Neutral Citation Number: [2013] EWHC 1419 (QB) 
Case No: HQ 13 X 00438 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 

Date: Wednesday, 10th April 2013 

Before:
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY
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Between:
	LONDON BOROUGH OF LAMBETH & OTHERS	Claimants	
	-and -		
	MR. BRIAN PEAD	Defendant 	
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Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,
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MISS CAROLINE ADDY (instructed by Messrs. Pinsent Masons LLP) for the Claimant 
THE DEFENDANT appeared In Person
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Judgment
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY: 
1.	I now give the reasons for findings of breach of injunction and contempt of court that  I made in this court on 27th March last. This was an application by the claimants to  commit the defendant for breach of the terms of an order of Tugendhat J dated 7th  February 2013. This judgment should be read in conjunction with the short resume  given on 27th March. 
2.	The background in short was that the defendant, Mr. Pead, was formerly a teacher  employed by the first claimant who was dismissed from their service due to  allegations of disciplinary breaches. He brought a claim for unfair dismissal in the  Employment Tribunal and that claim failed. The third and fourth claimants  respectively are the former Executive Director of the Children and Young Persons’  Service in Lambeth Council and the Assistant Director of Standards. Each was  involved in the proceedings which led to the termination of Mr. Pead’s employment.  The second claimant is a firm of solicitors who act for the other three. 
3.	There are two actions in being, HQ 13 X 00438 and HQ 13 X 00439, which have  been called in these proceedings respectively the “harassment” and “privacy” actions.  They result from a campaign which the defendant has run, as he sees it, to clear his  name and expose a conspiracy to cover up wrongdoing and corruption in the running  of the affairs of the first claimant. That includes allegations of mishandling of matters  relating to the abuse of children. It was to that end the defendant co-authored a book  entitled “From Hillsborough to Lambeth” purporting to be an exposé of such  corruption. This book appears only ever to have been available for purchase on line. 
4.	On 30th January the claimants applied on short notice to Tugendhat J for injunctive  relief and that was granted until the return date, the 7th February. In the harassment  action the operative clause of the order made stated that the defendant must not 
“(a) engage in any course of conduct amounting to harassment  of the first claimants’ officers and employees, the second  claimants’ partners and employees, the third and fourth  claimants and each of them whether by the defendant  committing them himself or by soliciting others to commit  them including (but not limited to) the following acts: 
(b) further publishing the book and the related claims,  allegations and statements complained of in the Part 8 claim  form and its confidential schedule in this action, or any similar claims … 
(c) contacting the first claimants’ officers and employees, the  second claimants’ partners and employees, the third and fourth  claimants and each of them, by any means whatsoever  including by telephone, e-mail, social network or any other  electronic communication, or in writing, save that the defendant  may correspond with Mr. Damian Crosse of the second  claimants for the purpose only of the proper conduct of his  defence of this action and any further action brought by the claimants herein against the defendant.” 
5.	The defendant says that the claimants’ advisers fraudulently deprived him of the right  to attend the hearing on 30th January by giving inadequate notice and the order made  is therefore void ab initio for that reason and for the reason of it being an abuse of  process. He claimed that counsel and solicitors for the claimants misled the court on  that occasion. On the return date of 7th February the defendant did appear at court  and I have read the transcript of that hearing that day and a copy of the written  reasons distributed five days later in support of the Judge’s decision on 7th February to  continue the orders made until trial. Tugendhat J summarised the issues in the  litigation itself in this way: 
“Since about August 2012 [the defendant] has been engaged in a campaign to proclaim his innocence. He has used websites  and a book … which was published in December. The book  contains information in relation to children for whom Lambeth  had had responsibilities, and statements which the third and  fourth claimants complain of as defamatory of them. There  have also been a number of website postings relating to the  third and fourth claimants and their alleged role in his dismissal  by Lambeth. Other employees have also complained of being  threatened by the defendant. These are under names which the claimants submit are probably pseudonyms of the defendant.” 
