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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Moorhead v. Tiilikainen [1999] IEHC 180; [1999] 2 ILRM 471 (17th June, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/180.html Cite as: [1999] IEHC 180, [1999] 2 ILRM 471 |
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1. The
late Maria Tiilikainen (née Moorhead) (hereinafter "the deceased") died
intestate on the 3rd September, 1997 survived by three children who are
represented in these proceedings by the second Defendant defending by his
father named in the title hereof. The first Defendant is the husband of the
deceased and the Plaintiff, her brother, brings these proceedings in his
capacity as acting executor of his mother the late Patricia Moorhead who died
on the 10th October, 1997, that is a little over a month after the deceased.
2. The
late Patricia Moorhead left her entire estate to her three children namely the
Plaintiff, the deceased, and their sister Carmel in equal shares.
Notwithstanding the fact that the deceased died before her mother this gift did
not lapse by reason of the provisions of Section 98 of the Succession Act, 1965
which as applied to the circumstances of this case where the deceased has left
issue living at the time of the death of her mother, provides that the gift
shall not lapse but shall take effect as if the deceased's death had occurred
immediately after the death of her mother.
3. By
a separation agreement dated 6th December, 1991 the first Defendant and the
deceased agreed to separate and expressed themselves as mutually covenanting
and agreeing, inter alia,
6. The
first named Defendant in an Affidavit states that from January, 1994 he and the
deceased had recommenced their matrimonial relationship living as man and wife
and whilst this relationship was interrupted by two periods of three months
each when he was employed in Japan, it continued until the death of the
deceased who has since the death of his wife remained at the family home in
Three Mile Water, Wicklow with her three children namely, Riki and Kevin
Tiilikainen (both his sons) and the third Defendant who is in his custody with
the consent of his father.
7. In
an Affidavit sworn by Steve O'Donoghue on behalf of his son the second named
Defendant this reconciliation and recommencement of co-habitation between the
first Defendant and the deceased is controverted and challenged. Steve
O'Donoghue avers (and this is not in contest) that he himself entered into
relationship with the deceased in or about the year 1990 and in oral evidence
specified that this relationship continued for two years and 10 months.
Indeed, it was this relationship which brought about the separation agreement
already referred to and the first Defendant's voluntary withdrawal from the
household at Three Mile Water to take up work in Lambay Island. Steve
O'Donoghue avers that there was no reconciliation as claimed by the first
Defendant and states that the first Defendant was merely permitted to return to
live at Three Mile Water for the sake of the children and on the basis of his
poverty. He says that the first Defendant slept upstairs with his two sons
whilst the deceased slept downstairs with his son the second Defendant. He
makes specific reference to a meeting on the 25th May, 1996 at a public house
in Wicklow where he says it was obvious that the deceased was having a sexual
relationship with a new boyfriend, Bernard Mulcrone, that the deceased said to
the assembled company that there was no chance of any reconciliation with the
first Defendant at all and that she was very happy and in love with Bernard.
This relationship continued while the first Defendant was in Japan.
8. From
the foregoing it is clear that there is a conflict of fact as to whether or not
the first Defendant recommenced his marital relationship with the deceased and
I ruled that respective Counsel should cross-examine the Deponents on their
Affidavits in regard to this issue of fact. I will return to the evidence
later.
9. The
Plaintiff seeks directions, further, as to whether in the event that I were to
hold that there had been a reconciliation as contemplated by clause 11, this
had the effect of nullifying the renunciation and surrender by the first
Defendant of all his rights to the estate of the deceased under the Succession
Act, 1965. The point made by the Plaintiff in his Affidavit is that clause 11
provides in the contemplated circumstances that all
covenants
should become null and void and there is a question as to whether a
renunciation and surrender is or is not a covenant.
10. The
relevance of this is that if the renunciation of his rights under the
Succession Act, 1965 by the first named Defendant applies then the one third
interest of the deceased in her mother's estate will be divided equally between
her three surviving children namely Riki Tiilikainen, Kevin Tiilikainen and
John (otherwise Jack) O'Donoghue; whereas, if that renunciation is nullified
then the said one third interest will itself be divided as to two thirds to the
first named Defendant and as to one ninth part each to the said three children.
11. Accordingly,
I must first decide, in light of the evidence, whether the first Defendant was
in fact reconciled with the deceased so as to come within clause 11 of the Deed
of Separation and, if so, whether this had the effect of nullifying his
renunciation and surrender of rights under the Succession Act.
12. The
Affidavit of Steve O'Donoghue is based largely on information communicated to
him on the telephone by the deceased. It is therefore hearsay evidence. Mr
O'Donoghue was cross- examined on the contents of his Affidavit and Mr Peart
S.C. submitted on behalf of the second named Defendant that this "let in" the
evidence in chief of John O'Donoghue together with further evidence elicited on
re-examination. He relied on a paragraph in an earlier edition of Phipson on
Evidence substantially replicated in paragraph 33-70 in the 13th edition of
that work. Where relevant the text provides as follows
13. I
consider that I should have regard to the evidence of John O'Donoghue in all
the circumstances.
