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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Court of Appeal >> The Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins (Approved) [2024] IECA 322 (05 November 2024) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2024/2024IECA322.html Cite as: [2024] IECA 322 |
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THE COURT OF APPEAL
Neutral Citation: [2024] IECA 322
Bill No.: MHDP0018/2017
Court of Appeal Record No.: 175/20+19
Edwards J.
Kennedy J.
MacGrath J.
BETWEEN
THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
RESPONDENT
AND
MICHAEL COLLINS
APPELLANT
JUDGMENT of MacGrath J. delivered on the 5th day of November 2024
1. This is an appeal by Mr Collins against the severity of sentences imposed on him in the Circuit Criminal Court on the 17th July 2019. He was found guilty by a jury of sixteen offences relating to his driving on the 27th May 2016 on the N2 roadway near Waterside, Duleek, Co. Meath. He was charged on count no. 1 with dangerous driving causing the death of Jillian Thornton, a young woman who had been a passenger in his car, two counts of endangerment, one count of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, namely cannabis; and 12 counts of dangerous driving at various locations on the outskirts of Drogheda, Co. Louth.
2. The incidents of driving which led to the above convictions occurred over a 39 km stretch of road in a 35-minute period. His driving came to an abrupt and tragic end when his vehicle went out of control, travelled onto the incorrect side of the road and collided almost perpendicularly with the oncoming vehicle. His headlights were off at the time. Analysis of a blood sample taken from Mr Collins in the aftermath of the collision confirmed the presence of cannabis in his system. Ms Karen Hayes of the Medical Bureau of Road Safety gave evidence of the adverse effects of such intoxicant on motor coordination.
3. Garda Byrne had been on mobile patrol on a link road on the northern edge of Drogheda. He saw a dark coloured Mitsubishi Colt travelling at high speed towards a roundabout at Waterunder. It crossed onto the incorrect side of the roadway. It then navigated the roundabout against the flow of traffic. Garda Byrne activated the emergency lights and siren on his vehicle. He witnessed several incidents of Mr Collins' driving which have been summarised in the respondent's submissions as follows:
1. Overtaking stationary traffic which was waiting to execute a right-hand turn at Mell.
2. Passing onto the incorrect side of a roadway and driving through a red traffic light at or about the Cement Road.
3. Driving at high speed along the North Road.
4. Driving through red lights at the junction between Patrick Street and George's Street.
5. Driving through a red traffic light at the junction of George's Street and Fair Street.
6. Driving through a red traffic light governing the junction of George's Street and Narrow West Street.
7. Driving on the incorrect side of the roadway over the Bridge of Peace.
8. Overtaking vehicles at speed along the Rathmullan Road causing oncoming vehicles to take evasive action.
9. Proceeding through a red traffic light at Marley's Lane.
10. Travelling at high speed without lights through an area known as the Commons.
11. Travelling at speed through Duleek Village.
12. Travelling without lights along the N2.
13. Travelling on the incorrect side of the roadway without lights towards
oncoming Garda vehicles on the N2.
14. Weaving backwards and forwards across the central line of the N2.
15. Forcing a heavy goods vehicle and bus into the hard shoulder as he travelled
along the N2.
Garda Byrne then lost sight of Mr Collins' vehicle. He next saw it when he came upon the scene of the collision a short time later.
4. Garda Dessie McGarry encountered Mr Collins at Waterunder. Garda McGarry overtook Garda Byrne's car and activated his emergency lights and sirens. He also witnessed the various acts of dangerous driving referred to above and gave the following description of Mr Collins' driving: -
1. Dangerously negotiating a junction at Sheep House, a rural area on the outskirts of Drogheda.
2. Failing to stop at a stop sign at the approach road to Donore Village.
3. Turning on and off his lights as his vehicle travelled from Donore Village towards the Cement Factory at Platin Terrace.
4. Failing to stop at a stop sign and narrowly avoided a collision with an oncoming patrol van at Platin Terrace. This relates to one of the counts of endangerment (count no. 3).
