High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. The Plaintiffs claim in these proceedings against the Defendant is for the sum of £2,570,186.93 for tax and interest due by the Defendant to the Minister for Finance for the benefit of the Central Fund, payment of which sum was demanded prior to the commencement of proceedings. The Plaintiff is a Bureau officer appointed to the Criminal Assets Bureau pursuant to Section 8 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996. The Plaintiff is also an officer of the Revenue Commissioners nominated by the Revenue Commissioners to exercise the powers and functions of the Collector General. The Plaintiff brings the proceedings under S. 966 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996.

2. The tax claimed is in respect of 4 years, which are the 12 months ending on the 5th April, 1992, 5th April, 1993, 5th April, 1994 and 5th April, 1996.

3. In his grounding affidavit, Chief Superintendent Michael F. Murphy of the Criminal Assets Bureau deposes that the profits or gains of the Defendant which are being charged to tax and which are the subject matter of the proceedings arise from or follow an investigation by the Criminal Assets Bureau into the identification of the Defendants assets which are suspected to derive directly or indirectly from criminal activity and which have thus been charged under Case IV of Schedule D as miscellaneous income.

4. In respect of each of the 4 years, other than 1996, the Defendant made returns and payments prior to the raising of assessments which, in respect of all 4 years, were raised on the 25th November, 1997. This and other dates are of critical importance to this case.

5. By letter dated 22nd December, 1997, the Defendant’s Solicitors, Messrs. Donal T. McCarthy & Co, 19 South Mall, Cork, wrote to the Plaintiffs (by fax and registered post) a letter in the following terms:-

6. It is common case that this letter was dispatched by registered post on the 22nd December, 1997, being the date of the letter itself. The Plaintiff claims however, that this letter was not received until the 30th December, 1997. The fax of the letter dated 22nd December was received on the 29th December, 1997. A further faxed message (which has now become lost) which was also received on the 30th December, 1997 apparently stated,

7. On the 7th January, 1998, an officer of the Criminal Assets Bureau wrote to the Defendants Solicitors in the following terms:-

8. These letters were, by agreement, received into evidence by the Court.

9. The Summary Summons launching the proceedings on behalf of the Plaintiff was issued on the 22nd January, 1998.

10. The Plaintiff, having established all formal proofs on affidavit and by certificate, contends that the Defendant, being a person who has been assessed to tax, has failed to appeal the assessments made on the 25th November, 1997 as a result whereof the assessments have become final and conclusive.

11. The Defendant for his part maintains that he did appeal within time and that, in the case of the 1996 return, the time for bringing his appeal did not begin to run until such time as he had made his return and paid the tax, neither of which had occurred in respect of that particular year.

12. The Defendant further maintains that there were certain defects in the certificates of both the Tax inspector and collector which were relied upon by the Plaintiffs, which fell short of the statutory requirements for validity. He also challenges the locus standi of the Plaintiff to bring the proceedings.

13. While constitutional issues were raised in the Defence (and Notice pursuant to Order 60 of the Rules of the Superior Courts was duly given to the Attorney General,) no constitutional arguments were advanced during the hearing before this Court, nor were any arguments advanced to support further contentions that some of the statutory provisions relied upon by the Plaintiff were repugnant to the European Convention of Human Rights. The Defence is a purely technical one, alleging non-compliance by the Plaintiff with the requirements of various sections of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 to which I will shortly refer.

14. The only oral evidence in the hearing before this Court was the evidence of Chief Superintendent Felix McKenna, Chief Bureau Officer of the Plaintiffs, who sought an order under Section 10 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996 for anonymity for the inspector of Taxes and the collector of Taxes who had signed the two certificates in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau. Chief Superintendent McKenna told the Court that it was his belief that in the event of the identity of the two officers becoming known, it would hinder the work of the Bureau in the general sense that other enquiries would be affected if the people in question were known. He said it would be difficult to get a suitable applicants to come and work in the Bureau if their identity was not protected. He further gave evidence of his belief that the Defendant was a person suspected of drug dealing in Cork, an activity which by its very nature was likely to pose safety and security risks to Bureau officials if their identity became known, although he was not aware of any specific threats in the instant case. He based his belief on information supplied to him by Drug Squad Officers from Cork and investigations carried out in the Bureau since 1996.

