fact that the failure to reinstate the application arises from Mr Ahmad's failure to apply or otherwise to communicate with the UKIPO for years after he received a letter telling him what steps he would need to take – down even to which number form he would need to fill out – in order to seek to pursue his application further.

  76. Even if Mr Ahmad's complaints were reformulated as an appeal under s. 97 PA77, that appeal would be:
  77. i) years out of time; and

    ii) in any event, hopeless in substance. Whilst he takes issue with the inventiveness assessment he has no answer to the objection of lack of novelty, which is fatal on its own.

  78. I should also make it clear that the Defendant did not accept many of the tendentious assertions made in the Statement of Claim, and certainly did not accept any allegations it has acted illegally or maliciously. But, as Dr Baran submitted, in a very real sense, none of that matters. Even taken as read, the Statement of Claim does not disclose a viable claim that could be said to be a proper cause of action with reasonable grounds for bringing it.
  79. For all these reasons, Mr Ahmad has only himself to blame for the outcome that no patent was granted on application no. GB1412516.5. The Defendant's application to strike out the Statement of Claim and the Claim form succeeds.
  80. Summary Judgment

  81. In the light of all the analysis set out above, I can deal with summary judgment relatively succinctly. Even assuming Mr Ahmad had been able to overcome the Examiner's objections on novelty and obviousness:
  82. i) He failed to ask for a hearing.

    ii) He failed to respond to the 20 December 2021 letter.

    iii) He failed to apply to reinstate this application, but his statement that he forgot about the reinstatement procedure in 2021 indicates he was previously aware of that option.

    iv) He did nothing for years in relation to this application until his complaint filed in September 2024 and then the commencement of this action in November 2024.

  83. I have already assumed in Mr Ahmad's favour that he did file a response to the final Examination Report, and even if I assume he did ask for a hearing, there is nothing to suggest he ever followed up on those actions, as one would expect any normal applicant to do. In any event, he still has no viable claim against the Defendant. In these circumstances, even if I had not struck out the entirety of his claim, I would have granted summary judgment against Mr Ahmad over the entirety of his claim.
  84. Costs

  85. Naturally, having struck out Mr Ahmad's action, and the Defendant's complete success on its Application, Mr Ahmad must pay the Defendant's costs and on the indemnity basis. The Defendant served a Costs Schedule which reveals total costs in the sum of Ł23,664. Although this is a substantial sum to a litigant in person such as Mr Ahmad, the costs incurred by the Defendant are very modest in comparison to many costs schedules which are presented to the Patents Court. It is appropriate to make a summary assessment of those costs. I summarily assess the Defendant's costs in the sum of Ł20,000. I will give Mr Ahmad the extended period of 28 days in which to pay that sum.
  86. The Defendant's Second Application

  87. At [34] above, I outlined briefly the circumstances which led to the making of the Defendant's Second Application, issued on 10 January 2025, which is for a retrospective extension of time for filing a Defence (put forward on various grounds) and, in the alternative, for relief from sanctions. The point here is that the First Application ought to have been served within the time for filing a defence. This Second Application was supported by Mr Daley's second witness statement. Mr Ahmad responded in his second witness statement, in which he set out his contentions at some length, and I have considered all of them.
  88. The extension required is one day.
  89. The Defendant's primary submission is that no sanction was imposed from which relief is necessary. The failure to provide a Defence on time gives the Claimant the opportunity to apply for judgment in default of Defence under CPR12.3(2)(a). In this case, the Claimant did not make any such application.
  90. In those circumstances, as Dr Baran submitted, the Court has a general power to extend deadlines pursuant to CPR3.1(2)(a), but he accepts that the Denton principles governing relief from sanctions under CPR3.9 provide the appropriate yardstick to assist the analysis.
  91. For the reasons which are set out in Dr Baran's Skeleton Argument in [90], I agree that this is a situation where it is plain and obvious that the extension of one day should be granted. I do not find any of Mr Ahmad contentions showed otherwise. Briefly:
  92. i) Denton Factor 1 – seriousness/significance: I agree the non-compliance in this case was neither serious nor significant. Although Mr Ahmad sought to suggest it was hypocritical for the Defendant to seek this extension of time in circumstances where the strike out application is based on Mr Ahmad's failure to seek to reinstate his patent application in time, this is a bad point. No analogy can be drawn between an extension of one day and Mr Ahmad's failure for years to seek to reinstate his application.

    ii) Denton Factor 2 – why the breach occurred: I accept the breach was entirely inadvertent, and it was corrected within a matter of hours of it coming to light.

    iii) Denton Factor 3 – all the circumstances: overall, Mr Ahmad cannot point to any prejudice as result of this one day delay in early January 2025. It caused him no additional cost, nor has it interfered in any way with the Court's ability to do justice on these applications.

  93. For all these reasons, I am in no doubt that I must grant the retrospective extension of one day so that the Defendant's First Application is treated as properly filed in time.
  94. Postscript

  95. A draft of this Judgment was circulated to the parties in the usual way, with the rubric at the head of the draft being specifically drawn to Mr Ahmad's attention. Despite the fact that he was invited to submit a list of typing corrections and other obvious errors, he took the opportunity to argue or reargue a series of points. I considered all of his points but it is only necessary to mention the following.
  96. First, Mr Ahmad was particularly insistent that he had never been offered the opportunity of a hearing. However, the letter enclosing the Final Examination Report (as quoted in [17] above) clearly did so. To my understanding, he has never denied receiving that letter and any denial now would conflict with other clear evidence which suggests he must have received it. Furthermore, I am sure that he was aware of the opportunity to request a hearing from the examination of the numerous other patent applications he had filed with the UKIPO, although this is a point I would only take into account for summary judgment and not on strike out.
  97. Second, Mr Ahmad made it clear that he was not asking the Court to reinstate his application, instead asking the Court to grant a Patent based on this application. The Court has no power to grant a Patent.
  98. Third, I should acknowledge that Mr Ahmad persuaded me to change my mind about the so-called 'missing documents' – i.e. whether he filed a response to the Final Examination Report. As I have stated above, I have proceeded on the basis that he did so.


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