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Cite as: [2025] IECA 59
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Court of Appeal >> Meehan v Ireland (Approved) [2025] IECA 59 (14 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2025/2025IECA59.html Cite as: [2025] IECA 59 |
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THE COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL
Appeal Number: 2024/162
Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 59
Allen J.
MacGrath J.
Hyland J.
BETWEEN/
PAUL CHRISTOPHER MEEHAN
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
- AND –
IRELAND
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 14th day of March, 2025
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the State against so much of the judgment of the High Court (Jackson J.) delivered on 7th May, 2024 ([2024] IEHC 404) and consequent order made on the same day as refused the State's application to dismiss Mr. Meehan's action against the State for damages for alleged stalking and harassment by An Garda Síochána as frivolous and vexatious and bound to fail. It will be necessary in due course to examine precisely the case which Mr. Meehan makes but for the moment I will say that the gravamen of his case is that for many years he has been stalked and harassed by unidentified persons in civilian clothes who he asserts were members of, or somehow in an unspecified way associated with, An Garda Síochána.
2. Mr. Meehan appears to have first come to the attention of An Garda Síochána at the end of 2005 when he was a postgraduate student in Trinity College Dublin. He was at that time prosecuted and convicted in the District Court for harassment of a fellow student ("the complainant"). It appears that on Mr. Meehan's appeal to the Circuit Court the convictions were set aside upon terms that he would pay compensation to the complainant and leave her alone. He has since made a number of complaints to the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission ("GSOC") alleging that he has been persistently followed and harassed first - at the time of the investigation and criminal prosecution in 2006 and 2007 - by a number of identified Gardaí and later - starting in 2012 and continuing until 2024 - by unidentified persons in plain clothes, said to be members of An Garda Síochána and their "associates".
3. I should say at the outset that there was no argument in the High Court or on the appeal as to whether there is a separate tort of stalking and harassment, still less what the parameters of any such tort might be. By s. 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 any person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, by any means including the use of the telephone, harasses another by persistently following, watching, pestering, besetting or communicating with him or her, is guilty of an offence. For the purposes of that section, a person harasses another where he or she by his or her acts intentionally or recklessly seriously interferes with the other's peace and privacy or causes alarm, distress or harm to the other. The High Court application and the appeal were argued on the assumption that there was an equivalent or broadly equivalent tort of harassment - or stalking and harassment - and I am content to decide the appeal on the basis on which it was argued. Clearly some, at least, of the elements of the crime of harassment are actionable in civil law. I leave over the issue as to whether there is in law a separate tort of harassment - and if there is, the parameters of any such tort - to a case in which it is argued.
The action
4. By plenary summons issued on 22nd May, 2023 Mr. Meehan commenced proceedings against the State claiming damages in respect of an alleged failure of a Trinity College Dublin psychiatrist to diagnose him with mental illness in 2004/2005; his exclusion from Trinity College Dublin, which appears to have been in about 2006; the media coverage of his prosecution in 2006 for harassing the complainant; alleged harassment and stalking of him of members or associates of members of An Garda Síochána; and his loss of employment with a number of companies between 2006 and 2023. He also claimed a number of injunctions against An Garda Síochána restraining surveillance of his phones; restraining An Garda Síochána from stalking, harassing and communicating with and about him in such a manner as to cause him distress and harm; and restraining An Garda Síochána from interfering with his employment prospects by contacting his future potential or actual employers.
5. Mr. Meehan delivered a statement of claim on 27th June, 2023 in which he quantified his claims in various sums amounting in total to €1,050,000; and an amended statement of claim on 4th July, 2023 in which he quantified his claims in in various sums amounting in total to €900,000.
6. Mr. Meehan's pleadings were irregular. His statement of claim and amended statement of claim were very short. The general indorsement of claim referred to three "Exhibits" – which ran altogether to 194 pages - to which I will return. These "Exhibits" were intended to set out the basis of his claim and in turn, were referred to in his amended statement of claim.
The motion to dismiss
7. By notice of motion dated 26th September, 2023 the State moved to have Mr. Meehan's action struck out or dismissed pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action and that it was frivolous and vexatious and bound to fail. Mr. Meehan countered with a motion for judgment in default of defence, which he issued on 10th October, 2023.
8. The two motions came on together before Jackson J. on 11th March, 2024. For the reasons given in a written judgment, Jackson J. dismissed Mr. Meehan's claims relating to the alleged actions of all of those described in the summons and statement of claim and exhibits, bar the claims against the State in respect of alleged stalking and harassment. She directed that Mr. Meehan serve an amended plenary summons and statement of claim within fourteen days and reserved the costs. On 21st June, 2024, on the application of counsel for the State, the judge stayed her earlier order pending the final determination of an appeal.
9. To understand the grounds of appeal and the arguments advanced on behalf of the State it is necessary to examine in some detail the application which was made to the High Court.
10. The State's motion was grounded on an affidavit of Ms. Rachel Dando, who is a solicitor in the office of the Chief State Solicitor. Ms. Dando - as she put it - first came across Mr. Meehan in 2021when he sent an e-mail to the Chief State Solicitor. She referred to and exhibited correspondence from Mr. Meehan to that office; to the Minister for Justice; to An Taoiseach - whose private secretary referred him back to the Minister for Justice - and to the Office of the Attorney General - who referred him back to the Chief State Solicitor. Attached to some of this correspondence was a document entitled "Strictly private and confidential" running to about twenty pages and which started with a list of:-
"1.1 Medical negligence by a university psychiatrist;
1.2 Torts by the same university;
1.3 Psychological personal injury by an arm of the State;
1.4 Adverse online publicity; and
1.5 Illegal employment terminations."
11. In the course of the correspondence, this document was updated from time to time but the thrust of it remained the same.
12. Mr. Meehan's plenary summons was in an irregular form. The general indorsement of claim ran to about a page and a half, but the indorsement of claim referred to "Exhibit A", "Exhibit B" and "Exhibit C". These "exhibits" do not appear to have been part of or annexed to the summons as issued but they were served on the Chief State Solicitor with - and apparently as part of - the summons.
13. Exhibit A (in two parts) was a bundle of correspondence with GSOC, running to about 147 pages. Exhibit B was a further updated version of the "Strictly private and confidential" document which had been retitled "Cause of action". Exhibit C was a small bundle of news reports of Mr. Meehan's prosecution and conviction in the District Court, and his appeal to the Circuit Court. The exhibits, said Ms. Dando, purported to set out the factual allegations to support Mr. Meehan's claim that he was entitled to the reliefs set out in the general indorsement of claim.
14. From Mr. Meehan's Exhibit B, Ms. Dando abstracted a list of sixteen entities who had not been named as defendants and in respect of which she suggested that Mr. Meehan had not identified any cause of action that might give rise to a claim for damages against the State. Those sixteen entities were private entities: Trinity College Dublin, a number of media outlets, a number of Mr. Meehan's former employers, and so on.