15. He further identified the handwriting of the particular inspector and collector, stating that he had frequently seen each individual sign documents in his presence over a period of 5 years. Each officer signed his respective certificate in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau.

16. I ruled at that stage of the proceedings, following submissions to which I will later refer, that I would grant anonymity to the two officers under Section 10 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1997 on the basis that I was satisfied, having heard the evidence of Chief Superintendent McKenna, that there were “ reasonable grounds in the public interest ” to do so, as required by Section 10(7) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996.

17. The ruling was without prejudice to the separate arguments advanced by Mr. Corrigan in relation to the validity of the two certificates to which I will shortly return. In proceeding now to address the other issues argued, I propose for convenience to refer exclusively to the up to date statutory code, which, both sides agree, replicates the pre-existing statutory provisions in all areas relevant to this case.

18. On behalf of the Defendant, Mr. Corrigan contends as follows:-

19. Mr. Corrigan submits that no particular form of appeal is set out in the Act. He further submits that it is clear from the Plaintiffs letter dated 7th January, 1998 that Mr. McCarthy’s letter of 22nd December, 1997 had been treated as a valid “notice in writing” for the purpose of bringing an appeal, because the Plaintiffs letter expressly purported to refuse the appeal on the sole ground that it was not received within the prescribed time. If time ran from the date of posting of Mr. McCarthy’s letter, then the appeal was clearly bought within time and the inspector was not entitled to reject the appeal on the basis stated. Insofar as the section required only the “giving” of notice, a taxpayer need only show that he did everything necessary in the ordinary way to act within time, as had occurred in this case, when he posted his appeal within time by registered post.

20. By way of illustration of his submission, Mr. Corrigan referred to Section 15(2) of the 1998 Finance Act, which provides an appeal procedure for a different purpose but which states:-

21. The use of the past tense in the Finance Act underlines, he submits, the requirement that the notice under that Act must have been received by the inspector within 30 days. However, the provision at Section 933(1)(a) is solely referable to the taxpayer giving notice within 30 days.

22. Mr. Corrigan’s second point was that, regardless of the grounds of refusal, there then existed a further period of 15 days to appeal against the refusal by notice in writing to the Appeal Commissioners from the date of issue by the inspector of the notice of refusal.

23. The refusal letter is dated the 7th January, 1998. It was received by the Defendant’s Solicitors on the 9th January. The Defendant, he submits, could hardly be expected to commence an appeal under Section 933(1)(c) without been told or knowing that his appeal under ss. (1)(a) had been refused and this consideration alone was a very strong argument suggesting that “the date of issue” should itself be excluded from the computation of the period of 15 days. At the time of the refusal, the Plaintiffs were well aware that an appeal was both intended and had been notified.

24. There was no reason not to treat the notice of appeal given as an appeal from the refusal.

25. Mr. Corrigan draws the Court’s attention to Order 122 R.10, of the Superior Court Rules where it is provided:-

26. He submits that where time runs from an act, as distinct from a specified day or date, the time should always be regarded as being exclusive of the day of the act ( Williams v. Burgess (1840) 10 LG, QB p. 11).

27. Mr. Corrigan’s alternative argument in relation to time for appeal is referable to the provisions of ss. (7)(a) of s. 933. Mr. Corrigan submitted that it must surely constitute “reasonable cause” for extending the time for a late appeal to demonstrate that the letter constituting the appeal had been posted on the 22nd December, at a time when delays might reasonably be expected in the postal system due to the pressures of Christmas and Christmas holidays on the postal system and where, in fact, it had been received before any refusal . The fax of 29th December, 1997 had to be regarded, Mr. Corrigan submitted, as an application that the appeal would be admitted late, or, alternatively had to be seen as ‘reasonable cause’ for extending the time.