5. Travelling at speed through Donore Village by forcing an oncoming vehicle to take evasive action near Cruicerath.
6. Turning his lights on and off as he passed from the correct to the incorrect side of the road approaching Duleek.
7. Overtaking vehicles in the face of oncoming traffic as he approached Duleek.
8. Traveling between the hard shoulder and the oncoming lane of traffic on the N2 at Balrath.
9. Switching on and off his lights as he travelled along the N2.
10. Travelling on the incorrect side of the road into the path of oncoming bus and articulated lorry.
11. Performing a handbrake turn on the N2 motorway.
5. Garda McGarry also witnessed Mr Collins completing a U turn and travelling on the incorrect side of the road in his direction. He was forced to pull onto the hard shoulder. This incident of driving resulted in his conviction for endangerment, count no. 2 on the indictment. Sergeant Hodgkinson had to drive his van into the hard shoulder to avoid a head on collision at a time when Mr Collins was driving on his incorrect side of the road.
6. Brief footage from CCTV cameras which captured part of the journey was played to this Court.
Sentencing Remarks
7. In passing sentence, the sentencing judge remarked as follows, as per the transcript:
"Now, in relation to the aggravating factors, I propose to identify them and thereafter, deal with what mitigation is present. In terms of sentencing, I must be proportionate in terms of the sentence that I'm going to structure for these offences as committed by Michael Collins on that date. Thereafter, I will address each count in sequence on the indictment separately and individually where I will nominate the headline sentence and then the actual sentence. The sentence that I am proposing adopting is, in commencing in the order of time as the events evolved, commencing with count 5, then dealing with those devastating events in count 1, but for the purposes of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing judgment, I'm identifying the aggravating factors as follows. The loss of a young life and those harrowing circumstances in which Ms Thornton died, at every remove, the driving by Michael Collins was dangerous without any regard for others. It was dangerous in the most extreme fashion, and it was continuous as he was relentless in avoiding being caught up with or being caught by the guards. His driving included driving at speed, ignoring the traffic signals and lighting sequences at junctions and driving straight through them, taking the chase specifically, ignoring the presence of other road users, failing to stop at any stage for the gardaí despite many, many opportunities. This journey transversed between evening light fading to dusk then darkness with consequential effect of him being described by many witnesses as driving the car, switching on and off lights which are only deliberated. All the environmental factors were ignored from the narrow rural roads to urban locations. The cause of this fatal collision was his driving. It was dangerous and chaotic. He was in control and wasn't stopping and taking the chase and it seems the only thing that would stop him was either going to be a collision or running out of fuel.
I note his previous convictions at the time and the presence of relevant convictions are relevant to this sentence. His earlier consumption of cannabis was described by the expert witness as having an acknowledged effect on one's ability to drive. His lack of remorse, his lack of taking responsibility, he continues to absolve himself of any blame and therefore, his continuous attribution of blame to everyone but himself in terms of his own actions are also matters I can take into account.
The victim impact statement, as I said, it's an impressive, articulate and heart-breaking insight into the life of Jillian Thornton and gives colour to the appalling loss to her beloved family. His actions caused the death of a bright, young 20-year-old girl who thought she was going to a concert and the impact of her loss at such an age upon her family is, no doubt, beyond calculation. The Thorntons are grieving, and that loss can never be measured but they are stoic and strong and their composure throughout the difficult and often trying trial is a testament to their dignity and it is to their credit.
Now, as I said, his driving at all stages endangered both members of the public and other road users and included that of his passengers. He had no regard for safety, life or limb. Now, in relation to matters in respect of the overall gravity of the case, I've indicated I'm taking a global view as these offences were committed in that 35-minute spree rendering the gravity of each individual offence more serious. And so, the overall offending conduct most consequently be regarded as more serious than any individual offence considered in isolation.
In terms of proportionality and those well-recognised principles of sentencing, I must now turn to the presence of mitigation, if any. Firstly, he's lost mitigation through contesting the trial and that he was entitled to do so but he will not be penalised for fighting the case, but it was his behaviour which was very often challenging to the Thorntons and the witnesses in the case. All behaviour without any display of insight or for the feelings of the Thornton family did him no favours in front of the jury. He's refused all legal representation offered at all stages and that's his own decision. He now states that he feels for them and has apologised to them about what happened in the car and stated that he wished that he had stopped the car and then goes on to blame others for what happened while maintaining that he asked the young women to get out, again, flying in the face of all evidence adduced. Again, in relation to taking the chase but it was the gardaí who crashed into him, again, flying in the face of all evidence adduced."
