APPROVED                                                             [2025] IEHC 114

 

 

 

 

The High Court

judicial review

 

2024 1176 JR

 

BETWEEN

 

 

McE.

 

APPLICANT

 

 

AND

 

 

CHIEF APPEALS OFFICER

SOCIAL WELFARE APPEALS OFFICE

MINISTER FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION

 

 

RESPONDENTS

 

 

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 28 February 2025

 

 

Introduction

1.             This judgment is delivered in respect of an ex parte application for leave to apply for judicial review.  The proceedings seek to set aside a social welfare decision made by the chief appeals officer.  The principal issue addressed in this judgment is whether the impugned decision is amenable to the statutory appeal to the High Court provided under section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  If so, then leave to apply for judicial review might properly be refused on the grounds that there is an adequate alternative remedy available to the Applicant. 

 

 

Legislative framework

2.             These judicial review proceedings concern a claim for a form of social welfare benefit known as "domiciliary care allowance".  This benefit takes the form of a monthly payment to the carer of a child with a severe disability.  The eligibility criteria are prescribed under Chapter 8A of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  The principal criteria are prescribed as follows under section 186C of the Act:

(a)     the child has a severe disability requiring continual or continuous care and attention substantially in excess of the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age, and

(b)     the level of disability caused by that severe disability is such that the child is likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months.

3.             The Supreme Court has held, in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2023] IESC 25, that eligibility must be assessed as of the date of the making of the application for domiciliary care allowance.  This is so even in the case of an appeal or a revision of an appeals officer's decision.  In each instance, the index date is the date of the making of the application for domiciliary care allowance (not the later date of the appeal or revision).  The Supreme Court held (at paragraph 56) that a change in circumstances must now trigger a new claim for benefit rather than the revision of an earlier claim.

4.             The practical consequence of this is that, in cases where the child has been diagnosed with a severe disability on the basis of an assessment carried out subsequent to the date of the application, the claimant should submit a fresh application rather than seek to pursue an appeal or revision or judicial review proceedings. 

5.             The decision-making procedures are prescribed under Part 10 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  The legislation provides for two tiers of decision-making.  The first-instance decision is made by a deciding officer.  Thereafter, there is a right of appeal.  Section 311(3) provides that an appeals officer shall not be confined to the grounds on which the decision of the deciding officer was based, but may decide the question as if it were being decided for the first time.

6.             Appeals are generally determined by appeals officers, but there is also a formal right to refer any particular appeal decision to the chief appeals officer (section 318).  The legislation also provides a right of appeal on a question of law to the High Court (section 327).

7.             The striking feature of the legislation is that provision is made for the "revision" of both the first-instance decision and the decision of the appeals officer.  In effect, a claimant who is dissatisfied with the decision can request same to be revisited.  This has the practical consequence that a decision by an appeals officer is not necessarily an end of the matter.  The Court of Appeal has held that a claimant may be required to exhaust their right to seek a revision before having recourse to the High Court: F.D. v. Chief Appeals Officer [2023] IECA 123.

8.             The Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides (at section 300A) for the preparation of a written opinion by a medical assessor appointed by the Department of Social Protection.  A medical assessor is required (a) to assess all information provided to him or her in respect of an application for domiciliary care allowance, and (b) to provide an opinion on the question of whether the child satisfies the principal eligibility criteria.  It is expressly provided that a deciding officer shall "have regard to" the opinion of the medical assessor.  As discussed below at paragraph 42 and onwards, an issue arises as to whether it is permissible for an appeals officer to have regard to the opinion.

9.             It may be helpful to the reader to highlight two further aspects of the appeals process as follows.  The Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 1998 (S.I. No. 108 of 1998) (as amended) make provision for certain information to be furnished to the appeals officer.  This is provided for under article 10 (as substituted by the Social Welfare (Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 505 of 2011)):

"In the case of an appeal against the decision of a deciding officer or the determination of a designated person under section 311, the Chief Appeals Officer shall cause notice of the appeal to be sent to the Minister who shall, as soon as may be, furnish to the Chief Appeals Officer—

 

(a)        a statement from the deciding officer or the designated person or on his or her behalf showing the extent to which the facts and contentions advanced by the appellant are admitted or disputed, and

 

(b)        any information, document or item in the power or control of the deciding officer or the designated person, as the case may be, that is relevant to the appeal."

 

10.         The Regulations also make provision for the possibility of an oral hearing as follows.  Article 13 provides that where the appeals officer is of the opinion that the case is of such a nature that it can properly be determined without a hearing, he or she may determine the appeal summarily.  (This is subject to a proviso that the Minister can direct an oral hearing).

