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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> PK v VS & Anor (Approved) [2025] IEHC 244 (28 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC244.html Cite as: [2025] IEHC 244 |
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THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
[2025] IEHC 244
RECORD NO. 2024/163H JR
BETWEEN
P.K.
APPLICANT
AND
V. S. AND COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SIOCHANA
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 28th day of April, 2025.
INTRODUCTION
1. In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks to quash the decision to refuse his application for a small public service vehicle licence, more commonly referred to as a taxi licence, on foot of his application under the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 (hereinafter "the 2013 Act"). As an Authorised Officer under the 2013 Act, the First Named Respondent is designated as the Licensing Authority and is charged with a variety of functions including ensuring that taxi licences are only granted to suitable persons.
2. The Applicant's application for a taxi licence was refused by the Licensing Authority due to concerns emanating from an allegation of sexual assault made against the Applicant, for which he was prosecuted, notwithstanding that the Applicant was ultimately found not guilty following a full jury trial.
BACKGROUND
3. It is common case that the Applicant was convicted on one count of sexual assault alleged to have occurred on the evening of the 24th of December, 2017. The Applicant denied all wrongdoing throughout the investigation and trial and gave evidence during his trial denying the allegation. Having been convicted of the offence, he appealed successfully, and his conviction was quashed. The circumstances leading to the quashing of his conviction are set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal (delivered on the 31st of July, 2020, in the case of D.P.P. v. P.K. [2020] IECA 220). The Applicant was subsequently acquitted by a jury by unanimous verdict after a second trial on the 17th of September, 2021.
4. On the 14th of January, 2023, the Applicant made an application to his regional Garda division for a taxi licence pursuant to the provisions of the 2013 Act. On his application form, he disclosed that he was working as a tour guide/driver for a named coach company and that he had historic convictions for public order and domestic violence offences (events occurring more than 15 years previously).
5. On or about the 25th of September, 2023, on invitation, the Applicant attended a meeting with the Licensing Authority at which his application was discussed. It was understood that the purpose of this interview was to assess the Applicant's suitability as a person to hold a taxi licence. At this meeting, the fact that the Applicant had been prosecuted on foot of an allegation of sexual assault was raised and the Applicant was advised by the decision-maker as follows:
"all I have is a one-sided version of events. Is there anything you can say to convince me that you are a proper person to hold a PSV licence."
6. The Applicant objected to being questioned in respect of the previous allegation telling the Licensing Authority that he had been through two trials and had been proved innocent, to which it is understood the decision-maker replied:
"that's not quite the case."
7. The decision-maker in his capacity as Licensing Authority also stated with reference to the allegations:
"I have to operate on the balance of probabilities with regards to the allegations..."
8. It is clear from the record of the meeting that the Licensing Authority gave the Applicant an opportunity to discuss the circumstances surrounding the incident giving rise to the charge and acquittal and asked the Applicant to give his version of events. The difference between a "not guilty" verdict and being proven innocent was also explained.
9. By letter dated the 27th of September, 2023, the Licensing Authority wrote to the Applicant in terms indicating that it was intended to consider refusing the Applicant a taxi licence. That letter, entitled "Notice of intention to consider refusal to grant a licence..." stated:
"The Authorised Officer is not satisfied that you are a suitable person to hold a SPSV licence".
10. The reasons were stated to be as follows:
"Due to concerns raised by the allegation of a criminal act against you by a third party as discussed in the meeting of the 25th of September at Bandon Garda Station."
11. This letter allowed the Applicant a period of 14 days to make representations in respect of the intention to refuse. On foot of same, the Applicant's solicitor wrote to the Licensing Authority via email on the 5th of October, 2023, requesting the notes from the meeting and stating, inter alia, as follows:
"The grounds cited by you are "concerns raised by the allegation of a criminal act against you by a third party as discussed in the meeting of the 25th of September in XX Garda Station". You should be well aware that the conviction against my client was quashed by the Court of Appeal, yet you arrived at the decision you did, without mention of this despite my client advising you of his acquittal on a number of occasions. Your decision jeopardises my client's livelihood and character. I am therefore requesting that this decision is reviewed as a matter of urgency and set aside and my client deemed a suitable person as required by Taxi Regulation Act of 2013. My client is also seeking a retraction and an apology from you."
12. By letter dated the 11th of October, 2023, the Licensing Authority replied enclosing the meeting notes, noting that the application was in fact still under consideration, stating as follows:
"....As the correspondence sent to your client reflects, the notice indicated an intention to consider refusal to grant a licence. As Chief Superintendent, I am still considering this application. My role as deciding officer in the consideration of applications for public service vehicle licences bears certain responsibilities, as set out in the Taxi Regulation Act 2013. The Chief Superintendent who is the Deciding Officer bears responsibility to the public at large in the issue of licences and as such, all matters that may be of relevance to the application must face careful scrutiny and deliberation. As previously referred to, this application is still under consideration. The promise of judicial review will not impact or influence the decision making process in this regard. In accordance with the Taxi Regulation Act and the obligations to the public at large, my decision will be reached independently and as fairly as possible."
13. The Licensing Authority allowed a further period of 10 days for submissions to be made in respect of the intention to refuse.
14. By email dated the 23rd of October, 2023, the Applicant's solicitor replied to the invitation to provide further submissions and referred to the grounds of refusal set out under s. 10 of the 2013 Act stating:
"None of the above apply to [P.K.]. His conviction was quashed. The Garda are well aware of this. On that basis there are no grounds pursuant to Section 10 that apply and the license should be granted."
15. By letter dated the 7th of November, 2023, the Licensing Authority refused the Applicant's application stating:
"As explained in our meeting, I am refusing your application as I am not satisfied that you are a suitable person to hold a SPSV Licence."
16. In providing the reasons for refusal, the Licensing Authority referred to the explanation given at the meeting on the 25th of September, 2023, before stating:
"Due to concerns, emanating from the incident reported against you on the 25th December 2017 for which you were subsequently investigated for and are aware of."
17. The Applicant did not appeal to the District Court in respect of the refusal of his taxi licence application but instead proceeded by way of judicial review obtaining leave on an ex parte basis on the 11th of March, 2024 (Hyland J.).
