High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This interlocutory motion for an injunction came before the Court on Thursday 17 April 1997. The matter was contentious with numerous and voluminous affidavits and exhibits which were still being opened on Friday 18 April 1997. The matter then hadto be adjourned and taken up again on Tuesday 6 May and continued on Wednesday 7 May. The following affidavits were opened, contained in books 1, 2 and 3; the four affidavits of William O'Grady; the four affidavits of John Cornally; the two affidavits of David Byrne; the two affidavits of Peter Thornton and there were many exhibits referred to therein. The time lag in the middle of the hearing obviated the necessity for a ruling in respect of the late production of certain affidavits, as the interval ensured a reduction in any element of surprise. During the adjournment, the situation was held in status quo by an undertaking given on behalf of the defendant.

The Plaintiff company is a supplier of toiletries to hotels and airlines. By an agreement made in July 1994 the defendant Seamar Limited agreed terms with the plaintiff to supply certain products in the fashion market to the plaintiff for distribution in the amenities market, ie, mainly hotels and airlines.

It is common case that the contract made in July 1994 governed the relationship between the parties and the contract provided for a six month period for a notice of termination and also provided for a 30-day credit facility. It also contained provisions in respect of the price of the products. The terms of the agreement are to be found in book 1, tab 8(a) at the back of exhibit JC1. I quote paragraph 2 in the Proposal and paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 in the Minimum Requirements part of the document as these seem to me to be particularly relevant. I should add that several differing copies of this clause have been produced in the course of the careful and diligent arguments of Counsel. Since the photocopy at tab 8(a) in book 1 is quite difficult to read, it seems to me that an agreed clean copy should be initialled by the solicitors and handed in so as to avoid any future confusion. Paragraph 2 in the Proposal part of the document reads:

"Agreement to provide finance for surplus stock estimated at maximum of £50,000 by way of reduced credit while stocks last, this to be implemented not later than 1 October 1994."

Under the Minimum Requirements part of the document, paragraph 1 reads: "30 days credit." Paragraph 2 reads:

"HDPE bottles; 25ml-30ml to be included in costings at 1.2p (now 1.28p per 20 equals 1.6p) . HDPE caps, 25ml-30ml to be included in costings at 1.2p. The screen printing of plastic bottles to be included in costings at 0.8p per pass."

Paragraph 5, which is critical, reads:

"Supply new 7 ml Gucci Pour Momme aftershave at a maximum of 22.5p per unit and EDT at 25p."

Paragraph 7 reads:

"To provide for labelling bottles at 0.8p in the costings."

Paragraph 8 reads:

"No further review of margin percent for two years."

Paragraph 9 reads:

"Premier to control moulds purchased by Premier."

Paragraph 10 reads:

"Not to engage in the amenity sector of the market."

Paragraph 12 reads:

"To recognise that increased sales at lower cost but fixed percentage margin is beneficial."

Paragraph 13 reads:

"Quarterly review meetings to be held and to include TC Johnson."

That is a reference to Mr Terry Johnson of Johnson Brothers. It is perhaps to be regretted that the quarterly review meetings to include Mr Johnson apparently did not take place1 as these might have prevented the conflict which arose by enabling the parties to have a forum to discuss and overcome differences as they came about and to sort them out in a practical and businesslike way to the mutual benefit of the parties, especially as there is a very considerable interdependence between these companies in their business.

It was also common case, arising from the previous history and a prior agreement, that a six month period of notice was required for termination. This is explicable in the context of the defendant being the plaintiff's main supplier and the need for certainty in the supply of products for distribution to the large customers of the plaintiff. No such notice has been served and the supply of products enabling annual sales of £2 million per annum has continued, although laterally on foot of the defendant's undertaking to continue these supplies.

The matters in contention are ostensibly in respect of a narrow range of products which constitute the bulk, about 75% in value, of the business, being the Gucci items. Unhappily, the differences over the pricing of these four products have eroded trust between the parties and their capacity to meet and find a way of overcoming the difficulties over these four products, although they are only four out of a range of about 40 products.