6.	The Judge went on to find on the evidence before him that Lambeth was likely to  establish at trial that publication of the information the subject of the privacy action  should not be allowed under section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act and that it was  likely to establish that the information was confidential or the publication of the  information was unlawful under the Data Protection Act 1998. As to the harassment  proceedings he noted the defendant had not put forward anything that might amount  to a defence. The Judge had seen evidence that the defendant had been served with  the papers on 2nd February. The defendant raised issues about this service but it is to  be noted that (as he put it at page 6E of the transcript, referring to himself in the third  person) despite the conflicts in the two accounts of the defendant and of the process  server, they both agreed that “Mr. Pead was present at the time the process server  served the documents”. 
7.	The Judge found that the harassment claim was not just a good arguable case but was  likely to succeed at trial. He did not find the defendant’s statements of fact capable  of belief. He continued the injunctions unchanged until trial. The Judge read out the  terms of the orders to the defendant who said he understood them but he opposed their  continuation, he said, on the grounds the Judge had been deceived. The Judge, as I  have said, did not believe the case the defendant was presenting to him with the result  that he did indeed continue the orders.  
8.	As to what followed, thereafter the claimants complain of continued breaches of the  orders with the result that on the 26th February they served an application to commit  the defendant supported by an affidavit from Mr. McBurney. On the 13th they  noticed that their notice of application was defective, it did not incorporate a penal  notice in accordance with CPR 18 PD 16.2. They amended that omission by an e- mail to the defendant adding a penal notice in the prescribed form. Miss Addy has  taken me to the case of Nicholls v. Nicholls [1997] 1 WLR 314 and submits that the  defect in the notice, which she accepts, was cured by this course of action. Nicholls was a case where the committal order itself had failed to include the right of the  contemnor to apply to purge his contempt. Lord Woolf reviewed the consequences  of irregularities in the obtaining of committals at 326C. I need not set out the  quotation here. I agree with Miss Addy’s submission no prejudice of any sort was  caused to the defendant by this omission and the requirements of justice to both  parties require me to consider the notice of application as having been validly served. 
9.	On 14th March 2013 the matter came before the court for the first time. The  defendant sought an adjournment to obtain legal representation. That was granted.  The court ordered the committal application adjourned to 27th March in order for him  to obtain such representation and directed that any evidence he was to rely on be  served by 21st March. No evidence was served by that time. On 21st March the  defendant sent an e-mail to the court claiming he had only just received the order of  14th March. Be that as it may he cannot in any way have been unaware of its content.  He said he had been unlawfully arrested and held in custody for some 24 hours or so from 15th to 16 th March; that had caused him to lose a considerable amount of time to  find a barrister and prepare his defence. He believed himself to be not guilty of the  allegations of contempt. Nothing more was heard from the defendant until the  afternoon of 26th March, the day before the date fixed for the hearing, when he  submitted a skeleton argument but no witness statement. On the morning of the  hearing itself he produced further documents which included what he called an  application to strike out both sets of proceedings. 
10.	I now turn to consider the allegations of breach. The first breach relates to the book “From Hillsborough to Lambeth” said to contain references to pupils or former pupils in the Pupil Referral Unit of Lambeth run by the first claimant. The order at paragraph 2 simply prohibited publication or any communication disclosing any such information. The evidence before me is that the book was still being offered for sale on line by certain retailers identified in the McBurney affidavit of 25th February 2013 as at 17:00 hours on 7th February. Subsequently, when the second claimants notified these retail outlets of the existence and terms of the injunction, they immediately removed the book from sale. The claimants say this is something the defendant could  have done with ease whereas in fact he appears to have done nothing. The publisher  of the book is a limited company called Invenire Limited. Its registered office shares  the same address as that of the defendant and Mr. Pead admitted to the court that it  was a company which followed his instructions and he had “an association” with it.  He was no more specific than that. He claims that he had a lengthy lunch with the “printer and distributer” and had told them he would like them to comply with the order. They said it was difficult because it was on so many websites. 
