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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Alstom Transport UK Ltd v London Underground Ltd & Anor [2017] EWHC 1406 (TCC) (15 June 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2017/1406.html Cite as: [2017] EWHC 1406 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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Alstom Transport UK Limited |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) London Underground Limited (2) Transport For London |
Defendants |
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(instructed by Hogan Lovells International LLP) for the Claimant
Mr Jason Coppel QC and Mr Joseph Barrett
(instructed by Transport For London) for the Defendants
Hearing date: 26 May 2017
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mr Justice Coulson :
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE RELEVANT AUTHORITIES
"27. …Broadly, I form the view that this it is not really fair, just or necessary for there to be this disclosure prior to the Regulation 47(H) hearing. I have formed the view that there is a concern that there may be documents which may well assist the claimant's case ultimately and there is a concern that the court might be bamboozled which I am sure would not be the desire of any party in this case.
28. The court might be bamboozled into deciding the Regulation 47 application on the basis of controversial facts, but if the facts are controversial and they are challenged and it is only through such facts that the threshold as to whether there is a serious issue to be tried can be considered, then in those circumstances the claimants can rest assured that the court will not, and I consider cannot, make a decision on that aspect of the case.
29. Miss McCredie QC argues however, that because there may be such further documents, in effect her client would like to have them, because if they were to show that her client's case was very strong, not just a serious issue to be tried, but was a very strong case, that could be deployed on the balance of convenience. In this respect, I am more persuaded overall by the general submissions put forward by Mr Bowsher QC. The American Cyanimid approach is one that is well understood in the English and Welsh courts and it is based usually on uncontroversial facts or pleaded facts by the claimant or a combination of both. One of the reasons for Regulation 47(H) is to give the employing party the opportunity to come to court as soon as is reasonably necessary to seek to have the suspension lifted. There is a policy consideration here which involves consideration as to whether in effect all the steps necessary for the ultimate hearing of the case need to be gone through virtually, before such an application can be made."
"18. Now I am not going to decide the Section 47H application now, but it does seem to me that there is more than adequate ammunition and evidence to support the claimant's argument, at least, that there is a serious issue to be tried in relation to this first head of claim. Whether that is the final decision or not, I do not know, because I have not heard all the argument, but there is clearly something there to support the claimant. It is clear just on the face of the pleading, let alone anything else."
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the judge concluded that there was no need for the specific disclosure application to be heard first. That application would generate documents that went only to the aspect of the suspension hearing concerned with whether or not there was a serious issue, so if the contractor was going to be able to establish a serious issue to be tried in any event, the relevance of any other documents fell away. Moreover, at paragraph 34 of his judgment, Akenhead J confirmed that, if justice could not be done on the suspension hearing without sight of the relevant documents, the suspension hearing would have to be adjourned.
"23. It is a question of balancing the interests of justice against the background facts of the particular case. Contracting authorities have to work out, in fairly short order, whether, having provided the unsuccessful tenderer with the statutory minimum information, they are going to retain all other documents relating to the evaluation and the successful tenderer's bid, and let the unsuccessful tenderer take his own course; or whether they are prepared to be helpful and, providing that the confidentiality of the information is protected, offer to provide as much information about the process as they can. In my view, however, what the authority should not do is to try and have it both ways. It ought not to refuse requests to provide documents relating, say, to the evaluation of the successful tenderer's bid, or the bid itself, but then, on the application to lift the suspension, provide for the first time evidence about the process or the successful bid in support of its case, either that there is no serious issue to be tried, or that he would be prejudiced if the suspension was not lifted. That approach is at least potentially unfair, because it is relying on potentially controversial material which the unsuccessful tenderer has been given no proper opportunity to consider."
"25. I rely on those observations to conclude that controversial material, and/or material which, because of the absence of prior disclosure, the claimant is simply not in a position to address satisfactorily if it is produced for an interlocutory hearing, should not ordinarily be deployed on an application under Regulation 47(H), because of the risk of unfairness. I consider that, in this case, the Council has sought a potentially unfair advantage through its attitude to disclosure. There are two reasons for that."
3. ANALYSIS
"An unsuccessful tenderer who wishes to challenge the evaluation process is in a uniquely difficult position. He knows that he has lost, but the reasons for his failure are within the peculiar knowledge of the public authority. In general terms, therefore, and always subject to issues of proportionality and confidentiality, the challenger ought to be provided promptly with the essential information and documentation relating to the evaluation process actually carried out, so that an informed view can be taken of its fairness and legality.
We note that, in your paragraph 24, you rightly acknowledge that we are entitled to be provided with information that will establish whether LUL's contract award decision in this case is well founded. You also refer in your letter to a number of key documents (including the tracker used by LUL in relation to Bombardier's bid and the evaluation board meeting of 19 July 2016). We assume that, although this procurement was carried out under the Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006, as a responsible utility you have also kept the documentation necessary to justify decisions taken at all stages of the procurement procedure, including communications with tenderers, internal deliberations, negotiations and award of the contract, which is now required under Regulation 99(S) of the 2016 Regulations.
