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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Kahn v Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd [2007] EWHC 2659 (QB) (15 November 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2007/2659.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2659 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Mr David Kahn |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd |
Defendant |
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Miss Suzanne McKie (instructed by Berrymans Lace Mawer Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 9, 10, 11 & 12 October 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Foskett :
Introduction
The general background
The DHL bonus scheme
"DHL was a firm of consultant surveyors with five departments. Its revenues were dependant upon the amount of fee income it generated and in terms of fees, a number of clients were cross-referred between departments. An Incentive Scheme was in operation (and had been for some years) – the DHL Incentive Scheme ("DHLIS"). Under the DHLIS each department was set a threshold contribution for a twelve month period when an incentive bonus could be earned once the threshold was exceeded. There were specific provisions about percentage allocations above the threshold and when payments would be made.
The DHLIS had specific provisions in relation to referral fees. Referral fees were fees billed by a department that had received a referral and had undertaken the work ("receiving department"). The department that had referred the work to the receiving department is referred to as the "referring department". After completion of the work the receiving department would raise an invoice for its work to which the referring department would be entitled to a share of the fee for the referral. Generally 30% of any fee (net of any commission paid to any external party such as introducing agents and/or other professional organisations such as Building Surveyors) was paid to the referring department. This was the arrangement for invoices in excess of £3,000 (where an invoice was for less than £3,000, a percentage allocation was then agreed between the departments. In practice these were the smaller jobs and therefore, in the grand scheme of things, were not going to make that much difference either way).
In the event the referred client was happy with the work carried out by the receiving department, the client may well then instruct the receiving department again. If the receiving department was then instructed on other occasions thereafter by that particular client, the issue would arise as to what referral fee should be paid by the receiving department to the referring department. It was impossible to cater for all the possible different scenarios in the DHLIS and so a principle was accepted whereby the referring department would need to agree the referral fee with the receiving department. In practice, there would be a discussion between the individual in the referring department and the individual in the receiving department as to what sum would be paid by the receiving department to the referring department for the jobs accepted from that particular client. Clearly that discussion and any sum agreed depended on the number of instructions, the complexity of the job, the time taken to discharge it, the role played by the individual in the referring department, the relationship the individual in the referring department had with the client, the value of those instructions and whether the receiving department effectively considered whether the client was "their client", as well as the client of the referring department."
The essential issue
The background to the negotiations
"I believe that this [speculation] prompted Erinaceous to take steps to secure my position with Dunlop Haywards. In this respect, my bargaining position was relatively strong and that of Dunlop Haywards/Erinaceous was relatively weak because, by virtue of the letter dated 22nd March 2004, the term of the restrictive covenants in clause 18 of the Service Agreement had been reduced from 12 months to 3 months. So I could indeed have left at this point. My client following would have left with me and Dunlop Haywards/Erinaceous would only have had 3 months' protection from competition by me…. Around February 2005, after Lloyd had tendered his resignation, Nigel [Davis] invited me to attend a meeting with him and Danny [Innes] to discuss a special bonus scheme to cater for my particular situation. They said that they wanted to tailor a package to suit the way I operated (or words to that effect). What they were referring to in saying this was the referral business generated by me, including repeat business, and the fact that such business was not rewarded by the standard bonus entitlements. Obviously, the purpose of a special bonus scheme would be to reward me for the referrals and repeat business generated. The clear implication of what Nigel and Danny said at this meeting was that Dunlop Haywards wished to retain me because they wished to retain the referral business that I brought in and they recognized that in order to retain me I would have to be rewarded for this."
"Both Nigel Davis and Danny Innes were party to the initial discussions and subsequent negotiations with [the Claimant] in connection with his … job description and proposed revised remuneration. Remuneration was an amalgam of base salary and a bonus. Whilst I was kept informed of these discussions and from time to time commented on them I was, as far as I can recall, present at only one or two of them. I believe [the Claimant] preferred to negotiate directly with Danny Innes and/or Nigel Davis rather than me, given he had held the position of Managing Director of DHL and had always previously agreed his remuneration package with the Chief Executive of HPS. That was fine by me. I did though hold interim discussions with [the Claimant] on an informal basis at which he would additionally (to Nigel Davis and Danny Innes) update me and I would comment on the ebb and flow of the negotiations. In essence you could describe my role at this stage as one of mediator in the emerging remuneration package negotiations, although I expected to be tasked with agreeing the final terms. It was against this background that [the Claimant's] bonus structure was negotiated. I would comment that the bonus negotiations were designed to incentivise him in his new job of business development. It should also be remembered that the bonus negotiations were in two parts. One in respect of [the Claimant's] investment work and the other in respect of his business development role. It was not to incentivise him to continue working for Dunlop Haywards."