18. In a replying affidavit sworn by the decision-maker in his capacity as the Licensing Authority, it was explained that throughout the interview on the 25th of September, 2023, the decision-maker was cognisant of his duty under the legislation to ensure the safety of vulnerable members of the public who might be travelling on their own as a passenger. He said that the fact that the Applicant failed or refused to allay the concerns he held by not fully engaging with him on the issue raised, "coupled with the fact that he grew visibly annoyed and aggressive in tone when I sought to explore same, was central to my being unable to be satisfied as to his suitability".
19. Of note, the Licensing Authority had not previously relied on the Applicant's demeanour in refusing the application. This was introduced as a factor justifying refusal for the first time in a replying affidavit filed in the within judicial review proceedings.
ISSUES
20. The Applicant contends that his application was unlawfully refused because regard was improperly had to a criminal allegation against the Applicant divorced from the outcome of the criminal proceedings, without any independent assessment of the allegation made against the Applicant and without affording the Applicant a proper opportunity to address materials being considered by the Licensing Authority. It is contended that refusing the application on the simple fact that an allegation was made was unreasonable and the decision was arrived at in breach of the requirements of constitutional justice.
21. On the other hand, the Respondents point to the duty on the Licensing Authority to refuse a taxi licence unless satisfied as to the suitability of an applicant. In this regard, the fact that a complaint of sexual assault had been made is identified as relevant, even when the Applicant was subsequently acquitted of the offence following a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal. Significant reliance is also placed on the availability of an appeal to the District Court. It is objected that the challenge to the fairness of the process by reason of the non-disclosure of material relied upon in making the decision to refuse is not within the scope of these proceedings. It is contended that the Applicant was afforded no less than three opportunities to address the Licensing Authority's concerns in relation to the third-party complaint of sexual assault ultimately relied upon in refusing the application but failed to properly engage with the process.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
22. Section 6 of the 2013 Act provides that the Garda Siochána shall be the licensing authority to grant licenses to drive small public service vehicles (pending any order under s. 6(3)). Section 70 of the Act provides that the Garda Commissioner may authorize another member of the Garda Siochána not below the rank of Superintendent to act or to carry out a function or requirement of the Garda Commissioner under the 2013 Act. It is common case that the First Named Respondent has been so authorized as Licensing Authority in respect of the grant of taxi licences in the region where the Applicant lives.
23. Section 9 of the 2013 Act provides, inter alia, that the Licensing Authority:
"may, upon application to it and in accordance with this section and the regulations, grant to the applicant a licence"
24. Section 10(1) of the 2013 Act provides that a Licensing Authority:
"shall not grant a licence under section 9 to a person unless it is satisfied that he or she is a suitable person to hold a licence."
25. Section 10(2) of the 2013 Act, in relevant part, provides that:
"in assessing whether a person is a suitable person to hold a licence, the licensing authority may, amongst other matters, have regard to the following:
(a) whether the applicant is of good character;
(b) any concerns raised by the Authority or the Garda Commissioner or other member of the Garda Síochána regarding the applicant's suitability to hold a licence;
(c) any convictions for offences (including offences under the enactments mentioned in the Schedule) committed by the applicant, and the extent to which those convictions are of relevance to the activities of the person in respect of providing small public vehicle services or driving a small public service vehicle, as the case may be;
(d) in respect of an application for a licence to drive a small public service vehicle, the health of the applicant and his or her ability to provide small public vehicle services or drive a small public service vehicle, ....''
26. Section 13 of the 2013 Act provides for refusal of a taxi licence by the Licensing Authority and a full appeal to the District Court in respect of that refusal as follows:
"(1) Whenever the licensing authority proposes to refuse to grant a licence or to revoke or suspend a licence, it shall notify in writing the applicant or the holder, as the case may be, of the proposal and the reasons for the refusal, revocation or suspension and shall, if any representations are made by or on behalf of the applicant or holder, as the case may be, not later than 14 days or such further period as the licensing authority allows from the date of the service of the notification, consider the representations.
(2) Whenever the licensing authority, having considered the representations (if any) that may have been made to it under subsection (1) by or on behalf of the applicant or holder, decides, as the case may be, to refuse to grant the licence or to revoke or suspend the licence, the licensing authority shall notify in writing the applicant or holder of its decision and of the appeal procedure under subsection (3) and that the decision does not take effect until the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (3) in the event of an appeal not being made within that period.
(3) Where a person has been notified under subsection (2) of the decision of the licensing authority, to refuse to grant the licence or to revoke or suspend the licence, as the case may be, he or she may, not later than 28 days from the date of the service of the notification, appeal to the District Court against the refusal, revocation or the suspension, as the case may be.
........
(6) An appeal under subsection (3) or (8) shall be to the judge of the District Court within whose jurisdiction the applicant or the holder ordinarily resides or carries or proposes to carry on the business of providing small public service vehicle services.
(7) On the hearing of an appeal under subsection (3) in relation to the decision of the licensing authority under subsection (2), the District Court may either confirm the decision or allow the appeal. If the appeal is allowed in relation to a decision to refuse to grant a licence the licensing authority shall grant the licence.
..........
(10) The decision of the District Court on an appeal under subsection (3) or (8) is final, except by leave of the Court an appeal on a specified point of law lies to the High Court."
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
27. The issues before me are relatively net.
28. A preliminary issue is raised in relation to the Applicant's failure to exhaust the alternative remedy of an appeal to the District Court which it is contended on behalf of the Licensing Authority was both an effective and more appropriate remedy. As the question of whether an appeal to the District Court constitutes an appropriate alternative remedy depends on the nature of any flaw found in the process at first instance and whether it is curable on appeal, I will address this question having first considered the substantive complaints made on behalf of the Applicant.
29. Substantively, I am asked to determine whether the fact that the Applicant was subject to an allegation of sexual assault was a relevant consideration upon which the Licensing Authority was entitled to rely in refusing the Applicant's application for a taxi licence and whether the fact alone of an allegation, even if acquitted, could justify a refusal of a taxi licence. If so, a further issue arises as to whether the decision-making process in this case was flawed by reason of a failure to comply with the requirements of constitutional justice in making the decision to refuse based on undisclosed materials.
30. The fact that demeanour was relied upon in the decision to refuse emerged from the terms of the replying affidavit filed in these proceedings. No complaint was made on the case as pleaded and for which leave has been granted in relation to the adequacy of the Licensing Authority's reasoning and the fact that it had not previously been disclosed that demeanour was a factor in the refusal decision. Any issue regarding the adequacy of reasoning either in relation to demeanour or the fact of acquittal as considerations are therefore not properly in issue before me, even if subject to comment in argument before me.