14. A
further point was made by Mr Peart S.C. to the effect that a diary kept by the
deceased and exhibited by John O'Donoghue in his Affidavit should not be
admitted because the deceased was not here to prove it and interpreting it
involves speculation. Ms Cawley B.L. submitted, on behalf of the first
Defendant, that the diary should be admitted, notwithstanding, because John
O'Donoghue made no comment in his affidavit challenging its authenticity
although he does comment on its contents. Moreover, in cross-examination John
O'Donoghue conceded that some of the references to "T" in the diary were
probably references to the first named Defendant (known as "Tapsa" by the
deceased) and not to other parties known to her whose names began with "T" as
contended by him in his Affidavit.
15. I
consider that I should have regard to the diary not only because there is no
suggestion that it is not indeed the diary of the deceased, but also because it
is relied upon by both Defendants.
16. The
first Defendant gives evidence by Affidavit that the first significant step in
the reconciliation which he says occurred with the deceased took place at
Christmas 1993 after she had ended her relationship with Stephen O'Donoghue.
He says he recommenced his matrimonial relationship from January, 1994 sleeping
with the deceased in the matrimonial bedroom (which was upstairs) as man and
wife. He refers to the deceased's diary for the year 1994 for the purpose of
illustrating frequent references to himself throughout that year. He says he
was maintaining the deceased and their children and that he bought her a
Volkswagen Golf motor car. Subsequently a letter from Cavan County Council was
produced at the hearing before me confirming that the car was registered in the
name of the deceased.
17. He
says he finished working in Lambay Estate in June of 1995 and then went to live
with the deceased as man and wife at Three Mile Water working at the Blainroe
Hotel and other places. He gave evidence that he worked in Japan for the first
and last three months of 1996. His absence, he says, was in the context of a
resumption of matrimonial co-habitation. When he returned he recommenced
living at Three Mile Water with the deceased who had a mild stroke in August,
1997 and subsequently suffered a brain haemorrhage and died at St Colmcille's
Hospital, Loughlinstown, Co Dublin on the 6th September, 1996.
18. He
further states that as a consequence of her illness the deceased made him
promise to her that he would keep the three boys, namely his two sons and the
son of Stephen O'Donoghue together, and look after them. He has complied with
this promise since her death residing with the three boys at Three Mile Water.
19. In
oral evidence he said that he discharged the deceased's overdraft with the
Allied Irish Bank paying £10 per week and a further £5 per week to
pay a Visa bill for her. He allowed her access to his account and opened a
small joint account with the Credit Union in Wicklow. Bernard Mulcrone was a
co-worker with him at the Blainroe Hotel which would appear to place the
latter's appearance on the scene in 1995. He was cross-examined as to his
drinking habits and appears to accept in a general way that he drank regularly
and on occasions too much. He accepted that he had a physical fight with
Bernard Mulcrone because the latter was getting too close to his wife and
admits that he lost his head on one occasion giving him a bruised face but not
a broken rib as suggested. He clarified that he was not making any claim to
the house at Three Mile Water as a family home but was making any claim to
which he was entitled under the Succession Act.
20. He
said that after the reconciliation he neglected to have any wills or
documentation drawn up by himself and the deceased clarifying that they had
recommenced co-habitation because she got sick and this would be the last thing
he was asking for in that context. He was not able to produce any
documentation supporting his case that he had recommenced to live with the
deceased as man and wife, for example, joint invitations or joint bank
accounts. He became confused when questioned about the car which had been
given to his wife and said it had been scrapped after she died. He believed
that the deceased and Bernard Mulcrone were good friends but that they did not
have a sexual relationship. He said that he shared a bedroom with his wife
which was upstairs, that there was a second bedroom upstairs and also a landing
upstairs which was used by Kevin, one of the boys. Bernard Mulcrone was
working with him at the Blainroe Hotel in 1995 and on occasions, perhaps as
frequently as three nights a week or more, he would sleep at Three Mile Water
which was convenient to the place of work. On these occasions Bernard Mulcrone
slept downstairs on the sofa in the living room.
21. Bernard
Mulcrone gave evidence and agreed that he was a very good friend of the
deceased but denied that he ever had a sexual relationship with her. He
explained the occasion when he had the fight with the first Defendant as
starting when the first Defendant saw him with his arm around the deceased. He
denied that he was having a physical or sexual relationship with the deceased
but did accept that the first Defendant might have misconstrued the situation.
He said that the first Defendant slept upstairs in the house at Three Mile
Water with his wife. He met Stephen O'Donoghue on three occasions including
once at the Forge Tavern when Jack O'Donoghue was being brought to meet his
father coming from England to see his son after many years. He did not
remember the deceased saying or implying that she was having an affair with him
at the meeting at the Forge Tavern.
22. Evidence
was given by Stephen O'Donoghue father and guardian ad litem of the second
Defendant. He was cross-examined on his Affidavit and stated that his affair
with the deceased commenced he thought in approximately 1990 and continued for
two years and ten months. They parted because they were unsuited and were
having rows and fought like cat and dog. He was the subject of a barring order
in 1993, he said that the deceased slept with his son Jack and initially
claimed that references in her diary (for 1994) to "T" were not necessarily
references to the first Defendant who was known to the deceased as "Tapsa".