11.	This I find to have been a specious and obfuscatory response by the defendant and I  readily reject it. I am satisfied he controlled the retailing of the book in a practical  sense. Even if he did not, had he done what the solicitors did and simply sent a copy  of the order to these retailers, he would, I find, plainly have achieved the result that  the solicitors later achieved. He was in clear breach of this provision. I find it  proved to the criminal standard.  
12.	The next breach I consider is that set out in paragraph 24 of the McBurney affidavit.  On 15th February an extremely unpleasant and threatening e-mail was sent to a trainee  solicitor in the employ of the second claimant. It was apparently from the e-mail  account of someone calling himself “Brian Hopkins” with an e-mail address of theatreoftheself@gmail.com. It was signed by someone calling himself Thomas  Kelly. I am satisfied so that I am sure that this was sent by the defendant. Brian  Hopkins purports to be the author of postings on the website  www.corruptlambethofficialsblogspot.co.uk which carry the defendant’s fundamental  message. His e-mail address is listed on the website www.theatreoftheself.com  which website lists Brian Hopkins and Michael Bird, the co-author together with the  defendant of the book, as contacts, together with a mobile telephone number which  has been clearly established by evidence to be that of the defendant. When asked  about this e-mail the defendant said he had no knowledge whatever of it.  
13.	 I reject that submission. I am sure that this was him using the convenient pseudonym    “Brian Hopkins”. It was a plain piece of harassment contrary to the terms of the   order in the harassment action which clearly and expressly permitted the defendant  only to contact the second claimant’s solicitors through their partner, Mr. Crosse.   
14.	The other breaches complained of fell into three categories: first, allowing material  containing pupil information (as I will call it for short) to remain on line; secondly,  allowing internet postings prohibited by the harassment order to remain on line; and,  thirdly, making fresh postings in breach of the harassment order. Miss Addy, at the  court’s request, selected samples of such alleged breaches and agreed that her  application should be confined to consideration of them.   
15.	First, there were two postings on the site www.lambethchildabuseandcoverup.com,  the first headed “Proposal for forfeiture of Dunipace OBE” and emanating for the  “All Around Justice campaign for the forfeiture of the OBE by Ms. Phyllis Dunipace  for her unlawful removal of Head Teachers Brian Pead and James Walker from the  posts …” and the second entitled “Brian Pead makes a statement about child abuse in  Lambeth to Essex Police”. These were both pleaded in the claim form in the  harassment action and both remained on the website as at the 18th February. The  claimants say that it is the case and it is to be inferred irresistibly, that this is a site  which is controlled by the defendant or sympathisers of his acting in concert with  him. “All Around Justice” operates from a PO Box number in Southend on Sea  where the defendant lives. It is plain the website is no more than a vehicle for the  defendant’s grievances as is evident from documents exhibited to Mr. McBurney’s  affidavit of that website and blogspot carrying that name, the latter document carrying  links to other of the defendant’s postings.   
16.	In my judgment it is clearly proved that the two postings are the work of the  defendant. They have not been removed by him since the making of the orders in  breach of those orders.   
17.	Examples of two postings discovered since the making of the order are a page on the  www.lambethchildabuseandcoverupblogspot dated 29th January 2013 still on the  website as at 18th February. It is entitled “Law firm threatened Brian Pead who  uncovered child abuse and racism in the court”. It is identical to a posting  complained of in the Part 8 claim form. It plainly emanates from the defendant and I  so find and it plainly breaches the terms of the order. A second posting in this  category is on the www.allaroundjusticeblogspot.com entitled “Brian Pead makes a  statement about child abuse in Lambeth to Essex Police” dated 13th January 2013. It  was still on the blogspot as of 18th February 2013 and it too is plainly the work of the  defendant and in breach of the terms of the order.    
