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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> English and Welsh Courts - Miscellaneous >> Begum v Issa & Ors [2014] EW Misc B51 (CC) (05 November 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2014/B51.html Cite as: [2014] EW Misc B51 (CC) |
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Sitting in Leeds
Oxford Row Leeds LS1 3BG |
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B e f o r e :
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NARGHIS BEGUM |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) NADEEM ISSA (2) SHAMEEM AKTAR ISSA - and THE MORTGAGE WORKS |
Defendants Intervenor |
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Elizabeth Darlington (instructed by Watson Woodhouse) for the First Defendant
Antoine Tinnion (instructed by Askew Bunting LLP) for the Second Defendant
Hearing dates: 22, 23 and 24 October 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Judge Behrens :
1. Introduction
1. Whether Narghis Begum has any beneficial interest in 107 Chalford Oaks. This turns on the question of whether she signed the 2007 Transfer. If she did sign it there is the further question of whether it was intended to transfer anything more than her legal interest in 107 Chalford Oaks.
2. If Narghis Begum's beneficial interest survived the events of 2007, the question arises whether it was overridden by the registration of Shameem Issa's title in 2011. Narghis Begum contends that her interest is an overriding interest by virtue of her occupation. Nadeem Issa and Shameem Issa accept that Narghis Begum was in actual occupation but contend that she ought to have responded to "informal inquiries" that were made of her in the early autumn of 2011.
3. If Narghis Begum's interest survived the sale to Shameem Issa, a number of questions arise under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 ("TOLATA") as to what should happen to 107 Chalford Oaks. Narghis Begum wishes to live there until her youngest child is 18 or finishes her education. Shameem Issa wishes to realise his investment by selling the property. There are also issues under TOLATA and/or the principles of equitable accounting as to what payments should be made by Narghis Begum in respect of her occupation since the separation and for the future.
4. Shameem Issa's interest is subject to a mortgage in favour of The Mortgage Works. The Mortgage Works are a party to these proceedings. Although, in the interest of saving costs, it did not appear at the trial it set out its position in a witness statement by Louise Batty dated 19 August 2014. It is content to abide by any order of the Court. However insofar Narghis Begum has a beneficial interest which overrides the interest conferred by its registered charge it seeks to be subrogated to the rights of any earlier mortgage binding on Narghis Begum.
2. The facts
2.1 The relationship
2.2 106 Costa Street
2.3 107 Chalford Oaks
Acquisition in 2005
The Transferees are to hold the Property on trust for themselves as joint tenants.
Remortgage in 2007
O'Rourke's file up to 27 June 2007
1. The Transferors are Narghis Begum and Nadeem Issa. The Transferee is Nadeem Issa.
2. The Consideration clause reads:
The Transferor has received from the Transferee the sum of £NIL
The amount secured under the mortgage at the date hereof is £22,646.66
[The figure of £22,646.66 is in manuscript. The figure may be explained on the basis that it is half of £45,293.32]
3. There is no declaration of trust.
4. In clause 12 the Transferee agrees to indemnify the Transferor against any liability under the Mortgage
Execution of the Transfer
As such [Nadeem Issa] instructed O'Rourkes Solicitors to act in the transfer of the property. This was discussed with [Narghis Begum] and she was agreeable to the transfer as she had no interest in the property. Narghis Begum came to the offices of O'Rourkes and she was fully advised as to the contents of the Transfer Deed which she willingly signed in the presence of Afzal Butt
I can recall attending with Mr Butt when both myself and the Claimant signed the TR1 in the presence of Mr Butt. To be clear Mr Butt was not known to me when I instructed him to act in the transfer.
In paragraph 14:
As the house was, in all but name my absolute property there was no question that I would apply for a mortgage in my sole name. As the Claimant had no financial interest in the house she had no beneficial interest to transfer to me and so this was not an issue.
