High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. The Applicant is a Nigerian national who sought asylum in the State on his arrival on 23rd February 1998. He completed a Questionnaire on 24th February 1998. He arrived in Ireland via Belgium. The evidence establishes that the Applicant attended an interview. The Applicant was not successful in his application and the grounds for that decision were that he had not provided evidence of a well founded fear for any Convention (i.e. Geneva Convention 1951 as amended by The 1967 New York Protocol as defined in J. 2 of The Refugee Act 1996) reason and that the fear he expressed was not for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. The Applicant appealed this decision to the Refugee Appeals Authority, their decision was contained in a letter to the Applicant of 29th December, 1999 in the following terms;-

2. The report of the Appeals Authority dated 9th November, 1999 indicates that considerable care was given to the hearing of the appeal.

3. Notwithstanding the failure of the appeal the Applicant was very properly advised of his entitlement to make an application and Section 3 of the Illegal immigrants Act 1999 for ‘leave to remain on humanitarian grounds’. This opportunity was availed of in the terms of a very long and detailed letter dated 18th January 2000 written on the Applicant’s behalf by his solicitors Messrs Blackwell & Company. The letter treats of ‘Fear of Torture /Imprisonment/Danger to Life or Liberty, the transition to democracy in Nigeria, Ethnic Tensions, Religious Tensions, the Governments response to inter ethnic violence, private armies and religious intolerance, the Applicant’s dispute in relation to lands, also such matters as the Applicant’s human rights law, the ability to earn a livelihood and to obtain food and shelter and the personal health and circumstances of the Applicant. The submission was very comprehensive. The medical reports of Mr. Brian Glanville, Psychologist and Dr. F. G. Kelly were enclosed with the submission..

4. Some fourteen months later, i.e. on 4th May, 2001 a letter of the making of a Deportation Order dated 26th April 2001 was served on the Applicant. The Order and form of Notice was in a form considered as appropriate by the Supreme Court in the decision in P. L. & B. v. The Minster for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (unreported 30/7/2001). The case advanced for the Applicant is that the Deportation Order should be quashed on the ground that the Respondent, his servants or agents have not provided any reasons for the decision that the principle of non -refoulement is of no relevance to the Applicant and that the Respondent failed to have regard to relevant considerations, particularly the lapse of time between the date of the Section 3 representations and the date of the Deportation Order.

5. The provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1999 make it quite clear that the entitlement to make a Deportation Order are subject to the provisions of Section 5 (prohibition of refoulement) of the Refugee Act 1996 and the subsequent provisions of Section 3 itself.

6. In the instant case the relevant section of the letter of 4th May, 2001 giving Notice of the making of the Deportation Order is:-

7. The letter goes on to state that the Minister has had regard to the matter set out in Section 3 (60 and is satisfied that in the interests of the common good public policy and the integrity of the asylum and immigration systems that the Applicant remain not in the State.

8. It is clear that not only was Section 5 of the 1996 Act addressed, but addressed in a priority order and also in a manner in which the Minister expressed himself as satisfied in this regard, whereas in the context of Section 3 (6) he has had regard to the representation. It was argued that no reason was given for the Minister’s decision or if so, the reason was inadequate and so insufficient as to preclude the court on review from exercising its function, Dunnes Stores Ireland Company v. Maloney [1997] 3 IR 542 at page 560 et seq. was relied upon as authority for the proposition that in the absence of reasons, applicants could not properly pursue their appropriate means of redress which was an application for judicial review. In that case Laffoy J. considered the decision of Costello P. in McCormack v. Garda Síochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 at page 500 which is in point in the instant case:-

9. The Supreme Court in P. B. & L. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform hereinbefore referred to considered a Notice in identical terms to that in the instant case. The reason for making the Deportation Order is that the Minister has first satisfied himself on Section 5 of the 1996 Act. I have carefully considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in R. v. The Secretary of State, exp. Cambolat [1998]

10. I am satisfied that the Minister gave reasons for the Deportation Order and that they are adequate reasons.

11. There certainly was an interval of time between the Section 3 representations and the deportation determination but in all the circumstances referred to me I do not consider it to be inordinate. The obligations in the asylum process are mutual - “the Applicant is not a passive party in the process” per the Illegal (Trafficking ) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 I R 360 at 395. Up to date Country of origin information or a change of circumstances under Section 3 (6) if notified and shown to differ significantly in the context of asylum/refugee/immigration concerns might if proven to have altered between date of submission of the Section 3 information and date of deportation decision give rise to review. There is no factual basis laid in the instant case to even suggest that this is so. There are no good and substantial grounds upon which to proceed. I refuse to speculate. I therefore refuse the application.