11.         For completeness, it should be noted that new regulations, the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 2024, will come into force on 28 April 2025.

 

 

Procedural history

12.         The Applicant submitted a claim for domiciliary care allowance in relation to her son (hereinafter "the child" to preserve privacy).  The application form is dated 23 November 2022.  As of that date, the child had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder ("ASD").  The child's general practitioner filled in the medical report part of the form on 12 December 2022.  The completed form seems to have been received by the Department of Social Protection on 6 January 2023.

13.         The medical assessor's opinion is dated 20 January 2023 and, in relevant part, reads as follows:

"I have carefully reviewed all the available medical evidence regarding [the child] who is a 4 year old boy.  The GP reports in the Part 6 Medical Report that [the child] was seen by an educational psychologist and occupational therapist and has been diagnosed with ASD.  There is no ASD diagnostic report scanned with this application.  There are no hospital inpatient admissions recorded in the Part 7 Medical Report. [The child] is not attending any hospital specialists and is not on any prescribed medication.

 

Restrictions recorded by the GP on the ability profile in the Part 7 Medical Report are noted.  I have also read and noted Part 4 of the DCA application form where [the child's] mother has outlined her concerns in relation to [the child] and the care he requires.

 

I have carefully read all the attached letters/reports with this application which are as follows:

 

1).        2 letters from Early Intervention Team/CDNT dated 19/04/2021 stating that [the child] is on the CDNT waiting list.

 

2).        HSE Head of Service Disability letter to parents dated 27/08/2021.

 

3).        Assessment Report from Assessment of Need dated 31/03/2021.  This report states that [the child] has a moderate to severe restriction in social communication, a moderate restriction in communication, and a mild restriction in learning and has been referred to CDNT for assessment and intervention.

 

4).        HSE Preliminary Team Assessment Summary, Ashgrove House, dated 31/03/2021.  I note from this report that [the child] was not using any functional language at that time, enjoyed non-functional play, prefers to finger feed, walks on tiptoes most of the time, his attention skills were not age-appropriate, but he was reported to be well-behaved at home and rarely had tantrums.

 

While I acknowledge that [the child] needs additional care and attention, the medical evidence currently available does not establish that the overall need for continual care and attention substantially exceeds the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age to deal with activities of daily living for a period of at least 12 months as per DCA scheme criteria.

 

An ASD diagnostic report when available for consideration would be welcome and may help to support this case.

 

This opinion has been prepared for the guidance of the Deciding Officer."

 

14.         The first-instance decision is dated 20 February 2023.  In brief, the decision was to refuse the application for domiciliary care allowance on the grounds that the evidence provided did not indicate that the level of additional support required is substantially in excess of that required by children of the same age without the child's disability nor that such additional support was likely to be required for at least 12 consecutive months.

15.         The Applicant submitted an appeal on 27 February 2023.  The social welfare appeals office subsequently notified the social welfare services office of the appeal on 11 April 2023.  This triggered a potential revision of the first-instance decision.  The Department notified the social welfare appeals office on 9 May 2023 that the deciding officer had decided that the decision should remain unchanged. 

16.         The appeals officer issued a decision on 30 August 2023 refusing the appeal.  The reasons for the decision are summarised as follows:

"Having regard to the appellant's account of [the child's] difficulties and care needs and the medical evidence provided, while I am satisfied that the evidence provided does indicate the requirement for additional care and attention, having regard to the totality of the evidence available at this time, I have concluded that it has not been established that [the child] is so severely disabled as to require continual or continuous care and attention which is substantially in excess of the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age and the level of disability caused by that severe disability is such that the child is likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months."

 

17.         The Applicant sought a review of the appeals officer's decision on 14 March 2024.  The chief appeals officer made a decision on 3 September 2024 declining to review the appeals officer's decision on the grounds that they had not erred in fact or in law in their decision. 

18.         The principal findings of the chief appeals officer can be summarised as follows.  First, it is in accordance with the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 1998 for the Department of Social Protection to include on the appeal file any evidence that was before the deciding officer where they (the Department) consider it to be relevant to the appeal.  This can include medical assessor opinions.  The chief appeals officer cites article 10 of the Regulations in support of this finding. 

19.         Second, in considering an appeal, the appeals officer will have regard to all relevant evidence including the supporting material.  This material may include reports of medical assessors.  The chief appeals officer cites section 311(3) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 in support of this finding.  The chief appeals officer attaches importance to the statutory wording: "may decide the question as if it were being decided for the first time", saying that an appeal "may" be de novo. 

