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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Carroll v. Mangan [1998] IEHC 162 (10th November, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/162.html Cite as: [1998] IEHC 162 |
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1. On
6th July, 1995 the first named Respondent, Judge Mangan, convicted the
Applicant on one count of possession of a controlled drug, cannabis resin,
contrary to Section 3 and Section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977, as
amended, and fined the Applicant £300, with five months to pay, with the
direction that the Applicant be imprisoned for 45 days in default of payment.
2. By
Order of this Court (McCracken J.) made on 18th December, 1995 the Applicant
was granted leave to apply by way of an application for Judicial Review for the
following reliefs:-
3. While
there is a conflict of evidence in relation to some of the facts at issue,
there is no conflict in relation to the facts which are most germane to the
Applicant's application. Detective Garda Patrick Crowley was responsible for
the instigation of the prosecution against the Applicant. On 12th April, 1995
he obtained a summons returnable to the District Court sitting in Limerick City
on 8th June, 1995 at 2.30 p.m. The matter was adjourned on four occasions,
from 8th June, 1995 to 15th June, 1995, from 15th June, 1995 to 22nd June,
1995, from 22nd June, 1995 to 29th June, 1995, and finally from 29th June, 1995
to 6th July, 1995. The Applicant was in the District Court on each occasion
and on each occasion he was remanded in custody. Judge Mangan dealt with the
matter on 15th June, 1995, in addition to dealing with it on 6th July, 1995.
4. The
Applicant, who was in custody on 6th July, 1995, did not have legal
representation. At the commencement of the hearing, when the prosecution
indicated that it wanted to proceed with the trial, the Applicant applied for
an adjournment on the ground that a defence witness, Alan Duggan, was not
present. The Applicant intimated to the Court that Mr. Duggan was an essential
witness for his defence and that he had been in Court on each occasion when the
case had been previously listed. Detective Garda Crowley objected to the
application. He told the Court that the matter had been adjourned on the
previous occasions at the behest of the Applicant for various reasons and that
Mr. Duggan had not been present in Court on any of the previous occasions.
Judge Mangan refused the application for an adjournment and proceeded to hear
the matter. During the course of the hearing the Applicant left Court and
returned to the cell area without participating further in the matter.
5. There
is a conflict as to what happened on the first four occasions on which the
matter was in Court. The Applicant's evidence was that Detective Garda Crowley
was not in Court on any of the previous occasions and that, contrary to what he
intimated to Judge Mangan on 6th July, 1995, on each of the previous occasions,
the request for an adjournment had been made by the prosecution and that Mr.
Duggan had been in Court on each of the previous occasions.
6. The
Applicant and Detective Garda Crowley were cross-examined on their respective
affidavits. On the basis of the totality of the evidence, including the
various warrants and other documents exhibited in the Applicant's grounding
affidavit, I find as follows:-
7. Mr.
Callanan, for the Applicant, and Mr. McDonagh, for the Respondents, agreed that
the law applicable to the issue I am concerned with is to be found in the
decision of the Supreme Court in
O'Callaghan
-v- District Judge Clifford
,
(1993) 3 I.R. 603. In that case, Denham J., with whom the other four judges
agreed, stated as follows in her judgment at page 611:-
8. Having
outlined the important factors for consideration by the Supreme Court in that
case, Denham J. then went on to say at page 612:-
9. On
behalf of the Applicant, Mr. Callanan submitted that the factors which the
Court should attach weight to in this matter are that the Applicant was not
legally represented on 6th July, 1995 and that he was in detention. It was
submitted that his application for an adjournment to give him an opportunity to
call evidence in his defence required to be treated seriously and determined
judicially. It was submitted that it was not. In particular, it was submitted
that Judge Mangan did not carry out rudimentary enquiries, as he should have
done, to inform himself as to the basis of the previous adjournments. On the
contrary, it was submitted, he allowed himself be left with the misleading
impression created by the evidence of Detective Garda Crowley that the
Applicant's application was just another application for an adjournment in a
long line of similar applications and was for the purpose of "putting off the
evil day".
10. In
my view, there is an air of unreality about the Applicant's contention. Judge
Mangan himself had dealt with at least one of the previous adjournments, the
adjournment on 15th June, 1995, and was aware what happened on that occasion.
In any event, as I have found that each of the previous adjournments was
granted at the request of the Applicant, the information which Detective Garda
Crowley gave the Court could not have created a misleading impression.
Moreover, the Applicant has established no factual basis whatsoever for his
contention that Mr. Duggan was an essential witness to his defence or his
contention that he was prejudiced by being tried in circumstances in which he
could not adduce Mr. Duggan's evidence.
11. In
my view, the Applicant has not established that, in refusing his application
for an adjournment, Judge Mangan violated his constitutional right to
constitutional justice and fair procedures and deprived him of due process. In
short, the Applicant has failed to establish that he strayed beyond
constitutional bounds and his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the relief he seeks
must be refused.
12. Having
dealt with and rejected the Applicant's application on a substantive basis, it
is unnecessary for me to comment on the submissions made by Mr. McDonagh on
behalf of the Respondents that this Court should deny the discretionary relief
of Certiorari to the Applicant by reason of the following factors, which Mr.
McDonagh asserted are a bar to the Applicant's entitlement to such relief:-