Following the appointment [Nadeem Issa] called me to say that he had been quite offended by Mr Butt who said "Is she from back home?", and was referring to Narghis Begum. Narghis Begum and Nadeem Issa had also laughed about how long the appointment had taken due to the fact that Mr Butt had spent about 30 minutes going through things with them and telling Narghis Begum that she should see a separate solicitor.
I did not know the property had been remortgaged. Nadeem Issa told me that the interest rate - he had changed it over . He did not go into too much detail
I did not know the lender had changed
He said the interest rate on the mortgage was too high so he has changed the interest rate. He never mentioned if it was with the same provider.
O'Rourkes's file after the Transfer
Events in 2011
Transfer to Shameem Akhtar Issa
Events in May 2012
3. Financial Position of the parties
Narghis Begum
Nadeem Issa
Shameem Issa
4. The first set of issues
Execution of the TR1
3. The Court's attention is specifically drawn to the following:
a. C's signature on the 2007 transfer was witnessed by an independent witness employed by O'Rourkes Afzal Butt;
b. there is no basis for an inference of negligence, still less an inference of fraud, on Mr. Butt's part by his signature, this is what Mr. Butt said he did, and there is no reason (other than C's denial) to conclude he did not;
c. the burden of proof rests on C C could have sought evidence from Mr. Butt to prove he did not witness her signing the 2007 transfer;
d. in addition, Mr. Butt was well known to Tanveer Hussain;
e. after the meeting at which the 2007 transfer was signed, both Mr. Butt and D1 telephoned Mr. Hussain about the offensive remark Mr. Butt made about C in D1's presence, D1 to complain, Mr. Butt to apologise;
f. as someone who obtained business from Mr. Hussain's recommendations, this is what one might have expected Mr. Butt to do;
g. if D1 attended O'Rourkes with a female pretending to be C, it is hard to believe D1 would have called Mr. Hussain to complain far more likely D1 would have said nothing and kept a low profile, having gotten away with fraud;
h. Mr. Hussain's evidence shows C was clearly lying when she claimed not to have attended O'Rourkes and spoken to Mr. Butt on 27 June 2007.
4. The Court is also referred to the following evidence:
a. O'Rourkes required proof of ID from D1 and C (as one would expect);
b. O'Rourkes had proof of ID on file copies of D1 and C's passports (C's issued in February 2007), and in D1's case, also a recent utility bill;
c. without the passport holder physically present, handing over C's passport would not have proved anyone's ID;
d. it is likely whichever employee at O'Rourkes took C's passport to copy it would have looked to see whether the female whose passport it was meant to be looked like the female on the passport photo ie, a visual check would have been done, and the employee would have raised an issue at the time if they were in any doubt as to identity;
e. as Mr. Butt was meant to be witnessing C's signature, and since C's passport was physically there, it is likely that Mr. Butt would also have checked C's passport before confirming he had witnessed C's signature.
Construction of the Transfer
(1) the ultimate aim of interpreting a contractual provision is to determine what the parties meant by the language used, which involves ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant;
(2) the reasonable person is one who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably be available to the parties in the situation they were at the time of the contract;
(3) where a term of a contract is open to more than one interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most consistent with business common sense;
(4) poorly drafted contracts do not attract a different approach, but the poorer the quality of the drafting, the less willing the Court should be to be driven to semantic niceties to attribute to the parties an improbable or unbusinesslike intention;
(5) however where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it.
Undue Influence
[14] Proof that the complainant placed trust and confidence in the other party in relation to the management of the complainant's financial affairs, coupled with a transaction which calls for explanation, will normally be sufficient, failing satisfactory evidence to the contrary, to discharge the burden of proof. On proof of these two matters the stage is set for the court to infer that, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the transaction can only have been procured by undue influence. In other words, proof of these two facts is prima facie evidence that the defendant abused the influence he acquired in the parties' relationship. He preferred his own interests. He did not behave fairly to the other. So the evidential burden then shifts to him. It is for him to produce evidence to counter the inference which otherwise should be drawn.
5. The second set of issues
"(1) If a registrable disposition of a registered estate is made for valuable consideration, completion of the disposition by registration has the effect of postponing to the interest under the disposition any interest affecting the estate immediately before the disposition whose priority is not protected at the time of registration."