I propose to answer the following questions: First, has the plaintiff made out that there is a real and fair issue about the enforceability of the July 1994 agreement, especially in respect of the pricing of the disputed range of Gucci products? Secondly, where lies the balance of convenience? Thirdly, would damages be an adequate remedy in the circumstances of this case?

It is agreed that the principles of law involved in the main are succinctly set out in John Farrell's Irish Law of Specific Performance. At paragraph 2.09, I quote:

"Interlocutory relief is intended to maintain the status quo until the trial and to do no more. The grant of an interlocutory injunction is a remedy that is both temporary and discretionary. No rights are determined nor are issues decided. The object of the injunction and other interlocutory relief is to permit the just realisation of the plaintiff's claim if he is successful. In interfering by interlocutory injunction the court does not in general profess to anticipate the determination of the right, but merely gives the opinion that there is a substantial question to be tried and that a case has been made out for the preservation of the property in (status quo) pending the trial. The court's jurisdiction is not restricted to actual breaches of contract; it also has jurisdiction to restrain an apprehended or threatened breach. The application for an interlocutory injunction is often treated by consent as the trial of the action. When that happens, the rights of the parties are finally determined on the interlocutory motion. There seems to be no significant difference in the law in this country and that of England and Wales as to the principles that should be applied by the court in granting or withholding an interlocutory injunction save that the constitutional rights of any of the parties to the action under the Irish Constitution cannot be abridged by the order."

I have also taken cognisance of the principles as explained in paragraphs 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12. I think it would be helpful if I also quote these as they are a clear and pithy statement of the principles which I have sought to apply to the facts of this case.

Paragraph 2.10 reads:

"The first question for the court to determine in an application for an interlocutory injunction where the claimant's right or its violation is disputed is whether he has shown that "a fair question" arises for decision by the court on the trial of the action in due course. It frequently happens that neither the applicant's right nor the fact of its violation is disputed by the person whose acts are sought to be restrained; in such a case an injunction may be given almost as of course. There are cases where a breach of contract in issue is so clear or the party attempting to resist the application for the interlocutory injunction so devoid of merits that the court should immediately provide a remedy by way of injunction. In very many other cases -- the right, the fact of its violation or both those points are contested. Then the issue of "a fair question" does arise. Tests applied by judges in recent times such as "that there is a fair question raised to be decided at the trial", "a serious question of law arose", that there is a substantial issue to be tried" and "that there is a serious question to be tried" are essentially the same. In a later case, Finlay CJ has used phrases "whether the plaintiffs have . . . raised an arguable case" and "if it could be asserted as an arguable case", while also making it clear that he was applying the principles laid down by the court in the Campus Oil case. There is no inconsistency; whether there is an "arguable case" is to be judged in the light of the principles in the Campus Oil case.

Formerly, the position was less clear on the "fair question" point and the majority opinion seems to have been that a plaintiff had to show on an interlocutory application that he probably would succeed at the trial. In the Campus Oil case, the probability test was rejected by O'Higgins CJ. He pointed out that the application of that criterion on a motion for interlocutory relief would involve the court in a determination of an issue which properly arises for determination at the trial of the action."

Paragraph 2.11 reads:

"When the party seeking an interlocutory injunction has raised a fair question to be tried at the hearing of an action in which, if he succeeded, he would be entitled to a permanent injunction the court should not express any view on the strength of the contending submissions, but should proceed to consider the other matters which then arise in regard to the granting of an interlocutory injunction. Normally it is undesirable that a court should come to firm conclusions in its judgment on an interlocutory application. In many cases where the courts have considered the principles applicable in granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction stress has been laid on the difficulties facing the court when the facts are disputed and it is not possible to resolve such a conflict by a perusal of the affidavits. In such circumstances, it is inadvisable for the court to express a view as to the probable outcome of the proceedings when they go to plenary hearing or to base a decision as to interlocutory relief on a forecast of such probable outcome.

O'Higgins CJ explained the approach of the courts:

"In cases where rights are disputed and challenged and where a significant period must elapse before the trial, the court must exercise its discretion (to grant interlocutory relief) with due regard to certain well-established principles. Not only will the court have regard to what is complained of and whether damages would be an appropriate remedy bat it will consider what inconvenience, loss and damage might be caused to the other party, and will enquire whether the applicant has shown that the balance of convenience is in his favour."