8. Mr Collins was 42 years old at the time of the offending. He knew the mother of the other passenger in his car, whom he summonsed to give evidence. The sentencing judge referred to this as a "nuisance fishing operation" which introduced irrelevancy into the trial. Mr Collins was supported in court by his mother and other family members. The sentencing judge acknowledged Mr Collins achievements while in custody: -
"I must structure the sentence to reflect the fact rehabilitation and that should be incorporated into the sentence. In this particular instance, bearing in mind the relevant previous convictions, deterrence must be incorporated into the sentence structure both general and specific. I'm obliged to consider and structure a sentence that is proportionate to these offences and to his culpability as his culpability is of a very high degree".
She addressed his convictions for dangerous driving and driving while under the influence of an intoxicant sequentially, with the structure of sentencing reflecting each act of dangerous driving. These sentences were imposed on a concurrent basis. Three months imprisonment was nominated as the headline and actual sentence in respect of count no. 4, the driving of a mechanically propelled vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. In respect of count no. 5, that is dangerous driving at the Waterunder area, a headline sentence of six months imprisonment was nominated, and actual sentence of four months imposed. The dangerous driving counts were considered to be continuous, but the structure of the sentence was said to reflect the increased gravity of these instances of driving.
9. Regarding the counts of endangerment, count no. 3 on the indictment related to the driving at Platin Little which caused Sergeant Hodgkinson to take evasive action. This was considered to be in the upper range of offending. A headline sentence of four years imprisonment was nominated, with an actual sentence of three years imprisonment imposed. A headline sentence of six years was identified in respect of count no. 2, relating to Garda McGarry, with a final sentence of five years being imposed by the sentencing judge. In so doing she remarked: -
"...I'm identifying a headline sentence of six years' imprisonment with an actual penalty of five years' imprisonment. This was the last in time in terms of the driving prior to the collision which caused the death of Ms Thornton. The evidence of the witness was very compelling, and, in that regard, the driving was so dangerous having observed from -- through the evidence that was adduced over the course of the trial, how it was progressively getting worse in its gravity, that I'm imposing a sentence of five years in that regard."
10. With regard to the dangerous driving causing death offence, the sentencing judge observed:
"Count 1 on the indictment, which is the last offence in time but is the first count on the indictment. Bearing in mind all the aggravating factors which I've highlighted already and having regard to the penalty being .... is one of 10 years' imprisonment? So, he was driving dangerously for 35 minutes, he was taking a chase, he was intentionally driving and refusing to stop, turning on and off his lights, driving into the face of oncoming traffic on the incorrect side of the road. This continued reckless behaviour and driving at other traffic with its devastating consequences, I'm nominating the headline sentence as the maximum being 10 years' imprisonment."
Plea in Mitigation
11. The appellant, who represented himself having discharged his legal team on two previous occasions, addressed the court as follows (as per the transcript):
"Thank you, yes. First, I'd like to say I apologise to the Thornton family what happened in the car accident. I know I went not guilty; I'm representing myself. I didn't want to plead guilty because the family wouldn't have heard the whole case, I needed to hear the whole case, the public needed to hear the whole case. You heard me, I went not guilty all the time. The jury found me guilty, that was their decision, I still say I'm not guilty, but you found me guilty, so the jury found me guilty. We're here today and I do feel for the family. I wish I had to stop but I -- they wouldn't get out the car. I asked them to get out the car on numerous occasions to get out the car, they wouldn't get out. We took a chase -- foolish thing to do, we had the crash. I always said it was DRU crashed into me. I might have imagined it, but I don't think I did imagine it. I'll always take it to my grave that the garda crashed into me. The jury found me guilty, that's their decision and I'll leave it in your hands, your honour."