18.	The next category of postings complained of are those discovered since the making of  the orders not referred to in the pleaded case but said to be evidence of harassment in  breach of paragraph 3(a) of the order. The first two are on the  www.lambethchildabuseandcoverupblogspot.co.uk. The first is dated 20th January.  It accuses Lambeth Council of corruption and contains a link to a posting complained  about in the pleaded case. The second is on the same blogspot and it asserts that the  third claimant is to be stripped of her OBE. Both these were still on the website as at  18th February. The third is on the website www.allaroundjusticeblogspot.co.uk  headed “CRB checks in Lambeth not worth the paper they are written on” and dated  29th January. It accuses the first claimant of having a fundamentally flawed  approach to child protection. It contains links to other postings complained of in the  pleaded case. The entry at the foot of the page “About me” is plainly a reference to  the defendant himself. He, as I find, is therefore responsible for the presence of all  three of these pages and is in breach of the order thereby.  
19.	On the www.lambethchildabuseandcoverupblogspot.com are two entries each dated  2nd February 2013 and each still present on the website as at 18th February. The first  accuses a supposed employee of the second claimant of assault and battery and  dangerous driving. This would appear to be a reference to the process server who  served documents on the defendant on 2nd February. Both are stated to be entries by  the defendant himself and are fresh examples of harassment contrary to the terms of  the order as I find.   
20.	 Following the hearing on 7th February the defendant on the Lambeth Child Abuse and   Cover Up website posted an entry headed “Gagging Order” with a tendentious and   inaccurate account of the hearing that had taken place that day describing it as a  masquerade for British justice and accusing the second claimants of having an attitude   “We don’t need to adhere to the official protocols, we will just say he is guilty and  everyone will believe us”. That page was still present on the website at the 18th  February and it is to be found on other websites. It is plainly the work of the  defendant as I find.   
21.	Finally, on the All Around Justice Blogspot on the 15th February under the heading  “Rooting out corruption”, the fourth claimant is accused of maintaining an unrelenting  and irrational pursuit of an innocent man in her investigation of the disciplinary  proceedings against the defendant which led to his dismissal.  
22.	The defendant having, as I say, obtained an adjournment for that express purpose  failed to obtain either legal representation or file a witness statement within the time  stipulated or at all. Instead, he filed a skeleton argument, as I have said. That, of  course, does not have to be supported by a statement of truth and he did so on the  afternoon before the hearing and served further documents on the morning of the  hearing, none of which were of assistance to the court in the event. But the principal  thrust of his submission was that the without notice order of 30th January was made  contrary to his rights under Article 6 and was therefore void ab initio. It was all no  real order as he put it, having been achieved fraudulently by flawed means. He  appears passionately to hold to that belief. I believe that belief has coloured the view  which I am sure he does hold, that he is not obliged to obey the terms of orders made  against him.    
23.	I endeavoured at the outset of the hearing to explain to him that the claimants’  application proceeded and had to proceed on the basis that the orders not having been  appealed against or set aside, had to be obeyed until they were discharged: see Ketley v. Brent [2012] EWCA Civ 324 at paragraph 20. Despite that, Mr. Pead devoted  much of the one and a half hours of his oral submissions to me to the support of what  he called his proposed application to set aside both orders as an abuse of process.  This was a vain exercise. He has never made any properly constituted application to  that effect nor has he attempted to appeal the relevant order of 7th February.    
24.	His response to the allegations of breach set out in the evidence which he had been  served with in advance of the hearing was to stress quite rightly that the burden of  proving these breaches lies on the applicants which, at the outset I stated I accepted,  and that they had to be proved to the criminal standard. Otherwise his attitude to the  offending postings that I have set out above was effectively to say that these were all  outside his control; he could not be responsible for what other people did, whether  they were either people who supported his cause or people who wished to incriminate  him by making such postings in order to get him into trouble.    
