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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Lewis Thermal Ltd v Cleveland Cable Company Ltd [2019] EWHC 206 (TCC) (16 January 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2019/206.html Cite as: [2019] EWHC 206 (TCC) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
OF ENGLAND AND WALES
TECHNOLOGY &
CONSTRUCTION COURT (QBD)
Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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LEWIS THERMAL LTD | Claimant | |
- and - | ||
CLEVELAND CABLE COMPANY LTD | Defendant |
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MR A. HICKEY QC (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
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Crown Copyright ©
MRS JUSTICE O'FARRELL:
(i) summary judgment against the claimant in respect of part of the claim, namely, the claims for deceit and/or misrepresentation set out in paras.27 and 32-33.1 of the Amended Particulars of Claim and paras.2 and 3 of the prayer in relation to loss and quantum;(ii) alternatively, for those parts of the claim to be struck out on the grounds that they do not plead a proper case and/or have no real prospect of succeeding and are an abuse of process.
"Accordingly, and as a direct result of the wrongdoing of Cleveland, Guardian lost –
(a) the opportunity of undertaking the remedial words and
(b) the opportunity to undertake further new work for its principle client upon which its business was in practical terms dependent.
Consequently, Guardian became insolvent and entered liquidation on 30 March 2012. Guardian therefore claims for loss of the value of its goodwill."
"1. During the period from April 2008 to December 2011, prior to the discovery by John Lewis of Guardian's breaches of the John Lewis contracts, Guardian had an average annual turnover of approximately £12.6 million of which an average of approximately £11 million was derived from contracts with John Lewis.
2. From 4 November 2011 until March 2012 –
(a) whereas it had previously been invited to tender for all major contracts for JLP, Guardian was not invited to tender for and was not therefore awarded any such contracts.
…
(c) Guardian lost the right to carry out the remedial works in respect of the twenty-eight stores in which the cables supplied by the defendant had been installed.
(d) JLW put Guardian under pressure to reduce its prices for the installation works at the John Lewis Parsons Green store.
3. There were a number of JLP projects that were available for tender between January 2012 and April 2012 which were not offered to Guardian.
4. The loss of goodwill and Guardian's subsequent liquidation was reasonably foreseeable to Cleveland at the time of the original contracts.
5. The claimant therefore claims for the loss of its business valued on the basis that it would have continued to contract with JLP but through the prospective of the prospects for the industry at that time which would have had a value of approximately £8.185 million."
"(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim.
(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court's process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings or,
(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order."
"i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91.
ii) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8].
iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain v Hillman.
iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases, it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10].
v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550.
vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 661.
vii) On the other hand, it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it."
"12. In handling all applications for summary judgment, the court's duty is to keep considerations of procedural justice in proper perspective. Appropriate procedures must be used for the disposal of cases. Otherwise there is a serious risk of injustice.
…
17. It is well settled by the authorities that the court should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in certain kinds of case. The classic instance is where there are conflicts of fact on relevant issues, which have to be resolved before a judgment can be given. A mini-trial on the facts conducted under CPR Part 24 without having gone through normal pre-trial procedures must be avoided, as it runs a real risk of producing summary injustice.
18. In my judgment, the court should also hesitate about making a final decision without a trial where, even though there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case."
"The method by which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well settled. After the normal processes of discovery and interrogatories have been completed, the parties are allowed to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can determine where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible. In other cases, it may be possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be take that view and resort to what is properly called summary judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being resolved in that way without conducting a mini-trial on the documents without discovery and without oral evidence. As Woolf L said in Swain v Hillman, that is not the object of the rule. It is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all."
i) There is no real prospect of the claimant establishing a causal link between the cable issue and the loss of JPL work. Mr Hickey submits that it is fanciful and imaginary that at trial the claimant could even begin to establish the causal link that the cable issue led to a decision to exclude Guardian from working on JLP projects from November 2011 until Guardian's liquidation in March 2012.ii) Secondly, the defendant relies on its submission that the claimant cannot satisfy the but-for test of causation, that its insolvency in March 2012 was caused by the cable issue. Mr. Hickey submits that it is obvious from all the available evidence that Guardian was trading insolvently in 2010 and 2011 and could not have survived into 2012 in any event. Since the claimant cannot satisfy the but-for test of causation, it is impossible for it to prove the essential loss ingredient of its claim in tort and under the Misrepresentation Act.