28. In the instant case, all appeal routes were closed to the Defendant by the issue of proceedings on the 22nd January until such time as the proceedings were determined. Absolutely no period of grace of any sort was allowed for the bringing of a late appeal, notwithstanding the advice that the Defendant consider a late appeal as set out in the Plaintiffs letter dated 7th January, 1998. Mr. Corrigan argued that the behaviour of the Plaintiffs was clearly oppressive having regard to the fact that the Plaintiffs had in place at the relevant time a Mareva injunction over the Defendants assets. No reasonable period which the Defendant might legitimately expect would have been allowed was allowed for a late application. In the events which had occurred, the Defendant’s letters and faxes were being treated as non-existent.

29. In reply, Mr. Nesbitt argued that the real issue in relation to any appeal was to enquire whether or not there was an unresolved appeal in existence when proceedings were commenced. He submitted that the letter of 22nd December, 1997 could not be construed as a Notice of Appeal. Further, no evidence had been adduced to show that this document, even if it was a Notice of Appeal, was communicated to or received by the inspector within 30 days as mandated by Section 933(1)(a). No paper was in the possession of the Plaintiffs until the 29th December at the very earliest. The 30 day appeal period had expired on the 24th December, which meant that no valid appeal within the prescribed time limits was ever made. This case had to be differentiated from CAB v. McDonnell (Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered the 20th December, 2000), which in effect determined only that an appeal brought within time should inure until the whole appeal process was determined.

30. Mr. Nesbitt further pointed out that had there been a refusal of an appeal that had been made within time, the appropriate procedure would then have been a right of appeal within 15 days. This had not happened and what the officer had quite properly done in his letter was to suggest to the taxpayer that he consider the right of late appeal under ss. (7). This was the appropriate thing to say where an appeal was out of time. No application was made under ss. (7). Accordingly, he submits, there was a default of notice of appeal in the events which had occurred which rendered the assessments final and conclusive.

31. In computing the 15 day period for bringing an appeal from the refusal of the appeal on the 7th January, Mr. Nesbitt submitted that the date of issue, i.e. the 7th, had to be included when computing the period. Mr. Nesbitt submitted that the Interpretation Act, 1937 indicated clearly how periods of time in statutes are to be computed.

32. Mr. Nesbitt submitted that the only possible interpretation of S. 933(1)(c) of the Act is that which includes the first day in the 15 day period. This in effect meant that the time for an appeal ended on the 21st and the Revenue were free to issue on the 22nd.

33. Mr. Nesbitt further relied on McGuinness v. Armstrong Patents Limited [1980] IR 289 and to p. 292 of the judgment of McMahon J. where he stated:-

34. Having then cited Section 11(h) of the Interpretation Act, 1937 , the learned judge went on to say (again at p. 292/3):-

35. Mr. Nesbitt further submitted that the Rules of the Superior Courts had no relevance to this issue of interpretation, given that the Court was concerned with a statutory construction.

36. Mr. Nesbitt submitted that there was no scope in the instant case for the application of any principle of legitimate expectation. No evidence had been led of any standard procedures used by the Plaintiffs which would suggest that a period of grace was regularly provided once the time for an appeal had expired. No evidence had been led by or on behalf of the Defendant to suggest he was within the category of persons addressed by ss. (7)(a). The Revenue had an obligation to collect tax and a right to sue when the same was due and owing. This was not the usual form of exercise of discretionary powers by public bodies as understood within judicial review cases. Further, in Pesca SCA Valentia v . The Minister for Fisheries [1985] IR 193, Keane J. (as he then was) stated (at p. 323):-

37. In the instant case, the contrary had been established because the evidence reveals that the letter was received on the 30th December.

38. In the event of a finding by the Court that the appeals under S. 933 were out of time, Mr. Corrigan on behalf of the Defendant further contends that in relation, specifically, to the 1996 assessment in respect of which no return or payment was made, that the appeal period couldn’t have commenced at all by virtue of Section 957(2) of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997.

39. Mr. Corrigan argued that, having regard to the requirement to interpret any fiscal statute strictly, this provision can only mean that the appeal period does not even commence until the taxpayer makes his return and pays what he says is due where the inspector has made an assessment in accordance with the aforementioned sections. This point had been touched upon by McCracken J. in Criminal Assets Bureau v . K.B . (Judgment delivered the 15th May, 2001), where McCracken J. stated (at p. 6-7):-

40. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Corrigan himself accepted (Day 2 page 39) that such an interpretation could well be seen as an entirely “absurd proposition”, but if it was a possible interpretation, and if there was an anomaly in the Act, then his client was entitled to the benefit of a strict construction in his favour. The argument was not developed beyond this basic assertion.

