High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This is an application by the Plaintiff for an Interlocutory Injunction in terms of a Notice of Motion dated the 12th day November, 2001 issued on behalf of the Plaintiff in proceedings in which the Plaintiff seeks a myriad of reliefs including ( inter alia ) declarations that, by their conduct of which the Plaintiffs complain, the Defendants are in breach of Section 4 of the Competition Act 1991 and are guilty of inducing breaches of contract between the Plaintiffs and growers for the supply of sugar beet to the Plaintiffs, of an unlawful conspiracy and of intentional interference with the Plaintiff’s economic interests. In addition, in those proceeding, the Plaintiffs also seek the injunctive relief sought herein and an award of damages. In this regard, by order of the High Court made herein on the 12th day November, 2001 it was ordered that the Defendants and each of them, their respective servants or agents and all persons acting in concert with them and all other persons having notice thereof, be restrained until the 15th day November, 2001 or, until further order in the mean time from; (1) taking any or any further steps to organise, co-ordinate, implement, encourage or participate in the withdrawal of supplies of sugar beet from the Plaintiff and/or measures which have as their object or effect the encouragement of members of the Irish Farmers Association not to supply sugar beet to the Plaintiff and (2) from taking any further steps to intimidate and/or persuade growers of sugar beet not to supply sugar beet to the Plaintiff.

2. In the light of the contents of the several comprehensive Affidavits sworn on behalf of the parties hereto in support of and in defence of the instant application and, indeed, in the light of the submissions by Counsel for either party in the course of the hearing of this application before me, it is clear that these proceedings involve a substantial number of factual issues which are not susceptible to resolution on Affidavit and , accordingly, it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to resolve those issues at this time. They are matters which must be left for the determination of the trial judge and, given that these matters are not susceptible to resolution at the hearing of this application, I do not think it necessary or appropriate that I should review them in the course of this judgment. In addition, however, Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that, apart from questions of fact which arise, there is a fair question to be determined at the trial of this action concerning whether or not the conduct of the Defendants, of which the Plaintiff complains, constitute a breach of the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Competition Act 1991 and/or amount to conduct inducing a breach of contract between the Plaintiff and the growers for the supply of sugar beet to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that the evidence currently available to the Court establishes that there is also a fair question to be determined by the trial judge concerning the existence of an unlawful conspiracy involving the Defendants and an intentional interference on their part with the Plaintiffs economic interests.

3. On behalf of the Defendants, it is submitted that the reality of these proceedings is that they involve a dispute between the parties with regard to the amount which the Plaintiffs must pay for sugar beet supplied to them by growers of sugar beet and that the legal issues which it is suggested on behalf of the Plaintiff fall to be determined by the Court have been introduced by the Plaintiff purely for the purpose of distracting the Court from the real issue which it must decide. Accordingly, it is submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the Injunctive Relief sought herein is misconceived, in that, it is an invitation to the Court to interfere in what is essentially a commercial dispute which, properly, should be left to the determination of the trial judge without the prior involvement of the Court.

4. While, in the light of the contents of the several Affidavits to which I have been referred, I have no doubt at all but that these proceedings would never have come into existence were it not for the fact that agreement has not been reached with regard to the price to be paid by the Plaintiff for sugar beet supplied to it by growers, I am also persuaded that it is arguable that the conduct of the Defendants, of which the Plaintiff complains is calculated to and has had the effect of inducing breaches of contract between the Plaintiff and growers for the supply of sugar beet to the Plaintiff and/or is conduct which amounts to an unlawful conspiracy and an intentional interference with the Plaintiff’s economic interests. In this regard, it is common case that the Plaintiff has entered into contracts with some 3740 growers of beet for the supply of sugar beet and, while these contracts are open ended in the sense that the ultimate price to be paid by the Plaintiff for sugar beet supplied to it pursuant to those contracts has yet to be finalised, there is no doubt but that the growers of beet, who are parties to those contracts, have thereby undertaken to deliver sugar beet to the Plaintiffs; notwithstanding that the ultimate price to be paid therefore has yet to be determined.

