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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Raissi & Anor v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWHC 2842 (QB) (30 November 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2007/2842.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2842 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) Sonia RAISSI (2) Mohamed RAISSI |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis |
Defendant |
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Mr. Michael BELOFF QC & Mr. John BEGGS (instructed by Metropolitan Police Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 12 – 19 November 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
The Honourable Mr. Justice McCombe:
(A)Introduction
"A constable may arrest without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist"
Section 40 of the Act defines a terrorist as including a person who
"is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism"
"1. Did the arresting officer suspect that the person who was arrested was guilty of the offence? The answer to this question depends entirely on the findings of fact as to the officer's state of mind.
2. Assuming the officer had the necessary suspicion, was there reasonable cause for suspicion? This is a purely objective requirement to be determined by the judge if necessary on the facts found by a jury.
3. If the answer to the two previous questions is in the affirmative, then the officer has a discretion which entitles him to make an arrest and in relation to that discretion has been exercised in accordance with the principles laid down by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223."
In this case, only question 2 is in issue. It is not suggested that the arresting officers did not, subjectively, suspect that the Claimants were "concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" (s. 40(1) of the 2000 Act). Nor is it suggested that if the officers had reasonable grounds for their suspicions that either of them was irrational in exercising the power of arrest. The only issue in each case is as to the reasonableness or otherwise of the grounds on which each of the officers acted, i.e. question 2 posed by Woolf LJ.
(B) Facts
"The detail of the two FBI letters was as follows:
(i) Hani Hanjour was probably the hijacker who piloted American Airlines Flight 77 in to the Pentagon;
(ii) Another of the hijackers on Flight 77 was Nawaf Al-Hazmi;
(iii) An Arizona Driver licence issued to Lofti on 22nd January 1997 provides an address of 20003 North 23rd Avenue Apartment 306, Phoenix, Arizona 85027;
(iv) Lofti possessed a United States Department of Transportation FAA commercial pilot licence issued 8th October 1997. Pilot data disclosed he had 400 flying hours.
(v) A personal data form completed by Lofti on 18th March 1998 listed his address as 20003 North 23rd Avenue Apartment 392, Phoenix, with telephone number 602-580-9816.
(vi) An Airman Certificate and / or Rating Application signed by Lofti on 7th December 1998 identified him as a male citizen of Algeria born on 4th April 1974, of address 20003 North 23rd Avenue Apartment 302, Phoenix, Arizona 85027.
(vii) A letter dated 9th April 1998 for the Director of Student Services of Westwind Aviation Academy to the United States Immigration Office disclosed that Lofti abandoned a Westwind Aviation Academy program to enrol with a program at Jet Tech International, owing $2,572 when he departed.
(viii) On 2nd March 1998 the sum of $4,950 was wired to a Wells Fargo Bank account in the name of Lofti and Sonia Demolis from a Bank of New York account: the Bank Account address of Lofti and Sonia was 20003 North 23rd Avenue Apartment 302, Phoenix, Arizona 85027.
(ix) On 27th May 1998 the further sum of $8,003.02 was credited to the same Wells Fargo account, this time from Hazam Doudja of the Bank of New York.
(x) On 3rd December 1998 Lofti enrolled in the Federal Aviation Administration approved Boeing 737-200 Type Rating Course at Jet Tech International, Phoenix, Arizona, at a cost of $8,995 in class 98-3-121.
(xi) On 25th January 1999 Lofti completed Jet Tech International Boeing 737 Type Rating course.
(xii) Whilst he resided in Arizona, Lofti had a vehicle, which he registered in the of Maan Al Quraishi.
(xiii) Either in February or September 1999 Lofti purchased 757/767 manuals for $250.
(xiv) In February 1999 a letter to the United States Immigration Service indicated that Lofti was changing his immigration status, had completed B-737 Initial Type Rating, and planned to study a second program B-757/767 Initial Type Training, which was expected to last until 18th June 1999.
(xv) During a search by SO 13 ("Operation Odin") of the home address of Amar Makhulif (aka Abu Doha) at 68 Earlsferry House, Earlsferry Way, Islington an address book was found which contained an entry "Red One Dahmani" (identified as being Redouane Dahmani) with the telephone number 602 586 9816. The FBI identified this as being Lofti's telephone number. However, it will be seen that this is in fact one digit out (see paragraph (v) above).
