THE    HIGH    COURT 						1986 No. lll26P

BETWEEN

				BRENDAN  DOYLE AND ORS

									PLAINTIFFS

						and 

				NORMAN  CROKE  AND  ORS

									DEFENDANTS

 
JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY  THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE  DECLAN COSTELLO ON 6TH MAY 1988

APPEARANCES
 
Declan  Budd,  SC
Roddy Horan,  BL 						For the Plaintiffs
 
Instructed  by 						Paul N  Beausang & 									Co. 10  Upper Fitzwilliam Street 
Dublin  2
 
Martin  Feehan,   SC 
Barry White,  SC
Mr McGovern,   BL 						For the Defendants

 
Instructed by							Fergus P Taafe &  Co.
		 						7  D'Olier Street 
								Dublin  2
Eighty-three members of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union have brought these proceedings claiming a declaration that all union members of the former work force of Irish Meat Producers Limited at  the company's meat  processing  factory at  Barnhall, Leixlip, County  Kildare, are entitled to share equally in a sum of £360,000  paid  to the union  in settlement of an official strike called in the early  part of 1986. The Plaintiffs say that their union received this  sum as trustee for all its members  (amounting in all to about 270  former employees of the company). The  Defendants,  the branch secretary and members of the strike committee involved in the dispute,   say  that  the money is held  in  trust  for only 150 members because of decisions  taken at meetings of members of the union held in June and  November 1986. The  validity of the decisions taken at those meetings  is an important,   but  not the sole,  issue in the case. Adequately to explain the issues of fact and law involved  I must briefly outline  the history of the strike and  in doing  so consider the proceedings at  the two important meetings to which I have referred.

THE STRIKE

Irish Meat Producers Limited experienced severe financial difficulties in  1985 and began letting off its staff. By the beginning of 1986 it was only operating with a small labour force and on the 30th January declared most of its employees redundant and sent them their statutory RPI  forms terminating their employment. But about 20 employees  in  the cannery department  remained in employment and in respect of these twenty workers strike notice was served by the union. No ballot  required by Rule 128 of the union's rules was held, but nonetheless the  strike was an official one and an all-out  picket  in respect of it  was authorised  by the Irish Congress of Trade  Unions. It was  believed that the strike could  be an effective weapon for two reasons: firstly, the company had contracted to sell its  premises to a firm called  Bayzana Limited, and the strike could hold up the closing of the sale; secondly,  there was a valuable consignment of meat in cold storage in the premises owned  by a firm called  Hibernia Meats Limited,  and as long as an effective picket could be maintained the release of the consignment could  be stopped.

The union made clear to the Manager of the Employment Exchange in Dublin  in a  letter of the 13th of February that the dispute,   which related  in the main to a claim for extra statutory redundancy payments, only involved  certain  named employees from the cannery department and not  the entire company's work force and as a result those of the labour force who remained unemployed obtained social welfare payments during the strike.   But it is  perfectly clear,  and on this  point there is no dispute,   that the strike was called not only to obtain benefits for the 20 employees of the cannery department  but  for the entire work force. And so negotiations began  by the union on behalf of all their 270 members  (which comprised almost the entire of the company's work force)  for the  payment to them of extra statutory redundancy payments, What was sought was the payment of a lump sum (not individual sums relating to length of service)  which would then be divided by the union equally amongst its members,  and at the initial stage of the negotiations the union had quantified its claim at £1.6M.

The strike was organised  by a strike  committee and the branch secretary. Rule  131 of the union's  rules  provides that  the  "Section Committee"   referred  to in  the rules is to become the "Strike Committee" and that the strike committee is to be  "responsible to the branch official in respect of the  pursuance of the strike." The rule went on to provide that  "no decision or action shall be taken by the strike committee without consulting with and obtaining the approval of the branch official concerned". The branch official concerned in this case was the  branch  secretary of the Lucan  Branch of the union,  a full-time official of the union. Although he was given a crucial and decisive role in  the conduct of the strike,   the strike committee was also involved in the decision-making  processes - a factor in the case to which I will later return.

