English and Welsh Courts - Miscellaneous

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCC 9

Case No: L00TQ030

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT PLYMOUTH

The Law Courts

Armada Way

Plymouth

Deven PL1 2ER

Date: 7 March 2025

 

 

 

 

Before:

DISTRICT JUDGE MASHEMBO

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Between:

CHIEF CONSTABLE OF DEVON & CORNWALL POLICE

Applicant

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PATRICIA SHORTHOUSE

Respondent

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MR BRETT for the Applicant

MISS GROSVENOR for the Respondent

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JUDGMENT

 

DISTRICT JUDGE MASEMBO:

 

1.                  The applicant in this application is the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police, represented today by Mr Brett. The respondent is Patricia Shorthouse, represented by Miss Grosvenor.  That she is represented today is through the massive efforts of the court to locate someone for her. 

2.                  On 20 November 2024, Miss Shorthouse appeared in this court following an arrest for being in suspected breach of an injunction order made against her on 3 April 2024, but made final on 2 July 2024, under the Anti‑Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. That injunction expires on 2 April 2026. The terms of that injunction that are relevant for the purpose of this sentencing hearing are paragraphs.1, 2 and 4. Miss Patirica Shorthouse is prevented, by virtue of paragraph.1, from acting in an anti‑social manner, that is to say in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person. At paragraph.2, she is prevented from using offensive, aggressive or obscene words or gestures in a public place, such that it causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person. By virtue of paragraph.4, she is prevented from using the 999 system to contact the police, ambulance or fire service unless calling for a genuine emergency. A power of arrest is attached to the terms of that injunction order.

3.                  The respondent on 20 November 2024, admitted breaching that injunction. On 14 November, the respondent appeared outside on the street in which her home is located. She came out of the front door and shouted words to the effect of "You are a fucking cunt" and words to the effect of "Shut the fuck up." The respondent then slammed the door. The respondent again came out outside of her home and started shouting "Shut the fuck up" multiple times, "Go to bed, you cunt.  Don't come near us."  It was also said that there was something said about the neighbour abusing his mother. The respondent was described as being "abusive and loud" in the street and it caused her neighbours significant distress.

4.                  On 20 November of last year, I found to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent breached the terms of paragraphs.1 and 2 of the injunction order. She was sentenced to a total period of 4 days in prison but this was suspended until 20 May 2025 and would not be put in force if during that time she complied with the terms of the injunctions, dated 2 July 2024.  Today, I have identified that there is an error in that order because the respondent spent one day on remand before that hearing which has not been taken into account on the order. So that order should reflect that the sentence was in fact 2 days and I invite Mr Brett to send me an amended order under the slip rule.

5.                  The applicant alleged that the respondent committed a further breach of paragraphs.1 and 2 of the injunction on 18 February 2025. The details of those breaches are set out in the schedule of breaches in the bundle that I have received, which reads as follows:

"On 18 February 2025, in the County of Devon, you breached Prohibition 1 and/or 2 of the Civil Injunction by using offensive, aggressive and obscene words to your neighbour Judith Cole, including calling her a "fucking cunt"; that "it will be good if you die soon because nobody wants you here"; and "you are a fat fucking cunt", causing harassment, alarm and distress. "

6.                  On 20 February of this year, the respondent was arrested for those alleged breaches.  The court heard the case on 21 February and the respondent attended court. The court adjourned the case until 28 February 2025 and the respondent was bailed until that hearing. She failed to attend. She informed a police officer that week that she would not attend and tore up the witness statement he gave her. The court decided to proceed in her absence. The court found that the breaches as set out in the schedule were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

7.                  The case was adjourned until this Monday, 3 March 2025, for sentencing and a bench warrant was issued. On Monday of this week, Miss Shorthouse came to court on the bench warrant. She told me that she wished to have legal representation. I adjourned until today for the sentencing hearing. I gave her bail in order to give her the best chance to secure legal representation. She told me that she would.

8.                  On Tuesday, Miss Shorthouse was arrested again and brought to court for further alleged breaches. The circumstances of that breach are that she breached paragraph.4 of the injunction on Monday by making 11 calls on the emergency 999 or 112 telephone service between 6.00 pm and 7.08 pm. The total duration of those calls was over 27 minutes and there was never any emergency situation in her calls. Today, with the benefit of Miss Grosvenor's assistance, the respondent has admitted that breach.

9.                   I find to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent has breached paragraph.4 of the injunction order in the manner I have just outlined. The respondent is, therefore, in contempt of court and I am now dealing with the sentence for those matters.