41. Mr. Nesbitt pointed out that such an interpretation has the rather unreal connotation that the Defendant is to be regarded, if Mr. Corrigan’s submission is correct, as being in a stronger position in relation to the year in which he made no payment or return than in respect of years where returns and payments were made. Mr. Nesbitt contended that Section 957(2) must be read in conjunction with the time limits for bringing an appeal prescribed by Section 933. He submits that the time reference in Section 957(2) refers merely to the actual mechanics for processing an appeal before the Appeal Commissioners. That process cannot commence prior to the making of the return and the payment of the appropriate tax. Section 957(2) does not remove from the taxpayer the effects of a failure to appeal under Section 933(1) and (6). At all times the taxpayer must get his appeal within the time limits prescribed by Section 933.

42. Mr. Nesbitt cited McGrath v . McDermott [1988] IR 257 wherein Finlay C.J. stated:-

43. In effect, the Court was being invited to interpret Section 957(2) in isolation without regard to the clear intent of the provisions set out at Section 933. Default of Notice of Appeal under Section 933 leads to an assessment becoming final and conclusive. Section 933 is the source of the right of appeal.

44. Kennedy, C.J. then continued:-

45. Mr. Nesbitt further submits that Section 957(2) is not a provision imposing a liability to tax; that liability is imposed by other sections. Consequently, one is not involved in ascertaining the intention of the legislature to impose or not impose a tax. However, the result one arrives at, if one accepts the interpretation put forward by the Defendant is that despite the clear imposition of a liability to tax, that tax is not recoverable unless and until the chargeable person makes a return and pays the appropriate tax. If the Act imposes a liability to tax then clearly there can be inferred an intention on the part of the legislature that that tax is collectable and payable. It would be quite wrong to give to Section 957(2) an interpretation which would lead to or produce the very absurdity conceded by Counsel on behalf of the Defendant.

46. Mr. Corrigan contended, firstly, that there was no proof before the Court that the unidentified anonymous Plaintiff was authorised in the first instance to sue in his own name as required under Section 966 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 which provides:-

47. He submitted secondly, that the certificates did not on their face state that the sums sought to be recovered were sought “as a debt due to the Minister for Finance for the benefit of the Central Fund”.

48. Thirdly, Mr Corrigan submitted that the certificates did not comply with S.10 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996. Accepting that an officer of the Revenue is also a Bureau officer and exercising powers or duties of the Bureau, and accepting that under S.10(4) of the Act he may do so in the name of the Bureau, Section 10(5) specifically excludes from its ambit any document to be adduced in evidence in respect of which subsection (7) is to apply.

49. Mr. Corrigan submits that where a document is used for the purposes of evidence, directions may be sought which include the deletion from certificates of the name and address of any Bureau officer. This can only mean, Mr. Corrigan submits, that it is thereby presupposed that the original certificate to be tendered in evidence is signed personally by the Bureau officer. Otherwise the provisions for deletion contained in ss. (7) would be quite meaningless and superfluous. Section 10(5) provides that if a document is to be used in any proceedings the identity of the Bureau officer shall not be revealed. However, a different situation exists under subsection (7), which relates to the situation where such a document is adduced in evidence. It is only then that the provision for deletion exists, and in the instant case there was no name to delete. Accordingly, he submits the certificates adduced in evidence were non-compliant with the requirements of the statute.

