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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Kiely -v- Judge Ní Chondúin [2008] IEHC 370 (27 November 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2008/H370.html Cite as: [2008] IEHC 370 |
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Judgment Title: Kiely -v- Judge Ní Chondúin Composition of Court: Judgment by: Sheehan J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2008] IEHC 370 THE HIGH COURT 2006 No. 1475 J. R. BETWEEN CHRISTINE KIELY APPLICANT AND
JUDGE ANGELA NÍ CHONDÚIN RESPONDENT AND
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS NOTICE PARTY JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Sheehan delivered on the 27th day of November, 2008 1. The applicant in this case seeks an order of certiorari in respect of a warrant issued for her arrest on the 4th December, 2006, when she failed to appear in the Dublin Metropolitan District Court to face charges of assault and breach of the peace. 2. The applicant whose bail on these charges had been revoked because of an earlier breach had subsequently been rearrested and remanded in custody from time to time. 3. Due to an administrative failure the applicant was granted temporary release on the 28th November 2006, despite there being a custody remand order in place for her. It appears from the documentation filed before this Court that the prison authorities were not aware of this remand order, and believed the accused to be in custody solely in respect of a three months prison sentence which she was then serving. 4. The salient facts are set out in the following chronology:- 12th August, 2006 14th August, 2006 21st August, 2006 11th September, 2006 27th September, 2006 October, 2006 3rd November, 2006 27th November, 2006 28th November, 2006 4th December, 2006 5. Both the applicant and the notice party agree that the issue before this Court is primarily one of jurisdiction. 6. On behalf of the applicant, Mr. Dwyer submits in the first instance that the learned judge had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant. He further argued that even if the learned judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant, the obligation to apply fair procedures in the particular circumstances of this case, required the respondent to use other means of getting the accused back before the District Court, before resorting to the issuing of a warrant for her arrest. 7. In support of his argument that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a warrant for the arrest of the applicant, he relied on rules 1 and 2 of O. 22 of the District Court Rules 1997, as well as an extract from Professor Dermot Walsh’s book Criminal Procedure (Thompson Round Hall 2002).
8. Rules 1 and 2 of O. 22 of the District Court Rules 1997 read as follows:-
(b) an accused person is before the Court in connection with an offence and, on being remanded, is admitted to bail by recognisance for his or her appearance before a subsequent sitting of the Court (either in the same or another place), and that person, having entered into the recognisance, fails to appear at a time on a date and at a place at or on which he or she was bound by the recognisance to appear, the Judge then and there sitting may, on production of the recognisance to him or her, issue a warrant, in the Form 22.3, Schedule B, for the arrest of that person.”
10. In responding to this argument Ms. Phelan, on behalf of the notice party, contends that the jurisdiction of a District Judge to issue a warrant is not confined to those circumstances set out in O. 22 and relies on the decision of Finlay Geoghegan J. in Stephens v. Governor of Castlerea Prison [2002] IEHC 169. 11. In the course of her judgment in that case, Finlay Geoghegan J. cited with approval the judgments of Gavin Duffy P. in The State (Attorney General) v. Judge Roe [1951] I.R. 172, and the judgment of Davitt P. in The State (Attorney General) v. Judge Fawsitt [1955] I.R. 39. 12. In the course of his judgment in The State (Attorney General) v. Judge Roe [1951] I.R. 172 Gavin Duffy P. stated at p. 193:-
Mr. Sergeant Hawkins says: - ‘Also it seems clear that whenever a Statute gives to any one justice of the peace a jurisdiction over any offence… it impliedly gives a power to every such justice to make out a warrant to bring before him any person accused of such offence…for it cannot but be intended, that a statute giving a person jurisdiction over an offence doth mean also to give him the power instant to all courts of compelling the party to come before him’ (HAWK. P.C., 8th Ed., vol. 2, book 2, c.13, s.15). Chitty’s Criminal Law, 2nd Ed. 1826, vol. 1, c. 8, pp. 337- 8 says: - ‘Wherever the king grants an authority of oyer and terminer, the power to issue process is incidentally given; for as there can be no inquiry respecting offences, without the presence of the party, wherever the power is entrusted of determining the former, there must also be authority to compel the latter. For the same reason, justices of the peace, whenever they are authorised to inquire, hear, and determine, may thus compel the defendant to appear; and, indeed this is expressly declared by the words of their commission. The same observations apply, of course, to all magistrates whatsoever, who are invested with the power to try offenders.’”
16. While the applicant in this case had not been released on bail, I hold that she was nevertheless obliged to attend at the District Court for her trial, notwithstanding her wrongful release from custody and notwithstanding the fact, that she may not have been aware of the particular date that her case had been remanded to in her absence. I also hold following the decision of Finlay Geoghegan J. in the Stephens case, that in the circumstances of this case, the respondent judge Angela Ní Chondúin did have the necessary inherent jurisdiction to issue the impugned warrant. While I accept Mr. Dwyer’s submission that the respondent was not obliged to issue the warrant in the first instance, and would have been entitled to adjourn the matter for a short period to enable the accused to voluntarily attend court, I nevertheless hold that in the circumstances of this case, and particularly where the applicant had failed to attend court on the occasion when her case was first listed for trial, that the issuing of the warrant for the arrest of the applicant was the appropriate step for the District Judge to take. Accordingly, I refuse the application for the reliefs sought.
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