High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. The Plaintiff in this case, Peter Pringle, claims damages for negligence, breach of duty, (including breach of statutory duty) and failure to vindicate his constitutional rights arising out of his arrest on the 19th day of July 1980 by a member of the Garda Siochana and his subsequent detention, interrogation by members of the Garda Siochana and prosecution in respect of alleged offences of capital murder contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 and robbery contrary to the provisions of the Larceny Act 1916 (as amended), in respect of which offences, on the 27th day of November 1980, the Plaintiff was convicted by the Special Criminal Court and sentenced to death and to fifteen years imprisonment respectively; the said death sentence being subsequently commuted by the President to one of forty years penal servitude following which the Plaintiff suffered fourteen years and ten months loss of liberty. In an amended defence delivered herein on the 25th day of May 1999, the Defendants plead ( inter alia) that the Plaintiff has exercised the option conferred upon him by Section 9(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 by instituting an application for relief pursuant to Section 9 of that Act and is thereby barred from proceeding with a claim for damages in these proceedings.

2. By Order of the High Court made herein on the 14th day of May 1999 it was ordered that, without further pleadings, preliminary issue be tried without a jury wherein the questions at the trial of such issue shall be:

3. It was admitted or was established by evidence on Affidavits respectively sworn herein by Ms Grainne O'Mahony on the 8th day of March 1999 and by Mr Gregory F. O'Neill on the 19th day of April 1999 that the following are the relevant facts with regard to the trial of the said issue, namely:

4. On behalf of the Defendants, Mr Comyn submitted that, by virtue of the option provided for by Section 9(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993 the Defendants could only be burdened with one set of proceedings seeking compensation in respect of the matters of which the Plaintiff was complaining and that, therefore, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeal pursuant to the powers conferred upon that Court by Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, by virtue of his application in that behalf of the 6th of July 1995, the Plaintiff had exercised that option and is thereby barred from proceeding with his claim herein which he subsequently instituted on the 5th of December 1995. In that regard, Mr Comyn submitted that the proceedings herein are a duplication of the application that the Plaintiff made to the Court of Criminal Appeal pursuant to Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, which, in turn, was referred back to the Court of Criminal Appeal by the Supreme Court to enable the Plaintiff to renew that application. Accordingly, he submitted that the proceedings herein are unnecessary in that, the Plaintiff has yet to renew his application to the Court of Criminal Appeal under the provisions of Section 9 of the 1993 Act, and in those circumstances, the Court should exercise its inherent discretion to bar the Plaintiff from seeking to assert his claim for compensation in these proceedings; particularly, as it is clear from the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 that that Statute only contemplated one claim for compensation in respect of the matters to which it relates. In support of his submission, Mr Comyn referred to the provisions of Section 60(1) of the Workman's Compensation Act 1934 wherein it is provided that a workman might, at his option, either claim compensation under that Act or take proceedings independently of the Act and to a judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in a case of Jeremiah Depus v Haulbowline Industries Limited (1964 I.R. page 341) wherein it was held that a workman who failed in proceedings independently of the Workman's Compensation Act 1934 was limited to enforcing his rights under that Act by an application for compensation at the close of the unsuccessful action and not otherwise. Accordingly, Mr Comyn argued that, where a Statute confers an option, the Court cannot permit a person, who has exercised that option, to abandon it in favour of the alternative.

5. On behalf of the Plaintiff, Mr White submitted that, on a true construction of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, there were three pre-requisites to exercising the option provided for by sub-section 2 of that section, namely:-

6. In my view, Mr White is correct in his interpretation of the provisions of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993. I, also, would interpret that section as providing that it is a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of the option provided for in sub-section 2 that the person making an application under that sub-section has obtained a certificate from an appropriate Court that a newly discovered fact which led to the quashing of a conviction, or to an acquittal, shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice. No such certificate has been obtained by this Plaintiff and, accordingly, he has not exercised the option provided for by sub-section 2 of Section 9 of the 1993 Act and, indeed, he has never been put in a position to exercise that option. Accordingly, while I think that Mr Comyn is probably correct when he says that it was clearly in the contemplation of the Legislature when they enacted the provisions of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993, that only one set of proceedings would be brought in respect of the matters to which the section relates, I do not think that it follows that a person who, for whatever reason, has not obtained the certificate provided for in the section is precluded from pursuing an action for damages through the Courts even when, as in this case, he has initiated an application for such a certificate, because I think that it is clear from the provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 9 that the option thereby provided for, with its implication that a multiplicity of proceedings is to be avoided, only applies to a person to whom the provisions of sub-section 1 of that section relates and the Plaintiff is not such a person because he has never been granted a certificate that the newly discovered fact which was the basis for his ultimate acquittal shows that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

7. Having regard to the foregoing , I am not persuaded that the Defendants are, in fact, burdened by two sets of proceedings arising out of the same set of circumstances, as Mr Comyn would suggest that they are. Accordingly, I would not consider that the proceedings herein are in any sense oppressive in so far as the Defendants are concerned. Neither do I think that the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeal saw fit to certify under the provisions of Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 that its decision to refuse to grant the Plaintiff a certificate under Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993 involved a point of law of exceptional public importance which it was desirable in the public interest that the Supreme Court should consider and that the Supreme Court, while affirming the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, referred the matter back to that Court so that the Plaintiff might renew his application under the provisions of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993, is a good reason for precluding the Plaintiff from pursuing a claim for damages in the proceedings herein. While it may well be that it is in the public interest that the Courts should decide what class of newly discovered facts which leads to the acquittal of a convicted person shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice, I am not persuaded that, merely because the Plaintiff has been permitted by the Supreme Court to renew his application to the Court of Criminal Appeal for a certificate under the provisions of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993, he is thereby obliged to renew that application. In this regard, I can see no good reason why the Plaintiff should be required to pursue a course of action which, while it might well be in the public interest, is not necessarily in his own interest.

8. In the light of the foregoing, I would reply to the questions posed for my consideration by Order of this Honourable Court dated the 14th of May 1999 as follows:-

9. By way of completeness, while I think that Mr White is probably correct in his submission that, irrespective of any rights which he might have by virtue of the provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, the Plaintiff still has a constitutional right to litigate the matters which are the subject matter of these proceedings, in the light of my conclusions aforesaid, it is not necessary for me to decide that question and I do not propose to do so.