15. As far as the State was concerned, Ms. Dando suggested that the only perceived claim was in respect of a number of instances of what Mr. Meehan characterised as "'Garda harassment, stalking, long term warrantless phone surveillance and oppression' being carried out by either unnamed plainly clothed people who the plaintiff, without merit or foundation, asserts are Gardaí, under-cover Gardaí, associates of the Gardaí or simply other people who are within the vicinity of the plaintiff on divers dates". "In fact," she suggested, "an examination of such allegations reveals that no such 'harassment, stalking, long term warrantless phone surveillance and oppression' of the plaintiff took place by the Gardaí, under-cover Gardaí, associates of the Gardaí or any other servant and/or agent of An Garda Síochána as would be necessary in order to maintain this claim against the defendant."
16. The affidavit commented in detail on a sample of nine of the thirty instances of what were described in section 9 of Mr. Meehan's Exhibit B as "Examples of garda harassment, stalking etc." [emphasis original] It was accepted that a plaintiff is not required to plead evidence in support of allegations but suggested that bald assertions were not sufficient: in particular - it was said - when making claims of the nature that Mr. Meehan was making. Later in her affidavit, Ms. Dando deposed that "... such assertions are unsupported by any evidence and in such circumstances are bound to fail." Later again she deposed that "... it would be unfair and onerous for the defendant to have to mount a defence to the within action based on the information pleaded. Further the defendant would be put to considerable expense in defending such an action."
17. On 8th February, 2024 Mr. Meehan filed a replying affidavit in which he rehearsed in some detail his dealings with the Gardaí in 2005 and 2006 and then dealt with his allegations of what happened in the succeeding years - starting in 2012. Mr. Meehan deposed to his "feeling that [he] was being permanently tracked"; one instance of alleged intimidation by unidentified persons - who he asserted were Gardaí - on a specified day in an identified place; and then, generally, that from 2013 to 2019 he had observed "people" warning retail staff and other members of the public about him. He deposed that it was his "... strong belief that these were plain clothes Guards or sometimes an informed contingent of associates of the Guards." He had something to say about his cocaine use and a particular purchase by him of a quantity of cocaine in 2017.
18. It appears that shortly before 13th September, 2023 - very likely in response to a letter from the Chief State Solicitor presaging the motion to dismiss - Mr. Meehan slightly revised his "Cause of action" document which he then topped and tailed with the title of the proceedings and a jurat and swore this as an affidavit, which he filed in the Central Office of the High Court on 21st September, 2023.
The High Court judgment
19. The High Court judge briefly summarised Mr. Meehan's pleadings and "exhibits" which she - quite correctly - described as long and prolix. She identified in Mr. Meehan's Exhibit A (first part) - which comprised part of his correspondence with GSOC - a list of 123 instances of alleged Garda harassment in the period 2006 to 2007 which formed the basis of a complaint to GSOC which - a copy letter dated 12th February, 2010 in the same bundle showed - had been ruled to be inadmissible for being out of time.
20. In Mr. Meehan's Exhibit A (second part) - which comprised correspondence with GSOC in relation to further complaints made in 2012 - the judge identified a letter dated 13th June, 2012 by which Mr. Meehan was asked to clarify whether he had had any direct contact with any individual who had identified themselves as a member of An Garda Síochána, to which Mr. Meehan had replied on 15th June, 2012:-
"None of the people following me identified themselves nor spoke to me. I understand it may be difficult to prove these offences as the tactic I experienced was for them to rotate who actually harasses or follows me on any one occasion. There was one face, a woman, who it seems to me, was involved in three incidents. I think it is highly unlikely [that I] was being harassed by members of the public for the motive I set out in my first piece of correspondence."
21. The judge then identified a determination by GSOC dated 2nd July, 2012 which found the 2012 complaints to be inadmissible on the ground that "the behaviour described would not amount to an offence or a breach of discipline". The judge noted that with the exception of the Gardaí who were involved in the investigation in 2005 and 2006, Mr. Meehan had not identified any of the Gardaí involved. She also noted that the allegations of harassment set out in Mr. Meehan's "Cause of action" document were identified as "Examples."
22. The judge then identified some further correspondence with GSOC in 2014, the outcome of which was not entirely clear save that there was no indication that requests for further information were substantively replied to by Mr. Meehan.
23. The judge then looked briefly at Mr. Meehan's Exhibit B - his "Cause of action document" - in which - in section 9 - Mr. Meehan gave a number of examples of harassment and similar behaviour between 2008 and 2022. She said that while the examples contained considerable detail as to location and the alleged intimidatory conduct, no Garda was identified and the alleged perpetrators were described as "plain clothes" members of An Garda Síochána.
24. At para. 11, the judge summarised the submissions made on behalf of the State - which appear to have mirrored what was said in the affidavit grounding the application - and, at para. 12, Mr. Meehan's submissions in reply.
25. I pause here to note that the judge, at para. 11, noted that the relief claimed by the notice of motion did not include relief under O. 19, r. 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, which - she said - would have allowed for parts of the proceedings to be struck out. She referred to the judgment of the High Court in Burke v. Beatty [2016] IEHC 353 in which Noonan J. said that an application under O. 19, r. 28 was concerned solely with what appears on the face of the proceedings and - citing Aer Lingus v. Ryanair [2004] 1 IR 506 - that on such an application the court has jurisdiction to strike out an entire pleading but not a portion thereof.
26. At the oral hearing of the appeal, counsel for the State confirmed my surmise that the application was argued in the High Court by reference to the previous version of O. 19, r. 28, as it was prior to a significant amendment of O. 19, rr. 27 and 28 made by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 19) 2023 (S.I. No. 456 of 2023) with effect from 22nd September, 2023. The new rules were substituted only three days before the motion to strike out was issued and a little less than six months before the motion was heard. The fact that the important change to the rules was not brought to the attention of the judge was not ideal. I would go further in relation to the written submissions filed on behalf of the State on the appeal which were critical of the judge's failure to deal with the motion by reference to the new rules, without acknowledging that the responsibility for this lay with the State.
27. Starting at para. 13, the judge set out the text of the old O. 19, r. 28 and referenced the judgments of Butler J. in Keary v. Property Registration Authority of Ireland [2022] IEHC 28 and of Noonan J. in Burke v. Beatty [2016] IEHC 353 in relation to that rule. She then referred to the seminal judgments of the Supreme Court in Lopes v. Minister for Justice [2014] 2 IR 301 and Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66 - from which she quoted extensively.
28. At para. 21 the judge identified this case as one which fell within the third category of cases identified by Clarke J. in Keohane, that is, a case in which the court might examine an allegation to determine whether it is a mere assertion and, if so, consider whether any credible basis had been put forward for suggesting that evidence might be available at trial to substantiate it. Previously, at para. 20, the judge had identified the focus of the State's application as being on the evidential deficiencies of Mr. Meehan's case as pleaded, rather than on any denial or acceptance of inference from agreed facts. The judge noted that the proceedings were at a very early stage and said that as far as the deficiencies in the particularisation of the claims was concerned, it was open to the State to seek particulars, which, if not provided, could be assessed by the court as to the appropriateness of same and the consequences which should follow. It was clear, she said, that Mr. Meehan had little to no evidence which he had adduced and that his failure to provide GSOC with the information which it had sought tended to confirm that he did not have it.