20.         Third, the chief appeals officer observes that the medical assessor's opinion was only "mentioned briefly" in the list of evidence referenced and no further analysis was given.  The chief appeals officer states that there is no evidence that the appeals officer gave any particular weighting to the medical assessor's opinion: it is said rather that the appeals officer examined all of the medical evidence on file and came to a "rational and reasoned decision based on the entirety of the evidence".

21.         The chief appeals officer does not address, in terms, the appellant's argument based on the judgment of the High Court (Baker J.) in C.O'B. v. Chief Appeals Officer [2014] IEHC 485.

22.         The Applicant instituted these judicial review proceedings on 20 September 2024, i.e. within three weeks of the date of the chief appeals officer's decision. 

23.         The principal grounds of judicial review advanced are as follows.  The first ground concerns the status of the medical assessor's opinion in the context of an appeal.  It is contended that it is only the deciding officer at first instance who may rely on a medical assessor's opinion, and that an appeals officer is precluded from doing so.  This is said to follow from the wording of section 300A(3) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  It is said that the decision-making process in the present case had been "contaminated" by reliance on the medical assessor's opinion. 

24.         The second ground is advanced in the alternative.  It is said that if an appeals officer is permitted to have regard to the medical assessor's opinion, then the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 1998 envisage that there must be an oral hearing.  In particular, it is pleaded that where a claimant furnishes medical evidence from her own clinician which effectively controverted the medical assessor's opinion, then the claimant ought to be offered an oral hearing with cross-examination.  It is pleaded that, at a very minimum, a claimant is entitled to notice of intention to rely on the medical assessor's opinion and a copy of the Minister/Department's appeal submission.

25.         The ex parte application for leave initially came on for hearing on 25 November 2024.  The application was adjourned from time to time to allow the Applicant take up a copy of the medical assessor's opinion.  A supplemental affidavit was filed on 12 February 2025 which exhibits, inter alia, the medical assessor's opinion.  The Applicant had also been invited to file supplemental written legal submissions on the question of whether the chief appeals officer's decision is amenable to the statutory right of appeal.  These submissions were filed on 9 December 2024. 

26.         Counsel made further oral submissions on 13 February 2025.  Judgment was reserved to today's date.

 

 

Statutory appeal to the High Court

27.         Section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) provides as follows:

"Any person who is dissatisfied with—

 

(a)        the decision of an appeals officer, or

 

(b)        the revised decision of the Chief Appeals Officer,

 

on any question may appeal that decision or revised decision, as the case may be, to the High Court on any question of law."

 

28.         Absent some unusual limitation arising from the terms of the statute conferring the right of appeal, the presumption is that an appeal of this kind is intended to both supplant and enlarge the remedies provided for by way of an application for judicial review: Chubb European Group SE v. Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91, [2022] 2 IR 686 (at paragraph 138).

29.         The question of statutory interpretation which arises in the present proceedings is whether the right of appeal is confined to circumstances where the chief appeals officer has made a decision which modifies or reverses the decision of the appeals officer, or whether, alternatively, the right of appeal extends to circumstances where the chief appeals officer has affirmed the decision of the appeals officer.  Put shortly, should the term "revised decision" be interpreted as requiring that the outcome be different?

30.         A similar question of statutory interpretation has been addressed by the Supreme Court in McDonagh v. Chief Appeals Officer [2021] IESC 33, [2021] 1 ILRM 385.  The precise point at issue was whether a decision by a deciding officer not to revise an earlier decision was amenable to appeal under section 311 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  The Supreme Court (per Dunne J.) held that the legislature did not confine the right of appeal to the original decision of the deciding officer.  It was further held that to confine the right of appeal would not reflect the "generous and flexible" regime for challenging a decision under the Act.  It would also result in anomalies: a claimant who achieved a partial victory on an application for revision would be entitled to pursue an appeal in an attempt to secure an even better result, while a claimant who was wholly unsuccessful would have no right of appeal (paragraph 76 of the judgment).