12. Before imposing sentence, the sentencing judge received and considered various skills certificates obtained by Mr Collins, including from the British Red Cross, in communications and other disciplines. She also considered a report prepared by Dr Conor O'Neill, consultant forensic psychiatrist, on the 29th May 2018. This had been prepared in the context of a potential pre-trial issue of fitness to plead and was provided to the sentencing judge as background information. Counsel for the prosecution informed the court that Mr Collins did not agree with its contents. It was based on an interview with Mr Collins. Dr O'Brien also had access to extensive collateral information concerning Mr Collins' family, medical and personal matters. Dr O'Neill did not find evidence that the offending behaviour was driven or motivated by a major mental illness. There was no indication for psychiatric hospitalisation and no evidence that Mr Collins was suffering from a mental illness at or in around that time. There was no evidence of major affective or psychotic illness in a drug-free environment. He opined that Mr Collins did not present as suffering from acute symptoms of a psychiatric illness.
13. The sentencing judge found that mitigation was limited. She considered his personal circumstances, work history and family circumstances. He has a supportive mother. That Mr Collins pleaded not guilty was not to be considered aggravating factor. He enjoyed the presumption of innocence and was entitled to defend himself. By taking that course of action, however, he deprived himself of mitigation that might otherwise attach.
14. In respect of his conviction for dangerous driving causing death, count no. 1, Mr Collins received the maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. He was sentenced to various periods of imprisonment of between four and six months in respect of twelve counts of dangerous driving and three months imprisonment for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. Mr Collins was sentenced to five years in respect of the endangerment charge, the subject matter of count no. 2; and three years in respect of the endangerment charge, the subject of count no. 3. She directed that his term of imprisonment for dangerous driving causing death should run consecutively with the sentence imposed in respect of the first count of endangerment, with the final twelve months of the sentence for dangerous driving being suspended on conditions. The three-year sentence in respect of the second count of endangerment was directed to run concurrently with the five year sentence imposed on the other endangerment count. All sentences in respect of dangerous driving were directed to run concurrently with the sentence for dangerous driving causing death. Mr Collins was sentenced to a total of 15 years in prison with the final 12 months of the ten-year sentence for dangerous driving causing death being suspended.
Grounds of Appeal
15. In his notice of appeal and in submissions the appellant criticises the sentencing judge for failing to make adequate effort to ensure that he was legally represented or to seek up-to-date reports. It was clarified at hearing that the criticisms were advanced by way of background information rather than as errors of legal principle per se.
16. We are satisfied that these criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny. Mr Collins had been represented prior to his trial by a legal team which he discharged on two occasions. That an accused takes upon him or herself to proceed without legal representation is ultimately a matter for him or her. Mr Collins was aware of his entitlement to legal representation and any lack of wisdom in his decision to represent himself cannot be laid at the door of the sentencing judge whose overall responsibility is to ensure a fair trial, which we are satisfied occurred in this case.
17. The principal grounds of appeal are that the sentencing judge fell into error in imposing the maximum sentence of ten years on count no. 1, in imposing consecutive sentences and that, when assessing the cumulative effect of the sentences, she failed to impose an overall sentence which was proportionate to the offending. It is submitted that an overall sentence of 15 years in prison with the final 12 months suspended is excessive and disproportionate. While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence, counsel for the appellant submits that an error of principle arises and that, in effect, the risk of double counting when consecutive sentences are imposed, has materialised.
Discussion and Conclusion
18. A sentencing judge must have regard to the fundamental principles of sentencing. Sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offending and reflect that the offence has been committed by the particular offender before the court. The court repeats what was said by Edwards J. in DPP v. Flynn [2020] IECA 294, at para. 55:
"Although the range of available penalties open to the sentencing judge for the principal offence in this case theoretically ranged from non-custodial disposal up to imprisonment for ten years, we consider that such was the gravity of the respondent's offending conduct that in no circumstances could a non-custodial headline sentence ever have been realistically contemplated. In our view, an appropriate assessment of the gravity of this case based upon a synthesis of the twin ingredients of culpability and harm done would mandate that the headline sentence should be a substantial custodial one, and that it should be located towards the high end of the mid-range on the spectrum, in a situation where that spectrum extends from zero custody to imprisonment for up to ten years (or one hundred and twenty months) and assuming a division of that spectrum into three equal parts to provide for a low range, a mid-range and a high-range. Accordingly, the low range would extend from zero to three years and four months (i.e., forty months); the mid-range would extend beyond that to six years and eight months (i.e., eighty months); and the high range beyond that again up to the maximum of ten years (i.e., one hundred and twenty months)."