29. At para. 23, citing para. 27 of the judgment of Dignam J. in Towey v. Ireland [2022] IEHC 559, the judge identified five overarching principles which were to be applied. These were, first, that the jurisdiction to strike out - whether that conferred by the Rules of the Superior Courts or the inherent jurisdiction - is one that is to be exercised sparingly; second, that the onus was on the moving party to establish that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action or that the case was bound to fail; third, that the court must take the plaintiff's case at its high-water mark; fourth, that the court must be satisfied not just that the plaintiff's case will not succeed but that it cannot succeed; and fifth, that the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff's case could not be "improved" by appropriate amendment or through the utilisation of pre-trial procedures such as discovery, or evidence at the trial.
30. At para. 26, the judge found that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the State in respect of any of the actions of the entities identified by Mr. Meehan, other than An Garda Síochána. At para. 27 she found that the action was frivolous and vexatious insofar as those entities for whom the State could not be liable were concerned. The judge was of the view that those claims might have been the subject of an application under (old) O. 19, r. 27 but could not be dealt with under (old) O. 19, r. 28. However, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, the judge struck out those parts of the summons and statement of claim that referred to claims arising from the actions of the sixteen private entities, for which the State could have no responsibility - that is, all of Mr. Meehan's claims save those in respect of An Garda Síochána.
31. There is no cross-appeal against the decision of the High Court to strike out the claims in respect of the alleged acts and omissions of the private entities. I do not propose to dwell on the precise basis on which those claims were struck out. It is sufficient, I think, to say that one way or another they are out of the case.
32. The judge also struck out Mr. Meehan's claims against the State for injunctive relief on the ground that the Garda Commissioner was not a party and that those claims were bound to fail. There was no cross-appeal against that part of the order and those claims are also out of the case.
33. At para. 29 the judge found that Mr. Meehan's claim for damages for alleged harassment and stalking could not be viewed as a failure to disclose a cause of action, nor - she thought - could it be considered to be frivolous and vexatious.
34. In a heading immediately before para. 30, the judge identified the core question in respect of those claims as being:- "Can it be established that there is no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as asserted and that, thus, the proceedings are bound to fail on the merits as it invokes the inherent jurisdiction?" Citing Burke v. Beatty [2016] IEHC 353, the judge concluded that it was not possible, at that juncture, for her to say that there were no circumstances in which the claim could succeed, irrespective of what evidence might be led by the plaintiff at trial.
35. The order of the High Court was that:-
1. The application pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 was refused;
2. The application pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was refused, save as to items 3(i) - the claims arising out of the alleged actions of the private entities - and 3(ii) - the claim for injunctive relief;
3. Pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court:-
(i) the claims arising from the action of the sixteen private entities were struck out;
(ii) the claim for injunctive relief in respect of the actions of An Garda Síochána were struck out, on the ground that the Garda Commissioner was not a party;
4. Mr. Meehan should deliver an amended plenary summons and statement of claim within 14 days; and the State should deliver its defence within 28 days thereafter.
The appeal
36. By notice of appeal filed on 2nd July, 2024 the State appealed against the judgment and order of the High Court.
37. The grounds of appeal run to two pages but there are essentially two grounds:-
1. That the judge erred in failing to strike out all of Mr. Meehan's claims pursuant to O. 19, r. 28; and
2. That the judge erred in failing to strike out all of Mr. Meehan's claims pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction.
38. As to O. 19, r. 28, the notice of appeal pointed to the judge's finding that there was "little to no evidence" in support of the factual assertions made by Mr. Meehan, and to her finding that additional information sought from Mr. Meehan was not forthcoming and "... indeed the responses from the plaintiff tend to confirm that he does not have such information." The State's contention was that:-
"Based on this conclusion, the [State] pleads that there was no factual basis upon which the court could have rationally reached the subsequent decision that there was a reasonable basis for believing that such additional information could become available at trial to substantiate [Mr. Meehan's] assertions."
39. I pause here to say firstly, that the observations of the judge identified by the State were made in relation to Mr. Meehan's correspondence with GSOC and secondly, that in challenging the rationality of the judge's conclusion, the State rather appears to set itself an unnecessarily high bar. To justify the intervention of this Court, the State must establish either that the High Court judge failed to identify the correct legal test or - if she identified the correct test - that there was either a manifest error of appreciation in the application of that test, or an unfair result. As I will come to, it was not ultimately contended that the judge erred in the identification of the applicable principles, but rather in their application.
40. The State contends that the judge failed to adequately balance what it describes as Mr. Meehan's prima facie right of access to the courts against the State's right not to have to spend time and incur expense in defending litigation which has no prospect of success.
41. As to the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction to dismiss, the State's contention is that Mr. Meehan had failed to put forward any credible basis on which it could be suggested that the facts asserted in the summons and amended statement of claim are as asserted. It is said that the judge incorrectly determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe that such evidence could be made available at trial.
42. Mr. Meehan opposed the appeal on the grounds that his action in respect of the alleged stalking and harassment was not "frivolous and vexatious". In particular, he countered the suggestion that there was no reasonable basis for believing that evidence would be available at the trial to substantiate his assertions on the basis that the examination at the trial of the action of the Garda Commissioner would easily verify that the majority of his communications were under surveillance for the majority of 17 years.
43. In his respondent's notice, Mr. Meehan advanced as an additional ground on which the High Court decision should be affirmed new allegations made in what he described as a second amended statement of claim delivered on 21st June, 2024: which of course was after the High Court judgment. It will be recalled that the High Court judge stayed her order permitting the delivery of an amended statement of claim, but the Court of Appeal directions list judge allowed a copy of the proposed revised amended statement of claim to be filed with the papers for the appeal.
44. Under the heading in his respondent's notice "Respondent's notice of cross-appeal" Mr. Meehan asked this Court to recognise that there is a prima facie case set out in his affidavits of 13th September, 2023 and 7th February, 2024 and what he describes as his second amended statement of claim. Under the heading "Orders sought by the respondent" Mr. Meehan asked for an order joining the Garda Commissioner as a defendant.
Legal principles
45. It is not contended that the High Court judge erred in her identification of the applicable principles of law to be applied. Rather, the State's contention is that the judge erred in the application of those principles. In a nutshell, the argument is that the judge did not sufficiently engage with the detail of Mr. Meehan's case and that on the close examination to which it should have been subjected, it is evident that there is no credible basis for the allegation that Mr. Meehan was stalked or harassed by the Gardaí.
46. On the other hand, it is clear from the High Court judgment - and was confirmed by counsel for the State on the hearing of the appeal - that the important changes to O. 19, rr. 27 and 28 were not brought to the attention of the judge.
