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England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions Ltd [2014] EWHC 244 (TCC) (10 February 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2014/244.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 244 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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The Secretary of State for Defence |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Turner Estate Solutions Limited |
Defendant |
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Mr Richard Keen QC, Mr Garry Borland and Mr Martin Richardson (instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP) for the Defendant
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Ramsey :
Introduction
Background
"…repayment of all costs not properly verified or incurred; costs which do not relate to the Core Works or to valid/approved and substantiated Changes or which exceed the sums due for such Changes; and the costs of alleged Changes or claims which have not been made in compliance with the provisions of the Contract."
"our alternative defence that, should the MPTC mechanism be relevant to the calculation of interim payments (which is denied) then that mechanism ought to be adjusted to reflect the various matters notified throughout the course of the works, and the level of interim payments due determined accordingly."
"The CP register alone currently extends to some 480 change proposals, each of which will require to be considered by the DRB in order to conclude a view on the full MPTC adjustment arising as a consequence of them."
"…the costs claimed by [the Defendant], which include the above CPs, have not been properly incurred and/or are not reasonable and that [the Defendant] is not entitled to any adjustment to the MPTC (except where expressly admitted above). In the circumstances, [the Defendant] is not entitled to interim payments which include the cost of such CPs."
"16. Further and in any event, [the Defendant's] first ground of entitlement (the Interim Position) is of somewhat academic interest now that the ambit of the arbitration has been widened to take into account [the Defendant's] final entitlement in that the Core Works are complete save that approximately £1.178m of interest will turn on the outcome of this argument. …
17. It is [the Defendant's] second ground of entitlement (adjustment of the MPTC: the Final Outcome) to which the vast bulk of the main hearing will be devoted. This is because in order to determine an appropriate adjustment to the MPTC the Tribunal must determine [the Defendant's] entitlement in respect of delay and each of the 231 Change Proposals. This is a highly fact intensive inquiry and will, in practical terms (if not technically) represent the final accounting position between the parties.
18. The fact is that the Interim Position is less important (and of infinitely less value) than the Final Outcome. …
19. As set out further below, the preliminary issues proposed by [the Defendant] potentially resolve a very significant part of the dispute in relation to [the Defendant's] second ground of entitlement (the Final Outcome) and, however decided, will reduce both the scope and cost of the main hearing."
"Can the parties clarify how the disputes in Change Proposals, defects and disallowable costs fit in with their primary claims and defences and the extent to which, if at all, it would be unnecessary or inappropriate for the Tribunal to deal with such matters in its Award if the primary cases can properly be decided without reference to such matters."
"…rather than delaying all matters in the arbitration, we would issue a part award on certain points of principle which would be dealt with following the conclusion of the hearing of evidence in this part of the arbitration in January, and obviously following submission from the parties."
"… I know, Ms Hannaford, you have expressed the view on a number of occasions that you were keen to ensure that all the matters in dispute were dealt with for reasons of costs, and I should say that from the Tribunal's perspective, the possibility, if it were, for example, to accept Mr Keen's what I might call the primary argument, which is the most extreme end of that particular spectrum, and if we were to accept Mr Keen's submission that it was not then necessary to deal with the CPs and other matters, and I am not for any moment suggesting that is a likely outcome, or unlikely, it would be a considerable waste of time and effort and massive expense on behalf of all the parties to have spent the amount of time and money which has been spent on dealing with matters such as the defects and the CPs without getting a view from the Tribunal. And that would be a very unpalatable outcome, and that would clearly be a factor in any decision which the Tribunal took ultimately on the parties respective primary cases.
So I would also invite Mr Keen in particular to see if it would be possible to take instructions upon the point upon which he has reserved previously about whether, if there was a part award of some description, or if we were to sustain the primary case, or actually regardless of any decision that we should take, that award would also deal with the issues of the CPs and the other matters, because that seems highly desirable, given the cost of this arbitration to the parties. So that's another matter which I think would be helpful if it could be addressed on Monday morning."
"As regards CPs and delay, I will depart from my reservation and say that at the end of the day the Tribunal should make declarators on these matters if everything is going to be deferred to July in light of the amendment and the supplementary quantum, report. I don't see how one or two of them can be picked off in March and I don't see the advantage of doing that, because we are trying to narrow and focus what it is the tribunal has to deal with.