31.         It might be thought that a similar approach to statutory interpretation should be adopted in respect of the right of appeal to the High Court under section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  It might seem anomalous that the availability of a right of appeal should be contingent on the happenstance of whether the chief appeals officer changes the appeals officer's decision in any way.  In the present case, for example, the chief appeals officer has delivered a comprehensive decision, running to some ten pages, which addresses a number of important questions of law governing the assessment of claims for domiciliary care allowance.  This is not a case, therefore, where the chief appeals officer refused, on a peremptory basis, to entertain an application to revise the decision.  Rather, the chief appeals officer embarked upon a comprehensive review of the appeals officer's decision.  It would seem surprising were a claimant, who had an unqualified right of appeal to the High Court in respect of the decision of the appeals officer, to have no right of appeal against a substantive decision of the chief appeals officer.  Different considerations might pertain had the chief appeals officer simply affirmed the appeals officer's decision without any analysis. 

32.         It seems, however, that this issue is governed by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Ltd v. Minister for Social Welfare [2004] IESC 40, [2004] 4 IR 150.  There, the appellant had purported to pursue appeals to the High Court against both (i) the decision of the appeals officer and (ii) the decision of the chief appeals officer.  It is explained in the judgment that it was only at a very late stage in the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court that that court itself adverted to the absence of a right of appeal from the chief appeals officer where he does not revise the decision of the appeals officer.  The Supreme Court held as follows (at paragraph 14 of the reported judgment):

"However, there is a more fundamental objection to the approach adopted by the High Court Judge and it is this. Although under s. 271 [of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993] an appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of an appeals officer, an appeal lies only from 'the revised decision of the chief appeals officer'.  If, as in this case, the chief appeals officer decides not to revise the decision of the appeals officer, then it would seem to me that there is no 'revised decision of the chief appeals officer' and, therefore, no right of appeal.  The Act does not appear to give any right of appeal to the High Court from the refusal of a chief appeals officer to revise a decision, though no doubt in an appropriate case there might be grounds for judicial review.  In fairness to the High Court Judge I do not think that this point was adverted to by any party in the High Court."

 

33.         The judgment in Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Ltd had been relied upon before the Supreme Court in McDonagh v. Chief Appeals Officer.  Having cited the passage above, Dunne J. stated as follows (at paragraph 72):

"S. 271 is, broadly speaking, in the same terms as s. 327 of the 2005 Act.  The only difference between the provisions has no bearing on the issues that arise in these proceedings.  There is no doubt that a distinction is drawn in s. 327 between 'a decision' of an appeals officer and 'a revised decision' of the Chief Appeals Officer in that only a 'revised decision' of the Chief Appeals Officer can be appealed to the High Court on a question of law.  Presumably, the distinction drawn between 'a decision' and 'a revised decision' must have some meaning.  Some assistance could, perhaps, be derived from the provisions of s. 327A of the 2005 Act.  As was observed by the Court of Appeal at para. 59 of its judgment, 's. 327A (1)(b) confers a unique right to the Minister to appeal a decision of the Chief Appeals Officer 'not to revise' the first mentioned decision to the High Court on a question of law. Thus, an express right is conferred by that section on the Minister to appeal against such a decision.  Such a right is not conferred on any other party, thereby excluding any other party from such an appeal.'  This led the Court of Appeal to conclude that having regard to a consideration of Part 10 of the Act as a whole, there is a distinction between a 'revised decision' and a 'decision not to revise a decision'.  I do not disagree with the proposition that there is a distinction between a revised decision and a decision but it is also interesting to note the express reference in s. 327A to a decision not to revise a decision."

 

34.         It may be of assistance to the reader to pause here, and to set out the provision cited by the Supreme Court in the above passage, i.e. section 327A(1) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as inserted by the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2010) as follows:

"Where pursuant to section 318 the Chief Appeals Officer—

 

(a)        revises a decision of an appeals officer, the Minister may appeal that revised decision to the High Court on any question of law, or

 

(b)        does not revise a decision of an appeals officer, the Minister may appeal the decision of the Chief Appeals Officer not to revise the first-mentioned decision to the High Court on any question of law."

 

35.         This section confers a right of appeal upon the Minister for Social Protection against decisions of the chief appeals officer.  As appears, the section expressly distinguishes between circumstances where the chief appeals officer "revises a decision" and those where he or she "does not revise a decision".  The practical effect of this wording is to ensure that there can be no doubt but that the Minister has a right of appeal irrespective of the outcome of the revision process.  However, the existence of this express distinction under the legislation has been relied upon to inform the interpretation of the right of appeal under section 327.  The implication being that the use of a different form of wording in the respective sections is intended to indicate that a decision not to revise is only amenable to appeal at the instance of the Minister.