(xvi) During Spring 2001:
(a) Lofti Raissi and Hanjour attended flight training at the same flight school, Jet Tech International, Phoenix, Arizona.
(b) Lofti spent a considerable time on a flight simulator at this school during the same period that Hanjour was using the simulator.
(c) Lofti undertook flight training on 737 type aircraft and purchased books for 757/767 type aircraft, at Jet Tech International;
(d) Hanjour and Al-Hazmi were room mates at Indian Springs Village Apartments, Mesa, Arizona, which they vacated on 31st March 2001, leaving a Saudi Arabian forwarding address.
(xvii) On 3rd May 2001 Lofti obtained a visa at the USA Embassy in London for travel to the USA on 11th June 2001, providing the address 113 Staines Road, Feltham, Mddx, and citing employment by Four Forces Aviation of Colbrook Berkshire. On the visa application Lofti indicated that he wanted to obtain flight training on B737/200-300 at K & S Aviation Service Inc, and indicated that he had been in the USA in October 1996.
(xviii) Lofti had a cheque account with Sonia Demolis whilst living in Phoenix. They were roommates at Indian springs Village Apartments, Mesa, Arizona.
(xix) Lofti was currently applying for an airline job in the USA.
(xx) Lofti had recently married a non-Muslim French woman he met in France, which his Visa Application revealed to be Soivia (sic) Raissi of Tunisia.
(xxi) Lofti's current residence was 7 Cavendish Court, Coleridge Crescent, Colnbrook."
"Information/Intention
1. As a result of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, information has been received from the US authorities regarding the following person:
2. Hani HANJOUR, is believed to be the pilot who piloted American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ascertained that HANJOUR attended flight training at Jet Tech International, Phoenix, Arizona during Spring of 2001. During this period a Lofti RAISSI (dob 4/4/74 Algeria) also attended this flight training centre. RAISSI spent considerable time on flight simulator training during the same period as HANJOUR.
3. RAISSI is also associated to an Ahmed RESSAM an individual arrested with explosives crossing the Canadian border during the 2000 millennium celebration.
4. Lofti RAISSI whilst residing in Arizona had a vehicle registered in the name of MAAN A ALQUARAISHI. (Reason for this is not known)
5. On September 18th, 2001 the American Authorities learned that K & S Aviation in Arizona had recent contact with RAISSI. RAISSI has previously furnished a forwarding address of 7 Cavendish Court, Coleridge Crescent, Colnbrook 3SI OQO. He had indicated that he was planning to attend further training at K & S in the future.
6. RAISSI is associated to two further addresses within the UK these are
a) 186 Harlech Gardens, Hounslow.
b) 68 Highgate Street, Birmingham, B12OXP
7. Search warrants have been obtained under schedule 5 Terrorism Act 2000 for the above address.
8. It is intended that police search the above addresses on Friday 21 September 2001 for relevant material that is likely to be of substantial value to a terrorist investigation. "
It will be seen that the note contains no reference to either Claimant and does not mention any intention to effect arrests. However, on the third page of the note, the following passage appears:
"Power of Arrest.
Should the decision be made to arrest the subject or subjects they will be informed that they are being arrested under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 Reasonably suspected of being involved in the Commission, Preparation or Instigation of Acts of Terrorism."
"12. …DI Wanless went through with us everything he knew about the Operation, that he had been told by the SIO, DCI MacBrayne. I recall being told that Lofti Raissi and his brother were very close and that Lofti Raissi had access to his brother's house.
13. It was this latter point that was of paramount importance because Lofti was implicated with the 9/11 attacks, and thus the fact that he had access to Mohamed's premises was very significant as we would naturally wish to preserve any possible evidence. There would be two reasons for it being imperative to preserve evidence, namely evidential development and public safety.
14. I would also wish to interview Mohamed Raissi. Sometimes one can invite a suspect for interview. But where the offence is within the remit of the Terrorism Act 2000 public safety is paramount and the preservation of evidence is part of achieving public safety, including by "preserving" the suspect himself, Mohamed. For example, he may have had forensic evidence upon his own person and we would want to place him in a white suit to preserve this. Arrest was the only mechanism realistically by which I could control him.
