[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
High Court of Ireland Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Tierney v. Midserve Ltd. t/a Sachs Hotel [2002] IEHC 12 (23rd January, 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/12.html Cite as: [2002] IEHC 12 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
1. On
the 10th February, 1995 the plaintiff entered premises known as Sachs Hotel as
a customer for the purpose of attending a dance. Accordingly she was at all
material times a visitor in the premises within the meaning of the Occupiers
Liability Act, 1995 and the customer within the meaning of the Hotel
Proprietors Act, 1963. She fell suddenly and without warning and blames the
alleged wet condition of the surface of the floor which caused her to slip and
fall. She instructed her solicitors Messrs. Mangan & O’Beirne. The
firm of solicitors Messrs. Becker Tansey and Co. replied to the initiating
letters from the plaintiff’s solicitor as follows:-
3. A
plenary summons was issued on the 25th August, 1997 in which
Midserve
Limited trading as Sachs Hotel
was the defendant. A plenary summons was served on Becker Tansey Limited on
Friday 6th February by ordinary prepaid post. However they were returned
under cover of a letter dated the 12th February which reads:-
4. The
plaintiff’s solicitor Gerry McKinney whilst attending a licensing session
in the Dublin Metropolitan District Court on the 24th June, 1998 became aware
of an application for an Intoxicating Liquor Act licence in respect of Sachs
Hotel on behalf of an applicant company known as
Genport
Limited
.
The applicant intimated to the court that the said company was the licencee
and therefore occupier of the premises.
5. By
order of the Master of the High Court dated the 30th July, 1998
Genport
Limited
was joined as a co-defendant in the proceedings. The amended plenary summons
and statement of claim was delivered by the plaintiff’s solicitor on the
24th August, 1998. Messrs. P.C.L. Halpenny and Son Solicitors entered an
appearance on behalf of
Genport
Limited
and delivered a notice of particulars on the 6th February, 1999. On the same
date the second-named defendant’s solicitors delivered a full defence to
the plaintiff’s claim and raised a plea that the plaintiff’s claim
was barred by virtue of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations, 1957 as
amended by the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991. Meanwhile the
plaintiff had marked judgment for the plaintiff in default of appearance
against the defendant
Midserve
Limited
trading as Sachs Hotel.
6. In
June of 1999 the plaintiff’s solicitor delivered a full reply to the
second defendant’s defence. The action was thereafter set down and
notice of trial served. The action came on for hearing before this Court on
the 8th May, 2001.
7. It
was agreed between the parties and the court that a preliminary issue should be
tried on the question as to whether or not the plaintiff’s claim was
barred by virtue of the Statutes of Limitations as pleaded. The court
requested written submissions from both parties and received a final submission
with a covering letter of the 15th November of last year from the plaintiff and
from
Genport
Ltd
under cover of a letter of 17th December 2001.
8. The
next question is whether or not the plaintiff by herself or through her
solicitor could reasonably have ascertained who the correct defendant was and
had taken reasonable steps to ascertain that fact.
9. The
hearing of the issue took place on the 8th and 9th May, 2001. The
plaintiff’s solicitor was called to give evidence on behalf of the
plaintiff. The second-named defendant did not call any evidence. It was
accepted at the hearing that the plaintiff did not herself know of the true
identity of the occupier and licensee of Sachs Hotel She had relied entirely on
her solicitor. It was also admitted by the second-named defendant that at all
material times the true identity of the occupier and licensee of the premises
known
as Sachs Hotel was
Genport Limited
.
10. The
plaintiff’s contention is that the earliest date on which
she
became aware that
Genport
was the licensee and occupier was on the 24th June, 1998 when her solicitor who
was at the licensing court realised that
Genport
Limited
was the licensee and occupier because he heard their application being processed
.
She
contends that the three year period runs from that date. The defendant
contends that the cause of action against the second-named defendant accrued on
the 10th February, 1995 (the date of her accident). Accordingly the
plaintiff’s claim is statute barred.
11. Their
main argument is that had the solicitor for the plaintiff carried out an
intoxicating liquor licence search the identify of
Genport
Limited
as licensee would have been disclosed to her. No evidence was called from the
Law Society or elsewhere that such a search was normal having regard to all the
facts of this case.
12. The
plaintiff’s solicitor’s answer to this contention is that by virtue
of the inquiries which he made in the recited correspondence with Messrs.