50. In reply, Mr. Nesbitt submitted that both certificates which had been produced in Court purported to issue under the provisions of Section 966 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997. Mr. Nesbitt points out that the only manner in which the signatory to the certificate can be duly authorised is because he is in fact authorised to take the proceedings under Section 488 of the old Act or under Section 966 of the new Act. This was duly deposed to at par. 6 of the Affidavit of Michael Murphy. The certificate clearly states that he is the Collector General duly authorised to collect the sum due for tax in the proceedings . No evidence was led to rebut the contents of the certificate or certificates which must therefore prevail unless or until such evidence is adduced. Mr Nesbitt further relied upon the presumption of regularity, as O’Sullivan J. had done in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Craft & Anor (Unreported Judgment, delivered the 12th of July 2000). In that case counsel for the Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the appointment of the Revenue Bureau Officers by the Minister for Justice “with the consent of the Minister for Finance” as required by Section 8(1)(a)(ii) of the Act of 1996. At p.21 O’Sullivan J. stated:-

51. On Mr. Corrigan’s second point Mr. Nesbitt submitted that the proceedings couldn’t be clearer and set out the claim as “being for monies due by the Defendant to the Minister for Finance for the benefit of the Central Fund.” That was what Section 966 required, i.e. that the monies be claimed as a debt due to the Minister for Finance for the benefit of the Central Fund. This had been done.

52. It was not correct to maintain that these certificates must be signed in the individual names of the inspector or collector. Section 10(4) makes it mandatory for a Bureau officer to exercise his powers or duties in the name of the Bureau.

53. Further, any document relating to proceedings must not reveal the identity of the particular Bureau officer.

54. However, a situation could arise where the Court might take the view that although the certificates had been signed “Criminal Assets Bureau” as required by law, the Court might wish, for some reason which had arisen in the course of evidence, to determine precisely who that individual was.

55. Subsection (7) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to deprive the previous sections of meaning. In particular, ss. (7) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to negative ss. (4).

56. It was entirely possible that a Bureau officer who was in the witness box might need to produce a certificate of the appointment of some person for some purpose which might or might not be signed by an officer of the Criminal Assets Bureau but which would still be signed under the Revenue Acts. In such circumstances a certificate might be produced which would have an appropriate name which might require to be deleted. Alternatively, the identity of a particular officer might have become known through other means, so that the certificate produced by him, even though in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau, might require to be amended or deleted in some way to avoid the possibility that the person signing as the Criminal Assets Bureau might nonetheless be identifiable.

57. Mr. Corrigan on behalf of the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff had failed to establish locus standi to obtain the relief sought. The Plaintiff, he asserts, is an unidentified tax inspector who asserts he was entitled to bring these proceedings in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau.

58. Any evidence tendered in relation to the Defendants alleged criminal involvement was purely hearsay evidence. There was, he submitted, no admissible evidence that the assets in respect of which the assessments were to be made and on foot of which the proceedings are based stand directly or indirectly from criminal or suspected criminal activity. Accordingly, Mr. Corrigan submitted that the Plaintiff had produced no evidence to bring himself within the objectives of the Bureau. He further submitted that similar considerations applied to at least portion of Chief Superintendent McKenna’s evidence on the issue of anonymity sought in this case for Bureau officers under S. 10 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996.

59. In reply, Mr. Nesbitt argued that the Plaintiff had locus standi conferred by statute but that the Defendant had no locus standi . He had led no evidence to put in issue any of the steps taken by the Plaintiffs. Any attack on the Plaintiff was based solely on the Defendants own failure to vindicate his rights. He should have appealed when he had the opportunity to do so or appealed from a refusal when that opportunity arose. He had given no evidence as to the correctness or otherwise of the amounts set out in the various certificates. In this regard, Mr. Nesbitt referred to the unreported decision of O’Sullivan J. in Criminal Assets Bureau v . John Kelly (decision 13th April, 2000) where a taxpayers failure to invoke the rights available to him led the trial judge to accept the submission of the Criminal Assets Bureau that the Defendant had no locus standi to challenge the validity of impugned sections of certain statutes referred to in the proceedings. Chief Superintendent McKenna had given direct evidence for the issue of anonymity under S. 10, but the Court could in addition received hearsay evidence as the only requirement was to establish reasonable grounds in the public interest under S. 10(7) of the 1996 Act.

60. The interpretation of section 933 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 is fraught with difficulty. Some of these difficulties were considered by the Supreme Court in Criminal Assets Bureau .v. McDonagh (unreported judgment delivered the 20th day of December 2000).