15. Mohamed was in my mind a suspect because, at the briefing, DI Wanless had made clear that Mohamed was the close brother to a significant 9/11 suspect. If I had asked Mohamed to attend as a volunteer and he had said no, I would have arrested him. Thus in reality he had to be arrested. There is no bail under the Terrorism Act 2000 and I needed some kind of control.
16. Lofti Raissi was plainly a serious suspect because of what the FBI had said. Mohamed was closely associated to Lofti his brother, and apparently a close brother. I noted that they lived near to each other (Berkshire and Middlesex). That would have been enough in my mind to form reasonable grounds. In my experience terrorists only trust very few people and the blood association is very significant. The magnitude of the 9/11 case made me think that those involved would confide in someone. My experience in terrorist cases suggests that terrorists confide in their close family. I have this experience from previous cases including an Irish republican terrorist case where the conspirators included two brothers and their sister who had a child with a third conspirator and a fourth conspirator. I had also picked up the propensity of family links within terrorism in my duties within SO13. …
18. Sometimes the purpose of confiding in your family is so that you may rely upon a non-participant to conceal or destroy potentially incriminating evidence out of loyalty. Or to turn a blind eye to your activities.
19. Who else would Lofti confide in but his brother and wife?
20. The fact that Lofti had access to 186 Harlech Gardens made those premises evidentially significant; and the occupier(s) of those premises significant. Had there been another male present who for example refused to provide me with his details, he might well also have been arrested to prevent him notifying co-conspirators and / or facilitating the destruction or removal of other evidence we did not know about.
21. I also understood that s.41 was a vehicle for me to get suspects into custody as a means of furthering the investigation.
22. On that basis, the decision had been made that Mohamed should be arrested for his possible involvement with his brother's suspected terrorist activities, for him to be interviewed and for his house to be searched. As I will come onto, I agreed with that course. "
"… I was satisfied from what I had been told that I had sufficient grounds in the circumstances to arrest Sonia Raissi. This was based upon what I had been told during both briefings and from what I had read on the briefing note. Sonia Raissi was the wife of an individual who I considered to be a suspect for a recent terrorist atrocity. I had reason to believe that she had been living with Lofti in Phoenix whilst he was undergoing flight training. The significance of this was that it was highly likely that she was aware of his activities and may have knowledge of his associates. Lofti and Sonia also shared a Wells Fargo bank account and I had been told that fairly significant sums of money had been paid into their account and used to support flight training. It is reasonable to assume as a joint account holder that she would have had full knowledge of these sums of money and the subsequent outgoings from the account. I had also been made aware that Sonia was currently working at the check-in for Air France at London Heathrow. A position of this nature could easily be used to facilitate the boarding of aircraft by an individual or individuals for an unlawful purpose and may also allow access to security related information that may assist in terrorism. It was based upon a combination of these and other factors that I have outlined in this statement at paragraph 10 that I formed my reasonable grounds for arrest in that I suspected Sonia Raissi was involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts in connection with the terrorist attacks in America on 11th September 2001."
"… In these particular circumstances weight was added to my grounds of arrest because of the proposal to arrest made by officers at a more senior level. I trusted their judgment and considered that they may be in possession of additional information or intelligence about the individuals in this investigation that may be sensitive in nature which I did not need to know. This is not uncommon in Counter Terrorism investigations."
In paragraph 27 of his statement Mr. Bredo added this:
"Finally I would point out that John MacBrayne was "developed vetted", I was not and thus it would not surprise me if MacBrayne was privy to further intelligence. I would not want to know what he knew. In fact I had and still have a high regard for MacBrayne who I recognised as an exceptionally good senior officer and thus although I would not hesitate to challenge any instructions from a senior officer, the fact that it was John MacBrayne considerably reassured me."
