High Court of Ireland Decisions

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 THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 225

[Record No. 2010 6979 P]

BETWEEN

PATRICK CLOHESSY

PLAINTIFF

AND

 

THE LEGAL AID BOARD, THE COUNTY REGISTER OF THE COUNTY OF CORK, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND LAW REFORM, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, VALERIE COLEMAN,

FINTAN COLEMAN, ANN CLOHESSY, JUDGE SEÁN Ó DONNABHÁIN AND JOSEPH I. WARD

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger delivered on the 11^th  day of April 2025

1.    This is the plaintiff's application for interlocutory relief.  For the reasons I set out below I refuse all reliefs sought.

Background

2.    The plaintiff issued proceedings in July 2010 seeking damages under a number of headings he identified including misrepresentation, breach of duty, negligence, loss of opportunity, slander, unlawful imprisonment, breach of his constitutional and human rights to due process of law, a fair trial and the right to give evidence and to be heard before imprisonment without charge. In October 2010 he served his statement of claim in which he made similar claims for damages and also sought six declarations relating to steps taken by the Circuit Court and this Court and the registration of a Deed of Conveyance.

3.    In the course of the many years that this litigation has gone on, the plaintiff has brought several interlocutory applications before this court and appeals to the Court of Appeal resulting in twelve orders from this Court and four orders of the Court of Appeal. However, at no time has he sought to expand on the reliefs he set out in his plenary summons and statement of claim by way of any application to amend his pleadings.

This application

4.    By way of notice of motion dated 19 March 2024, the plaintiff seeks fourteen separate reliefs comprising of injunctive, declaratory reliefs and mandamus. The reliefs he seeks are far reaching and unconventional. Many of them are unknown to law and unavailable on an interlocutory application. For example, he seeks an order declaring all previous orders made by the Circuit Court and this Court these proceedings to be invalid and void, and then goes further and seeks a declaration that "no valid enforced statutory jurisdiction is in existence for 99+ years" because he says Courts of Justice Act 1924 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1924 Act") was not validly commenced. His claim about the 1924 Act links into other reliefs he seeks including an investigation by the European Commission, the holding of a Constitutional Referendum and the appointment of an independent impartial tribunal without the involvement of any member of the Irish judiciary who, the plaintiff claims, would be objectively biased to act as judge in their own cause.

Previous judgments

5.    Unconventional as the reliefs that this motion seeks are, this is not the first time the plaintiff has sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the 1924 Act in these and other related proceedings. The plaintiff previously contended that the absence of a signed commencement order deprived the 1924 Act, and therefore all courts in this country, of any jurisdiction.  Those claims were all definitively and emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeal as having no validity. The reasons for this were succinctly set out by the Supreme Court in its decision in AC v Hickey & Ors, [2019] IESC 73 where O'Malley J., on behalf of the court, stated at para. 215:

 "In any court proceedings initiated since 1925, an order of the Executive Council of Saorstát Éireann may, pursuant to s.4 of the Documentary Evidence Act of that year, be proved by production of the relevant extract from Iris Oifigiúil. The printed volume containing the set of commencement orders for the Courts of Justice Act 1924 has been produced in court. It is clear that Part 1 of the Act was brought into operation on the 5^th June 2024, on foot of an order made by the Executive Council on the 4^th June 1924. The absence of a copy from the National Archives has no legal significance."

6.    In the later decision of Coleman v Clohessy [2022] IECA 279, Collins J in the Court of Appeal relied on ss. 4(1) and (5) of the Documentary Evidence Act 1925, which meant that the production of a copy of the Iris Oifigiúil purporting to contain any order of the Executive Council made under s.2 of the 1924 Act and/or production of a copy of any such order which purports to be published by, or by the authority of, the Stationery Office,

"[44] [...] constitutes prima facie evidence of the Order. Production of the original order is not required to prove the order, at least in the absence of any contrary evidence.

[46] There was not a whit of basis for any suggestion that the copies of the four commencement orders contained in Statutory Rules, Orders and Regulations 1922-1938, all of which purported to have been published by the Stationary Office were not in fact so published." (at para. 44 and 46).

He concluded at para. 49:

"The fact- if fact it be- that the original of any of the commencement orders identified in paragraph 40 above cannot now be located does not establish that such order was not duly made. Even in the absence of the provisions of the Documentary Evidence Act 1925, the matters set out above suggest that all relevant parties proceeded on a common understanding that the 1924 Act had been brought into operation and seem to attest to the fact that commencement orders were indeed made in accordance with the requirements of section 2 of the 1924 Act. However, it does not appear to be necessary to consider that issue any further here, having regard to the means of proof provided by the Documentary Evidence Act 1925 which may be relied on in any legal proceedings in which any issue is raised as to the commencement of the 1924 Act."