61. As Murray J. pointed out at p. 11:-

62. It is quite clear in that case that no issue arose as to whether or not the appeal was brought within 30 days, but the case is nonetheless important from the point of view of the present case, given that the import of the decision was that the appeal process must be exhausted before the assessments become final and conclusive.

63. As stated by Murray J. (at p. 13):-

64. Later (also at p. 13) Murray J. stated:-

65. Mr. Corrigan accordingly submits on behalf of the Defendant that the appeal process must be seen as a continuum and I agree with that view. While Mr. Nesbitt suggested that the true question was to enquire whether or not there was an “unresolved appeal at the time proceedings were commenced”, I think the more appropriate test is to enquire whether or not all rights of appeal under Section 933 have been, in the events which have taken place,

66. This brings me to Mr. Corrigan’s first submission to the effect that the Defendant had complied with the requirements of Section 933(1)(a) by “giving” notice in writing within 30 days. I accept Mr. Corrigan’s submission that there is a clear distinction in meaning between the requirement of a statute which demands the “giving” of notice, as distinct from a statute which contains a “notice given” provision. In the latter case, the emphasis is on the date of receipt of the notice. In the former case, the emphasis is on the deed whereby “giving” takes place. Given that the letter was posted within time by registered post and should, in the ordinary course, have arrived also within time, I hold that the Defendant did give notice in writing within 30 days of the notice of assessments as required by s. 933(1)(a).

67. It can hardly be disputed that Mr. McCarthy’s letter sent on the 22nd December 1997 constituted a Notice of Appeal. It was treated as such by the Plaintiffs which, in my view, effectively precludes them from now arguing that it is not to be seen as such. In this regard, I also accept Mr. Corrigan’s submission that the section does not require a Notice of Appeal to be in any particular format.

68. I then must consider, having held that the Defendant got himself within the 30 day period, following which his application was refused, the proceedings were thereafter commenced prior to the expiration of the 15 day period of the date of issue by the inspector of the notice of refusal.

69. On consideration of Section 933(1)(c), one is immediately struck by the fact that in this case, at least, there is no evidence to indicate what the date of issue of the notice of refusal by the inspector might have been. There is only the letter of the 7th January which, having regard to the fact that its contents could not have been communicated to the Defendant prior to the following day if posted in the ordinary way, had the effect in real terms of truncating the 15 day period for bringing an appeal under the section against the refusal.

70. Be that as it may, it seems to me that the Court can only take the date of the letter as being the date of issue by the inspector of the notice of refusal. The question is whether that date is to be included or excluded in the computation of the 15 day period.

71. It seems to me that Mr. Nesbitt’s submission on this point must be correct, namely, that this issue essentially falls to be determined under Section 11 of the Interpretation Act 1937. While the issue of a notice of refusal is an act, the computation period is expressed in the Section to commence with a date which clearly is a particular day (in this instance the date of issue) and that being so, I must hold that when proceedings were launched on the 22nd January 1998, the 15 day period had expired.

72. That does not, however, conclude the matter because there then remains Section 933(7)(a). The terminology of this sub-section is important:-

73. When the refusal in this case issued on the 7th January, 1998, what possible view could the inspector have had of the Defendant’s intentions other than that he intended to appeal? The inspector had in his possession a registered envelope postmarked the 22nd of December 1998 which contained Mr. McCarthy’s letter. He had received a fax on the 30th December 1998 stressing that this letter was to be treated as a Notice of Appeal. He had received a fax of the letter the previous day.

74. It seems to me that in such circumstances, and in informing the exercise of his discretion, an inspector must consider whether reasonable cause exists to satisfy him that the notice actually given should be regarded as having been appropriately given. On the facts of this case, it seems to me that, had he given the matter due consideration, he could only have concluded that reasonable cause did exist, taking into account the date of posting and the inevitable delays associated with Christmas holidays and the notorious vagaries of the postal system at that time. To hold otherwise is to treat the letter of appeal as though it had never existed or been sent at all, or had fallen through cracks in the pavement.