Becker Tansey acting for Sachs Hotel and including searches which he made, that
is a search at the register of Business Names under the Regulation of Business
Names Act, 1963 and the information derived therefrom that he was entitled to
rely and did rely on the information disclosed as a result of these inquiries.
The particulars on the register being a matter of public record and that
showed
that Sachs Hotel and its licence attached to the function room on the first
floor. In relation to the business name Sachs Hotel, Morehampton Road, Dublin
4 it is registered in the name of a limited liability company
Midserve Limited
having a registered office at 36 Wicklow Street, Dublin 2 and that the business
carried on by the owner of the business name was that of
“hotelier-licensed
premises”.
The
plaintiff also relies on Section 22(1) of the Companies Act, 1960 which
provides that every company
carrying
on business
in the name other than its corporate name shall register in the manner directed
in law and the registration
of
business names statutes.
13. The
court has also referred to Section 3(1)(d), Section 6(1) and Section 12
.
Midserve
Limited
does not appear to have complied with these sections.
14. Initially
the plaintiff’s solicitor wrote to the Secretary of Sachs Hotel at
Morehampton Road, Donnybrook, Dublin 4 to make a claim on behalf of the
plaintiff and suggesting they contact their insurance. Becker Tansey replied
“on behalf of our clients”. However, it did not identify that
Genport
had taken over
Midserve.
The plaintiff’s solicitor tried to find out who held the dance licence
and found only a reference to Sach’s Hotel. A search of the register of
Business Names on the 8th August, 1997 disclosed that Sachs Hotel at
Morehampton Road, Dublin 4 was owned by a limited liability company
Midserve
Limited
and that the nature of the business being carried on was
“hotelier
licensed premises”.
In
his direct evidence he explained to counsel for the second-named defendant as
to why he had relied on the contents of that search. Mr. McKinney stated that
the business disclosed was that of hotelier and licensed premises. This is a
matter of public record and he felt entitled to rely on it. It disclosed that
Midserve
was the owner of the name Sachs Hotel and was carrying on business of hotelier
and licencee in the relevant premises. It is therefore the appropriate
defendant. He felt he had enough information for a careful and prudent
solicitor to initiate proceedings. He referred to
Boylan
v. Motor Distributors Limited
[1994] ILRM at 115.
15. The
various statutory requirements where a name is changed were not complied with.
This was the fault of the defendant. Therefore a person with a reason for
inquiry would not ascertain the true identity of the company carrying on
business in the name of ‘Sachs’ as corporate name. The public
must be protected. Indeed since the coming into force of the Intoxicating
Liquor Act, 2000 the object and desirability of achieving transparency is
further enforced and underlaid by the provisions of Section 38 of that Act
requiring a licencee not to carry on business under its own name, to produce a
Certificate of Registration of ownership of the business name as registered
under the Regulation of Business Names Act, 1963. When the solicitor for the
plaintiff sent correspondence which was received at the hotel premises; it
was passed to Becker Tansey and Company. The true position regarding
ownership and occupation was obviously known to
Midserve.
It was owned by
Genport
and should have been known to solicitors Becker and Tansey & Co. There is
no doubt that the failure of
Genport
Limited
(and of its solicitor) to disclose that it was the occupier of the premises in
circumstances where
Midserve
Limited
and the solicitors knew a claim was being brought by the plaintiff as a result
of an accident, and they allowed the plaintiff to proceed to judgment in
default of appearance against
Midserve
Limited
constituted and amounted to a concealment of the identity of the correct
defendant from the plaintiff. He relies on the judgment of Morris J. (as he
then was), his judgment in
McDonald
v. McBain
[1991] 1 IR 284 which adopts the approach of Lord Denning M.R. in
King
and Victor Parsons
[1973] 1 WLR 29. This Court would adopt both judgments. As Denning M.R. says:-
16. The
plaintiff’s solicitor was misled by virtue of the Acts or omissions of
the second-named defendant. The court also had regard to
Simpson
v. North-West Holst Southern Limited
[1980] 1 All ER 471. In this case the true identity of the second-named
defendant was knowingly concealed from the plaintiff and such concealment
constitutes fraud within the meaning of Section 71 of the Statute of
Limitations 1957. To adopt the words of Ó Dálaigh C.J. in
O’Reilly
v. Crandall
[1971] IR 90 at 98:-
17. In
view of the foregoing this Court is firmly of the opinion that in all the
circumstances of this particular case the Statute of Limitations does not offer
protection to the second-named defendant. Accordingly the issue is decided in
favour of the plaintiff. The action will proceed in default of settlement on
another day before another judge.