Unreasonable Reliance on Allegation of Sexual Assault despite Acquittal
31. As set out above, s.10 of the 2013 Act provides that certain specified matters, "amongst other matters", can be considered in assessing suitability. It is clear from the terms of the correspondence which issued on behalf of the Applicant and his attitude in response to questioning at interview that the Applicant and his solicitor proceeded on the basis that having been acquitted in respect of the application of sexual abuse, the fact that an allegation had been made could not justify the refusal of a taxi licence and was not a relevant consideration. The correspondence did not otherwise address the question of "good character" under s. 10(2)(a) or "suitability" under s. 10(2)(b), albeit the Applicant responded to some extent to questions of suitability and character during his interview even though clearly unhappy to go into any detail in respect of the allegation in question. The fundamental premise of these proceedings remains that the Licensing Authority was not entitled to rely on the fact that an allegation had been made when the Applicant had been acquitted, that the making of an allegation was not a relevant consideration and that reliance on the fact of an allegation in the circumstances rendered the decision unreasonable.
32. On behalf of the Licensing Authority, it is contended that there was an obligation to take all relevant information into account in assessing the suitability of the Applicant, including the fact that allegations were made in relation to an alleged sexual assault carried out by the Applicant, in respect of which he was subsequently acquitted. The case made on behalf of the Licensing Authority is that it cannot grant a taxi licence to an applicant, who will be driving vulnerable members of the public and frequently alone with such members of the public, unless the Licensing Authority is satisfied as to that applicant's suitability pursuant to s. 10 of the 2013 Act. The case made on behalf of the Licensing Authority is that despite efforts to seek assurance from the Applicant, concerns were not adequately addressed during the meeting with the Applicant or thereafter. In consequence, the Licensing Authority was unable to satisfy itself as to the "suitability" of the Applicant to hold a taxi licence as required by the 2013 Act. It is firmly denied that the Licensing Authority based conclusions on the "simple fact that an allegation had been made."
33. As apparent from the statutory scheme, the Licensing Authority is charged with a variety of functions including ensuring that taxi licences are only granted to suitable persons. This is to ensure public safety and to ensure that the common good is upheld in the granting of such licences. The holder of such a licence will be operating a taxi and, during the course of their duties, carrying members of the public, some of whom such as elderly persons, young persons and persons under a disability or under the influence of alcohol or substances are considered to be vulnerable persons. Trust is a central issue where such persons get into a car, often alone, with a driver unknown to them. It is therefore a cornerstone of the functions set out in the 2013 Act, that no taxi licence should be granted unless the holder of the taxi licence is deemed to be a suitable person to carry such vulnerable members of the public.
34. The fundamental duty with which the Licensing Authority is charged is to ensure the public safety when being carried in, or otherwise using the taxi. The burden to satisfy the Licensing Authority that an applicant for a licence should be granted one rests on that applicant. It is a high burden because under s.10 of the 2013 Act, a Licensing Authority "shall not" grant a licence unless it is satisfied that the Applicant is a "suitable person to hold a licence." Accordingly, the default position is that the Licensing Authority must refuse the application unless satisfied to grant the licence having regard to prescribed considerations.
35. The 2013 Act provides that the Licensing Authority should have regard to a broad range of matters when determining whether an Applicant is a suitable person to hold a licence. The matters include, but are not limited to, whether the applicant is of good character and whether any concerns arise regarding the applicant's suitability to hold a licence. These considerations are separate and distinct from the requirement to have regard to criminal convictions recorded against the Applicant which are identified as relevant under s. 10(2)(c). The fact that a complaint has been investigated and a prosecution brought remains relevant to questions of character and suitability more generally under the broad terms of s. 10(2) and having regard to the terms of s. 10(2)(a) and (b), even where an applicant is acquitted. The fact of acquittal and the circumstances in which this arose is also relevant.
36. The broad ranging nature of s.10 of the 2013 Act was discussed in detail in the case of MD Rahman v. Healy [2022] IEHC 206. In that case, one of the issues raised was whether an applicant's immigration status and history could be considered in assessing suitability for a taxi licence. The Court held (at paras. 55 and 58):
" The Taxi Regulation Act 2013 envisages that a broad range of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether to grant a licence. These include, inter alia, the driving abilities of an applicant; whether the applicant has committed any relevant criminal offences; whether the applicant is of "good character"; the physical and mental health of the applicant; and whether the applicant holds a valid tax clearance certificate. This evinces a legislative intent that an applicant must not only meet technical criteria relevant to their ability to safely operate a public service vehicle, they must also be compliant with the law of the land. It would be inconsistent with this legislative intent to interpret the Act as precluding the licensing authority from having regard to the immigration status of an applicant. A non-EU national who is present in the State without the requisite immigration permission is here unlawfully. It would be anomalous were the licensing authority to be entitled to refuse to grant a licence merely because an applicant is not tax-compliant, but would be required to disregard the fact that they are present in the State unlawfully. On its proper interpretation, the statutory concept of "suitability to hold a licence" certainly allows the licensing authority to consider whether the applicant holds a current immigration permission (where required)......A finding of serious dishonesty made against an applicant is a relevant consideration in assessing whether an applicant is a "suitable person" to be licensed to drive a public service vehicle. It goes to the character of the applicant. The legislative intent underlying the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 is to ensure that only individuals of "good character" are permitted to operate public service vehicles. The licensing authority is entitled to rely on the finding notwithstanding that it is subject to a review process. The first-instance decision represents a red flag and the appropriate balance is struck by refusing to grant an SPSV driver's licence until such time, if any, as the initial finding of dishonesty is set aside. It would be disproportionate—and contrary to the legislative intent of ensuring public safety by confining licences to those of "good character"—to oblige the licensing authority to disregard the finding and to grant a licence in the interim."
37. In Rahman, the Court accepted that the wording of s. 10 was so broad in nature that matter unspecified in the section, could be taken into account in assessing "suitability" given the legislative intent in ensuring public safety. I am similarly of the view that the fact that the Applicant had been prosecuted but acquitted of a sexual offence was a relevant consideration under s. 10(2) of the 2013 Act. The fact alone that a serious complaint was made gives rise to a concern which requires to be considered when it gives rise to an issue of public safety and the safety of vulnerable persons. As stated by the High Court in McKenna v. Commissioner of An Garda Siochána [2023] IEHC 437 (at para. 19), the Licensing Authority is entitled to be concerned with public safety.