Gravity of Offending
(a) Culpability
19. There are many factors present in this case which are indicative of culpability at a very high level. These include:
a. Mr Collins' complete disregard for the safety of his passengers and exposing them to a terrifying experience, evidenced objectively by the sustained nature of his dangerous driving and, subjectively, by the harrowing cries for assistance made by the passenger in two emergency calls from within the vehicle before it crashed.
b. His dangerous and total disregard for the safety of other motorists and members of the public generally when travelling over 39 kilometres,
c. Deliberately switching his lights on and off as he travelled, thereby increasing the risk.
d. He had many opportunities to stop and bring matters to a safe conclusion. He failed to do so, and his driving became progressively more dangerous.
e. His failure to stop when it must have been obvious to him that he was being directed to do so by the activation of sirens and lights on emergency vehicles.
f. He drove while under the influence of an intoxicant, cannabis.
While the appellant must not be punished again for past offending, relevant offending is an aggravating factor. Mr Collins had 51 previous convictions. An offence was committed by him on the 18th November 2011 which involved the unauthorised taking of a vehicle and endangerment. On that occasion, when gardai attempted to stop the stolen vehicle, it was driven at high speed towards them, and they had to take evasive action. There are convictions for dangerous driving and many other driving offences. He was convicted in June 2011 of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and disqualified for four years. He has a further conviction in 1999 in respect of drunken driving. All of this is quite apart from the specific incidents of driving which are the subject of the endangerment offences.
(b) Harm
20. The harm occasioned was truly devasting for the victim, her family and her loved ones. Jillian Thornton suffered the ultimate harm, the loss of her life. Her family have been deprived of her loving and joyful company and of the promises which her future held. The loss of Jillian to her siblings has been devastating for them. It must be particularly felt by her brother, Derek. Her parents' loss is unimaginable. It is against nature for a parent to have to bury a child. Elaine Thornton, the sister of Jillian, gave a profound victim impact statement in which she described her sister's character and the deep grief her death has caused: -
"She was that silver lining people always talked about. Everyone that knew her loved her deeply. Every day we have unanswered questions which we will have to live with for the rest of our lives. Jillian was going to be a childcare worker and open up her own business one day. She loved children. You would never see her without her niece or her nephew, her godchild or her cousins, one of them would always be with her. Jillian was never in trouble."
...
"For me, as a daughter, to watch my mother fade away when Jillian died that night, I've never felt so helpless. He has also taken my mother from me, and it kills me and my family. The world goes on ... but my family are stuck back in 2016. Christmas was a big deal in our house up until Jillian died. We all spend Christmas in my parents' house together, but my parents don't stay for Christmas as it's too hard for them. We don't celebrate any special occasions anymore because there is always one of us missing. How can we go to a family event if we don't have our family anymore? The only way I see life now is we don't have the right to celebrate. Why should we get to be alive, and she isn't?".
Conclusion in Respect of the Sentence Imposed For Dangerous Driving Causing Death.
21. While the sentencing judge may not have expressly nominated a headline sentence, the failure to do so is not necessarily to be considered an error of principle. Expressly nominating a headline sentence provides greater transparency. It is evident, however, that the headline sentence nominated by the sentencing judge on count no. 1, that of dangerous driving causing death, was the maximum sentence of 10 years. The sentencing judge imposed sentences on the multiple counts of dangerous driving on a concurrent basis.
22. We are satisfied that the gravity of the appellant's offending in respect of the dangerous driving causing death count falls within the highest range of sentencing as considered in Flynn. We are not satisfied that an error of principle has been identified in the assessment of a pre-mitigation sentence of 10 years. The maximum sentence was within the range of sentences open to the sentencing judge.