47. I have already noted that O. 19, rr. 27 and 28 were replaced by new rules with effect from 22nd September, 2023. The Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 19) 2023 did not state in terms that the new rules would apply to all actions whether commenced before or after the operative date but the position of the State on this appeal was that they did; and Mr. Meehan did not argue otherwise.
48. Among the authorities referred to on the appeal was the judgment of Simons J. delivered on 13th August, 2024 in O'Malley v. National Standards Authority of Ireland [2024] IEHC 500 which also proceeded on the assumption that the new rules were to be applied to any motion heard after the change in the rules.
49. O'Malley is a judgment on two strike out applications which had been brought in an action which had been commenced in 2020. The judgment shows that the plaintiff and each of the defendants were represented by senior and junior counsel and solicitors. It also shows that the motions were heard and determined by reference to the new O. 19, r. 28 but not that there was any argument as to the precise effect of the change in the rule, or, indeed, whether the change was prospective only.
50. Hosford v. Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection [2024] IECA 294 was an appeal against a decision of the High Court on a motion to strike out or dismiss a 2022 action which had been issued before the rule change, but which had been heard and determined after the change on the basis that it was the new rule which was the applicable rule. Mr. Hosford was a litigant in person and again the question does not appear to have been argued. In a judgment delivered on 4th December, 2024 (Hyland J., Costello P. and MacGrath JJ. concurring) this Court took the view that in the absence of a temporal limitation on the application of the amendment, it was the new version that ought to be applied, but immediately went on to say that the amendment made no material difference as the basis of the Minister's motion was a failure to disclose a cause of action and/or an abuse of process.
51. The new O. 19, r. 28(1) provides that:-
"(1) The Court may, on an application by motion on notice, strike out any claim or part of a claim which:
(i) discloses no reasonable cause of action, or
(ii) amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, or
(iii) is bound to fail, or
(iv) has no reasonable chance of succeeding."
52. Order 19, r. 3 provides that:-
"(3) The Court may, in considering an application under sub-rule (1) ... have regard to the pleadings and, if appropriate, to evidence in any affidavit filed in support of, or in opposition to, the application."
53. In considering the new legal test, Simons J. in O'Malley had regard to the pre-amendment case law. The old O. 19, r. 28, he said, was directed to the formal pleading rather than the underlying merits. Under the old rule the court had been required to assume that the facts as pleaded - however unlikely they might appear - were as they were asserted in the pleadings. That was a correct and concise statement of the law. By contrast, on an application made pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the court was permitted, to a very limited extent, to consider the underlying merits of the case. If it could be established that there was no credible basis for suggesting that the facts were as asserted, and that the proceedings were bound to fail on the merits, then the court - in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction - could dismiss the proceedings on the merits. That again is quite correct.
54. The amendment of O. 19, r. 28 - as Simons J. has said - has had the practical effect of eroding the previous distinction between the jurisdiction conferred by the Rules to strike out pleadings and the inherent jurisdiction of the court to deal with an abuse of process. Simons J. also recalled the consistent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings as being bound to fail is not to be misunderstood as a jurisdiction to resolve issues on a summary basis. That is also correct. The effect of the new O. 19, r. 28 is to erode the distinction between the previous jurisdictions. It does not create a new jurisdiction to summarily determine contested questions of fact or law. Now, as heretofore, the jurisdiction is one which must be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases, rather than on the basis that the plaintiff's claim is very weak.
55. It seems to me that although on applications such as this, the jurisdiction to be exercised will generally be that conferred by the Rules, the fundamental basis of the approach to be taken is the same. The new rule removed from the Rules of the Superior Courts the perhaps emotive language of "frivolous or vexatious" actions but the object - as far as actions which previously would have been characterised as "frivolous" is concerned - is unchanged.
56. As I will come to, there are two core issues on the appeal. The State contends that even if Mr. Meehan were to establish at trial that all of those men and women he describes in his Exhibits and affidavits did what they are said to have done, that could not, as a matter of law, amount to stalking and harassment: or, more correctly, to harassment. Separately, however - and this is the lynchpin of Mr. Meehan's case - the State contends that there is no credible basis on which Mr. Meehan can possibly establish that the men and women he describes were members - or cronies, or associates of members - of An Garda Síochána.
57. Before examining the respective contentions of the parties, it is useful to recall the basis on which the court can consider the factual basis for the plaintiff's claim. That is well established and unaffected by the change in the rules.
58. At the oral hearing of the appeal counsel for the State commended to the Court the restatement of the principles in the judgment of this Court (Donnelly, Faherty and Ní Raifeartaigh JJ.) in Scotchstone Capital Fund Ltd. v. Ireland [2022] IECA 23. That was a case decided under the old regime and explained and emphasised the distinction between the two jurisdictions.
59. Under the new O. 19, r. 28 the court has jurisdiction to strike out a claim (or part of a claim) that is bound to fail or has no reasonable prospect of success.
60. Since the substitution of the new O. 19, r. 28 the jurisdiction to deal with a claim which is said to be an abuse of process is to be found in that rule. As Simons J. observed in O'Malley, the new rule reflects the pre-amendment jurisprudence. The new rule is expressed in terms of four alternatives. With the caveat – I suppose I should say - that the point was not argued, I see no difference between a claim which discloses no reasonable cause of action, or is bound to fail, or has no reasonable chance of succeeding. The foundation of the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss such claims in limine was the jurisdiction of the court to protect its process from abuse. That jurisdiction is now to be found in the new O. 19, rule 28. It is long and well established that it is an abuse of process to pursue a claim which is bound to fail; which a claim which discloses no reasonable cause of action is bound to do.
61. To my mind the clearest exposition of the entitlement of the court to engage with the facts is to be found in the judgment of Clarke J. (as he then was) in Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66, where he said:-
"6.2 However, it is important to emphasise that the extent to which it is appropriate for the Court to assess the evidence and the facts on a motion to dismiss as being bound to fail is extremely limited. ...
6.5 It is important, for the avoidance of any doubt, that the overall principle be clearly stated. As pointed out in many of the authorities, not least in the judgment of Murray J. in Jodifern, the underlying basis of the jurisdiction to dismiss as being bound to fail stems from the court's inherent entitlement to prevent an abuse of process. Bringing a case which is bound to fail is an abuse of process. If it is clear to a court that a case is bound to fail, then the court has jurisdiction to prevent that abuse of process by dismissing the proceedings. However, as again noted by Murray J. in Jodifern, whatever might or might not be the merits of some form of summary disposal procedure, an application to dismiss as being bound to fail is not a means for inviting the court to resolve issues on a summary basis.
6.6 It is for that reason that all of the jurisprudence emphasises that the jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised and only adopted when it is clear that the proceedings are bound to fail rather than where the plaintiff's case is very weak or where it is sought to have an early determination on some point of fact or law. It is against that background that the extent of the court's entitlement to look at the facts needs to be judged.