Lord Diplock has also explained:

"The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiff's need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's favour at the trial. The court must weigh one against another and determine where "the balance of convenience" lies."

The potential inconvenience to the plaintiff must be greater than that to the defendant and the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. The phrase "balance of convenience" has been described as "simply a useful shorthand expression" pointing out that a number of factors should be taken into account and these are usefully embraced under the general rubric 'the balance of convenience'. Accordingly, it may be said that the two material questions in the great majority of claims for interlocutory injunctions are whether the applicant has made a fair case and where the balance of convenience lies.

A vital matter for consideration in relation to the balance of convenience is whether, if the plaintiff is refused an interlocutory injunction but succeeds at the full hearing, he could be adequately compensated in damages. That point itself may raise two questions. One is whether damages would be an adequate remedy; the second is whether there is a defendant liable to pay such damages who is able to pay them so that the compensation could actually be realised. The facts that individuals might be unable to pay and that an organisation such as a trade union might have some immunity or that the party expected to pay may show that in fact he has no liability in law for the loss will be taken into account. The fact that a plaintiff's right to compensation in the event of his ultimate success is not conceded may be a factor in a decision to grant or withhold an interlocutory injunction. A plaintiff usually has to establish the inadequacy of damages as a remedy "for the purposes of an interlocutory injunction" and, if the case goes to plenary hearing, he must be able to discharge a similar onus then. The fact that a claim relates to ascertainable sums of money does not always make damages a sufficient remedy. For example, non-payment of plaintiffs wages and salaries, having regard to their particular personal circumstances, may cause hardship, distress and anxiety constituting substantial prejudice and injury over and above the fact of non-payment.

The next point to be considered is whether, if the interlocutory injunction is granted but the defendant succeeds at the full hearing, he can be compensated adequately for any loss suffered by a combination of the undertaking which must necessarily be given in order to obtain the interlocutory injunction and any separate claim he may have against the plaintiff by way of counterclaim or otherwise. If the undertaking as to damages is not worthwhile, even without default on the plaintiff's part, that is an important factor against granting the interlocutory injunction."

I have read all that at such length because those are the principles which I have sought to apply to the facts of this case and it seems to me that Mr Farrell has made a clear and pithy statement of the principles involved. I also want to make it clear that, while I make certain findings with regard to the contents of the affidavits as before me, I am not making any final determination of any of the issues, I merely make those findings for the purpose of applying the criteria set out above.

From the affidavits, I accept that Clause 5 of the agreement made in July 1994 stipulated that the defendant was to supply new 7.5ml Gucci aftershave at a maximum of 22.5p per unit and EDT at 25 pence. I accept that Mr Cornally wrote in "lable (sic)". I infer that this was to indicate that products referred to in paragraph 5 were products with labels. The six months' notice of termination dealt with in Mr Johnson's letter of 6 July 1994 and Clause 9 of the contract in respect of moulds are both significant and they are indicative that all parties were aware of the need to avoid or at least to reduce the problems which a disruption of the supply of products would cause.

Sensibly, the dispute over the pricing of the Gucci products was referred to a management consultant, Mr Alley, to try to resolve the conflicts which had arisen in respect of the defendant charging higher prices than the plaintiffs contended had been agreed. The plaintiff refused to pay and, indeed, made deductions in respect of what the plaintiff regarded as overpayments once the price increases were appreciated.

The plaintiff contends that the outcome of the arbitration should have been binding. However, it is clear that the defendant does not accept the pricing as suggested by the arbitrator. Indeed, by December 1996 the plaintiff had brought in Dunne and Bradstreet to apply pressure with the threat of legal proceedings in respect of the disputed amounts and the sums which the plaintiff had deducted from the defendant's statement of accounts sent.