But  for the strike to be effective the  picket which the union had placed on the company's plant had to be manned for twenty-four hours a day for seven days a  week,  as otherwise the meat in cold storage might be moved and one of the principal weapons available in the dispute rendered useless. Not unreasonably,  as the union was negotiating on behalf of all its  members and  not just  those technically on strike, support for the  picket from the entire work force was sought. By a letter written to all members on the 19th February 1986  (signed by the branch  secretary and  the chief shop steward)  each member was informed that the  "dispute was concentrated on the issue of payment of redundancy agreements and the right of employment in a transfer situation"  and  that  it was imperative that every member should take part in the  picket line and contribute £3 per week to supplement the dispute  benefit of £36  per week which was  being  paid to the cannery workers. The letter added: 

'if you do not attend  for picket duty or contribute to the fund it will be accepted that you are not interested in either the dispute or its outcome and we shall act accordingly."
 
I have underlined the  word  "or"  in  this letter to draw attention to the fact that members were being required to take part in picket duty or to contribute to the strike fund. Whilst the Defendants do not claim this letter had any legal consequences it is indicative of the view which at an early stage in  the strike the  branch secretary had  formed as to the obligations of members  in  relation  to it.

THE MEETING OF  10TH JUNE 1986

Negotiations on  the union's claim  for a  lump sum in  respect of extra statutory redundancy payments for its members took place under the aegis of the Labour Court who issued a  recommendation that the claim be settled  by  payment  by the company of £400,000. It was decided to call a meeting of the union's members to consider this offer.       But instead of giving  notice of this meeting to all members by letter or by press advertisement it was decided merely to post a notice in the hut erected for members on picket duty at  the factory premises at Leixlip. This  notice  informed members that  a  general meeting of the union would  be held  in  the  "Hitching  Post"  at Leixlip on  10th June, but it made no reference to the business to be transacted and in particular no reference that a resolution would be discussed affecting members'  rights in  relation  to any negotiated  settlement. It was explained in evidence that notice of this meeting was not  posted to all members because when the factory was in operation union meetings were convened by notice pinned up in the factory premises and that it was considered that a  notice pinned in the hut at the picket line would suffice. But  the evidence satisfies me,   and I so hold,   that whilst a large number of members either saw the notice or learnt of the meeting by word of mouth a significant  number did not know that it was to be held.     In  this connection it is relevant to point out that it transpired quite late in the case that an earlier meeting of members had been held in the previous March which had  been convened in a similar way but  none of the witnesses who gave evidence were asked about this meeting and  I accept counsel's statement that they knew nothing about it.     Furthermore,   it is clear from the evidence that not all the union's members  lived in the Leixlip area and that a number,   for various  reasons,  had  not  been attending regularly for picket duty and so it is  reasonably probable that a  number outside Leixlip would not have seen any notification or otherwise have learnt of the proposed meeting.
 
The meeting approved the acceptance of the recommendation for settlement proposed by the Labour Court.  But it was known that either this recommendation had not been or would not be approved by the company and it was fully appreciated that the strike was far from settled. Strong criticism was expressed at the meeting at the lack of support for the  picket and after a full discussion a resolution was proposed and seconded and then adopted  unanimously by those present (including some of those who are  Plaintiffs in these proceedings)  in the following terms:

"That  people who are not doing picket duty or who_ henceforth do not attend for two  (2)  six hour picket shifts per week shall not be deemed to be in dispute and the union officials and committee is directed not to seek or represent such persons in pursuance of extra statutory redundancy entitlements."

As this resolution  (referred to throughout the strike and these proceedings as  "the June  mandate")   is the sheet-anchor of the Defendants'  defence  it  is  necessary clearly to understand what it meant. It was a decision that the union was to represent in any future  negotiations  for extra  statutory redundancy payments only those members who in  future attended for two six-hour periods of picket duty per week and that only those members who in future attended for two six-hour periods of picket duty were to be entitled to participate in any lump sum which the union  might obtain from the company in any future negotiations.
 