So I would not take exception, if the amendment and supplementary report are allowed, to the Tribunal in July addressing declarators on CPs and delay, even though that may no impact directly upon the determination of interim payment. And then it's done as it were."
"Just two points of clarification, if I may, Mr Keen on the position.
I think Ms Hannaford was suggesting that it would be appropriate to deal with some of the CPs at the end of March. I appreciate that that is not your position, but if we were minded to take that course: you have previously reserved your position in connection with the CPs and you have departed from that reservation; what would be your position if we were to say, "Well, we think we ought to deal with some of the CPs in March", in light of the reservation you have previously made?"
"Then we have to obey the Tribunal, I think is my only answer.
At the end of the day, the Tribunal will determine the matter. My concern is that in March we have a self-contained operation that the Tribunal can cope with and we can cope with, and if we list the major CPs - for example 237 - I don't see that process working.
…
In addition, I think we have to remember that we have quantum to deal with anyway, and that might more appropriately be pulled in with the issue of the CPs and, indeed, delay."
"MS HANNAFORD: Yes. One point of clarification, which I think I understood, is Mr Keen saying that if you were to determine everything in May and on this assumption didn't do any CPs or defects, he would nonetheless - whatever happens - accept determination of CPs and defects at a later stage? I see nodding.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think Mr Keen was prepared to accept the views of the Tribunal on that matter.
MS HANNAFORD: Yes
MR KEEN: That was my position, but the Tribunal's position may be radically different.
MS HANNAFORD: That's extremely helpful. I just wanted to make sure I hadn't misunderstood.
What we do submit would be helpful would be not to confine any partial award that the Tribunal decides is appropriate to issues of principle. There has been a vast amount of evidence, and we are not at the end of it yet, in relation to CPs and defects. It would in my submission, be a tragedy to leave until July and after July the determination of that evidence, at which stage the Tribunal would have heard the evidence many, many months earlier. In my submission, it would be extremely useful for any part award to include an award on liability in relation to defects and CPs.
…
Some of the other larger CPs that I've mentioned - 84, 235 and 396 - don't raise the same difficulties in terms of volume of evidence. Yes, there is an amount of evidence, but it's not insurmountable, and in my submission, again could helpfully be done. As Mr Keen says we are obviously very much in the hands of the Tribunal."
"1.31 In light of its decision that the Maximum Price is not a cap on interim payments, and because this arbitration is concerned with interim payment and not the Final Price Payable, the Tribunal could form the view that there is no need for it to go on to make findings in relation to the respondent's alternative defence for adjustment of the MPTC to reflect the value of all unapproved Changes.
….
1.33 We accept that the following is a matter entirely for the Tribunal, however, if the Tribunal finds it necessary to consider all the CPs then the respondent's position is that the Tribunal will, in due course, need to determine liability for all of the remaining disputed CPs, namely:…"
"…the parties have made an agreement to submit the question of liability for CPs and the consequential adjustment of the MPTC (if any) to the Tribunal for a final and binding decision. Insofar as necessary, [the Claimant] submits that the parties have given the Tribunal ad hoc jurisdiction to determine this issue, and the Tribunal is therefore bound to determine it.
Alternatively, the parties have agreed the procedure for the future conduct of the arbitration, which includes the determination of the question of liability for CPs and the consequential adjustment of the MPTC (if any), whether or not CPs were relevant to the issue of interim payment. The Tribunal is bound by this agreement. [The Defendant's] attempt to ignore the agreement amounts to an invitation to the Tribunal to conduct the proceedings otherwise than in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties, which could amount to serious irregularity pursuant to section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996."
"4.14 On day 17 of the hearing Mr Keen confirmed that:
"I will depart from my reservation and say that at the end of the day the Tribunal should make declarators on these matters if everything is going to be deferred to July in light of the amendment and the supplementary quantum report."
"In addition, I think we have to remember that we have quantum to deal with anyway, and that might more appropriately be pulled in with the issue of the CPs and, indeed, delay."