"I appreciate and acknowledge your contribution in the day-to-day maintenance and retention of these clients and we have a moral if not contractual obligation to reflect this."
The negotiations
"I was and am still very disappointed that there seems to be a reluctance to agree a fair package for me to move across from my existing MD's position to the business Development role. Since the start of the merger of DHL/ISG I and the majority of senior personnel on the first floor have felt very uncomfortable with the petty politics and the continuous undertones of trying to force out the old Baker Lorenz team … In my recent meetings with you and Danny you have stated that you both value my contribution and are keen to keep me. If this is really the case then my proposal would have been agreed without a second thought. The increase in my basic and request for share options is insignificant to the contribution I can make to this business. I regret proposing to reconsider my proposed package but did so as a sign of good faith to try and resolve this matter and move on.
I propose the following:
- The Agreed £20,000 bonus for which I have been waiting for since November is paid immediately.
- My Basic salary is increased to £200,000 pa.
- After I earn by way of direct fees or split fees for cross sale/ introductions:
£350,000 to £550,000 50% goes to my bonus pool
£550,000 plus 75% goes to my bonus pool
- Share options/LTIP. I see this as an important long term incentive and would be looking for a plan similar to that I had at Hercules.
Reporting:
I am happy to be accountable for the development of the Business Development role and will report to the National Executive Board which I will be sitting on.
I will require a remit that this role would encompass all areas of the business across all our service lines.
If we cannot agree terms then I will continue my contractual role as managing director of Dunlop Heywood Lorenz soon to be Dunlop Haywards.
I await to hear from you.
David Kahn."
"Following our meeting this afternoon, for the sake of good order I confirm our agreement.
1. The Bonus period is from 1st January to 31st December.
2. For all direct billings in excess of £300,000 50:50 split dpk/dh
3. For Business generation/referrals the net fees to me over £150,000 50:50 dpk/dh.
Plus when I reach £150,000, automatic £25,000 Bonus payment.
4. My basic remains the same to be reviewed in the normal way at pay review.
5. The bonus becomes payable during the year when these thresholds are exceeded.
6. Both bonus thresholds work independently.
Therefore if my total billings are say £600,000 my bonus would equate as follows:
£400,000 direct billings = £50,000 bonus
£200,000 BG/referrals = £50,000 bonus
Total bonus £100,000
Please confirm your agreement so we can officially document and move."
"I am delighted to confirm that the basis of your overall remuneration package as set out in your e-mail to me of 18 March (22:56) has been accepted by Erinaceous.
I hope very much that this will harness your undoubted fee winning and earning skills and galvanise you into a fresh positive approach in the evolving world of "Dunlop Haywards".
As you know the new management structure which frees you up from the day to day management issues that have hitherto taken your time, creates a new Business Development Unit that will be the engine room of the company's expansion. This is a role you have sought and I am confident it will provide the appropriate platform for you, together with Neil and Tony, to help take the business ever forward.
We have always enjoyed a good relationship and I look forward to that continuing and flourishing so that we – and others – can reap the rewards that run with success."
The disputed parts of the meeting of 18 March 2005
"Are you aware of the bonus package that I agreed last year? My deal on business generation/referral is designed to reward me on not just new business but also maintaining existing relationships."
In a further e-mail to him some ten days later, when he set out his calculations of his entitlement (having received information from Mr McGarry concerning referral fees from 'clients originally (my emphasis) introduced' by him) these calculations were clearly based on an approach that did not involve a 70/30 split before his own bonus entitlement was calculated. In other words he was putting forward then an entitlement based upon the version of the agreement that is put forward in this claim.
"Your client has been suspended subsequent to our client's serious concerns that he is deliberately attempting to claim a bonus payment to which he knows he is not entitled. Our client has ordered an immediate and thorough investigation into whether or not its concerns are well founded.
Bearing in mind the above, your client has been suspended on full pay pending the outcome of the formal investigation. This is not a disciplinary action or an implication of guilt, it is merely a holding action while we await the outcome of the formal investigation.