Whilst a copy of this  resolution was  placed in the hut at the picket line the evidence established that compliance with its terms was never demanded  by the strike committee nor was  proof of compliance made a condition  for inclusion  in the list of those entitled to share in the settlement of the union's claim which was drawn up by the strike committee and the  branch secretary at the end of the strike. The reasons for this were not made clear at the hearing. It may have been because the necessity of maintaining a twenty-four hour picket on every day of the week made it very difficult for members of the strike committee to ascertain whether those on picket duty in fact did a six-hour shift;   or it may have been  because the strike committee considered that the obligation to do two six-hour shifts per week was too stringent a requirement.  For whatever reason,  those on  picket duty were merely asked to sign their names on a sheet of paper to establish their attendance at the picket but  were not required to state the length of time during which they did duty.  And in a letter written shortly after the meeting to those members who it was considered were not supporting the picket no copy of the resolution was sent and no reference was made to the need to do two six-hour periods of picket duty per week. The letter dated 18th June reads as follows :

"Re:     Picket  Duty /Irish Meat  Producers
 A  Chara,

A  general meeting of our Irish Meat Producers Workers was held on Tuesday,   10th June, 1986 in the Hitching Post,  Leixlip. At this meeting many of the members expressed anger at the number of members who were not turning up for picket duty. Accordingly it was formally proposed and agreed to mandate the strike committee not to negotiate redundancy payments on behalf of members who were not attending at that  picket line.

A  register of picketers has now been kept since that meeting and your  failure to attend for your share of picket duty has been noted.     We must  now inform you that in accordance with the mandate of the members  we will have no choice but  to drop your name  from the list of those seeking extra redundancy unless (a)  there is an immediate effort  by you to make up lost picketing time,  or,   (b)  there is a  genuine explanation for your absence."

It will be noted that the letter (a)  requires immediate attendance for picket duty but does  not  specify that  two six-hour periods  per week are required;   (b)  indicates that  if a  genuine explanation for non-attendance is available the union will continue to act for the member in the claim  for redundancy payment,  and  (c)  that no reference is made in it to the necessity to contribute to the strike fund.

The evidence adduced on the Plaintiffs'  behalf (which was not contradicted) established that very imprecise records of those attending for picket duty were maintained; that some who signed the register left  immediately thereafter;  that some did picket duty but did not bother to sign.     It is clear that although members of the strike committee attended  for some period of every day during the period of the strike, it would not have been possible to draw up an accurate list of those members of the union who attended twice per week for a six-hour  period of duty. In  fact,  the list drawn up at the end of the strike by the strike committee and branch secretary of those members entitled  to share in the settlement was not compiled in accordance with the June resolution. The  150 members chosen by the strike committee and branch secretary to participate in it were the members who in  their opinion had supported the strike by attending for picket duty to an extent which the committee and the branch secretary considered adequate in all the circumstances and who had contributed to the strike fund and also those members who had contributed  to the strike fund but whose non-attendance at picket duty was excused by the strike committee and the branch secretary for reasons which they considered genuine. This method of compiling the list cannot, in  my judgment, be regarded as  compliance with the June resolution. By their June resolution  the members present laid down clear conditions for participation in any negotiated settlement, and the resolution cannot  be construed as  permitting the strike committee and branch secretary to ignore those conditions    and as conferring on them the wide discretionary adjudicative  powers they in fact exercised.

There is another finding of fact  in  relation  to the compilation of the list which I must record. None of the nine members of the union who gave evidence on  the  Plaintiffs' behalf had any prior notification of their exclusion  from the list of participants and I think I can conclude that,  as a matter of probability,  the procedures adopted by the strike committee    and  branch secretary did not involve prior notification to members  proposed  to be excluded. I  was  impressed  by their evidence and I think it  is highly probable that  if it was given to an impartial committee compiling a  list  in accordance with the criteria employed  by the strike committee and branch secretary in  this case,  the names of each of these nine witnesses would have been included.