6.7 I am in full agreement with the views expressed by Birmingham J. in Burke [v. Anglo Irish Bank Corporation plc & anor [2011] IEHC 478]. Where there is evidence placed before the court on affidavit on behalf of a plaintiff which, if accepted at trial, might arguably lead to the plaintiff succeeding, then that is an end of the matter. But it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff even has to put evidence of that type before the court. In Lopes, I observed at para 2.5:
'In order to defeat a suggestion that a claim is bound to fail on the facts, all that a plaintiff needs to do is to put forward a credible basis for suggesting that it may, at trial, be possible to establish the facts which are asserted and which are necessary for success in the proceedings. Any assessment of the credibility of such an assertion has to be made in the context of the undoubted fact, as pointed out by McCarthy J. in Sun Fat Chan (at p. 428), that experience has shown that cases which go to trial often take unusual turns on the facts which might not have been anticipated in advance.'
I commented to similar effect in Salthill Properties at para 3.15:
'... it seems to me that I should assess the factual allegations ..., not on the basis of whether those parties have shown that they have evidence which, if accepted, would lead, arguably, to success in the proceedings but rather whether [the applicants] have established that it is impossible that any such evidence will be produced at trial.'
6.8 What the Court can analyse is whether a plaintiff's factual allegation amounts to no more than a mere assertion, for which no evidence or no credible basis for believing that there could be any evidence, is put forward. ...
6.10 ... [I]t is an abuse of process to maintain a claim based on a factual assertion in circumstances where there is no evidence available for that assertion and, importantly, where there is no reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available at the trial to substantiate the relevant assertion. However, the bringing of a claim based on a factual assertion for which there is or may be evidence (even if the defendant can point to many reasons why it might be argued that a successful challenge could be mounted to the credibility of the evidence concerned) is not an abuse of process. It is for that reason that a court cannot properly engage with the credibility of evidence on a motion to dismiss as being bound to fail and it is for that reason that the very significant limitations which I have sought to identify exist in relation to the extent to which a court can properly engage with the facts on such an application."
62. For present purposes, para. 6.10 is the most significant part of that quotation. The first issue on the appeal is whether - on the assumption that everything which Mr. Meehan has alleged is true - his factual assertions disclose a cause of action against the State. The second issue is whether there is any reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available to support those factual assertions.
Analysis
63. I am bound to say that it was not immediately obvious to me from the grounds of appeal or the written submissions filed on behalf of the State precisely how it was contended that the judge erred in her application of the law. On the one hand, it was accepted that the onus of proof was on the State as the moving party to show that the case was clearly bound to fail. On the other hand, it was suggested that Mr. Meehan had failed to put forward any credible basis on which it could be suggested that the facts, as asserted in the summons and statement of claim, were as asserted.
64. In the course of oral argument, however, the State's submission was made clear. It is, in part, an old O. 19, r. 28 argument - which is equally open under the new O. 19, r. 28 - that the facts as pleaded, taken at their height, do not disclose a cause of action: specifically, that the facts as pleaded, if proven at trial, could not establish that Mr. Meehan had been followed or stalked or harassed by anyone. There was some confusion in the argument between assertions, facts, and evidence of facts but in the end, the argument - save as to the involvement of An Garda Síochána - is not that the facts pleaded by Mr. Meehan are not credible; but that those facts, if proved, could not ground a credible assertion that he was stalked or harassed by anyone.
65. As to the alleged involvement of An Garda Síochána, the argument is different, and separate. It is that this is a mere assertion for which there is no credible basis. The core criticism of the High Court judgment is that it did not engage forensically with the "facts" as pleaded. If the judge had so engaged - it is said - it would have been evident that there was no reasonable basis for believing that Mr. Meehan could ever adduce evidence to substantiate his assertions that those who he thought were watching and following him were members of, or in any way associated with, An Garda Síochána: and that for that reason, his case was bound to fail.
66. I should first of all say that I entirely agree with the judge that Mr. Meehan's Exhibits are long and prolix and by no means easy to follow. However, I think that there is merit in the State's submission that the judge did not engage in a forensic examination of the documents. The judgment gives a broad outline of the content of the Exhibits and sets out the State's arguments as to the adequacy of the case pleaded by reference to the affidavit of Ms. Dando and the legal submissions but does not make a closely reasoned assessment of whether those arguments are correct. In fairness to the judge, it seems to me that the argument that the case had not been adequately particularised was calculated to distract from the core submission that it was bound to fail, and incapable of being salvaged. I will come to the detail but if the core argument was - as it was - that there was no credible basis for Mr. Meehan's account of events, then, on one view, his failure to specify the dates, times and places in which those events were said to have occurred was irrelevant. Similarly, it seems to me that the reference in argument to "extraneous evidence" and "evidential deficits" tended to suggest that there were deficiencies in the case, as opposed to that Mr. Meehan had no case at all. At the same time, there was substance in the State's argument that the absence of any detail as to dates and times meant that it would be impossible to counter Mr. Meehan's evidence and at the oral hearing of the appeal Mr. Meehan conceded that if asked or ordered, he would not be able to provide any such details.
67. At the oral hearing of the appeal, counsel for the State first drew attention to the first part of Mr. Meehan's Exhibit A which is a bundle of correspondence with GSOC in relation to a complaint made by Mr. Meehan on 12th July, 2009. The complaint was based on a 25 page table drawn up by Mr. Meehan of 123 instances of alleged "Garda harassment and mobbing" between 16th January, 2006 and 20th May, 2007 setting out dates, in some instances times, locations, in some instances witnesses, "actors", and an indication of Mr. Meehan's mental state at the time. Along the way, the list records some engagement with identified members of An Garda Síochána in the context of the 2006 Garda investigation and prosecution, and, later, engagement with identified members in relation to complaints which Mr. Meehan made of alleged harassment of him; but in the main it does not identify the "actors" – save to describe them as men or women or "cronies" and to suggest that they were plain clothes Gardaí and "cronies" under instruction of An Garda Síochána.
68. Even at first glance, the list is not a list of incidents of "Garda harassment and mobbing". I do not want to get bogged down in the detail, but on the first page of the table there are complaints that Mr. Meehan was falsely arrested on suspicion of offences for which he was later convicted in the District Court but was given the benefit of the Probation Act by the Circuit Court on terms that he paid compensation to the complainant. On another occasion, on being ushered by a named Garda into a Garda car to be brought to court, Mr. Meehan records that he told the Garda that he did not wish to say anything during the journey to court, to which the Garda replied:- "shut up and just get in, will you?" He records that on the same day he was held in a holding cell in the Bridewell until his case was called: which I am sure that he was. Later, he records that in the course of a discussion about a proposed application to vary his bail conditions, the same Garda said:- "we'll see what the judge thinks about that." Elsewhere in the list are numerous instances of Mr. Meehan's observation of unidentified Garda "cronies", an unidentified plain clothes female "Garda" operating a taxi, cars parked beside his car, cars driving along the road and so on. With two exceptions - to which I will come - the list of engagement with identified Gardaí sets out instances of clearly lawful engagement by the Gardaí with Mr. Meehan in the course of a criminal investigation and prosecution and of entirely innocuous encounters on the street where the height of Mr. Meehan's complaints are that a named Garda walked in close proximity to him and another Garda verbally drew attention to himself.