Relations deteriorated to the point where Mr Cornally wrote the letter of 14 February 1997, see Tab 4g. There is a conflict as Mr O'Grady refutes many of the allegations, especially about any suggestion that the plaintiff does any manufacturing of products covered by the July 1994 agreement. His refuting of this is perhaps confirmed by the plaintiff's need to ensure the continued supply of products from the defendant. The tone of the defendant's letters is threatening. See, for example, the fax of 10 March 1997 at tab 8D. I am inclined to ask why were quarterly review meetings as agreed not actually sought? My impression from all the affidavits is that the plaintiff was prepared to consider price increases and sought information on costings and at times, agreed reasonable cost increases in respect of other products. This seems to be confirmed by the plaintiff agreeing to arbitration in respect of the prices for the four Gucci products. I note in passing that no step was taken by the defendant to set aside the award of the arbitrator. On the other hand, I am aware of the suggestion that the defendant perhaps only regarded Mr Alley's role as an advisory one.

This dispute has been going on since 1994 over the Gucci product prices. In the background, there was the remedy of a six months' notice of termination. This was never used and the symbiotic relationship of the two companies continued with the parties struggling on. The defendant is the only source at present for the supply of these products and holds the plaintiff's moulds under licence. This appears to be the reason for the six months notice, so as to enable arrangements for an alternative source of supply to be set up in the event of termination. While the injunction sought is in the nature of a mandatory injunction to continue the supply of product until the hearing of the action, or for six months after a termination notice, nevertheless I accept the arguments that this is necessary to maintain the status quo ante until the issues are tried. I am impressed by the arguments on the lines of those accepted in respect of spare parts by McCracken J in Barlo Farm Machines Ltd, (unreported judgment of 24 October 1996), about the need to preserve the status quo in respect of the continuity of supply of a product or, in that case, repair parts. I also think the loss, if the plaintiff's customers are not supplied, would be very difficult indeed to assess and very probably incalculable.

As to the suggestion that the plaintiff agreed to increase prices on the Gucci range by payments made on costing sheets showing increased prices, the plaintiff strongly and consistently has maintained that once these increases were appreciated, then deductions were, for what the plaintiff regarded as excess payments, duly made and notified to the defendant. While some variation of the July 1994 agreement could be negotiated, I have doubts about the reality of the suggestion that there were varied agreements on the pricing of the Gucci products by virtue of Seamar's costing sheets and some payments on foot thereof.

There seems to me on the affidavits opened to me -- but I do not decide this in the absence of hearing oral testimony -- to have been a lack of agreement on the plaintiff's part to variations in the pricing in relation to the four products. From studying such payments as were made, it seems to me, once the plaintiff adverted to the fact that there were what the plaintiff regarded as overpayments, the plaintiff proceeded to deduct those in a consistent approach to the matter. I do not decide this aspect in the absence of hearing oral testimony but I do take the view that the plaintiff has made out a fair case on this aspect of the disputed pricing. Similar considerations apply in respect of the essence price increases.

The issue as to whether the arbitrator's findings were to be binding can await the hearing of the action. However, since the defendant did not accept the findings, it is not surprising that the plaintiff adhered to the consistent line that the pricing should remain on the basis of the July 1994 agreement and paid on this basis in respect of the four Gucci products rather than on the basis suggested by the arbitrator. If the defendant was not prepared to accept the arbitrator's award or findings, then it seems to me not unreasonable that the plaintiff would say that the basic agreement of July 1994 should continue.

Since the business of supply and distribution has been ongoing, I doubt if the defendant is justified in regarding the sub franchise to Premier from Johnson Brothers as being effectively at an end, as was contended. I am impressed by paragraph 10 of Mr O'Grady's fourth affidavit. In paragraph 10, it is stated:

"I say that the constant attempts made by the defendant to get away from the terms of the 1994 contract in order not to be bound by them is the essence of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. I further say and believe that the 1994 contract is the lifeblood of the plaintiff's commercial existence and that the plaintiff cannot survive unless the defendant adheres to the terms and conditions of the 1994 contract.

In refusing to return to the plaintiff's possession moulds which the defendant has acknowledged are owned by the plaintiff and which moulds the defendant has informed the plaintiff require repair, the defendant is acting in a deliberately constructive way and in a manner calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff, who is thereby denied the opportunity of repairing and/or improving upon the design of the moulds which it owns."