"In broad terms, it seems to me that the purpose of the Act of 2013 is to provide a statutory framework to protect the interests and safety of members of the public who avail of the services provided by holders of SPSV licences. Hence the concern over the applicant having prior criminal convictions."
38. It was not only open to the Licensing Authority to require to be satisfied that the fact of the previous complaint of sexual assault did not mean that the Applicant was not a suitable person, in my view the Licensing Authority was under a statutory duty to be so satisfied. Accordingly, the Licensing Authority is entitled to have regard to the fact of a previous complaint, prosecution and acquittal because it was obliged by statute to ensure that the Applicant was "suitable". It was necessary that any decision on this question of suitability be informed by the fact that a serious and relevant complaint had been made following an assessment of the facts and circumstances of the complaint. This requirement arises notwithstanding the fact of an acquittal on the criminal charges by the jury as acquittal on criminal charges does not necessarily mean that a basis for concern no longer exists. The level of concern remaining where an acquittal has occurred requires separate assessment in the context of a taxi licensing application. It is clear that a concern may arise warranting refusal of a taxi licence based on the evidence led at trial, notwithstanding that evidence sufficient to establish guilt on a criminal law standard of beyond reasonable doubt did not exist.
39. It is the function of the Licensing Authority to ensure that if a taxi licence is granted, public safety is not put at risk. Therefore, to contend that the Licensing Authority took into account irrelevant matters, as the Applicant does, is misconceived. This flawed contention represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the licensing function under the 2013 Act.
40. As for the Applicant's contention that refusal of a licence constitutes a disproportionate interference with his right to earn a livelihood in view of his acquittal on charges arising from the complaint in question, a contention not pressed in any serious manner before me, it bears emphasis that the Applicant had no entitlement to a taxi licence. His only entitlement was to have his application determined in accordance with law. It is not disproportionate to refuse a taxi licence based on public safety concerns provided the concerns are rational, reasonable and justified having regard to the material before the decision-maker.
41. The test for irrationality and unreasonableness was recently summarised in Burke v. Minister for Education and Skills [2022] IESC 1, [2022] ILRM 73 (Charleton J.) at para. 15 as follows:
"As to whether a decision of a tribunal or of an administrative body is reasonable has become an independent ground in addition to jurisdiction and a fair approach to adjudication. Essentially, a decision must not be so devoid of sense as to fly in the face of calculable reason; State (Keegan) v Stardust Tribunal[1986] 1 IR 642, O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála[1993] 1 IR 39, and this includes that the proportionality of the decision may make it reasonable; Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform[2010] 2 IR 701 at [171]. Another way of expressing the concept is that no reasonable tribunal or administrative authority could come to the impugned decision. That separate ground, however, is historically derived from a fundamental administrative law principle that tribunals and instruments of administration are not set up to act unreasonably. This principle is of wide-ranging embrace and includes, for instance, a requirement that arrest powers be based on rational, though not necessarily extensive, suspicion. Thus, an irrational decision, carrying a definite flavour of repellence to reason and to balance, exceeds jurisdiction and may consequently be impugned by judicial review. "
42. In the present case, the evidence is that the Licensing Authority wished to discuss the circumstances surrounding the sexual assault and asked the Applicant to give his version of events. In this way, the Licensing Authority attempted to investigate its concerns arising from the fact of the complaint of sexual assault as I am satisfied it was entitled to do.
43. Although clearly aware that the Applicant had been acquitted, the Licensing Authority was also conscious that the fact that the Applicant had been found not guilty on a criminal standard of proof did not mean that he was a suitable person and that no evidence of risk existed. This was explained during the interview with the Applicant. This was an entirely correct position for the Licensing Authority to adopt given the onerous duty on it as decision-maker to be satisfied as to the Applicant's suitability. Afterall, this was not a case of no evidence of wrongdoing. Indeed, as pointed out during the hearing before me, this case was not dismissed by a judge at the close of the evidence but was allowed to go to the jury (not once but twice). Recalling that the Applicant was legally advised for the criminal trial, it may be assumed that the matter went to the jury (for a second time) on the basis that there was evidence which, if accepted by the jury, could support a guilty verdict.
44. The Licensing Authority has provided clear, uncontroverted evidence that the Applicant failed to address its concerns. Instead, the Licensing Authority contends that the Applicant was aggressive and annoyed and refused to engage with the questioning. The assessment of concerns and the weighing of the appropriateness of the Applicant's response thereto was clearly a matter for the decision-maker.
45. In adopting a position adverse to discussing the events occurring in December, 2017, leading to his prosecution and ultimate acquittal, the Applicant failed to appreciate the nature of the distinct legal process in train with regard to assessment of suitability for a taxi licence. His apparent aversion to further discussing the events leading to his prosecution, conviction and acquittal on a retrial, having served part of a custodial sentence, is understandable from a human perspective but given that the Applicant was seeking to satisfy the Licensing Authority as to his suitability under s. 10 of the 2013 Act, it was clearly necessary for the Applicant to properly engage with the process. He was wrong not to do so. It was not open to him to simply refuse to revisit the complaint made against him with the Licensing Authority and expect that this would not weigh against him in the licensing decision. The Applicant's belief that the previous allegation was irrelevant was seriously mistaken.
46. The Licensing Authority's position in the face of a lack of any proper engagement in relation to his concerns predicated on the Applicant's mistaken belief that the Licensing Authority was simply not entitled to have regard to the allegations made given that he had been acquitted, was difficult. While it was accepted that the Applicant had been acquitted in respect of the charges of sexual assault following a re-trial (albeit without expressly referring to this fact in his decision letter), in circumstances where the Applicant would not engage in any discussion concerning the events, or the circumstances leading up to those events, in a way that would assist the Licensing Authority in determining his "suitability" under the 2013 Act, it is hardly surprising that the Licensing Authority remained concerned that it could not be satisfied as to his suitability, particularly if it did not have access to the Applicant's version of events as previously given during the criminal trial.