69. What is striking about this table is that - save in relation to the investigation and prosecution, and Mr. Meehan's later complaints to GSOC of harassment - it was not suggested that there was any communication or interaction with any of the supposed stalkers. The list records that Mr. Meehan observed people walking and running on the street; cutting across his path; making faces; standing in front of and behind him in queues and on escalators; following him into shops and restaurants; sitting in front of him on the DART; making eye contact; not making eye contact; and of cars beeping their horns, turning without indicating, and speeding away. The height of what any of these people were said to have said was to "tut" and "tsk".
70. Included in the bundle is a copy of a decision dated 3rd February, 2010 by which GSOC ruled this complaint to be inadmissible as out of time, but that is neither here nor there.
71. Counsel then moved on to the second part of Mr. Meehan's Exhibit A, which started with a letter dated 2nd June, 2012 by which Mr. Meehan made a complaint to GSOC of alleged harassment by members of An Garda Síochána on 31st May, 2012. He wrote that the only reason he could think of why he might have been the subject of Garda attention was that on 26th May, 2012 he had made a Facebook post about a named person who - he said - might have made a complaint to the Gardaí. Mr. Meehan's letter did not disclose the nature of the Facebook post or indicate why he thought that it might have led to a complaint to the Gardaí.
72. The attached complaint was that over the course of the afternoon of 31st May, 2012 Mr. Meehan had "noticed a man wearing a hoody ... following [him] on a bike"; "noticed a man watching [him] across at the supermarket"; noticed "a man" walking into a coffee shop and looking around, as if looking for someone; that a woman had sat next to him at a bar; and so on.
73. On 5th June, 2012 Mr. Meehan supplemented his complaint by what he described as further "evidence" of having been asked by an unidentified man in a Social Welfare office what he - the man - should do; of having been followed out of the Social Welfare office by two men who were eating bananas, looking at him, and grinning; of an unidentified woman busting past him in a hotel garden; that a young man sitting alone in a winter jacket on a warm day had turned his back; and of two men using their phones in his vicinity.
74. On 8th June, 2012 Mr. Meehan further supplemented his complaint with an account of how he had seen a car with its emergency lights flashing; how he had seen a man with a priest - or at least a man who was dressed as a priest but who Mr. Meehan sensed was not a priest - in a hotel; how a woman had pointed a camera in his direction and photographed him; and so on. He suggested that these people had been sent to harass him but that when "their intelligence informed them" that he had been in correspondence with GSOC, the harassment stopped.
75. In a letter to GSOC of 15th June, 2012 - which it may be recalled was referred to in the judgment of the High Court - Mr. Meehan confirmed to GSOC that none of the people described had identified themselves nor spoken to him but said that he thought it highly unlikely that he was being harassed by members of the public for the motive he had set out in his first piece of correspondence - that is, his surmise that a complaint might have been made to the Gardaí arising out of his Facebook post on 26th May, 2012.
76. By a determination made on 2nd July, 2012 GSOC decided that the allegations were inadmissible as the behaviour described would not amount to an offence or a breach of discipline. I pause to observe that again, whatever view GSOC may have taken of the complaint is immaterial to the Court's assessment of what it establishes or fails to establish.
77. On 29th January, 2015 Mr. Meehan copied GSOC with four letters which he had written to the office of the Complaints Referee appointed under the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993, initially calling for an investigation into an allegation that his telephones were being monitored and later alleging that he was being followed. It is not evident how the office of the Complaints Referee dealt with this correspondence. As far as GSOC is concerned, it seems to have run into the sand when Mr. Meehan failed to reply to a letter of 3rd February, 2015 seeking further information.
78. As counsel brought the Court through all of this material, she repeatedly emphasised the vagueness of Mr. Meehan's complaints. Counsel also repeatedly submitted that there was "no evidence" of Garda involvement in any of the incidents, but it was clear that what she really meant was that if the whole or any part of Mr. Meehan's complaints amounted to anything, there was no credible basis on which it could have been thought that the Gardaí were involved; or, as Clarke J. put it in Keohane, that there was no reasonable basis for believing that evidence would become available at any trial to substantiate the assertion that any of the unidentified people were members of, or in any way associated with, An Garda Síochána.
79. Counsel then turned to Mr. Meehan's Exhibit B, which was for all practical purposes identical to his affidavit of 13th September, 2023. It was divided into thirteen numbered sections, each with a heading. Much of this document was directed to Mr. Meehan's engagement with Trinity College Dublin; his prosecution in the District Court; his appeal to the Circuit Court; the newspaper reports of those proceedings; and his employment history since the District Court prosecution, all of which have fallen away. As far as the alleged stalking and harassment by the Gardaí is concerned, the relevant sections are section 8 - under the heading "An Garda Síochána" – and section 9 - which is entitled "Examples of garda harassment, stalking, long term warrantless phone surveillance and oppression since the case." [emphasis original]
80. I pause here to recall that the judge appeared to attach some significance to the fact that the 31 instances of alleged harassment etc. in section 9 of Exhibit B were described as "examples". The document, of course, says what it says but there was no suggestion that the list of complaints was not exhaustive. In other words, if the case based on the incidents set out in section 9 was bound to fail, there was no question that there might be any other case which might not. Before setting out his examples, Mr. Meehan had contemplated that there might have been other instances of stalking of which he was unaware, but his "Cause of action" was clearly based on, and limited to, the instances of which he was aware. As I will come to, not all of the complaints made by Mr. Meehan to GSOC which were apparent from his Exhibit A were clearly incorporated in his Exhibit B, which later became his affidavit of 13th September, 2023. This very strongly suggested that the case which Mr. Meehan sought to make against the State was in respect of - and was confined to - the complaints set out in Exhibit B but that was not absolutely clear.
81. In section 8 Mr. Meehan set the scene for what was to come in section 9:-
"The Guards were disgusted that my convictions were overturned and I did not go to jail. They decided to dish out their own justice. 14 years on and off harassment, stalking, oppression and psych-ops that left a man recovering from psychiatric problems with severe psychological difficulties and distressing flashbacks to the harassment."
82. In Mr. Meehan's list of 31 instances of alleged Garda harassment not a single Garda was identified. As counsel put it, there was no factual basis for the suggestion that any of those described were Gardaí, or in any way associated with the Gardaí. While there was mention of the guards, there was no "evidence" of harassment. Counsel went through a sample of the listed alleged incidents, pointing out that on Mr. Meehan's own case, his allegations of being followed and observed were entirely dependent on surmise, perception and "feeling".