Without the intervention of the Court, the plaintiff is left with the scenario that unless it pays in advance the full prices claimed by the defendants, the supply of products will cease. I think the plaintiff's concerns about the loss of goodwill of its big customers, if supply is cut off, are both real and reasonable. I think that the plaintiff was entitled to be apprehensive of the defendant's threat to contact the plaintiff's customers directly. However, this aspect has been resolved by the defendant's agreement not to contact the plaintiff's customers as was threatened.

I have come to the conclusion, having taken particular note of the careful and articulate arguments made on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiff has made out a satisfactory case that there is an arguable fair question to be tried, that the balance of convenience does favour the plaintiff, that irreparable damage would be caused to the plaintiff if the supply of the products is disrupted because of the nature of the business with the main source of supply, if not the only source, being the defendant and also by reason of the type of customers of the plaintiff.

Fourthly, I have come to the conclusion that damages would be an inadequate remedy in the circumstances. I think that the plaintiff is entitled to have the situation maintained in statu quo ante until the hearing on the basis of an injunction or undertaking, if it is forthcoming, until the trial. Then it seems to me fair that the stock allowance should be increased again to £50,000 ie, the deduction of £25,000 unilaterally made by the plaintiff should be topped up again. I will also hear brief arguments with regard to the alleged £40,000 deductions made by the plaintiff in respect of the moulds. But it seems to me, subject to that, that the plaintiff is entitled to have the situation held until the trial of the action or until six months notice has been validly given and the six months is up. I think that the plaintiff is entitled to have the situation held until then in statu quo ante. Now, I suggested that I should hear you briefly in relation to the question of the moulds.

MR MARRAY: I am just taking instructions on that, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Yes. It was suggested that £40,000 deductions had been made. Sorry, Miss Barrington did you want to talk to your client about that aspect of it?

MS BARRINGTON: I did, my Lord, briefly.

MR MARRAY: My Lord, just in relation to the two matters that you referred to, I think the trading allowance or the stock allowance can be restored to £50,000.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Yes, I had said that should be done.

MR MARRAY: Yes, and will be done.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: That will be done.

MR MARRAY: Secondly, with regard to the moulds, my Lord, we are not clear as to the level of the deduction but the reason why any deduction was made in regard to the moulds was that the defendant was denying that the plaintiff actually owned those moulds. Now the defendant is apparently accepting that the moulds are owned by the -- I may not be correct in this but the defendant is accepting that the moulds in respect of which the deduction was made are in fact owned by the plaintiff and that deduction will not apply but, naturally, when requested to do so, the defendant will have to return those moulds to the plaintiff.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Yes, it is stated in the July agreement that the moulds are Premier's.

MS BARRINGTON: Perhaps I could just add to that, my Lord, I agree with what my Friend has said, with regard to the deductions made in relation to the moulds. Unfortunately the matter is not fully before your Lordship because it only arose last Friday. Deductions had been made.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: That is why I wanted to be addressed by Counsel in relation to that aspect of it. I was concerned that I did not have the full picture with regard to the moulds.

MS BARRINGTON: Yes, my Lord. With regard to the deductions that have been made, the defendant acknowledges that those moulds are the property of the plaintiff and if their credit is restored or, rather, their deductions are cancelled, the defendant is happy to return those moulds on payment of what is customary in the industry and what is known as a development charge of £2,000 to which the plaintiff . . . (INTERJECTION)

MR MARRAY: I do not think I am accepting that.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: This is new to me.

MS BARRINGTON: Sorry to have caused confusion, my Lord. I think the position is that in relation to . . . (INTERJECTION)

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Miss Barrington, would you like a little time at this point?

MS BARRINGTON: No, my Lord, I think the position is clear insofar as those moulds are concerned, the defendant acknowledges that they are the property of the plaintiff. There has been some confusion because in relation to a separate set of moulds, there is an ongoing dispute as to ownership and that is what has caused the confusion. But insofar as the deductions that have been made are concerned, if they are cancelled, the moulds to which they relate will be returned by the defendant.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: I was told the plaintiff had made £40,000 deductions.