THE SETTLEMENT

Irish Meat  Producers Limited was a member of a group of companies of which Cork Marts Limited was parent. Mr Declan Collins was group chief executive and in September of 1986 he was appointed acting chief executive of Irish Meats. The company was then hopelessly insolvent, although it had  not gone into liquidation. He set about trying  to settle  the strike. He was aware that a claim for a lump sum payment  in  respect of extra statutory redundancy had been made on behalf of 270 members of the ITGWU and the first thing he did was to obtain authorisation  from the parent  board for payment of £270,000, being £1,000 per employee. He then  sought a contribution towards a settlement from Hibernia Meats Limited  (whose meat was strike-bound in the factory)  and  Bayzana Limited   (who had  purchased the factory premises). Early in  November he made an offer of £270,000 plus the proposed contributions from the other two companies,   which brought the settlement offer to £380,000,   but he made it clear that this was a conditional offer and  that  the contribution had  not  been  finalised.     He also offered to make arrangements to ensure payment of statutory redundancies to all former employees. A  general meeting of the union was called  for the 20th November (which I will consider in  greater detail in a moment). It approved the settlement. The branch secretary wrote on the 26th November confirming that the settlement proposal  "has been accepted by our membership in full and final settlement of any claims which we may have on  your Company in respect of redundancy  payments" and that the official dispute had been terminated. In   fact  the settlement  figure had to  be amended to £360,000 and of this  £310.000 was  sent  to the union on  2nd  February 1987 and a  further £50.000 was  sent after the meat had  been released to  Hibernia  Meats. Mr Collins  made it clear in evidence that when payment was made in  February he was aware of the dispute that had broken out  in the union about those entitled to participate in the settlement     but  that at  that  time he did  not care how the money was distributed as long as the picket was called off and the strike ended.
 
Notice of the meeting of 20th  November was not sent to all members. Prior to the meeting  the  branch secretary and  the strike committee had drawn  up a list of  150 members of the union to whom it was  proposed to distribute the  settlement of £380,000.     The  list was  prepared on the basis to which I have already referred and only those members on this list  were  notified  that  the meeting was to be held. Other members of the union  learnt of the meeting and attended  but were informed that they would not be  permitted to vote at it. A  vote was taken at the meeting on the settlement proposals and they were approved by a large majority of those voting. No decision was sought or obtained from the  meeting confirming  the June  resolution, and no decision was sought or obtained  from  the meeting confirming  the  validity of the manner in which the branch secretary and  strike committee had prepared the list of participating members.
I must now come to a consideration of the legal consequences which flow from the facts of this case.
 
LEGAL ISSUES  AND  CONCLUSIONS

The  Plaintiffs  claim  a  declaration  that  the  sum of  £360,000  is  held  in trust by the Defendants for the entire former work force of Irish Meat Producers  Limited  who were members of the union. The  Defendants do not deny that the relationship between the members of the union and the union itself could  result in the creation of a trust in respect of monies received by the union on its members behalf but claim that in this case they are held in trust only for those members entitled to it in pursuance of the terms of the resolution of 10th June 1986.The Defendants' case therefore depends on the validity of the June resolution and on establishing that the division of the settlement was in accordance with it.

Before turning to consider these issues there is one aspect of the Plaintiffs' claim to which I should briefly refer. There could be circumstances  in  which an employer pays a  lump sum to a union  so as to impress it with a trust of his creation. But that did not happen in this case.  It is true that Mr Collins negotiated with the union a lump sum payment in respect of claims to extra statutory redundancy payments which had  been made,  as far as he knew,  on behalf of all its members. But when the sum was actually paid he was aware that a dispute had broken out  in the union and that it was proposed that only some of its members were to participate in it.     He explained that he paid it over on the basis that the union would call off the strike and that once that was done he was not concerned how the sum was divided. I do not think that anything the employer may have intended by the  payment had any bearing on the legal situation arising from the relationship which existed  between the  Plaintiffs and their union and resulting  from the facts of the case which I have outlined.
 