7.    The judgment of Collins J applies equally to the submissions made by the plaintiff in this application arising from what he says was the absence of the seal until after the Commencement Order in respect of the 1924 Act.

The plaintiff's assertion of new evidence

8.    The plaintiff now claims in this application that he has unearthed new evidence from the National Archive proving that the 1924 Act was not validly commenced because of what he says was the absence of a seal at the time the Act was purportedly implemented. He seeks to rely on his research of historical documents that were presumably available well before the commencement of his litigation.  No explanation was provided why that evidence was not made available to the courts that were previously asked by this plaintiff to determine a similar jurisdictional issue.

9.    The plaintiff's assertions about the absence of the seal until after the commencement of the 1924 Act affecting its jurisdiction is as groundless and devoid of any legal basis, merit or validity as were his previous claims based on the asserted absence of an officially enrolled Commencement Order for the 1924 Act.  I reject the plaintiff's contention that this seal constitutes new evidence or any legal basis whatsoever for revisiting an issue that has clearly already been determined by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court, the conclusions of which are binding on this Court. What the plaintiff asserted was new evidence in relation to the seal does not alter the legal significance of the Documentary Evidence Act 1925, the existence of the relevant extract in Iris Oifigiúil and the resulting status of the 1924 Act, as set out by Collins J. in Coleman v Clohessy. The legal point was already established and should not have been sought to be relitigated.

Decision

10.  There is no basis to the plaintiff's submission that the 1924 Act was not validly commenced and/or that this and other courts thereunder were not established or that this or those other courts lack jurisdiction. The point is unstateable and has already been found to be so by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.  I refuse the relief sought in relation to the jurisdiction of the 1924 Act and all reliefs related to that claim.

11.  The plaintiff seeks interlocutory injunctive relief independent from and unrelated to the main reliefs he seeks in his underlying proceedings and which he has never sought to amend. The plaintiff has failed to establish a fair issue to be tried in relation to the interlocutory injunctive relief he seeks. I refuse the injunctive relief sought.

12.  There is no basis to the plaintiff's assertion that this Court should exercise its jurisdiction to refer a question of law to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The plaintiff has not raised any substantive issue of EU law and therefore the necessary issue of competence is missing. As succinctly pointed out by Keane J in Toal v The Honourable Society of Kings Inns Barristers Disciplinary Tribunal & Ors. [2015] IEHC 512:

"[43] In Case C-206/13 Siragusa v Regione Sicilia-Soprintendenza Ben Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo, 6 March 2014, the CJEU reiterated that it has no jurisdiction to examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation falling outside the scope of EU law (at paragraph 21). It is only where legislation (or other national law) that falls within the scope of EU law is at issue, that the CJEU, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine whether that legislation (or law) is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures; Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson [2013] ECR, paragraph 19, and the case-law cited).

 

[44] The CJEU continued (at paragraph 22) that, taking into consideration the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, in accordance with the requirement to do so under the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and article 52(7) of the Charter, the obligation to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the European Union is binding upon the Member States only in respect of matters covered by EU law." (at paras. 43 and 44).

13.  For the avoidance of doubt, I find no merit in the written submissions made by the plaintiff purportedly challenging the right of audience of one of the solicitor's firms involved in these proceedings. The point is, in any event, irrelevant as it is not pleaded in either the substantive proceedings or in his motion.

14.  For the further avoidance of doubt, my comments in this judgment are not to be taken as an invitation to the plaintiff to seek to amend his pleadings or to seek to relitigate these groundless points at any future date in these or indeed any other proceedings. The issue has been determined and should not be revisited before this Court.

Indicative view on costs

15.  The defendants, particularly the second to the nineth defendants, submitted that the plaintiff's approach was an abuse of process. As can be seen from the reasons for my decision set out above, this plaintiff has sought to relitigate an unstateable claim that was definitively rejected previously by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  Thus, there is a basis for finding that this application was an abuse of process. That may be relevant in deciding on the costs of this application.

16.  My indicative view on costs in accordance with s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that the plaintiff should be responsible for the costs incurred by all defendants in defending this groundless motion without any stay on execution.

17.  I will put the matter in at 10.00am on 30 April next to deal with final interlocutory orders and costs. If either party wishes to file written submissions, they should be with the court at least 48 hours before the matter is back before me.

 

 

The plaintiff represented himself.

Counsel for the first defendant - Frank Kennedy BL.

Counsel for the second to nineth defendants - Martin Fitzgerald BL.