Assertions to the effect that LUL was satisfied with the ultimate outcome do not in any way enable Alstom to determine that LUL's contract award decision was well founded. At the very least, Alstom is entitled to know exactly what each of Bombardier's non-compliances were and how LUL addressed these with Bombardier in order to arrive at its position of apparent satisfaction, without prejudice to our contention that the general Treaty principles of equal treatment, transparency and good administration required LUL then formally to re-score Bombardier's bid and the bids of the other remaining bidders before proceeding to conclude its evaluation of the commercial aspects of the bids.
As to your third assertion, namely that the documents are commercially sensitive, we are content at this stage for genuinely commercially sensitive documents to be provided into a confidentiality ring composed of external lawyers only. We will send you a form of confidentiality undertaking to be signed by members of the ring on Monday together with the names of the proposed members.
In the light of the limited further information provided in your letter of 13 April 2017, we have refined our request for the essential documents and request your confirmation by no later than close of business on Monday 24 April 2017 that you will agree to provide these to our external lawyers:
1. The document(s) evidencing your decision to request Bombardier to submit further information in relation to its Stage 3 fails, rather than to reject its bid.
2. Your request(s) to Bombardier to submit further information in relation to its Stage 3 fails (paragraph 12 of your letter).
3. Bombardier's responses to the request(s) identified in 2 above.
4. Correspondence (whether via the online portal or otherwise) and minutes of meetings between LUL and Bombardier to resolve its Non-Compliances (paragraphs 15 and 18 of your letter).
5. Sections D-01, D-02, D-03 and D-04 of Bombardier's bid and its Contract Programme.
6. The evaluators' and moderators' contemporaneous comments and score sheets in relation to the above sections of Bombardier's bid.
7. Minutes and notes of the moderation meeting (paragraph 25.4 of your letter).
8. The ranking of the bids (paragraph 13 of your letter).
9. A copy of the minutes of the evaluation board meeting on 19 July 2016 and any papers submitted to that meeting (paragraph 14 of your letter).
10. A copy of the document(s) evidencing the decision which was "endorsed" at the above board meeting (paragraph 14 of your letter).
11. The tracker(s) prepared for Bombardier's commercial qualifications and technical and deliverability non-compliances, including all updates thereof (paragraph 15 of your letter).
12. LUL's review of Bombardier's response to ensure the requirements in the tracker(s) had been resolved to LUL's satisfaction (paragraph 19 of your letter).
13. The document(s) evidencing your consideration of whether Bombardier's bid was abnormally low and your conclusion that it was not (paragraph 23 of your letter).
14. The comparative analysis carried out under paragraph 7.1 of the ITT and, if different, that mentioned at paragraph 23(a) of your letter.
15. Your tender evaluation report."
"Alstom's very wide-ranging requests for disclosure do not relate to any particularised or properly arguable breach of duty under the UCR. Alstom's proposed approach appears to be that its legal team should conduct an audit of LUL's procurement documents, including a review of the preferred bidder's tender response, in order to seek to find points to complain about. Having carefully considered the request we do not consider that Alstom is entitled to the disclosure sought; nor do we consider that the proposed exercise is a legitimate or appropriate ones.
Alstom's letter dated 21 April 2017 asserts that that 'at the very least, Alstom is entitled to know exactly whet each of Bombardier's non-compliances were and how LUL addressed these with Bombardier in order to arrive at its position of apparent satisfaction.' LUL does not agree. Alstom is well aware of the approach that LUL adopted to dealing with issues of non-compliance, not least because LUL engaged in very extensive negotiation with Alstom in order to increase its confidence in, and ultimately regard as acceptable, the multiple non-compliances that arose in respect of Alstom's response. LUL has already made clear to Alstom that it adopted the same approach towards negotiation on non-compliance points in relation to all bidders who were invited to negotiate. There is no proper basis for Alstom to allege that the way in which this was done in respect of the preferred bidder's tender response breached the UCR.
The ITT clearly sets out, and Alstom has always known, how LUL would score tender responses for Stages 2 and 3; namely, by reference to the bidder's proposal, the evidence supplied and how that affected the evaluators' confidence level. LUL treated all three bidders who were invited to negotiate in the same way. Having scored Stages 1 to 4, issues were identified which LUL wanted to discuss further with all three bidders in the negotiation phase, so as to obtain further information and/or evidence and increase LUL's confidence in the bidder's proposal.
LUL engaged with each bidder during the negotiation phase, such that LUL's confidence increased in respect of each non-compliance for each bidder. All three bidders therefore passed Stages 1-3 and all three bidders were invited to submit a BAFO. There is no proper basis for Alstom to allege that LUL's approach and/or conclusions in respect of these matters breached the UCR."
"1. LUL was not obliged to fail or to exclude a bidder who scored a Discretionary Pass/Fail at Stage 2 or Stage 3. Had LUL been obliged to do so, both your client and Bombardier would have been excluded.
2. The ITT anticipates and provides for LUL to negotiate the issues arising from bidders' tender responses, including any non-compliances, At the end of the negotiation period, LUL was satisfied that all non-compliances had been addressed.
3. Bombardier had more Technical non-compliances than your client. However, your client had substantially more numerous (and significant) Commercial non-compliances than Bombardier.
4. LUL evaluated all Stages of the process in an equal, fair, non-discriminatory and transparent way.
In the circumstances, LUL does not consider that your client had any proper basis for issuing proceedings in this case."