(C) Law
"… At trial the respondent, the Chief Constable, sought to justify the arrest under section 12(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. So far as it is material section 12(1) provides:
"a constable may arrest without warrant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be … (b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this Part of the Act applies; …"
The constable made the arrest in connection with a murder which was undoubtedly an act of terrorism within the meaning of section 12(1) of the Act of 1984. It was common ground that subjectively the constable had the necessary suspicion. The question was whether the constable objectively had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the plaintiff was concerned in the murder. The constable said in evidence that his reasonable grounds for suspecting the plaintiff were based on a briefing by a superior officer. He was told that the plaintiff had been involved in the murder. The constable said that the superior officer ordered him to arrest the plaintiff. He did so. Counsel for the plaintiff took the tactical decision not to cross-examine the constable about the details of the briefing. The trial judge described the evidence as scanty. But he inferred that the briefing afforded reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion. In other words the judge inferred that some further details must have been given in the briefing. The legal burden was on the Chief Constable to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion. Nevertheless I am persuaded that the judge was entitled on the sparse materials before him to infer the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion. On this basis the Court of Appeal was entitled to dismiss the appeal. That means that the appeal before your Lordships' House must also fail on narrow and purely factual grounds."
"Given the independent responsibility and accountability of a constable under a provision such as section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 it seems to follow that the mere fact that an arresting officer has been instructed by a superior officer to effect the arrest is not capable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion within the meaning of section 12(1). It is accepted, and rightly accepted, that a mere request to arrest without any further information by an equal ranking officer, or a junior officer, is incapable of amounting to reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion. How can the badge of the superior officer, and the fact that he gave an order, make a difference? In respect of a statute vesting an independent discretion in the particular constable, and requiring him personally to have reasonable grounds for suspicion, it would be surprising if seniority made any difference. It would be contrary to the principle underlying section 12(1) which makes a constable individually responsible for the arrest and accountable in law. In Reg. v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, Ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 485, 474 Lawton L.J. touched on this point. He observed:
"[chief constables] cannot give an officer under command an order to do acts which can only lawfully be done if the officer himself with reasonable cause suspects that a breach of the peace has occurred or is imminently likely to occur or an arrestable offence has been committed." "
"My Lords, the test which section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 has laid down is a simple but practical one. It relates entirely to what is in the mind of the arresting officer when the power is exercised. In part it is a subjective test, because he must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind that the person has been concerned in acts of terrorism. In part also it is an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. But the application of the objective test does not require the court to look beyond what was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the grounds which were in his mind at the time which must be found to be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. All that the objective test requires is that these grounds be examined objectively and that they be judged at the time when the power was exercised.
This means that the point does not depend on whether the arresting officer himself thought at that time that they were reasonable. The question is whether a reasonable man would be of that opinion, having regard to the information which was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the arresting officer's own account of the information which he had which matters, not what was observed by or known to anyone else. The information acted on by the arresting officer need not be based on his own observations, as he is entitled to form suspicion based on what he has been told. His reasonable suspicion may be based on information which has been given to him anonymously or it may be based on information, perhaps in the course of an emergency, which turns out later to be wrong. As it is the information which is in mind alone which is relevant however, it is not necessary to go on to prove what was known to his informant or that any facts on which he based his suspicion were in fact true. The question whether it provided reasonable grounds for the suspicion depends on the source of his information and its context, seen in the light of the whole surrounding circumstances. …" (p. 298 A-E)
"… Many other examples may be cited of cases where the action of the constable who exercises a statutory power of arrest or of search is a member of a team of police officers, or where his action is the culmination of various steps taken by other police officers, perhaps over a long period and perhaps also involving officers from other police forces. For obvious practical reasons police officers must be able to rely upon each other in taking decisions as to whom to arrest or where to search and in what circumstances. The statutory power does not require that the constable who exercises the power must be in possession of all the information which has led to a decision, perhaps taken by others, that the time has come for it to be exercised. What it does require is that the constable who exercises the power must first have equipped himself with sufficient information so that he has reasonable cause to suspect before the power is exercised." (pp. 301H-302A) (Italics added)
"Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect but I cannot prove." Suspicion arises at or near the starting-point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. When such proof has been obtained, the police case is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed desirable as general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is complete. But if arrest before that were forbidden, it could seriously hamper the police. To give power to arrest on reasonable suspicion does not mean that it is always or even ordinarily to be exercised. It means that there is an executive discretion. …" (p. 948 B-C)
"The test of reasonable suspicion prescribed by the Code is one that has existed in the common law for many years. The law thus stated in Bullen and Leake, 3rd ed. (1868), p. 795, the "golden" edition of (1868):
"A constable is justified in arresting a person without warrant, upon a reasonable suspicion of a felony having been committed and of the person being guilty of it."