47. I am satisfied that where the decision-maker was not provided with any or any proper explanations by the Applicant upon due and proper enquiry and where assurances in relation to his conduct were not forthcoming, then the Licensing Authority was entitled to conclude that it could not be satisfied as to the Applicant's suitability to drive vulnerable member of the public. This was not therefore an unreasonable and irrational refusal merely because the Applicant had been acquitted on charges relating to the complaint which gave rise to concern. The existence of such a complaint was relevant and capable, subject to a proper assessment of the facts and circumstances, of justifying a refusal of a taxi licence.
48. While it is a notable feature of the letter communicating the decision to refuse that no reference was made to the fact of the acquittal and the Licensing Authority did not elaborate on why it was that the complaint of sexual assault remained a concern notwithstanding that the Applicant had been acquitted, it is clear from the record of the interview that the Licensing Authority was fully aware of the fact that the Applicant had been acquitted. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Licensing Authority erred in failing to consider this relevant fact even though no reference was made to the acquittal in the brief statement of reasons provided. As already noted, the decision is not challenged as being inadequately reasoned, even though additional reasoning referrable to demeanour and attitude have been provided in a replying filed on behalf of the Respondents in these proceedings.
49. In the absence of any appropriate engagement by the Applicant to address concerns properly raised, the Licensing Authority was entitled to refuse the application. I am satisfied that the Applicant falls well short of demonstrating that the refusal of a taxi licence in the face of his non-engagement with the Licensing Authority in respect of concerns as to his suitability was unreasonable in law. Provided the decision-making process was sufficiently robust and procedurally fair (the issue to which I next turn), it cannot be concluded that the decision to refuse is unsustainable as unreasonable in all the circumstances of this case where identified concerns were not engaged with in any material way.
Whether Failure to Disclose Material a breach of Requirements of Constitutional Justice
50. On behalf of the Licensing Authority, I am urged not to determine this element of the claim made on behalf of the Applicant on the basis that it goes outside the terms of the leave granted. Indeed, this part of the Applicant's complaint was not addressed in the written submissions filed on behalf of the Licensing Authority, presumably because it is not accepted that it is comprised in the claim made in these proceedings.
51. I cannot accept this submission on behalf of the Licensing Authority in circumstances where it is clearly pleaded at paragraph 15 of the Statement of Grounds that the Applicant was not aware of what material and information was before the Licensing Authority regarding the allegation of sexual assault which was the subject of the criminal proceedings and the further plea at paragraph 17 of the Statement of Grounds that the Licensing Authority did not afford the Applicant a proper opportunity to address whatever materials were being considered. These two pleas culminated in a final plea at paragraph 20 that the way the decision to refuse the taxi licence was arrived at was in breach of natural and constitutional justice and/or fair procedures.
52. Furthermore, this ground of complaint is supported factually by the Applicant's averment at paragraph 20 of his grounding affidavit that he was not aware of what materials were considered by the Licensing Authority regarding the allegation. At paragraph 21 of his grounding affidavit, he further averred that he would have to:
"...assume that he was furnished with documents arising from the criminal investigation and trial process, but I do not know what they were or how he dealt with them."
53. In addition, at paragraph 15 of the written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant in seeking leave to proceed by way of judicial review, it was stated:
"....the First Named Respondent did not afford the Applicant a proper opportunity to address whatever materials were being considered by the First Named Respondent in that regard."
54. It seems to me that based on the pleaded grounds and the case for which leave to proceed by way of judicial review was granted that the complaint made that the failure to disclose material before the decision-maker was in breach of the requirements of constitutional justice is properly before me for determination.
55. The only documents exhibited by the Licensing Authority in opposing these proceedings in respect of the complaint of sexual assault made against the Applicant were copy statements taken from the injured party dated the 25th of December, 2017, and the 11th of April, 2019, and a copy of the 25th of December, 2017, "Memo of Interview" with the Applicant as part of the criminal investigation. Of note, the Licensing Authority does not confirm on affidavit in express terms that this was the only material considered, despite the averments made by the Applicant raising a query as to what information was before the decision-maker.
56. In a further affidavit from the Applicant sworn on the 28th of November, 2024 (at paragraph 5), the Applicant said:
"At no stage did the First Respondent indicate how he had obtained this "one side of the events", nor did he provide an account of the events in question. Further, he did not refer to any material relating to the events in question or the charges on which I had been acquitted. Noting that the First Respondent exhibits (as part of exhibit XX to the replying affidavit) statements taken as part of the criminal investigation, and a memorandum of an interview of me by the investigating gardai, it seems that the First Respondent was basing his position, and the decision which he ultimately arrived at, on the contents of these documents."
57. The Applicant added that he was not asked to comment on these documents during interview, nor was he aware that they were to be considered as part of the concerns raised by the Licensing Authority in relation to his suitability as a candidate for a taxi licence. Although the Licensing Authority could have sought to reply to these averments by the Applicant if it were the case that he had relied on other material or if he had in fact provided an account of the events in question to the Applicant during interview, he did not do so.
58. It is indeed clear from the record of the interview exhibited in these proceedings that the Licensing Authority gave the Applicant an opportunity to discuss the circumstances surrounding the incident giving rise to the charges and acquittal and asked the Applicant to give his version of events, indicating that he only had one side of the events. While endeavouring to be fair to the Applicant by explaining that the Licensing Authority was obliged to make an assessment of his suitability to hold a taxi licence and that in order to do so it was necessary to discuss any concerns which might arise from the fact that a complaint of sexual assault had been made and get his description of events, the Licensing Authority did not specify what information it had before it. In response, the Applicant declined to discuss the matter with the Licensing Authority much beyond stating that he had been "proven innocent." The Applicant adopted this position even though the Licensing Authority explained the differences between an acquittal of the charges brought and a finding of innocence. Plainly, this was because he fundamentally and wrongly objected to the matter of the alleged sexual assault being raised with him again.
59. While the Licensing Authority was entirely correct to require the Applicant to satisfy it as to his suitability having regard to the complaint made even though he had been acquitted on the ensuing charge, the process which ensued was in my view less than perfect in an important respect, namely the failure to put the Applicant on notice of the material before the Licensing Authority. The concept of fair procedures is well established and was outlined by the Supreme Court in Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 IR 297 as follows at p. 316:
"[T]he general principles of natural and constitutional justice comprise a number of individual aspects of the protection of due process. The obligation to give fair notice and, possibly, to provide access to information or, in some cases, to have a hearing are intimately interrelated and the obligation to give reasons is sometimes merely one part of the process. The overarching principle is that persons affected by administrative decisions should have access to justice, that they should have the right to seek the protection of the courts in order to see that the rule of law has been observed, that fair procedures have been applied and that their rights are not unfairly infringed."