iii) Thirdly, it is submitted by Mr. Hickey that the claimant cannot prove and has no evidence to support the claim that its loss for the defendant's alleged wrongful acts was £8 million. His submission is that the public financial records that have so far been disclosed and/or obtained by the defendant demonstrate that the quantum case as pleaded by the claimant was, and is, wholly unsustainable. The dire picture of financial performance completely undermines the claimant's claim that, but for the cable issue in November 2011, it would have continued to trade profitably and achieve a value of some £8 million.
(i) He submits that the issues of which complaint is made by the defendant, namely questions of causation and quantum, are issues of fact and the proper place for those issues of fact to be determined is at a full trial. He submits that it would be wrong, as a matter of principle, for the court to embark on a summary determination of the merits of the case. There have not been full witness statements exchanged by both parties, although there has been some factual evidence which I will consider later. The expert reports are not complete. There has not been an opportunity for the court to consider all of the documents that might be put forward in a trial, hear the submissions of counsel on both sides and, crucially, have the evidence tested through cross-examination.(ii) Mr. Williamson also submits that the issues are not straightforward, and the court should be wary of granting summary judgment in such circumstances rather than awaiting the full evidence that would be available at a trial. In particular in relation to the case put forward by the claimant, namely that there is a link between the cable issue and the cessation of work from John Lewis, Mr. Williamson submits that this was always going to be a case of inference. If his clients could establish their case on deceit and misrepresentation, then it would be not such a great leap for the court to make in coming to the conclusion that it did in fact lead to a cessation of JLP work and for the court to conclude that there must have been some loss. Of course, the court is not being asked to make any summary determination of the primary issues of liability.
"It just does not seem credible to me that the suggestion that it is mere coincidence that the precise point at which JLP decided to use Guardian having worked together for decades prior, was exactly the point at which the cable issue was discovered by JLP."
"I can't comment on whether JLP did in fact scale back their work and their opening of stores for commercial reasons or otherwise on an overall view, but from our point of view as explained before, we were continuing to receive just as much work from JLP as we've had before, if not more."
"Mr. Burnett is carefully seeking to suggest that the reason why Guardian was excluded and/or not invited to tender for the other works was that they were not in JLP's view capable of performing the works. I do not understand the basis of this statement as we had consistently received a substantial amount of work from JLP for decades prior to the discovery of the inferior cables and as explained above, were due to receive significant work going forward into 2012 and beyond we had received no notification or warning from JLP that they had suddenly taken the view that Guardian was not capable of performing their works. I find it hard to believe that if there really was an issue with the price or quality of Guardian's work, that the main contractor would be unaware of this."
"Guardians' financial performance for the year-ending March 2011 was quite poor. It is clear from the management accounts for the nine months to December 2011 that by the end of 2011 we had been able to turn around the issues that Guardian was facing. In particular, for the nine months to December 2011, Guardian's turnover was £11.7 million and when compared with the prior year of sales of £8.8 million, this was an increase of thirty-three per cent. Further, sales for the quarter 31 December 2011 were also up thirty-one per cent on the same quarter of the prior years but for the issues that Guardian encountered with Cleveland, the company was on track to grow profitably.
11. I can identify that in or around 2011 and early 2012 I produced various forecasts to assess how we saw Guardian performing over the course of the next few years. These projections were created for various reasons, including but not limited to good internal management control for presentations to the company's bankers in respect of discussions as to renewing Guardian's overdraft facility and with a view to discussions with potential investors."
CERTIFICATE Opus 2 International Limited hereby certifies that the above is an accurate and complete record of the Judgment or part thereof. Transcribed by Opus 2 International Limited Official Court Reporters and Audio Transcribers 5 New Street Square, London, EC4A 3BF Tel: 020 7831 5627 Fax: 020 7831 7737 [email protected] This transcript has been approved by the Judge |