In so far as the defence depends on the plea that the union is acting in accordance with the June  resolution  it must fail because of the finding I have made that the list of participants was not in fact drawn up in accordance with it and because it would now be impossible to prepare a list in accordance with it,   no records of picket duty being available to enable this to be done.     But issues relevant to the validity of the June resolution also arise in relation to the November meeting and  so I  think I should consider whether,   in any event,  the June resolution was a valid one.
 
lt is accepted by the union's counsel that arising out of the contract between each member of the union and  the union  itself a lump sum negotiated  by the union in respect of extra redundancy payments for all its members would normally be held  by the union in trust for equal distribution amongst all its members. It is accepted by the Plaintiffs'  counsel that  this  situation could be altered by the union's members but he urges

(a)	that each member has as a matter of law the right to require that fair procedures be adopted in the convening and conduct of any meeting which might decide to limit  participation in the settlement in the manner attempted at the meeting on  10th June;

(b)	that the  proceedings adopted  for convening and conducting the June meeting  were not fair because  (i )  no proper notification that a meeting was to be held was given to the members and (ii) no prior notice was  given  to members that  the resolution limiting members'  participation in the settlement was to be proposed at the meeting,  and

(c)    that as  fair procedures were not adopted the June resolution was invalid and cannot  be relied on by the  Defendants.

What  falls  for determination firstly,   therefore,   is  whether as a matter of law the members had  the right to fair procedures as claimed on their behalf and if so whether this  right was denied them.

I think the Plaintiffs are correct in their contention that they are entitled to fair procedures in the conduct of their union's affairs which materially affect their interests.     This  right is derived from three different sources. Firstly,   it arises under Article 40(6)(l)(iii) of the Constitution by which the State guarantees liberty for the exercise,   subject  to  public  order and  morality,   of the right of citizens to form associations and unions. The effect of that  Article was considered by the President of the High Court,  Mr Justice Finlay, in Rodgers  v.   I.T.G.W.U. (unreported,   15th March 1978). That was a case relating to a decision of the Dockers Section,   No.5  Branch, Cork,  of the  Defendant  union to retire compulsorily members of the section reaching the age of 65. Some days  prior to 25th June  1976 a notice was  posted in the usual place used for convening meetings of members that a meeting would be held on that day,  at the bottom of which it was indicated that the terms of the national wage agreement were to be considered. A  resolution was proposed at the meeting and adopted that a  scheme of compulsory retirement at 65 with a pension should be introduced. The Plaintiff arrived late at the meeting after the resolution had  been adopted.  He had no idea that the  subject of compulsory retirement at 65 was to be discussed. The Plaintiff objected to being compulsorily retired and instructed a solicitor to write on  his  behalf to the union. As a result,  another meeting was summoned  for 3rd  August  1976. The Court found as a fact that the Plaintiff was aware that  the question  of compulsory retirement would be discussed at it.   However,  he did not attend this meeting.  At it a ballot  vote was  taken to confirm the resolution of the 25th June meeting. Subsequently the Plaintiff tried to continue to work but was informed that the  rest of the men would  not  work with him and he then instituted  proceedings against the union.  A  number of issues were raised.     That which is relevant to these proceedings was his claim that in relation  to meetings of the section of his union he was entitled to fair procedures. He asserted that a basic  requirement of natural justice  would  be that  for any important  matter which might  be decided by a meeting he should have explicit  notice of it and given an opportunity of expressing his point of view,  and that in respect of both meetings he did  not  receive fair or proper notice that the question of his compulsory retirement would be discussed-       The President  rejected the argument  that a right  to fair procedures arose because the resolution amounted in effect  to the imposition of a penalty on him so that  the proceedings at the meeting could be regarded as quasi-judicial. But he held that the right to fair procedures arose from the provisions in the Constitution  relating to the trade unions.     He  pointed out  that  the constitutional right to the formation of trade unions involves the right to join or not to join existing  trade  unions and went on   (page  14):

"It is,   in  my  view,   a  necessary corollary of the right to join and become a member of a trade union that the right must extend to taking  part in the democratic  processes  provided by it and in particular to taking  part  in  the decision-making  processes  within the  rules of the trade union. It would clearly be open to a trade union  so to formulate its  rules  so that  in  regard to certain matters or even  in  regard to all matters that decision-making would be in the hands of delegates or elected officers and specified members of the unions...It is quite clear from the rules of the defendant union that they envisaged the making of a decision of this description by the particular Section which would  be affected  by it and that ultimately it could only be made in accordance with the rules by the popular will of the members of the section. It  follows from this,  in my view,   that the Plaintiff had  both a  right under the rules and as part of the exercise of his constitutional right to take part,  if he so wished, in the decision-making process" (page  15).