An interest belonging at the time of the disposition to a person in actual occupation, so far as relating to the of which he is in actual occupation except for -
"(b) an interest of a person of whom inquiry was made before the disposition and who failed to disclose the right when he could reasonably have been expected to do so;
(c) an interest
(i) which belongs to a person whose occupation would not have been obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of the land at the time of the disposition, and
(ii) of which the person to whom the disposition is made does not have actual knowledge at that time..".
1. I am prepared to assume (without deciding) that Narghis Begum was present at the Eid celebrations. I am prepared to accept that there was a general discussion between Nadeem Issa and Shameem Issa and their father as to the sale of 107 Chalford Oaks to Shameem Issa. I do not accept that the price was ever mentioned. I do not accept that those discussions constituted an inquiry made of Narghis Begum in relation to her interest in 107 Chalford Oaks. Nor do I consider that (even assuming that Narghis Begum was present) it would have been reasonable for her to assert her interest then.
2. I do not accept that there were any significant discussions in the presence of Narghis Begum between 3 September 2011 and 12 September 2011. As already noted I do not accept Shameem Issa's evidence that the price was mentioned at the Eid celebrations. Equally I do not accept his evidence as to the detailed nature of the discussions after Eid. If there had been such detailed discussions I would have expected them to have been mentioned in his witness statement and to have been put to Narghis Begum when she gave evidence. I do not accordingly accept that any relevant inquiry was made to Narghis Begum after Eid.
6. The Third Group of Issues
6.1 Occupation
(1) The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining an application for an order under section 14 include
(a) the intentions of the person or persons (if any) who created the trust,
(b) the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held,
(c) the welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy any land subject to the trust as his home, and
(d) the interests of any secured creditor of any beneficiary.
the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries who is (or apart from any previous exercise by the trustees of those powers would be) entitled to occupy the land under section 12.
6.2 Equitable Accounting/ Occupation Rent/ Payments
14. Under the previous equitable doctrine the court was concerned only with considerations relevant to achieving a just result between the parties. The statutory innovation is section 15, which requires the court in determining all applications for an order under section 14 to include amongst the other matters to which it has regard: (1) in all cases (so far as applicable) the four matters referred to by Baroness Hale; (2) in the case of applications relating to the exercise by trustees of the powers conferred by section 13 the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries who is (or apart from any previous exercise by the trustees would be) entitled to occupy the land under section 12; and (3) in case of any other application (other than one relating to the conveyance of land to beneficiaries absolutely entitled) the circumstances and wishes of any beneficiaries of full age entitled to an interest in possession. The wider ambit of relevant considerations means that the task of the court must now be, not merely to do justice between the parties, but to do justice between the parties with due regard to the relevant statutory considerations and in particular (where applicable) the welfare of the minor, the interests of secured creditors and the circumstances and wishes of the beneficiaries specified.
In the ordinary case of cohabitation the common purpose of the implied trust subsists whilst the relationship subsists. During that period whilst the ordinary arrangements for the discharge of the outgoings subsist there is no breach or failure by any one of the parties to honour any obligation owed to the other. Thus in the usual case there is no room or reason for equitable accounting.
65. As to the period to which equitable accounting should relate, in a case such as the instant case where the property has been used as a home for both parties but the relationship between the parties has come to an end (what was described in argument as a cohabitation case), the judge was in my judgment right to conclude that that depends upon the intentions of the parties as to how the relevant expenditure should be borne as between them.
66. That said, I agree with Judge Behrens in Clarke v Harlowe that in the ordinary cohabitation case it is open to the court to infer from the fact of cohabitation that during the period of cohabitation it was the common intention of the parties that neither should thereafter have to account to the other in respect of expenditure incurred by the other on the property during that period for their joint benefit. Whether the court draws that inference in the given case will of course depend on the facts of that case.
6.3 Conclusion on occupation/ occupation rent.
7. The Fourth Set of Issues