Mitigation
23. The mitigation factors are as outlined by the sentencing judge, referred to at paras 12 and 13 above. There was no plea of guilty or real expression of remorse. At the sentencing hearing, Mr Collins apologised to the Thornton family for "what happened in the car accident" and said that he "felt" for them. But any such expressions must be seen in the light of his insistence on his innocence and his attempt to attribute blame elsewhere, including his passengers for allegedly not getting out of the vehicle. There is little if any mitigation. In this context it is to be noted that the trial judge suspended the final year of the sentence, which is further considered at para. 33 below. We are satisfied that no error of principle has been identified in respect of the sentencing judge's consideration and assessment of mitigation, such as might warrant the intervention of this Court.
24. Thus, we are satisfied that irrespective of the separate convictions for specific acts of endangerment, the sentence imposed for dangerous driving causing death was within the range available to the sentencing judge in the exercise of her discretion. The imposition of concurrent sentences in respect of multiple counts of dangerous driving is a relevant consideration in this conclusion.
The Endangerment Offences and Consecutive Sentences.
25. The maximum sentence for endangerment is seven years imprisonment. In respect of the incident involving Garda McGarry, the sentencing judge identified a headline sentence of six years but imposed a sentence of five years in prison. Mr Collins was sentenced to four years with an actual sentence of three years in respect of the incident involving Sgt Hodgkinson. No error of principle has been identified in respect of these sentences. No significant argument was made to that effect.
26. The real issue is that sentences were imposed on a consecutive basis. Counsel for the appellant submits that double counting has materialised because of the manner in which the sentence was constructed. The law leans towards concurrent sentences where offences arise from what might be considered the same incident or transaction. Further, a sentencing court should not impose a consecutive sentence where the conduct under consideration has already been taken into account as an aggravating factor in the assessment of the appropriate sentence for the principal offence.
27. The jurisdiction to impose sentences for multiple offending on a consecutive basis must be exercised sparingly. The principles which apply are well stated in O'Malley's Sentencing Law and Practice (3rd edn, Roundhall 2016) at para. 5.27 as follows:
"In so far as there is any guiding common-law principle, it is that concurrent offences should ordinarily be imposed for offences arising from the same incident, while consecutive sentences should be imposed for offences arising from separate and unrelated incidents. But this, it should be stressed, is no more than a broad guiding principle. A court's fundamental duty is to impose a sentence that fairly reflects the totality of the offending conduct, while making due allowance for personal mitigation and other relevant factors. It is equally important to consider carefully the sentence merited by each offence of conviction. The "one transaction rule" was most famously expressed in Thomas's Principles of Sentencing:
"[W]here two or more offences are committed in the course of a single transaction, all sentences in respect of those offences should be concurrent rather than consecutive. Difficulty lies in establishing a sufficiently precise definition of the concept of a single transaction. ... The essence of the one transaction rule appears to be that consecutive sentences are inappropriate when all the offences taken together constitute a single invasion of the same legally protected interest. ... The concept of 'single transaction' may be held to cover a sequence of offences involving a repetition of the same behaviour towards the same victim, such as a series of sexual offences with the same partner, a number of frauds on the same victim or several perjured statements made in the course of the same trial, provided the offences are committed within a relatively short space of time. The concept will not normally apply to a series of similar offences involving different victims, even though the offences are of a similar nature.""
28. Counsel for the appellant also referred to The People (DPP) v. Faulkner [2024] IESC 16, in which Charleton J. considered a number of propositions which may be deduced from the earlier decision in The People (DPP) v FE [2021] 1 IR 217, including the following: -
"When embarking on a crime, it is commonplace that several offences may be committed. As well as sentencing for a crime, a judge is sentencing for the event that makes up a sensible, or commonsense, view of the crime. A crime should not be split up into sections which render it no longer an event...." (para. 4)
...
"Appropriate totality, ensuring that the final sentence for two or more offences, whether concurrent or consecutive, is appropriate to the overall offending should be borne in mind; see Street CJ in R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 and in R v MMK (2006) 164 A Crim R 481." (para.15)
A further principle referred to at para. 16 is as follows: -
"Finally, the fundamental principle of sentencing should always be borne in mind. This is that the imposition of a sentence is not simply about punishing the offender and protecting society. Sentencing should also engage, even in the case of a life sentence, offering the possibility of rehabilitation within the penal system, even of a violent perpetrator. Prison offers much, including counselling, education, training and exercise. Sentencing is more than retribution ... In The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306, Denham, J. at pp 316–8, on behalf of this Court reiterated that the "nature of the crime, and the personal circumstances of the appellant, are the kernel issues to be considered and applied in accordance with the principles of sentencing". This approach she described as "the essence of the discretionary nature of sentencing."
