High Court of Ireland Decisions

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[2025] IEHC 153

[Record Nos. 2013/2708 P and 2013/2709 P]

IN THE MATTER OF THE CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (STABILISATION) ACT 2010

BETWEEN

PIOTR SKOCZYLAS, SCOTCHSTONE CAPITAL FUND LIMITED, JOHN PAUL MC GANN AND TIBOR NEUGEBAUER

PLAINTIFFS

AND

 

IRELAND, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE

DEFENDANTS

 

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Marguerite Bolger delivered on the 12^th day of March 2025

 

1.            In my judgment of 3 December 2024, I found against the plaintiffs in relation to the following applications: -

(1)          Substitution;

(2)          Costs;

(3)          To reopen the proceedings and amend or reverse my judgment of 13 May 2024 in the light of the decision of the CJEU in Commission v. Ireland C-465/20;

(4)          The slip rule correcting what the plaintiffs claim was a "falsehood" in my judgment of 13 May 2024.

2.            In my judgment, I gave an indicative view that the plaintiffs who brought the applications (namely Messrs. Skoczylas, McGann and Neugebauer) should be responsible for the State's costs. The plaintiffs opposed that approach and Mr. Skoczylas filed written submissions on 3 March 2025 which were adopted by Messrs. McGann and Neugebauer, in which they submitted that there should be no costs orders.

(i)        Substitution application

3.            The plaintiffs sought to rely on the fact that the State did not oppose the substitution application. However, the court still had to consider the application and make a decision on it, which is what I did in my judgment for the reasons set out therein. The State contend that this meant the length of the case was extended, for which period of time the State was required to be present.

4.            The costs of that and any work done by the State arising from the plaintiffs' application may be a matter for adjudication which is a matter for the Costs Adjudicator and not this Court. It does not, in itself, mean that no costs order should be made.

5.            The remainder of the plaintiffs' submission on the substitution application seem to repeat their earlier submissions on their substantive substitution application and their earlier application to allow Mr. Skoczylas to represent Skoczylas Capital Fund Ltd (one the plaintiffs in these proceedings) which I had refused in my judgment of 13 May 2024. The plaintiffs reiterated their view that this Court had erred in fact and law in refusing those applications. That does nothing to persuade me that a costs order should not be made against them.

(ii)       Costs

6.            The State having succeeded in its application for costs, as set out in my judgment of 3 December 2024, is entitled to the costs of that application against the unsuccessful plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs have not cited any particular reason, other than the generality of the points set out below, why they should not be made responsible for the costs of the costs application.  Their points do not persuade me away from my indicative view that the State, having succeeded in defending these proceedings, is entitled to their costs.

(iii)      Application to re-open the proceedings

7.            I have held that the decision of the CJEU in Commission v. Ireland did not establish exceptional circumstances such as to allow this Court jurisdiction to re-open its judgment and that that the plaintiffs' submissions around what might have occurred had the State had possession of the Apple monies back in 2010, were speculative and devoid of any evidential or legal basis. In submitting that there should be no order for costs against them, the plaintiffs continued to maintain their same arguments that those were exceptional circumstances, which I had previously declined to accept.

8.            The plaintiffs contend that this case was, similar to the case of Collins v. Minister for Finance [2014] IEHC 79, a case of public interest raising unique and novel issues of law and a test case. Once again, the plaintiffs argued points that have already been determined by this Court in my judgment of 3 December 2024 in which I found that it was not a test case (at para. 14) and that no truly novel or previously unexplored legal point had arisen, citing the same cases of Collins and Curtain v. Dáil Éireann [2006] IESC 27 on which the plaintiffs now seek to rely in their submissions on costs. None of those submissions establish any basis to depart from the default rule on costs.

(iv)      Slip Rule

9.            In my judgment of 3 December 2024, I refused the slip rule application as I found there was no basis to the plaintiffs' application (at para. 34). The plaintiffs now submit, in strong language, that this was incorrect and that there are, therefore, no grounds for awarding the costs of their unsuccessful slip rule application against them.

10.         The plaintiffs may disagree with the Court's outcome, but such submissions are now for an appellate court.  They do not persuade this Court why the usual rule in relation to costs following the cause should not be made against the plaintiffs in respect of their unsuccessful application.

Conclusions

11.         For the reasons set out above, and in accordance with s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, I am making a costs order against Messrs. Skoczylas, McGann and Neugebauer in respect of the substitution and the costs applications heard by the Court on 25 July 2024 and the applications to reopen the proceedings, slip rule and the plaintiffs' additional application/submissions arising separately from the decision of the Court of Appeal on the adjudication of a previous costs order against Mr. Skoczylas, heard on 9 October 2024.  The plaintiffs are also to pay the costs of this costs application.  The costs are to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement. I will place a stay on the costs order pending the outcome of any appeal to the Court of Appeal and/or the Supreme Court.

 

 

The plaintiffs represented themselves.

Counsel for the defendants: Michael Binchy BL