25.	He was quite unspecific in his submissions as to exactly what he had done in response  to the order. In general terms and without any particulars he stated, “I brought it to  the attention of those I know” and he said he could have brought a number of  witnesses to that effect. He claimed to have done everything to comply. He went on  to say he had at times removed certain posts. When I intervened to ask him to  identify any posts he had removed he responded he would deal with that question in  his own time in his submissions and return to it, but he never did. He said he had  had a long lunch with the printer and distributer of the book and told them he would  like them to comply with the order by removing it and they said that would be  difficult as it was on 300 websites. Removing a link could leave a link active he  claimed.   
26.	He argued these proceedings ought to have been brought by the Attorney General.  pointed out that that related to contempt of court in criminal proceedings. He  persisted in maintaining this fallacious view of the law. He argued that the  application should have been brought by the court itself and he had not been  summoned by the court. He was not aware of the terms of CPR 81 which make it  clear that contempt proceedings are triggered by a notice of application by the party  wishing to draw breaches to the attention of the court. In effect his overall position  was that the case against him had not been proved; that anyone could have made these  entries; there was no proof that he had done so or that anyone related to him had.  
27.	In the short reasons that I gave on 27th March I said, and I enumerated them, that I  found that the selected breaches alleged had been proved to the necessary criminal  standard and that they had been the responsibility of and committed by the defendant  and he was therefore in contempt of court. I considered the consequences which  ought to flow from that, the alternative ways of disposing of the matter short of a term  of imprisonment, but I concluded that the breaches were sufficiently serious to  warrant an immediate custodial return and I sentenced him to 28 days’ imprisonment.  I said on that occasion that I would give the reasons for my findings today and the  matter was put over for that reason.    
28.	Yesterday the court received a letter from Mr. Pead, still then in prison, which I  should read into the record. It was addressed to the Court Manager and it said:    
“Re: Civil Contempt of Court   
On Wednesday 27 March 2013 I was sentenced to 28 days’   prison for civil contempt of court.   
In accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules, I am writing to  the court to purge my contempt of court.   
I unreservedly apologise for any action or lack of action which  was deemed by the court to be a contempt.   
I wish to purge the contempt of court and can reassure the High  Court that I will take all appropriate steps to comply with the  orders of Mr. Justice Tugendhat. I will maintain a Log Book  of all the steps which I (and others associated with me) take to  comply with the orders. I will make the Log Book available to  the court.   
I cannot, of course, be held responsible for the internet per se  and its propensity to maintain links that have been previously  severed. I will, however, provide to the court evidence of all  communications with internet service providers.   
Nor can I reasonably be held responsible for any links or posts  which are uploaded in my name or purported to be authored by  me but which are not, in fact, connected to me.   
In summary, I reiterate the following:   
(i) a full apology to the court;  
(ii) full compliance with the orders;   
(iii) the creation and maintenance of a Log Book which will  remain open to inspection by the court;   
(iv) no further related posts uploaded to the internet;  
(v) all other posts deemed to be offending to be removed.    
I believe this letter provides to the court a full and unreserved  apology by way of purging the contempt and an assurance that   I will comply with the orders of Mr. Justice Tugendhat.”   
29.	 This morning Mr. Pead appeared in court and he did so as a free man, the early  release provisions permitting his discharge from prison irrespective of any order that  this court might or might not have made. I asked him what his position was in  respect of his application to purge his contempt. He said (as I noted it) that he did not  accept he was responsible for all the breaches alleged but, as he put it, “I do apologise   to the court for potentially having committed breaches” and as he put it again in his  later courteous submissions to me, “I am willing to accept some of the allegations I  posted or others posted but I cannot accept the postings of third parties unknown to   me”. He thought he had been asked to make decisions about his position on the basis   of insufficient information. He was happy to withdraw his application to purge if the  court thought that right and then returned to the submissions he had made on the  previous occasion when this matter was heard that anybody could cut and paste  material from any site. He wanted to know, first, what I felt he was responsible for  and, secondly, he wanted the claimants to explain to him how he could prevent third  parties cutting and pasting. On that basis he was, as he put it, happy to apologise.  But he did not know how to prevent, as he put it, malicious persons using his name.   