75. This seems to me a fair procedures point, rather than a legitimate expectation point, or an estoppel point, which is I note also pleaded in the defence. The inspector in his letter of refusal suggested that the Defendant consider a late appeal, but no reasonable period was then allowed for him to do so. Where reasonable cause can be shown to exist, as I believe to be the case here, a reasonable period for a late appeal must be allowed under Section 933(7)(a). It seems to me, on the facts of this particular case, that the Plaintiffs should have deemed it an appropriate case in which to hold there was “reasonable cause” within Section 933(7)(a) so as to regard the Notice of Appeal as having been given within the time limited by ss. (1)(a), and I so hold. It goes without saying that even if I am incorrect in holding that the Defendant gave notice in writing within 30 days as required by S. 933(1)(a), the facts of this case are still such as to bring the Defendant within the “reasonable cause” saver contained at S. 933(7)(a).

76. In relation to the case argued in relation to Section 957(2) which only, of course, arises if the appeals under S. 933 are seen to be out of time, I accept Mr. Nesbitt’s primary submission that the ordinary rights of appeal derive under Section 933. I further accept his contention that the two sections should not be construed in such a manner as would totally frustrate the operation and scheme of the Act. It is quite clear under the Act that the time scale for appeals runs from the date of the assessment, and that the tax authorities are entitled to issue proceedings after thirty days when no valid appeal against the assessment has been lodged.

77. Mr. Nesbitt’s submissions with regard to the construction of Section 957(2) are less satisfactory. This section clearly constitutes more than a mere description of the “mechanics” of the appeals process. It provides clearly for the commencement of a thirty day appeals period “at the earliest date on which both the return has been delivered and that amount of tax has been paid”. This appeal is not the appeal as specified in Section 933, and arises if, and only if, the Revenue Commissioners or its agents have decided not to issue proceedings on foot of the original assessment by the time the return is made and the tax paid on foot of the assessment. The tax authorities have, it seems to me, a discretion to allow an assessment to stand over before bringing proceedings, if it is felt that to do so would be a prudent course of action in a given case. The knowledge that a Section 957(2) appeal is open to a taxpayer can thus be characterised as an incentive for the non-compliant taxpayer to come forward and make a return without the opprobrium of legal proceedings being brought against him.

78. In the instant case, and for the purpose of this argument only, the tax authorities chose to issue proceedings on the assessment relating to the year for which the Defendant had failed to make a tax return more than thirty days after such assessment. The assessment ( sans appeal under S. 933) was final and conclusive for the purposes thereof. The fact that an appeal under S. 957 would have been open to the Defendant had the Plaintiff not sought final judgment prior to the Defendant making a tax return and paying the tax thereon would be of no assistance to the Defendant in such circumstances.

79. I accept Mr. Nesbitt’s submissions in relation to the certificates which I am satisfied conform to all the requirements required by statute. I also accept that the presumption of regularity applies in the absence of evidence of want of authorisation. I believe and hold that the provisions of Section 10(7) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 merely provide an additional measure for the protection of Bureau Officers where anonymity is required in the context of giving evidence or producing documents in evidence. I do not believe that ss. (7) can be interpreted only to mean that the certificate in respect of which the deletion is sought must be one containing the actual name of the officer in question.

80. I find absolutely no basis for the contention that the Plaintiff lacks locus standi to bring these proceedings. It is quite clearly within their statutory obligation and remit to do so. The objection, it seems to me, is an evidential one, rather than any true objection by way of locus standi . As the Defendant has confined his challenge in these proceedings to the application only of various sections of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to his particular circumstances, I hold equally that he had locus standi to argue those points. On the issue of anonymity, Chief Superintendent McKenna gave direct evidence of his opinion that the efficient functioning of the Bureau required anonymity for Bureau officers and I accepted his evidence on this point. I therefore did not need to rely on the separate ground advanced by Chief Superintendent McKenna for granting anonymity, namely, his belief derived from contact with members of the Drug Squad that the Defendant is actively involved in drug dealing, an activity which of its nature suggests safety concerns for Bureau officers whose identity is not protected. I should say, however, and in my ruling so held, that for the limited purpose of S. 10(7) of the 1996 Act and bearing in mind that the objectives of the Bureau extend to “suspected” criminal activity, that hearsay would be admissible to establish “reasonable grounds in the public interest” where no evidence to the contrary was led.