60. The right to know the information to which the decision-maker has had regard is included in the concept of fair procedures. In J&E Davy v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2008] IEHC 256, [2008] 2 ILRM 507 the Court stated (at para. 50):
"(W]here submissions [are] requested of the argument as to right and wrong, there is no need to exchange such arguments. The parties can make whatever arguments they wish. By contrast, where any factual material is presented that may fairly be said to be of influence to adjudication, the respondent to a complaint must be able to reply".
61. What amounts to relevant material which requires to be disclosed will depend on the circumstances of a particular case. Fundamentally what matters is that the affected person knows the basis for concern so that a fair opportunity is given to address it. When the concern is based on material, notice of what is before the decision-maker should be given in a manner sufficient to enable the affected person to address the concern either directly and/or by referring to other relevant material not already before the decision maker. There are several different ways the Licensing Authority could have satisfied the requirements of fair procedures in this case. It was not necessarily required that the documents held on file be furnished to the Applicant, if the Applicant knew what was alleged and the material relied upon by the Licensing Authority's in considering concerns emanating from the criminal complaint.
62. This is a finely balanced case. The tone of the correspondence issued on behalf of the Applicant by his legal representatives was, in my view, misjudged in circumstances where the Licensing Authority had not yet decided to refuse the application but had afforded an opportunity to make submissions in respect of the grounds of concern identified as supporting a decision to refuse. The Applicant's solicitor could be criticized for not requesting a copy of the material relied upon by the Licensing Authority in forming the intention to refuse as notified when asking for a record of the meeting in circumstances where complaint is made in these proceedings that the Applicant did not know what material was before the Licensing Authority and where it has subsequently emerged that the material was limited.
63. The Applicant's solicitor neither provided a copy of the judgment of the Court of Appeal or referred the Licensing Authority to the transcript of the trial(s), including the transcript of the Applicant's evidence nor otherwise sought to establish whether the Licensing Authority had access to this material and had considered it, as he might have done. While the Applicant was not expressly made aware that the Licensing Authority did not have his testimony given at trial, some might take the view that the inference was clear that if the Licensing Authority had "one side" of events, this was likely based on the complainant's statement(s) only, a matter which could be clarified in correspondence. A proper degree of engagement on the part of the Applicant through appropriate enquiries in relation to what the Licensing Authority's concerns were based on and what material had been considered, could have allowed matters to be clarified. To a significant extent the approach adopted on behalf of the Applicant contributed to a decision being made without any regard to the Applicant's substantive response to the complaint. It is regrettable that the Applicant, who after the interview had the benefit of legal advice, did not engage appropriately with the process to clarify matters. This is a factor which impacts on the exercise of discretion to grant or refuse relief by way of judicial review.
64. Whilst there is force to the contention that the comment regarding "one side" should have been sufficient to put the Applicant, legally advised, on enquiry as to whether the Licensing Authority was even aware that he had given evidence at trial and had access to the record of his testimony and the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in quashing his conviction and although the Applicant certainly contributed to the state of affairs by an ill-advised and misjudged lack of engagement, I am not sufficiently reassured that the outcome of the decision-making process was fair and is legally sustainable.
65. It is too much in my view to expect the Applicant to deduce from the "one-sided" comment that the Licensing Authority only had the Complainant's complaints (and, as it transpires the memorandum of interview in which the Applicant largely exercised his right to silence) but not the record of his testimony at trial, given that the Gardaí were also, in the normal way, involved in the criminal trial. In those circumstances, the Licensing Authority might be expected by the Applicant, albeit incorrectly, to have access to a complete file in a dual role of investigating and licensing authorities.
66. From a fair procedures or constitutional justice perspective, it weighs heavily in my assessment of the facts and circumstances presenting that in the case of a criminal complaint which does not culminate in conviction, any evidence offered by the Applicant in response to the complaint either at interview (minimal in this case) or in evidence at trial (where, as in this case, the Applicant gave evidence on oath and was available for cross-examination on his evidence) has an obvious relevance when it comes to assessing suitability from a public safety perspective to hold a taxi licence. This evidence should properly be considered, if available.
67. By not specifying the material being relied upon in a manner which would have alerted the Applicant to the fact that the Licensing Authority's information was perhaps incomplete both explaining to some extent why the matter was being revisited and alerting the Applicant to the absence of relevant material, it seems to me that the Licensing Authority fell into error giving rise to potential unfairness in the process leading to his decision where the material not before the Licensing Authority was so plainly relevant.
68. Had the Applicant been clearly on notice that the material available to the Licensing Authority was limited, he would have at least had the opportunity of referring to additional material which might have served to alleviate the Licensing Authority's concerns. In this case, specifying the material relied upon (in circumstances where the Applicant would previously have been provided with a Book of Evidence and had participated in the criminal trial) alone would have served to put the Applicant on notice that not all potentially relevant information from the trial process was before the Licensing Authority. This would have afforded the Applicant the opportunity to provide additional material or, at his own election, to not do so.
69. Indeed, knowing that the Licensing Authority was not aware of the account he had given at trial in his oral testimony, might potentially have prompted the Applicant to engage more openly with the Licensing Authority by repeating what he had already said in evidence during the interview process.
70. I am far from blind to the fact that the biggest impediment to the Applicant simply presenting his account again when asked by the Licensing Authority to give his account of what occurred was his own incorrect and misguided view that the complaint was no longer relevant because he had been acquitted. There is a difference, however, between being asked to give an account because the decision-maker does not know what one previously said or even that one previously said anything at all (which suggests an open mind and makes clear the different roles of licensing authority and investigating agency) and being asked to give an account in circumstances where you perceive that you are being asked questions that you have already addressed because your previous answers are being questioned (which might suggest that previous answers are not accepted and the matter is still under investigation). The failure to put the Applicant on notice of the material available to the Licensing Authority, compounded by the failure to establish what material was before the Licensing Authority by solicitors acting on his behalf, meant that the Applicant could not make a properly informed decision as to what additional information he could give the Licensing Authority to alleviate concerns arising.