4.15 In the Tribunal's view the words used require to be given their plain and ordinary meaning against the factual background at the time they were made. Having considered the detailed submissions of both parties, the Tribunal has formed the view that in January 2012 the parties agreed that the Tribunal ought to deal with the matter of CPs in this arbitration. This is the clear effect of the comments made by Mr Keen on day 17 of the hearing. However, the question which then arises is what is the extent of that agreement and does it constrain the ability of the Tribunal to determine the issues in dispute.
4.16 It should be remembered that at that point the Tribunal was considering the procedure which ought to be followed in the arbitration in the circumstances where it was necessary to re-organise the timetable which had previously been set. At the urging of the Tribunal, the parties were being asked to consider how best to use the time available to resolve as many of the issues which had been the subject of evidence as possible. This included the CPs. In withdrawing its reservation [the Defendant] clearly had in mind these factors. This is evident from the statement that the Tribunal should proceed to make declarations in relation to the CPs "if everything is going to be deferred to July."
4.17 However, as matters have turned out the procedure has taken a very different direction to that envisaged by the Tribunal in January 2012. The First Part Award has not served to narrow the issues in dispute. It would appear that the parties have been unable to agree anything that has not been formally decided by the Tribunal and indeed each party has sought to interpret the First Part Award so as to advance its respective position. The arbitration has been stayed for over seven months and there is no longer any agreement between the parties as to how the CPs should be dealt with. It is now over a year since the hearing on quantum was concluded (other than the evidence of Ms Wishart).
4.18 The question is, therefore, whether the Tribunal is bound to follow the agreement reached between the parties at a particular stage of the procedure when there has been a change of circumstance. [The Claimant] submits that the Tribunal has no discretion in this regard and that a failure to proceed to determine liability and quantum in respect of each CP would constitute serious irregularity pursuant to section 68 of the 1996 Act. The Tribunal does not accept this. It is for the Tribunal to determine the procedure which ought to be followed in light of its duties under the 1996 Act. The Tribunal has an obligation to assess what the correct procedure ought to be at any particular point in time. The Tribunal requires to determine the issues which have been referred to it but those issues are defined, as [the Claimant] has submitted, by reference to the pleadings framed by the parties. If the CPs are not required to resolve the issues in dispute (as defined by the parties' pleadings) the Tribunal requires to consider very carefully whether it ought to proceed in accordance with the agreement reached in January 2012.
4.19 The Tribunal notes that [the Defendant] has raised a substantive point with regard to the consequences of any finding with regard to the CPs in this arbitration. In short, what has been termed the "unapproved Change Proposals" argument has been pled by [the Defendant] in the defence and counterclaim. In agreeing that the Tribunal ought to deal with the CPs Mr Keen did not waive [the Defendant's] right to advance arguments which are pled by it as part of [the Defendant's] defence. It would be an extreme step for the Tribunal to hold that an agreement which fundamentally related to the procedure to be followed in the arbitration had the effect of preventing [the Defendant] from advancing part of its defence.
4.20 The point which then arises is whether the Tribunal ought to proceed to determine liability and quantum in respect of each of the CPs without considering as a preliminary step whether this is necessary to resolve the matters in dispute. The Tribunal has expressed repeated concerns about the wasted costs which might arise if it did not determine the CPs. Those concerns remain but up until June 2012 they were based upon an understanding that it would be necessary at some point for the parties either to agree the level of the CPs or for the Tribunal to determine them (whether in this arbitration or in some other procedure). [The Defendant] now submits that this is not the case. If [the Defendant] is correct in its submission then spending more time on the issue will not save time and expense. It will simply increase the amount of wasted cost. Further, the agreement reached in January 2012 does not address the question of who should bear the cost of the time spent in dealing with CPs. Presumably this would require to be determined by the Tribunal at a later stage but this may not be a straightforward matter if the Tribunal were to hold that although the parties agreed to deal with the CPs they were irrelevant to the eventual outcome of this arbitration.
4.21 In the present case it is only [the Claimant] which argues that determination of CPs is necessary to dispose of the various claims and counter-claims. [The Defendant] argues strongly to the opposite effect. In doing so [the Defendant] makes the point that it no longer places any reliance on the determination of CPs and that [the Claimant], in the context of this interim payment arbitration, only does so by asserting that CPs have relevance to interim payments. [The Defendant] contends that this relevancy matter, which is hotly contested, should be decided before any Tribunal decision on necessity is made."