29. While it may be that the sentencing judge did not articulate or express the criteria engaged by her in concluding that consecutive sentences were warranted, it is evident that that is what she did.
30. It does not follow that because more than one or multiple acts of offending may have occurred in relatively short period of time, they must inevitably be considered to be part of the same transaction. The circumstances of each case will differ. The conduct of an accused to warrant a conviction for dangerous driving, an offence in its own right is an ingredient of the offence of dangerous driving causing death, is qualitatively different to that required to ground a conviction for endangerment. While this of itself may not necessarily justify the exercise of discretion to impose consecutive sentences, here there are many victims and the convictions for endangerment resulted from what must in the circumstances be considered as separate and reckless episodes of driving in which members of An Garda Siochana were driven at in a targeted manner. We consider that it was a proper exercise by the sentencing judge to consider, and to impose, consecutive sentences. We are not satisfied that any error of principle has been identified in relation to the manner in which she exercised that discretion.
Totality and Proportionality
31. The imposition of consecutive sentencing is subject to the requirement and overall objective of sentencing that the final sentence be proportionate. Having assessed sentencing on a consecutive basis, the sentencing judge must then "stand back" and consider the totality of the sentence imposed. If on so doing it is reasonably considered that the overall sentence is disproportionate to the totality of the offending (or has often been described as crushing in its effect on the offender) an appropriate downward adjustment must be made before imposition of final sentence. There may also be cases where an upward adjustment is required.
32. The sentencing judge did not expressly refer to the totality principle, or to "standing back". It would be preferable had she expressly done so. Nevertheless, a consideration of the overall construction of the sentence, involving as it did the imposition of numerous sentences on a concurrent basis (including as between the two counts of endangerment), we are not satisfied that double counting has occurred or that an error in principle has been demonstrated. While the final sentence imposed might be considered to be at a high level, we are nevertheless satisfied that it was in accordance with the range of sentencing available to the sentencing judge in the exercise of her discretion and is consistent with principles of totality and proportionality. We are not satisfied, therefore, that the appellant has demonstrated an error of principle of such significance as to warrant intervention.
Rehabilitation and Suspension
33. Rehabilitation is an important goal of sentencing. It is submitted by the appellant that the sentencing judge did not give sufficient consideration to the potential for his rehabilitation. The sentencing judge suspended one year of the sentence imposed for dangerous driving causing death. There must be some evidential basis for suspending a sentence to incentivise rehabilitation. It is difficult to discern an evidential basis on which a longer period of suspension might have been warranted. The court has been informed that Mr Collins has and is endeavouring to deal with his drug and alcohol addiction problems while in prison. While this is to be commended, we are not satisfied on the basis of the evidence advanced before the sentencing judge that an error of principle was made in the consideration or determination of the length of suspension.
34. We must therefore dismiss the appeal on sentence.
Disqualification
35. Counsel for Mr Collins submits that a disqualification order follows a finding of unfitness of a person to hold a driving licence but is not the primary punishment in and of itself. It is submitted that a disqualification order, particularly one for life, has significant consequences for citizens in carrying out their daily tasks. It is therefore submitted that the imposition of a lifelong disqualification was disproportionate, and that Mr Collins should be given some hope for the future by the imposition of a lesser period of disqualification. The respondent submits that a lifetime ban was appropriate having regard to the manner of Mr Collins driving and that he had been disqualified from driving on at least two previous occasions.
36. Disqualification from driving must not be imposed as a further punishment. Mr Collins is now 50. Despite previously disqualifications, he has committed further serious driving offences. This is an extremely important factor in determining whether the period of disqualification imposed was excessive. The risk posed by him to members of the public, in our view, means that he is unfit to hold a driving licence. We are not satisfied that an error in principle has been identified.
37. Therefore, the appeal against the length of disqualification must also be dismissed.