71. Despite my misgivings arising from the lack of proper engagement on the part of the Applicant with the process, I am satisfied that the Licensing Authority should have gone further than merely tell the Applicant it had concerns with reference to the fact that a complaint of sexual assault had been made and it had only "one-side" and wanted to hear his side. It should properly have identified to the Applicant the material before the Licensing Authority giving rise to these concerns.
72. Despite his clear effort to be fair to the Applicant in the face of the Applicant's unhelpful attitude, by not putting the Applicant on notice of the material relied upon in a sufficiently clear and transparent manner, in my view the Licensing Authority qua statutory decision-maker did not provide a sufficiently robust and fair process from a procedural perspective. It was not made clear to the Applicant, as it should have been, that the materials available to the Licensing Authority did not extend beyond the complainant's statements and the memorandum of interview in which the Applicant relied in the most part of his right to silence.
73. I have grappled with the fact that it is not improbable that had the Applicant been on notice of the material before the decision maker that he would still have refused to engage further with concerns emanating from the complaint of sexual assault on the asserted basis that the Licensing Authority was not entitled to look behind the acquittal. Had the Applicant been notified of the material being relied upon either by the Licensing Authority expressly referring to it (in circumstances where it would in the normal course have already been served on him as part of a book of evidence) or providing copies, then the Applicant's lack of engagement would certainly be held against him in any challenge to the fairness of the Licensing Authority's subsequent decision. Although there is more than a mere possibility that the Applicant would have maintained his wrong-headed position that further enquiry was irrelevant and impermissible even if made aware of just how limited the material available to the Licensing Authority was, this cannot be certain. There is a real possibility that properly on notice of the extent of the material and with the benefit of appropriate legal advice the Applicant would have referred the Licensing Authority to additional relevant material (most particularly the evidence given at trial).
74. Accordingly, I have concluded that the failure to safeguard the fairness of the process by ensuring proper notice of the material before the Licensing Authority has rendered the subsequent decision legally unsafe.
75. Although it would be open to me to refuse relief by way of judicial review on discretionary grounds because of a lack of proper engagement with the process on the part of the Applicant and a failure on his behalf to establish what material was before the Licensing Authority, I have decided that in the circumstances of this case, it was for the Licensing Authority to safeguard the fairness of the process by ensuring that the Applicant had proper notice of matters weighing against him on an assessment of his suitability to afford him a fair opportunity to respond. Insofar as the Applicant's lack of proper engagement is concerned and falls to be weighed as a factor in the exercise of discretion, I am influenced by the fact (apparent from the record of the meeting) that the Applicant was personally impacted by the fact that a sexual offence for which he had been acquitted, having already served time in custody, was again being raised with him by a member of the Gardaí, albeit as Licensing Authority and not investigating and prosecuting authority. In the circumstances, some latitude should be allowed for an impaired ability on the part of the Applicant to appreciate why the Licensing Authority was required to consider the issue again.
76. As the primary responsibility for safeguarding procedural fairness in the decision-making process lies with the Licensing Authority and as there are mitigating circumstances which excuse to some extent the lack of proper engagement by the Applicant, I have decided that I should not exercise a discretion to refuse relief by reason of a lack of proper engagement on the part of the Applicant.
Appropriate Alternative Remedy
77. It is contended on behalf of the Licensing Authority that where the Applicant is aggrieved by the decision to refuse a taxi licence, he has a statutory right of appeal to the District Court. It is maintained that the District Court could hear evidence and reach its own determination on the suitability of the Applicant to hold a taxi licence, thereby curing any defect in the earlier decision-making process. I am referred to the recent decision in Tracey v. Garda Commissioner [2025] IEHC 234 (Bolger J.), a case involving a challenge to a refusal of a firearms licence. In that case, the Applicant failed to bring a statutory appeal claiming that he would not receive fairness in the District Court, that the decision of the Superintendent was irrational and that accordingly judicial review was appropriate. It was found that there was no evidence that the Applicant would not receive a proper hearing in the District Court and this was more appropriate as it would be more extensive, with a right to cross examine etc. It is submitted on behalf of the Licensing Authority that this decision is binding on me in circumstances where it is contended that these proceedings similarly constitute a merits-based challenge.
78. I am further referred to F.D. v. Chief Appeal Officer [2023] IECA 123 where the issue of whether the applicant ought not to have proceeded by way of judicial review where she had an alternative appeal mechanism open to her arose. Relevant case-law is helpfully reviewed by the Court of Appeal (Donnelly J.) [paras. 35 -44]. At para. 44 it was stated:
"Common sense dictates that applicants for social benefits/allowances ought to use the very wide provisions in the Act which are intended to ensure that potentially qualifying applicants would not be excluded on narrow or technical grounds. The power of revision is as broad as it could possibly be. In an appropriate case, it will permit a decision not to provide for an oral hearing to be reversed and it can accommodate an oral hearing itself. All matters that could be raised on appeal can be dealt with there. This is not the same as a loss of the possibility of first instance fair procedures. In effect this is a continuation of the entire process which is designed to be fair to applicants......................"
79. It is contended on behalf of the Licensing Authority that the Applicant, aggrieved by the assessment of his suitability, is engaged in a merit-based appeal through the medium of judicial review and that such a merits based challenge is far more suited to the wide-ranging appeal process provided for by s. 13 of the 2013 Act which allows the District Court to step into the shoes of the decision-maker and arrive at a different decision. It is pointed out that by appealing the decision, the Applicant would have an opportunity to provide evidence to the Court to satisfy the Court to his "suitability" and would have an opportunity to cross examine and to be cross examined in a process which cures any alleged unfairness.
80. The issue of alternative remedy also arose in the case of O'Neill v. D.P.P. [2025] IEHC 8. However, that case involved a criminal prosecution and the parties agree that it was a case decided on its own facts. It was found (Simons J.) that that it was one of the "truly exceptional cases where judicial review is the appropriate remedy" notwithstanding the availability of an appeal as in that case, by undertaking a hostile cross examination of an accused, the trial judge had denied the accused the benefit of a fair trial in accordance with law.