30.	So the position is that the apology which appeared on the face of his letter to be a full  apology without any equivocal features turns out to be no such thing in the sense that  it is limited, as it would seem, to those breaches which he accepts he was responsible  for. In my findings, which I announced in principle on 27th March, I identified the  allegations in the McBurney affidavit which I found proved and to be his  responsibility and for which I have given my reasons today. They are what the court  has found he has committed by way of breach of the orders. The court can go no  further than that.  
31.	There is a sense in which the application to purge today is a highly technical one  because it will not, as sometimes is the case, achieve the important factor of the  release of the contemnor for prison. Mr. Pead is today a free man and is not subject  to the court’s order for committal. But I can see that there are advantages  presentationally (may I put it that way) from Mr. Pead’s point of view should there be  any problems hereafter about continuing or repeated breaches involving material of  this nature for him to be able to say that he adopted a moderate and sensible position  in his approach to the court today.  
32.	I cannot go beyond saying that there is, in my judgment, something of a change in Mr.    Pead’s attitude to this litigation and the court’s exercise of its powers in response to   the applications by the claimants. It is, I regret to say, insufficiently clear as an  apology. It is a conditional apology which is not one on which I consider it would be  right to declare that the defendant has purged his contempt. I content myself with  noting that there is, in my judgment, something of a change in attitude and respect for  the orders of the court present today in Mr. Pead’s presentation of his position that I  did not find present on the last occasion.   
Mr. Pead, you, I think would benefit from having a transcript of what I have just  said.   
THE DEFENDANT: That would be most helpful, my Lord.   
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY: You have been trying to take notes and it is not easy.   
THE DEFENDANT: No.   
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY: So I think on this occasion I will order a transcript at public  expense to you of what I have said today.   
THE DEFENDANT: I am much obliged to you.   
(Discussion followed re order and costs)
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY:   
33.	I am asked to make costs orders following my ruling in this case covering the three  hearings, that is to say: the 14th March when the matter was adjourned at the request  of the defendant; the 27th March when I heard the substantive application and gave my  decision and identified the breaches that I found proved; and today, when there was  an attendance for what might have been a simple purging of contempt but turned out  to require the giving of the detailed reasons for my earlier decision.  
34.	These proceedings for contempt have proved to have been justified. Mr. Pead would  like me to reserve the costs until the outcome of any trial. I do not think that would  be the right order. They were necessary and justified for the reasons stated in my  judgment. It is a self-contained episode in the case. The claimants have proved  what they set out to prove and in principle should have an order for costs in their  favour.  
35.	The principles that Mr. Pead relied on in opposition to the making of an order, he  quoted from the procedure in criminal courts where contempt in the face of the court  sometimes falls to be dealt with and the court is warned not to proceed too quickly, to  give time for reflection and opportunity to consider to the contemnor. That is, of  course, in a very different context. I think Mr. Pead has had opportunity to consider  this matter. He was certainly given it on the 14th March. I do not believe he has  taken the opportunity as fully as he could have done.  
36.	In principle the claimants should have the costs of these hearings. I have not  received any submissions from Mr. Pead as to the quantum. As to the amount of  each bill there does not seem to me to be any excessive billing such that I should  interfere with on a summary assessment. So I do allow the costs of the hearings of the  14th and 27th March in the sum claimed, £21,601.60 and of today in the amount of  £2,747.60.   
37.	I summarily assess those costs and order them to be paid by the defendant to the  claimants.   
MISS ADDY: Is it wise to put a time limit, my Lord? The usual is 28 days.   
MR. JUSTICE MACKAY: Twenty-eight days to pay.   
(To the Associate): That is the original of Mr. Pead’s letter. Could you attach  that to the file? Thank you very much.   
I am leaving the original with the file. You have your copy of it. As I say, you  will get a copy of the reasons I expressed this morning.   
(Clarification of costs and time to pay followed)