5. It is also common case that, on and from the 7th November 2001, the vast majority of growers of beet, who have contracted with the Plaintiff as aforesaid but who had not theretofore delivered their beet to the Plaintiff, ceased to effect such deliveries. In the light of the terms of the contract for the delivery of the beet to the Plaintiff executed by those growers, it seems to me that it is eminently arguable that the failure to effect such deliveries constituted a breach of contract on the part of those growers and I am not persuaded that the failure of the Plaintiff to invoke the procedure for resolving disputes which is provided for in the said contracts (if it be a fact that the Plaintiff failed to invoke that procedure) would, in itself, justify the refusal of growers of beet to make deliveries of beet to the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of those contracts. Neither am I persuaded that the failure of the Plaintiff to invoke the procedure for resolving disputes provided for in the said contracts (if it be a fact that the Plaintiff failed to invoke that procedure) precludes the Plaintiff from seeking the relief sought herein. Accordingly, I reject the submission by counsel on behalf of the Defendants that the Plaintiff’s failure to invoke the said dispute resolution procedure (if it be a fact that the Plaintiff is in default in that regard) amounts to conduct which would entitle the court to refuse to grant the Plaintiff the injunctive relief sought herein by the application of the equitable maxim “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands”.

6. While the Defendants protest that the alleged conduct on the part of the Defendants of which the Plaintiff complains; either did not happen at all, or cannot be given the sinister interpretation suggested by the Plaintiff, I am left in no doubt but that, if that dispute is resolved in favour of the Plaintiff; as it could well be, it will be open to the trial judge to consider whether or not such conduct constituted conduct which induced the breaches of contract on the part of the growers of beet to which I have referred and/or an unlawful conspiracy on the part of the Defendants or, indeed, an intentional interference by the Defendants with the Plaintiff’s economic interests. For the purposes of adjudicating upon this application, it is neither necessary, nor desirable, that I should speculate upon how the trial judge might resolve these several issues. It is sufficient that, as laid down by the court in the well known case of Campus Oil Limited and Others .v. The Minister for Industry and Energy and Others [1983] IR 88, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs have established that there is a fair question to be decided at the trial of the action and, as I have already indicated, I have no reservations in that regard. That, however, is only one of three circumstances which, as I interpret the relevant authorities, must exist if a court is to grant interlocutory injunctive relief. The other two are, firstly, that the balance of convenience favours the granting of such relief and, secondly, that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the party seeking the injunctive relief in the event that that party was ultimately successful in the proceedings. In this case, I cannot envisage what additional harm might befall the Defendants in the event that they are required to desist from the behaviour of which the Plaintiff complains whereas, in the event that the growers of beet persist in their refusal to deliver quantities of beet to the Plaintiff, as they have contracted to, it seems to me that there is a high probability; not only that irreparable harm will be caused to the Plaintiffs in their production operation but that their seasonal workforce of some 200 workers will be deprived of their employment. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunctive relief sought herein. Moreover, I am not persuaded that, in the event that if I were to refuse to grant the injunctive relief sought herein and that, at the end of the day, the plaintiff were to succeed in their claim herein, it would be reasonably possible to assess an amount for damages which would adequately compensate them for the losses which flowed from the Defendants wrongdoing. Accordingly, I will grant an interlocutory injunction in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion herein dated the 12th November 2001.

7. By way of an addendum, I would point out that I recognise the possibility that, while, as a result of the injunctive relief which I am granting herein, the Defendants may desist from engaging in the conduct of which the Plaintiff complains, the growers of beet may, nevertheless, persist in their refusal to deliver quantities of beet to the Plaintiff. I sincerely hope that that will not happen because I believe that it would be contrary to the national interest were it to happen that I am not persuaded that it would serve any interest of the growers themselves. In this regard, it may well be that the Plaintiff’s refusal to allow the growers the price which they are claiming in respect of beet, which they are required to deliver to the Plaintiff is unreasonable, although it is not for me to express a view in that regard. However, if the Plaintiff will not agree to a price for the beet which the growers consider to be reasonable, the contract which they have executed with the Plaintiff provides a procedure for resolving such disputes and it seems to me that the growers’ better interests would be served by invoking that procedure rather than by persisting in their refusal to deliver beet to the plaintiff.

8. Furthermore, lest there be any misapprehension about the matter, might I say that I will not tolerate any conduct which offends either the letter or the spirit of the injunctions which I have just granted. If any individual person, or any association of persons, is shown to me to have breached the terms of those injunctions, they will be severely punished in a manner which hurts them most.