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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Ecclestone v Medway NHS Foundation Trust [2013] EWHC 790 (QB) (12 April 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2013/790.html Cite as: [2013] EWHC 790 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
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Marc Ecclestone |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Medway NHS Foundation Trust |
Defendant |
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Mr Gerard Boyle (instructed by Bevan Brittan) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 11-15 March 2013
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Crown Copyright ©
His Honour Judge Reddihough :
" He is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. At the same time, that does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pigheadedly carry on with some old technique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially the whole of informed medical opinion."
"A case which is based on an allegation that a fully considered decision of two consultants in the field of their special skill was negligent clearly presents certain difficulties of proof. It is not enough to show that there is a body of competent professional opinion which considers that theirs was a wrong decision, if there also exists a body of professional opinion equally competent which supports the decision as reasonable in the circumstances. Differences of opinion and practice exists and will always exist, in the medical as in other professions. There is seldom any one answer exclusive of all others to problems of professional judgment. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other: but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence."
At Page 639 he stated:
" I have to say that a judge's preference for one body of distinguished professional opinion to another also professionally distinguished is not sufficient to establish negligence in a practitioner whose actions have received the seal of approval of those whose opinions, truthfully expressed, honestly held, were not preferred. For in the realm of diagnosis and treatment negligence is not established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion to another."
" In my view the court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of opinion that the defendant's treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice. In the Bolam case itself McNair, J. stated that the defendant had to have acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a "responsible body of medical men". Later he referred to "a standard of practice recognised as proper by a competent reasonable body of opinion". Again, in the passage which I have cited from Maynard's case Lord Scarman refers to a "respectable" body of professional opinion. The use of these adjectives - responsible, reasonable and respectable - all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter."
At Page 242, he refers to the case of Hucks -v- Cole [1993] 4 Med.L.R. 393, where Sachs, L.J. stated:
"The court must be vigilant to see whether the reasons given for putting a patient at risk are valid in the light of any well known advance in medical knowledge, or whether they stem from a residual adherence to out of date ideas."
At Page 243, Lord Browne-Wilkinson goes on to state:
"These decisions demonstrate that in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence In my judgment that is because in some cases it cannot be demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction that the body of opinion relied upon is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a particular medical practice, a reasonable view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible. I emphasise that in my view it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable. The assessment of medical risks and benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence. As the quotation from Lord Scarman makes clear, it would be wrong to allow such assessment to deteriorate into seeking to persuade the judge to prefer one of two views both of which are capable of being logically supported. It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the benchmark by reference to which the defendant's conduct falls to be assessed."
"Granted that no textbook should be read unduly literally and without regard for relevant professional opinion "
The court was asked to accept the view of Mr. Fiddian that, in effect, textbooks may lag behind orthopaedic practice. It was suggested on behalf of the claimant that there was no relevant evidence that there was a body of surgeons undertaking percutaneous lateral release in 2008. Although Mr. Fleetcroft was using the technique the only other evidence, coming for the first time in the witness box, was from Professor Atkins who said he was still using the technique at that time. On the other hand, Mr. Fiddian said he knew of no surgeon using that technique at that time. The claimant suggests that no weight should be attached to the evidence of Professor Atkins on that point. In any event, it was said that Professor Atkins changed techniques in 2010, which is an indication that the alleged additional risks of the percutaneous technique could no longer be justified. So far as the textbooks were concerned, it was argued that the fact that the technique is described in a textbook is not the equivalent of satisfying the Bolam test. The claimant further very much relied upon the fact that the authors of Insall & Scott said that they in recent years had used electro surgery to perform lateral release. It was said that that supports Mr. Fiddian's view that the blind technique was no longer accepted practice in 2008.