MS BARRINGTON: That is correct, my Lord. When those deductions are cancelled, the defendant will . . .

MR JUSTICE BUDD: The plaintiff is going to cancel those deductions, isn't that it?

MS BARRINGTON: Yes, my Lord.

MR MARRAY: Yes, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: With mention of the fact that some of these moulds require repair, the parties should sort out that sort of ongoing problem. What is the situation? The first thing, perhaps, I should say is this, that I am conscious of the fact that I displayed impatience at times during the hearing because I have been told that it would take half a day and just merely opening the affidavits took considerably longer than that; but I am very conscious of the fact that this was a very contentious case and that both Counsel were making diligent and eloquent submissions in what I say was a very contentious case and I have been greatly assisted by Counsel in the case. Where there is contention of the sort-that there has unfortunately been between the parties in this case, it seems to me that this type of case requires, even at an interlocutory stage, a fairly full airing.

But it is my fervent hope that having aired their respective versions of events and their views about the matter that the parties may now be able to have a pause for reflection. They are in a peculiar business relationship arising out of these franchises and licences and I trust that the parties will reflect on finding some method of practical business circumnavigation of the obstacles or overcoming of the difficulties. I am aware that they have tried Mr Alley but there may be some other way which they, perhaps with the help of Mr Terry Johnson, will be able to devise so that they can get back the relationship, obviously a valuable business relationship which existed between them. Now, what is the situation because I have indicated that Mr Marray's client is entitled to an injunction?

MR MARRAY: In those circumstances, I would ask you for an injunction.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Well, is that necessary, Miss Barrington? Because of the symbiotic relationship between these two parties, if the matter can be dealt with by way of undertakings, that seems to me to be infinitely more desirable in this type of case. Would you like me to give you time to consider that at this stage or do you want to deal with it straight away.

MS BARRINGTON: I think if your Lordship just allows me a minute to consult with my client.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Yes.

MS BARRINGTON: The defendant is in a position to give undertakings in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the notice of motion and the undertaking in terms of paragraph 3 has already been given by the defendant.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Miss Barrington, Mr Cornally understands, I am sure it has been explained to him very fully, that his giving the undertaking means that while the Court does not make an order, the undertaking is a serious obligation on him which must not be breached.

MS BARRINGTON: Yes, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: He has the authority to give that on behalf of Seamar Limited?

MS BARRINGTON: He does, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: The plaintiff has given an undertaking as to damages, I presume?

MR MARRAY: Yes, that is given to the Court, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: Do you require anything further?

MR MARRAY: I formally apply for my costs but I think it is normal in the circumstances that the costs be reserved. That is the normal order made. But I formally apply for my costs.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: I suspect Miss Barrington would ask me to reserve them.

MS BARRINGTON: I would indeed, my Lord. I think that is the appropriate order in the circumstances.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: I will reserve the costs although I think I should warn you, Miss Barrington, that I do not always follow the practice. If I have heard a long and contentious application for an interlocutory injunction, then there are times that it seems to me that on the affidavits that a view should have been taken as to what the outcome would be. After all, it is an issue to some extent in itself but, in this instance, it seems to me that it is appropriate that I should reserve the question of costs to the final outcome, not least bearing in mind the living together relationship that these two companies have had and which must continue. An award of costs between those in a quasi 'husband and wife' relationship, as the companies are in this case -- they are bound together almost as Siamese twins -- can certainly damage and cause difficulty from the point of view of the parties trying to make a fresh start and review the difficulties and find ways of overcoming them. It may be that Mr Johnson or someone else can assist them in relation to finding a way in which to work out a modus vivendi. Anyway, they are both practical and experienced businessmen and they know a lot more about their business than I do and the ways in which they and their business colleagues devise to resolve difficulties of this sort so that they can both get on with the practical business of producing and selling these products; they are obviously good businessmen. Now, do I need to make any further order?

MR MARRAY: I don't think so, my Lord. I would just like to say that both myself and Miss Barrington are very much obliged to your Lordship for staying with the case, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE BUDD: I am very aware of the great care and diligence and eloquence with which the arguments have been presented in this case and the huge amount of work which both Counsel have done.