81. For his part, the Applicant contends that he is entitled to a fair process, both at first instance and on appeal. He relies on the decision in Ingle v O'Brien [1975] 109 ILTR 7 where it was held (Pringle J.) that the lack of natural justice in the first instance was not remedied by a sufficiency of natural justice on the hearing of an appeal. The Court in Ingle referred with approval to the statement of Megarry J. in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] 1 Ch. 34, as follows:
"whilst a complete rehearing by an original tribunal, or by some other body competent to decide an issue, might satisfy the requirements of natural justice, a plaintiff, where there was a right of appeal from an original decision, was entitled to natural justice both before the original tribunal and the appellate tribunal. At page 49 the learned Judge said: "If a man has never had a fair trial by the appropriate trial body, is it open to an appellate body to discard its appellate functions and itself give the man the fair trial that he has never had? I very much doubt the existence of any such doctrine' and again on the same page he said: "As a general rule at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body." I agree with this statement of the law. I am satisfied that the decision of Superintendent O'Brien in this case is null and void for the reason that the applicant was given no opportunity to be heard as to why such a decision should not be made."
82. It seems to me that the Licensing Authority's submission that an appeal represents an adequate alternative remedy, is predicated on the premise that there was no denial of fair procedures to the Applicant in the first instance decision or that any unfairness may be cured. In the light of my conclusion that there was a want of procedural fairness arising from the failure to specify what material was relied upon in the decision-making process, this premise is not accepted. This case falls to be distinguished from Tracey where it was found that the applicant has not made even an arguable case of a fundamental breach of fair procedures or a lack of jurisdiction such as to bring it within the exceptions to the rule of exhausting alternative remedies as identified by the Court of Appeal.
83. In the light of my finding of procedural frailty in the first instance decision, it seems to me that this case is more closely aligned with those cases in which it has been found that proceeding by way of judicial review rather than a statutory appeal may be considered more appropriate. Such cases were identified by Clarke J. in E.M.I. Records v. Data Protection Commissioner [2013] IESC 34, [2014] 1 ILRM 225, citing the dicta of Denham J. in Stefan v. Minister for Justice [2001] 4 IR 203, as including cases in which the aggrieved party alleges that they were deprived of the reality of a proper consideration of the issues such that confining them to an appeal would be in truth depriving them of their entitlement to two hearings (para. 4.9).
84. It is recalled that it was only upon the filing of opposition papers that the limits of the material before the Licensing Authority was disclosed. Had this emerged for the first time at the hearing of an appeal before the District Court, the Applicant might well have been unfairly taken short by the lack of notice in a manner which undermined his right to an effective or timely appeal. The provision of late notice could have resulted in a significant litigation disadvantage. For example, the fact that information as to what material was before the Licensing Authority was not known in advance could potentially have deprived the Applicant of an opportunity to adduce evidence in relation to the trial and the case he presented before the jury resulting in his acquittal at the appeal hearing before the District Court. Although the District Court could have adjourned proceedings to cure any apparent unfairness, even the fact of embarking on an appeal hearing without full information and the delay occasioned by a forced adjournment arising from late notice of the basis for the decision under appeal, are undermining of the Applicant's rights in the appeal process.
85. It seems to me that this case falls within the scope of the principle established by the dictum in Ingle. Insofar as the Applicant has established an entitlement to relief in these proceedings, it is not by reference to the merits of his underlying application but because of an identified procedural irregularity in the process culminating in that decision, which irregularity also impacted on the conduct of the appeal, its efficacy and timeliness.
86. Having carefully considered the presence of the alternative remedy of an appeal process, I am satisfied that I retain a discretionary jurisdiction, as contemplated by Clarke J. in E.M.I. Records, to grant relief by way of judicial review to achieve a "just solution". The Applicant is entitled to exercise his right of appeal in the knowledge of the material considered by the decision-maker, the better to understand the basis for the decision and to challenge it effectively. As I have concluded that the original decision was flawed because it was not made in accordance with constitutional justice principles where this material was not identified to the Applicant as it should have been, I would not hold the Applicant precluded on discretionary grounds from seeking to judicially review the decision notwithstanding that an appeal lay to the District Court but was not availed of.
CONCLUSION
87. Acquittal in a criminal trial does not equate to an absence of evidence of risk or mean that the existence of a criminal complaint is irrelevant to an assessment of suitability to hold a taxi licence under the 2013 Act. Were it the case that proper notice had been given but despite this the Applicant refused to engage constructively with the Licensing Authority, then any challenge to a decision on the basis that Licensing Authority had erred by deciding that it was not satisfied as to the Applicant's suitability because he had been the subject of a criminal complaint, albeit acquitted, would be likely to fail absent demonstrable unreasonableness having regard to the material before the Licensing Authority.
88. The Applicant is entirely wrong in law to maintain that the Licensing Authority is not entitled to have regard to the fact that a criminal complaint had been made against him resulting in a prosecution and ultimate acquittal. Both the fact of a criminal complaint and ultimate acquittal following a criminal process are relevant considerations which the Licensing Authority is entitled to consider. The Applicant is, however, entitled as a matter of constitutional fair procedures to know the material available to the Licensing Authority in relation to its concerns so that he can produce any additional, relevant material which may assist him in establishing his suitability for the issue of a taxi licence.
89. As it cannot be said with certainty that the Applicant, equipped with knowledge in relation to the incomplete nature of the material available to the Licensing Authority, would not have engaged at least to the extent of referring the Licensing Authority both to the decision of the Court of Appeal (which is publicly available) and to the evidence he gave at trial which resulted in his acquittal (the transcript of which should be either within the possession of or power of procurement of the Applicant and/or the prosecution authorities), I am left with a level of concern about the fairness of the process sufficient to warrant quashing the decision to refuse the taxi licence and remitting it for fresh consideration, despite my misgivings as to the Applicant's conduct during the process and his misguided attitude to the Licensing Authority's remit.
90. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is only when the Applicant is properly appraised of the materials relied upon in the negative decision the better to understand why his application has been refused and how his case might be strengthened on a further hearing on the merits, that he has sufficient information to enable him to effectively exercise his right of appeal. Accordingly, I do not find that he should be refused relief in these proceedings by reason of his failure to exhaust an alternative, appropriate remedy. The Applicant is entitled to both a fair process at first instance and on appeal and his rights on appeal require that he be properly on notice of the material relied upon in the decision-making process culminating in a refusal against which he wishes to appeal.
91. For these reasons, I will make an order of certiorari in the terms of paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion quashing the decision of the 7th of November, 2023, to refuse a taxi licence to the Applicant. I will hear the parties in relation to any other consequential matters not agreed and the within proceedings will be listed for mention following the expiry of fourteen days from the day of electronic delivery of this judgment for this purpose.