The President held that the Plaintiff did not know that the meeting of the 25th June was to discuss compulsory retirement and he held that

"having  regard to the right of the plaintiff to reasonable notice of the topic  to be discussed so as to afford him a reasonable opportunity of taking part in the decision,  the notice of the meeting of 25th June was inadequate and the decision affecting him reached at that  meeting  was for that reason invalid."

He held,  however,   that with regard to the second meeting of the 3rd August the Plaintiff knew that the question of compulsory retirement would  be discussed at  it   (even though it was  not specifically referred to in the notice convening it),  that he had fair and reasonable notice of it,  and that the resolution  passed at it was therefore valid.
 
That decision established that a member of a trade union has a right to require that in the conduct of the affairs of the trade union fair procedures will be adopted,  and that in certain circumstances the failure to give notice of a  proposed resolution could amount to a breach of fair procedures and be a ground for invalidating it. It has been suggested  (see "Irish Trade  Union Law",  Kerr and Whyte, p.26)  that whilst a member of a  union would certainly have a common law right to natural justice which would include the right to fair procedures the suggested constitutional right to participate in the decision-making processes of a union does not exist  because citizens do not have a constitutional  right  to join an established trade union  (except  possibly where membership is a  prerequisite to obtaining employment in a particular  firm). But  I do not  find this criticism persuasive  because it seems to me that  if the constitutional right of citizens to form associations and unions is to be effective the  Article in which it is to be found should not be construed restrictively as the right would be of limited  value if it did not protect individual members against procedures which might  be unfair to them.     I have no difficulty, therefore,   in respectfully following this decision and in holding that the Plaintiffs and all the members of their union had a constitutional right  by  virtue of  Article 40(6) (1) (iii)   to fair procedures in the conduct of the strike and the negotiations leading to its settlement.
 
They also derived this right from another Article of the Constitution. It  had  been established in  In  re  Haughey  (1971)   I.R.   217 at  264,- that Article 40(3)  of the Constitution contains a guarantee to the citizen of basic  fairness of procedures,  and in  Glover v.   B.L.N.   Ltd  (1973)  I.R. 388,  Walsh J.   pointed out that that decision implied that statutes, regulations or agreements setting up machinery for taking decisions which may affect  rights or impose liabilities  should be construed as providing  for fair procedures  (page 425) and he implied into a contract of employment  from that  Article a term that  fair procedures would be adopted.     So it  seems to me that there should  be implied into the contract  between the union and each of its members by virtue of this Article a  provision that fair procedures will be adopted when any decision materially affecting the members' rights is to be taken.
 
The right can also be derived from another source. In Breen v. A.E.U. 1971  2  Q.B.   175 the Court of  Appeal in England was concerned with a case in which a district committee of the defendant union had  failed to approve the election of the plaintiff as a shop steward.  One of the important points in the case related to the power of the court  to review the committee's decision.  In the course of his judgment  Denning M.R.  made certain observations with which I respectfully agree, he pointed out that courts had in the past juris¬diction to review decisions of bodies carrying out judicial or quasi-judicial functions,   that this jurisdiction had  been extended to cover statutory bodies entrusted  with discretionary powers,   but that it also extended  to committees of private associations such as trade unions. He pointed out that even though the  rules of a union might  provide committees with wide discretionary powers  that that discretion was not an  unfettered one:   that  the contract between  the  members  should be construed as containing an  implied  term  that  the discretion would be exercised fairly (p. 190).     Although his was a minority judgment,  the views which I have just summarised were approved by other members of the Court of Appeal and it seems to me that they cogently express an important principle, namely, that derived from common law principles the court will imply a term into the contract of membership of a union that fair procedures will be adopted in relation to decisions taken by committees of trade unions which materially affect the rights of any of its members.