Their Lordships have not found any English authority in which reasonable suspicion has been equated with prima facie proof. In Dumbell v. Roberts [1944] 1 All E.R. 326, Scott L.J. said, at p. 329:
"The protection of the public is safeguarded by the requirement, alike of the common law and, so far as I know, of all statutes, that the constable shall before arresting satisfy himself that there do in fact exist reasonable grounds for suspicion of guilt. That requirement is very limited. The police are not called upon before acting to have anything like a prima facie case for conviction; …" (p. 948G-949A)
"If a constable has made a decision in conditions of urgency and perhaps confusion it would be unfair to judge the reasonableness of his suspicion by the slow, careful, analytical standards of a trial court months or years later".
Mr. Owen submitted that this passage was not supported by any authority and was contrary to principle.
"…f. His (Bredo's) own views were fortified by the fact that he knew that his superior officers, including MacBrayne ("exceptionally good senior officer…") regarded Mohammed as a reasonable suspect;
g. He inferred (and was entitled to) that his senior officers might well know more than he did ("it would not surprise me if MacBrayne was privy to further intelligence"…)"
"Any constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist".
Note, the section did not require "reasonable suspicion", c.f. the words of Section 12(1) of the 1984 Act, the provision in issue in O'Hara and the words of the 2000 Act with which we are now concerned.
"On the true construction of section 11(1) of the statute, what matters is the state of mind of the arresting officer and no one else. That state of mind can legitimately be derived from the instruction given to the arresting officer by his superior officer. The arresting officer is not bound and indeed may well not be entitled to question those instructions or to ask upon what information they are founded."
"The statutory provision under consideration in the McKee case did not require that an arresting officer must have reasonable grounds for suspicion. Moreover, the legislation was in much wider terms inasmuch as it authorised arrest for the purpose of internment. That statute was repealed in 1987 and your Lordships are concerned with a quite different statutory provision. In these circumstances Lord Roskill's observations throw no light on the proper construction of section 12(1) of the Act of 1984 which in terms provide that the power to arrest under it only arises where a constable has reasonable grounds for the necessary suspicion. Contrary to counsel's submission I would hold that it is misuse of precedent to transpose Lord Roskill's observations made in the context of the subjective requirement of a genuine belief to the objective requirement of the existence of reasonable grounds. The McKee case is irrelevant on the point of principle under consideration in this case. …"
"Section 11 of that Act was, of course, subsequently repealed and replaced by section 12 of the Act of 1984, which requires that the suspicion be based on reasonable grounds. Nevertheless, I believe that despite the difference in wording, Lord Roskill's words, at pp. 1361-1362, when he emphasised that what matters is what was in the mind of the arresting officer, remain relevant:
"On the true construction of section 11(1) of the statute, what matters is the state of mind of the arresting officer and of no one else. That state of mind can legitimately be derived from the instruction given to the arresting officer by his superior officer. The arresting officer is not bound and indeed may well not be entitled to question those instructions or to ask upon what information they are founded." "
"…What it [the statutory power] does require is that the constable who exercises the power must first have equipped himself with sufficient information so that he has reasonable cause to suspect before the power is exercised".
A little later Lord Hope said,
"…So it is the facts known by or the information given to the officer who effects the arrest to which the mind of the independent observer must be applied. It is this objective test, applying the criterion of what may be regarded as reasonable, which provides the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention…" (Emphasis added)
"We accept that necessity can provide a defence to the tort of false imprisonment: see e.g. R v Bournewood Mental Health Trust ex parte L…"
The Court found, however, that it was not necessary to decide the case before it on that ground.
"… in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints upon him if he knows in substance why it is claimed that this restraint is imposed".
The ground given for the arrest must also be the true ground: see Clerk & Lindsell Op. et Loc. Cit.
(D) Application of the Law to the Facts
(E) Conclusion