83. Mr. Meehan, in response, submitted that he had documented the unwanted attention to which he had been subjected but that GSOC had not taken his case seriously. He said that in the time following the disposal of the criminal prosecution he "had a head on [him]", which he followed or explained by saying that he was - or may have been - sensitised by the process to the point that he "may have got some wrong." Mr. Meehan suggested that counsel had picked out his weakest examples and that those involved in other incidents had definitely been members of An Garda Síochána. The examination of the Garda Commissioner at trial would, he said, reveal if [my emphasis] he had been under surveillance. More than once, Mr. Meehan referred to his cocaine habit and his feeling of being constantly watched.
84. In response to a question from the Court as to whether he could identify any possibility that he could adduce evidence of Garda involvement other than the possibility of examining the Garda Commissioner at trial, Mr. Meehan said that he "pieced things together" and that "some people are intuitive."
85. Among the instances which he was 100% sure about was that on one night - circa 2013 - his fully charged phone had run out of power in an hour because "they" had turned on the microphone to listen to a conversation between Mr. Meehan and his girlfriend. Another time - at about the same time - when he drove to Sutton "there was four of them at different locations just standing and watching us in the car."
86. Another such occasion was on another unspecified date in 2013 when, on getting off the DART in Sutton, Mr. Meehan found "a plain clothes guard" waiting for him. The "guard" was on the phone to someone and Mr. Meehan "got the feeling" that something was about to happen. What happened was that a woman wearing a red jacket leading a white dog came out of a laneway; which - because the dog was white - Mr. Meehan perceived as a psychological reference to his cocaine use.
87. The link that Mr. Meehan tried to make between the presence of the man on the railway platform and the woman with the white dog was that two days previously he had posted a message on the website of the 2005 complainant's employer which was intended to convey his anger at the complainant's behaviour. This Facebook post was also the reason why Mr. Meehan concluded that a hotel lounge in Dublin which he visited on New Year's Eve was "deliberately filled with [plain clothes] Guards."
88. I can easily see that if it had come to the attention of the Gardaí in 2013 that Mr. Meehan had posted a message about the 2005 complainant, that might very well have prompted a visit by the Gardaí, but it lacks any reasonable credibility that a Garda might have gone to the DART station to wait for Mr. Meehan and then said nothing to him. The deployment of a number of plain clothes Gardaí in a hotel lounge on New Year's Eve in response to such a posting must be inherently unlikely but there is no credible basis for believing that evidence might be forthcoming that a large number of Gardaí went to the hotel and then said nothing to Mr. Meehan.
89. Another incident in which Mr. Meehan was sure that the Gardaí were involved was on an unspecified date in 2018 when a tall man came into a café and spoke to a young woman who was looking over and grinning. While Mr. Meehan asserted that the man said something to the woman about him, he acknowledged that he did not hear what was said.
90. At point 9.25 of his list, Mr. Meehan refers to the fact that the Gardaí attended his home - where he lives with his mother - on twelve occasions between 2018 and 2022 in response to reports from his sister of concern for the welfare of their mother. Mr. Meehan records that on each occasion his mother reassured the Gardaí that everything was fine. He records that on the eighth such visit he exploded verbally with the Gardaí because he was feeling so distressed about constant visits and that the Gardaí said that his sister was very convincing when she would call them. Mr. Meehan perceives these visits to have been harassment by his sister and the Gardaí but on his own account of events, the Gardaí called in response to convincing reports of concern for his mother's safety; which could not possibly amount to harassment.
91. The only other incident in which Mr. Meehan thought he could positively point to the presence of Gardaí was that on a date unspecified - even as to the year - a Garda car stopped on the public roadway outside his house for about 10 seconds before switching on its blue lights and driving away . This incident, he said, took place two days after he had sent an e-mail to a number of people, including the complainant, stating his intention to go to the High Court. It is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that Mr. Meehan's e-mail to the complainant might have prompted a complaint to the Gardaí, and by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that such a complaint might have prompted a visit by the Gardaí. But there is no credible basis to believe that the Gardaí might have gone to Mr. Meehan's house in response to any such complaint, only to stop outside his house for a few seconds and drive away again. If it was not unreasonable that Mr. Meehan might have apprehended that his e-mail to the complainant might have prompted a visit by the guards, it clearly did not.
92. The last of the incidents identified by Mr. Meehan was on Thursday 8th December, 2022. On that evening, Mr. Meehan himself called the Gardaí to his home where - he said - he and his mother had been drinking and arguing. After the guards left, Mr. Meehan went out in his car to "arrange a bit of cocaine." When he returned home - on his own account obviously under the influence of cocaine and alcohol - he found his way obstructed by a taxi. He managed to get his car around the taxi and hurriedly entered his house. This, he said, showed that his phone was still under surveillance and that Gardaí go around in taxis and were being briefed based on surveillance of his phone.
93. If I have identified in Mr. Meehan's list the most extravagant allegations, there is no credible basis for any of them. The common theme is that Mr. Meehan's perception that he is being followed and watched is linked to his engagement in activity which he more or less recognises - if he does not unambiguously acknowledge - he should not have been engaged in. Whatever his Facebook post was all about, it was sufficient to give rise to an apprehension in Mr. Meehan's mind that it might result in a complaint to the Gardaí. The proposition that further contact by Mr. Meehan with the complainant might prompt a further complaint by her to the Gardaí is perfectly credible. However, what is not credible is the suggestion - which I have earlier identified as the lynchpin of his case that he has been the subject of a concerted campaign of harassment - that the Garda reaction to any such complaint or complaints might have been the deployment of numbers of plain clothes Gardaí - or civilians - to monitor his movements without ever speaking to him. I cannot and do not express any view as to whether Mr. Meehan's acknowledged cocaine use is a material factor in his perception of the world around him, but he has repeatedly connected the two, temporally, at least.
Conclusions
94. The first strand of the State's argument is that the facts on which Mr. Meehan's claims are founded do not, at their height, disclose a reasonable cause of action. I accept that individually the incidents he identifies of being looked at, grinned at, brushed past and so forth could not in law amount to harassment. However, if there was a credible basis for believing that there was any link between the incidents, I would not be prepared to say that they could not, collectively, amount to harassment. In my firm view there is no reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available to support the assertion that the persons described by Mr. Meehan were Gardaí or associated with An Garda Síochána.
95. The second strand of the State's argument is that on examination of all that Mr. Meehan puts forward, there is no credible basis for his assertion that he has been the subject of a campaign of Garda harassment. For all the reasons given, I am satisfied that this is so.
96. I have carefully considered whether there is a distinction that should or might properly be made between the incidents referred to in the Exhibit A, first part, materials - as to the events said to have occurred between 16th January, 2006 and 28th April, 2007 - and the incidents referred to in the Exhibit A, second part, materials and Exhibit B - as to the events said to have occurred after 2008. I have concluded that there is not. It is true that the list attached to the initial GSOC compliant is in some respects a good deal more detailed than what can be gleaned from the later material. However, the particularity of what is said is a distraction from the real issue, which is whether there is a credible basis for the assertion of a campaign of harassment. The asserted motivation for the alleged campaign from 2008 onwards - in section 8 of Exhibit B - is a vendetta founded on disgust that Mr. Meehan's convictions were overturned. In the same way that it is evident that there is no credible basis for that suggestion, there is no credible basis for the suggestion that any of the unidentified "actors" described in the table were members of, or associated with, An Garda Síochána. Among the incidents listed in that table are allegations of false arrest and false imprisonment but those clearly occurred in the course of the Garda investigation and prosecution of the 2005 complaint against Mr. Meehan of harassment of his classmate. If that complaint did not ultimately result in a conviction, it was undoubtedly made out.