What  next  must  be considered is whether the  rights of the  Plaintiffs to fair procedures have been  respected. No hard and fast rules can be laid down as to what  procedures should  be adopted in a given case. But it seems  to me  that  the procedures  which the learned  President concluded  should have been adopted in the  Rodgers case should have been adopted here.  In the Rodgers case the resolution which was adopted  had  the effect of requiring the  plaintiff to retire at the age of 65 and it was held that fair procedures required that notice that such a resolution would  be moved should have been  given to him prior to the first meeting which adopted it.  Here less serious consequences for union members were involved in the June resolution but nonetheless important  rights of each union member were affected by it, namely, the contractual right to require the union to represent them in negotiations with their former employers and the prima facie right to participate in any settlement that negotiations might produce. he courts must  not interfere officiously in the affairs of private associations such as trade unions and must only do so in clear cases to prevent or remedy some manifest injustice. And when considering what  procedures can  properly be regarded as fair it must consider procedures  which  would  be appropriate  to the type of organisation or association which is to adopt them and the nature and scope of the decision to which they relate. Whilst bearing in mind these considerations it  seems,  nonetheless,  clear to me that before a decision was taken to deprive members of the union of the rights to which I have referred proper notice should have been  given to each member (a)  that a meeting was to be held and  (b)  of the terms of any resolution  to be  proposed at it which might  have the effect of depriving members of rights which they could reasonably believe they enjoyed in order to ensure that  every member who wished to could attend and avail of the opportunity of influencing the meeting's decision as he or she thought proper. As these procedures were not adopted  I must hold  that the June resolution was invalid.

The conclusions relating to the right to fair procedures which I have just expressed apply with equal force to the November meeting. It follows,  then,  that the November meeting cannot be relied on as impliedly  validating the June resolution by the approval it gave to the settlement or as impliedly approving the steps taken by the strike committee and the branch secretary in relation to it.     Notice of that meeting was only given to those  150 members on the list of participants and even though non-listed members were permitted to speak at the meeting they were not entitled to vote.    This means that fair procedures were not adopted in the convening and conduct of that meeting and so the  Defendants cannot rely on it to defeat the Plaintiffs' claim.
 
Even if the June resolution had been properly adopted and even if the Defendants were correct in the way they interpreted it,  their defence would fail.  The procedures actually adopted by them in drawing up the list of 150 members infringed the first basic principle of natural justice,  the rule against  bias.  All the members of the strike committee were former employees of Irish Meat  Producers Limited and as such had a financial interest in  the settlement and,  accordingly,  a financial interest  in the actual  number of persons who would  participate in it. It has not  been  suggested  that  they in  fact  allowed this interest  to influence the decisions in which they were involved  but the test to be applied is an objective one and a reasonable person could conclude that there was a risk that an even-handed decision might not be taken by a committee all of whose members had a  financial interest in its outcome. So it seems  to me that  even if it could be  said that the June resolution  had  been adopted in accordance with  fair procedures and that the procedures adopted by the strike committee and branch secretary were in accordance with it,  the  Defendants' defence would fail because those authorised procedures were themselves in breach of natural justice. Secondly,  the procedures actually adopted gave no opportunity of a hearing to those against whom adverse decisions might be taken and thereby infringed the second basic rule of natural justice. It seems to me that if a committee proposes to deprive a member of a union of a substantial sum of money and his or her contractual right  that the union will act on his or her behalf in a dispute because of an allegation that the member has not in its opinion adequately  performed  picket duty or has in its opinion no genuine excuse for failure  so to do    an opportunity to  be heard on  the allegation should be afforded. In its absence the decisions are invalid.

I must conclude,   therefore,  that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunctive relief they seek. I will discuss with counsel the terms of the Order which are appropriate in this case.