10.              I have heard from Mr Brett and Miss Grosvenor. The objectives of sentencing are to ensure future compliance with the order, punishment and rehabilitation. This was set out in Wigan Borough Council v Lovett [2023] 1 WLR 1443. There are a number of options available to the court when dealing with this respondent.  Again, the options are set out in that case. They are either:  committal to prison; immediate or suspended; to adjourn the penalty; or a fine.  I remind myself of the general principles that custody should be reserved for the most serious breaches and for less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed. In the most minor cases, the court may decide that the impact of the proceedings is likely to achieve the purposes of the contempt jurisdiction. It may be appropriate to make no order save for the finding of breach.

11.              The court should consider a penalty for each breach found proved. The terms of imprisonment may be concurrent or consecutive to each other. Consideration must also be given to the totality of the penalties imposed. A custodial sentence should not be imposed if an alternative course is sufficient and appropriate.  If I do decide to impose a term of imprisonment, that term should always be the shortest term which will achieve the purpose for which it is being imposed. If custody is appropriate, the length of the sentence should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended.

12.              In my judgment, adjournment of sentence as a deterrent and to secure a means of compliance would serve no purpose.  Similarly, a fine is not appropriate on the facts of this case. If I am thinking about custody, the first question to ask myself is whether the custody threshold has been passed. In my view, it clearly has, given the history. In fairness, Miss Grosvenor, on behalf of the respondent, accepts today that the threshold has been crossed.

13.              So far as sentencing is concerned, I have given consideration to the degree of harm and the degree of culpability bearing in mind the civil context. I have had regard to the well‑known scheme based on the three levels of culpability and harm.

14.              Dealing with the degree of culpability first, in my judgment, the breaches of the order by the respondent are wholly deliberate breaches. The respondent was fully aware of the injunction order and what she could or could not do. The respondent has now breached the injunction on three separate occasions. The third breach, this week, was committed whilst on bail and awaiting sentence for the second breach.

15.              With regard to the level of harm, what was said to Mrs Cole on 18 February of this year was, as Mr Brett has submitted, "nasty". I have read Mrs Cole's statement. What was said made her feel "absolutely horrible." She was distressed and alarmed. She was wished dead in circumstances where she has had a health scare which almost killed her. There is no evidence of actual violence or threat of serious violence. I find, though, that what was said was abusive and offensive and directed at her.

16.              Regarding the breach from 3 March this week, the respondent is described in some of the calls as being "very abusive". The precise nature of that abuse is not clear.  What is clear is that the emergency call handlers were taken away from dealing with emergency situations for a total period of over 27 minutes. However, I do not categorise that behaviour as causing very serious harm or distress. I do agree with both counsel that, having regard to the table as set out in Lovett, that I am dealing with breaches that fall within category 2 level B.

17.              The appropriate starting point for the sentence is one month. The category range can be adjusted from adjourned consideration up to 3 months' imprisonment. There are some elements for the court to take into consideration which increase the seriousness of the breaches. There is a history of disobedience. The most recent breach, as I have already stated, was committed whilst on bail. There is a disregard for the court injunction order and for the court process. Miss Shorthouse has ripped court papers up twice in the space of two weeks and she did fail to attend court last week. She has a long history of offending behaviour:  57 convictions for 89 offences.

18.              Are there mitigating factors?  I take into account the remorse that Miss Shorthouse, through Miss Grosvenor, has shown today. She has, since being in custody, had time to reflect on her behaviour and is currently sober. I take into account that she has admitted the breach of 3 March. She clearly does have her own vulnerabilities.  She does need support and has been signposted today for that support.

19.              However, in my judgment, the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty is appropriate. Firstly, I activate the suspended sentence that I gave on 20 November last year, that being 2 days' imprisonment. Consecutively to that, I give Miss Shorthouse 14 days for each breach that took place on 18 February 2025, those to run concurrently with each other. Consecutively to that and for the breach on 3 March 2025, I give the respondent 14 days. That makes a total of 30 days' imprisonment. The respondent has served 10 days on remand already in respect of the February and March breaches. I do take those into account.

20.              So, the sentence I pass today is 30 days' imprisonment, less 10 days for time spent in custody on remand, which gives a total sentence of 20 days. That, in my judgment, is just and proportionate. I am not suspending the sentence of imprisonment at this time because this is not now the first breaches that I am dealing with and the suspended sentence I gave last year did not ultimately bring about compliance with the injunction order. That is my decision.

21.              Of course, Miss Shorthouse will be informed that she has a right to appeal that decision, without permission, to a circuit judge and she has 28 days to do so.

22.              That is my judgment.