To preserve the independence and impartiality of the formal investigation, your client should not make contact with any employees of our client whist on suspension other than to speak with Simon Kitching about non-bonus related matters.
Our client feels very strongly about the fact that your client instructed you to threaten our client with legal proceedings without any warning and whilst the parties were in the middle of informal discussions.
Our client is both surprised and puzzled by this move. It considers your involvement wholly disproportionate, hostile, unnecessarily racks up costs and does nothing to assist an amicable resolution to this matter.
Both you and your client will be contacted when the outcome of the formal investigation is known but until then, as our client's employee, your client should remain contactable and available during working hours."
i) Mr Dyson
Mr Dyson was still working for DHL through this period and indeed did not depart until February 2007. However, he told me that he had not been asked about the situation concerning his discussions with the Claimant in March 2005 in the period before that letter was sent despite the fact, as I have indicated, that the Claimant had twice sent to Mr Kitching his e-mail and Mr Dyson's response. There is no evidence in the e-mails and documentation disclosed that Mr Dyson was indeed asked about what had been discussed. It is, to my mind, extraordinary that even a tentative allegation of dishonesty could have been made at the time of that initial letter if Mr Dyson's recollections of what had been discussed had not then been obtained. The letter indicated that 'an immediate and thorough investigation into whether [our clients] concerns are well founded' would be launched, but it is plain from another letter from Juliet Bellis & Co dated 15 September (some two months later) that their client was 'awaiting to hear from Mr Dyson'.
I have, of course, heard from Mr Dyson and will indicate my view of his evidence below.
ii) Mr Innes
He was involved from an early stage in the discussions with the Claimant and indicated there was 'no problem' with what the Claimant had suggested (see paragraph 43 above). However, I have seen nothing in the correspondence (nor, of course, heard anything from the witness box) to suggest that his view had been canvassed before the letter had been sent.
iii) Mr Davis
The evidence indicates that he was involved in the negotiations with the Claimant in the early stages and, if Mr Innes was involved in March/April 2005, it would be surprising if Mr Davis was not also broadly aware of what was being discussed, particularly if Mr Innes had just submitted his resignation from Erinaceous. There is evidence that he did become involved in March 2006 when the Claimant was raising his concerns, but no clear indication that he was asked, or ventured a view, on the way that the Claimant was putting forward his claim for a bonus. (There was an unfortunate e-mail exchange in March/April 2006 when he, Mr Davis, accused the Claimant of lying to him about an unrelated matter.) However, there is nothing I have seen that shows that Mr Davis had said unequivocally that the Claimant's approach was entirely unfounded. As I have observed previously, I have not heard from Mr Davis. This is, perhaps, all the more surprising given that one explanation put forward by Mr Dyson for why he had not been contacted about the issue earlier was that Mr Davis would have been in full possession of all the relevant facts.
The law
(i) construction
"To ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads the terms of the contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of the agreement, the parties' relationship and all the relevant facts surrounding the transaction so far as known to the parties. To ascertain the parties' intentions the court does not of course inquire into the parties' subjective states of mind but makes an objective judgment based on the materials already identified."
"Lord Hoffmann recognises that the boundaries of this exception of pre-contractual negotiations from the factual matrix are not clear. It may be very difficult to distinguish whether something that was stated in the course of pre-contractual negotiations is or is not admissible. For instance it may be evidence of the fact which forms part of the matrix which is admissible on interpretation, or alternatively it may amount to an agreement as to the way a provision under the agreement is to be interpreted."
"The "rule" that words should be given their "natural and ordinary meaning" reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. [1985] A.C. 191, 201:
"if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense."
"Before taking extrinsic evidence into account, it is important to consider precisely why it is said to assist in deciding the meaning of what was subsequently agreed and to consider whether its relevance is sufficiently cogent to the determination of the joint intention of the parties to have regard to it. It is also important, though not always easy, to identify what is extrinsic to the agreement and what forms an intrinsic part of it. When a formal contract is drawn up and signed, care must be taken to distinguish between admissible background evidence relating to the nature and object of the contractual venture and inadmissible evidence of the terms for which each party was contending in the course of negotiations. Where, as in the present case, an agreement is alleged to have been reached in the course of dealings which do not culminate in the drawing up of a formal contract, the task is to identify whether, and if so which, terms proposed in the course of negotiations have become the subject of a joint agreement."
(ii) implied terms
The Defendant's broad case as to the interpretation of the agreement
The agreement and its factual context
Conclusion