97. It was and is common case that Mr. Meehan's case was to be found - if it was to be found at all - in his Exhibits as well as in his summons and amended statement of claim. It is clear from the High Court judgment that the judge had grave doubts about whether the claim for stalking and harassment could be made out. The judge was undoubtedly correct in her emphasis that the jurisdiction invoked by the State was one which was to be exercised sparingly. It was a relevant consideration that the action was at a very early stage but the core issue before the High Court was whether it could ever go anywhere. If there was demonstrably nothing in it, it could not be saved by additional irrelevant detail of dates and times. The task of analysing the material on which the claim was founded was always going to be - as in the event it was - rather tedious. If it was not immediately obvious that there was no credible basis for the claim of Garda stalking and harassment, it was nevertheless necessary to interrogate the material to establish whether there was or not.
98. Having carefully considered Mr. Meehan's summons, amended statement of claim, Exhibits and affidavits I am quite satisfied that there is no credible basis for his allegation that he has been subjected to a Garda campaign of stalking and harassment. The claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, has no reasonable chance of succeeding, and is bound to fail. For each of those reasons it is an abuse of the process of the court and should be struck out.
The two exceptions
99. At paras. 67 to 69 I examined those entries in Mr. Meehan's list of 123 incidents between January, 2006 and May, 2007 in respect of which he identified the Gardaí involved and found that with two exceptions the list comprised instances of clearly lawful engagement by the Gardaí with Mr. Meehan in the course of a criminal investigation and prosecution and of entirely innocuous encounters on the street. The two exceptions are items No. 4 and No. 16.
100. Entry No. 4 suggests that on 8th February, 2006 at 13:35 Mr. Meehan was:-
"Falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned under section 6 and section 8 of the Public Order Act while seated in public area of station waiting to meet [a named Garda]. [Another named Garda] jumped over the front counter and dragged me from my seat, assaulted 4 times, twice with a sharp object. I was then imprisoned for 3 hours. A medical doctor had to be called to the cell I was so shaken and upset."
101. Entry No. 16 suggests that on 2nd June, 2006 at 18:45:-
"I was assaulted on street by [Yet another named Garda]. This agitated me greatly."
102. I observed earlier that the gravamen of Mr. Meehan's case is that he was subjected to a campaign of stalking and harassment which he supposes was motivated by the disgust that his convictions were overturned and he did not go to jail. For the reasons given, that case is bound to fail. However, while Mr. Meehan's main preoccupation was with the perceived campaign against him since 2012, he relied on the list of earlier complaints - including entries Nos. 4 and 16 - as part of his pleadings. Self-evidently, the allegations of assault go back nearly twenty years and predate the issue of the plenary summons by about seventeen years but the jurisdiction of the court under O. 19, r. 28 is very limited.
103. The State's application to dismiss Mr. Meehan's action did not address these entries. It was said - and rightly said - that many of the complaints were entirely vague and that by reason of the lack of particularity it would be impossible to meet them. That, however, does not apply to these complaints. It was no part of the State's case that it could not defend the action - or any of the individual complaints - because of the passage of time: whether because a fair trial would not be possible or because any of the claims were statute barred. For the avoidance of doubt, the fact that these issues were not canvassed on the motion to dismiss the action as bound to fail does not necessarily preclude them being raised later.
104. I am bound to say that I have considerable misgivings as to where Mr. Meehan can hope to go with these two elements of his case but by sharp contrast with the rest of his complaints, the facts pleaded clearly disclose a cause of action. The authorities all emphasise that the jurisdiction to dismiss an action on the grounds that it is bound to fail does not extend to an assessment of the strength of the case. For these reasons, the State has not discharged the onus of proof that these two elements of the case are bound to fail.
Further amended statement of claim
105. The object of the order of the High Court directing Mr. Meehan to file an amended plenary summons and statement of claim was obviously - to my mind, at least - to require him to excise those claims in respect of the actions and inactions of the sixteen entities which had been struck out. At least with the benefit of hindsight, it might have been better if that was spelled out. The judge clearly contemplated that the State might thereafter request further particulars and that the future progress of the case might be dependent on the extent to which Mr. Meehan might be able to provide sufficient particulars. On the view I have taken of the case it was - subject to the exceptions which I have identified - doomed from the start and incapable of being saved by elaboration.
106. As I said earlier, the judge stayed the requirement for amended pleadings in the event of an appeal but Mr. Meehan delivered - and the Court of Appeal list judge permitted him to include in the books of appeal - what he describes as "Statement of Claim (3rd Amendment)" but which I think is technically a proposed further amended statement of claim, which he asked that this Court should take into account in deciding the appeal.
107. Mr. Meehan's proposed further amended statement of claim runs to 94 paragraphs over 26 pages. It could not advance his case. It is in large part a restatement of what is set out in his earlier documents. Repeatedly, Mr. Meehan links his perception that he is being watched to his cocaine use. To his previous allegations of overt Garda surveillance, Mr. Meehan adds that he has been followed and observed by the CIA and sent subliminal messages by agents of the United States government and President Obama: for whose acts and omissions the State can have no liability.
Summary
108. Save as to the two alleged incidents of assault, I am satisfied that Mr. Meehan's claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, has no reasonable prospect of success, and is bound to fail.
109. I would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and substitute an order pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts striking out the action as an abuse of process, save his claims that he was assaulted by the named Gardaí on 8th February, 2006 and 2nd June, 2006. It seems to me that there is no need for any further formal pleading. I would extend the time for delivery of a defence by 28 days from the perfection of the order of this Court. The State can ask for such further particulars of the claims as it may be advised.
110. Strictly speaking, the cross-appeal which asks that the Court should recognise that there is a prima facie case is not a cross-appeal. Neither, strictly speaking, is the request for an order joining the Garda Commissioner - which was not something which the High Court judge was asked to do. However, as a matter of housekeeping, I would strike out the cross-appeal.
111. The State having been largely but not entirely successful on the appeal, my provisional view is that there should be an order for 80% of the costs of the application in the High Court and 80% of the costs of the appeal. I would make no order for costs on the cross-appeal. If either party wishes to contend for any other costs order, they may notify the other and the Court of Appeal office within ten days of the electronic delivery of this judgment: in which event the panel will reconvene for a short costs hearing.
112. As this judgment is being delivered electronically MacGrath and Hyland JJ. have authorised me to say that they agree with it and with the orders proposed.
Result Appeal Partly Allowed