However, he conceded that a number of specific references indicating that "T"
had gone to Lambay were possibly references to "Tapsa". He referred to the
meeting at the Forge Public House where the deceased, Bernard Mulcrone,
himself, his new girlfriend and his son were present and where the deceased
introduced Bernard Mulcrone as her new boyfriend. This was the day after his
son's birthday.
23. He
said that the first Defendant did not sleep with his wife in the house but that
the deceased, his son (Jack) and Bernard Mulcrone slept downstairs, all in the
living room and that "Tapsa" (the first Defendant) slept upstairs with his two
sons. His source of information for this was the deceased herself. Clearly
this evidence is hearsay but on the basis to which I have already referred, in
my view I must take it into consideration.
24. This
witness accepted that he consented to the first Defendant having custody of his
son. He said he had no option but to agree to this because he had no way of
winning custody of his son and the agreement meant that he could see his son
for two weeks in the summer and one week at Christmas which was more than he
had seen him prior to that.
25. He
said that at the meeting at the Forge Tavern he had seen Bernard Mulcrone
holding hands with the deceased and that in all his conversations (on the
telephone) with the deceased she gave him no hint of a reconciliation with the
first Defendant. It was simply a case that "Tapsa" never really came up.
26. In
his Affidavit and again in oral evidence this witness emphasised the drinking
of the first named Defendant and the fact that he Stephen O'Donoghue used to
have to cruise the pubs in Wicklow looking for him in order to bring him to
meet his sons. He claimed his wife, the deceased, never wanted to see him and
only tolerated him for the sake of the children.
27. I
have had the benefit of seeing the witnesses give their evidence as well, of
course, of considering the Affidavits. In my opinion it is more likely that
the first named Defendant did effect a reconciliation with the deceased than
not. The evidence on each side of this issue was less than ideal: it is
surprising that the first Defendant was not able to furnish any documentation
whatsoever supporting his claimed reconciliation with the deceased. His
evidence was, however, corroborated in part by Bernard Mulcrone who said that
the first Defendant slept upstairs with his wife and he himself specifically
denied having a sexual relationship with the deceased as alleged by Stephen
O'Donoghue. The diaries of the deceased for the year 1994 support, in my view,
an ongoing weekly contact with the first Defendant.
28. On
the other hand whilst admissible for the reason already referred to, the
evidence of Stephen O'Donoghue is largely based on what he was told by the
deceased on the telephone. The source of this evidence is not therefore
available to be cross-examined. Furthermore, the impression gained by Stephen
O'Donoghue was in one or two respects clearly incorrect. In my view the
references to "T" in the diaries of the deceased for 1994 are indeed references
to "Tapsa", contrary to the contention of Stephen O'Donoghue. I accept the
evidence of Bernard Mulcrone that he did not have a sexual relationship with
the deceased which, once again, runs counter to the impression of Stephen
O'Donoghue.
29. Furthermore
the fact of a reconciliation is corroborated in principle in the Affidavit of
the Plaintiff the brother of the deceased. Once again, of course, this
evidence is based in part on hearsay but also in part on his occasional visits
to the residence at Three Mile Water, Wicklow and on his contact with his
mother and his late sister.
30. Having
carefully considered the evidence I hold that the first Defendant and the
deceased did recommence co-habiting as man and wife within the meaning of
clause 11 of the Separation Deed and that this extended for "a continual period
of twelve months". In this latter regard I should say that I accept the first
Defendant's evidence that his absence in Japan for work was in the context of a
re-established matrimonial relationship and in my view would not mean that this
period of absence would break the continuity of the re-established co-habitation.
31.
The
Separation Deed at clause 1 sets out three specific matters which are dealt
with on the basis that the husband and wife "mutually covenant and agree with
each other" in relation to them. In my view I should look at the terms of the
agreement itself to see what the parties meant by the word "covenant". Clause
8 thereof also refers to a covenant to the effect that the parties
"shall
not at any time now or in the future apply to Court for an Order for Judicial
Separation".
32. Mr
Spierin for the Plaintiff submitted that it was open to the Court to construe
clause 1(c) of the Agreement as a covenant by the husband and wife not, in the
future, to make claims against the estate of each other. The renunciation and
surrender would have effect not at the time of the making of the deed but at
some time in the future. It was, accordingly, akin to a covenant strictly so
called.
33. Miss
Cawley submitted that in my interpretation of the Agreement I should be
influenced by the policy in Family Law statutes which is to encourage
reconciliation. She made a number of specific references to statutory
provisions to illustrate this submission.
34. In
my view it was the intention of the parties to this agreement that in the event
that they recommenced co-habiting as man and wife with mutual consent for a
continual period of twelve months then their mutual renunciation and surrender
of all or any rights they may have in the estate of the other under the
provisions of the Succession Act, 1965 should be rendered null. Accordingly I
hold that the first Defendant's renunciation and surrender contained in clause
1(c) of the Separation Deed is null in the events which have occurred.