These proceedings
"The Tribunal in seeking to minimise the impact of the amendments on the timetabling and costs of the arbitration, has maintained constant dialogue with the parties on procedural matters whilst remaining mindful that the parties should be free to agree how their disputes should be resolved."
The applicable principles
"... as a matter of general approach the courts strive to uphold arbitration awards. They do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye endeavouring to pick holes, inconsistencies and faults in awards and with the objective of upsetting or frustrating the process of arbitration. Far from it. The approach is to read an arbitration award in a reasonable and commercial way expecting, as is usually the case, that there will be no substantial fault that can be found with it."
"2. Section 68 reflects the internationally accepted view that the court should be able to correct serious failure to comply with the due process? of arbitral proceedings: cf Article 34 of the Model Law.
3. A serious irregularity has to pass the test of causing substantial injustice? before the court can act (s.68(2)).
4. The test of substantial injustice is intended to be applied by way of support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what has happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process, that the court will take action.
5. The test is not what would have happened had the matter been litigated. To apply such a test would be to ignore the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate not litigate.
6. Having chosen arbitration, the parties cannot complain of substantial injustice, unless what has happened cannot on any view be defended as an acceptable consequence of that choice.
7. Section 68 is designed as a longstop, only available in extreme cases, where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration in one of the respects listed in s.68, that justice calls out for it to be corrected."
"27 The legislative technique adopted to achieve this purpose was spelled out explicitly in the Report on the Arbitration Bill and in particular in discussion of clause 68, which became section 68 of the 1996 Act. The DAC observed about clause 68 that it "is really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected": p 58, para 280. On the other hand, the DAC recommended adoption of "the internationally accepted view that the court should be able to correct serious failure to comply with the 'due process' of arbitral proceedings: cf article 34 of the Model Law:" p 59, para 282. The ethos of the DAC report was that parties are entitled to a fair hearing leading to an impartial adjudication. But the idea that section 68 contemplated an adjudication which arrives at the "right" conclusion would have been wholly out of place in these recommendations. The DAC report was the matrix of the Parliamentary debates.
28. It is now necessary to examine section 68 in its textual setting…. This is a mandatory provision. The policy in favour of party autonomy does not permit derogation from the provisions of section 68 . A number of preliminary observations about section 68 are pertinent. First, unlike the position under the old law, intervention under section 68 is only permissible after an award has been made. Secondly, the requirement is a serious irregularity. It is a new concept in English arbitration law. Plainly a high threshold must be satisfied. Thirdly, it must be established that the irregularity caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant. This is designed to eliminate technical and unmeritorious challenges. It is also a new requirement in English arbitration law. Fourthly, the irregularity must fall within the closed list of categories set out in paragraphs (a) to (i).
29. It will be observed that the list of irregularities under section 68 may be divided into those which affect the arbitral procedure, and those which affect the award. But nowhere in section 68 is there any hint that a failure by the tribunal to arrive at the "correct decision" could afford a ground for challenge under section 68."
"It is unnecessary and in the circumstances undesirable for me to express a view as to whether the arbitrator came to the right conclusion, even if by the wrong route, or whether, had he ignored the 2003 amendments, he should have reached the same or a different conclusion. The element of serious injustice in the context of section 68 does not in such a case depend on the arbitrator having come to the wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact but whether he was caused by adopting inappropriate means to reach one conclusion whereas had he adopted appropriate means he might well have reached another conclusion favourable to the applicant. Thus, where there has been an irregularity of procedure, it is enough if it is shown that it caused the arbitrator to reach a conclusion unfavourable to the applicant which, but for the irregularity, he might well never have reached, provided always that the opposite conclusion is at least reasonably arguable. Above all it is not normally appropriate for the court to try the material issue in order to ascertain whether substantial injustice has been caused. To do so would be an entirely inappropriate inroad into the autonomy of the arbitral process."
The agreement
The effect of the agreement
Substantial injustice
"it is enough if it is shown that it caused the arbitrator to reach a conclusion unfavourable to the applicant which, but for the irregularity, he might well never have reached, provided always that the opposite conclusion is at least reasonably arguable. Above all it is not normally appropriate for the court to try the material issue in order to ascertain whether substantial injustice has been caused."
Conclusion