36.         In summary, it would appear that the rationale underlying the judgment in Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Ltd continues to represent good law.  Certainly, there is nothing in the judgment in McDonagh v. Chief Appeals Officer which suggests otherwise.  It would seem to follow, therefore, that insofar as a claimant is concerned, the right of appeal to the High Court is confined to circumstances where the chief appeals officer has revised the decision of the appeals officer in the sense of changing the decision, i.e. by modifying or reversing same. 

37.         On the facts of the present case, the chief appeals officer affirmed the decision of the appeals officer.  It would seem to follow that the Applicant has no right of appeal to the High Court.  In the seeming absence of any alternative remedy, I am satisfied that the Applicant has established—to the prima facie threshold which governs a leave application—that the only effective remedy which the Applicant could obtain would be an order by way of judicial review.  This provisional conclusion has been reached for the purpose of an ex parte leave application only and without the benefit of full argument.  Accordingly, leave to apply is granted subject to the proviso that the Respondents are entitled to agitate the question of whether the impugned decision is amenable to statutory appeal.

 

 

Legal test governing leave application

38.         The legal test governing an application for leave to apply for judicial review is as stated by the Supreme Court in G. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 IR 374.  As explained there, an applicant must satisfy the court in a prima facie manner that the only effective remedy, on the facts established by the applicant, which the applicant could obtain would be an order by way of judicial review, or, if there be an alternative remedy, that the application by way of judicial review is, on all the facts of the case, a more appropriate method of procedure.

39.         The legal test has been considered more recently by the Supreme Court in O'Doherty v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 IR 488, [2022] 1 ILRM 421.  The Chief Justice, O'Donnell C.J., explained at paragraph 39 of the judgment that the threshold to be met is that of arguability:

"[...]  The threshold is a familiar one in the law.  It is, in essence, the same test which arises when proceedings are sought to be struck out on the grounds that they are bound to fail, or the test that is normally required in order to seek an interlocutory injunction.  It must be a case that has a prospect of success (otherwise it would not be an arguable case) but does not require more than that.  While, inevitably, individual judges may differ on the application of the test in individual cases at the margins, the test itself is clear.  This test – it must be stressed – is solely one of arguability: it is emphatically not a test framed by reference to whether a case enjoys a reasonable prospect of success, still less a likelihood of success.  Any such language obscures the nature of the test and may on occasion lead to misunderstanding, appeal and consequent delay."

 

40.         The Chief Justice also confirmed (at paragraph 40) that the same threshold test pertains irrespective of whether the application for leave is made ex parte or is made on notice to the respondent.

41.         It follows, therefore, that in assessing the merits of the grounds of judicial review pleaded, the High Court must do so by reference to the low threshold of arguability.

 

 

Decision on arguability

42.         There are arguable grounds for saying that the chief appeals officer erred in law in purporting to find that an appeals officer is entitled to rely on a medical assessor's opinion.  To date, there has been no authoritative ruling by the courts as to the precise interaction between section 300A(3) and section 311(3) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  In particular, there is no ruling on whether the obligation which is imposed upon a deciding officer at first instance to "have regard to" a medical assessor's opinion applies mutatis mutandis to an appeals officer. 

43.         Whereas many statutory appeal mechanisms envisage that the appellate tribunal will have before it the same materials as the first instance tribunal, this is not invariably the position.  There is room for argument as to the precise form of appeal mechanism created under section 311 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  The parent legislation does not state, in terms, that the appeal is to be determined de novo or by way of rehearing.  (cf. Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 2024).

44.         It is perhaps telling that the Department of Social Protection itself had previously adopted a practice of omitting the medical assessor's opinion from the appeal file submitted to the social welfare appeals office.  This practice is described in the judgment in C.O'B. v. Chief Appeals Officer [2014] IEHC 485.  (The wording of the legislation then in force had been in broadly similar terms to that now found under section 300A).  It had not been necessary, in that case, for the High Court to make any finding on the legality of this practice in circumstances where the decision as to what is to be contained in the appeal file had not been challenged in those proceedings.  The practice has since been changed and the medical assessor's opinion is now normally provided to the appeals officer.

45.         The only significance of all of this for present purposes is that the very fact that the Department itself appears to have struggled with the interpretation of the legislation tends to suggest that there are arguable grounds for contending that the Applicant's interpretation may be correct. 

46.         For completeness, it should be emphasised that there is no suggestion that the Department, by dint of it having had a particular practice a decade earlier, is precluded from ever changing that practice.  Rather, the only point is the narrower one made above.

47.         There are also arguable grounds for the Applicant's alternative argument that if an appeals officer is entitled to have regard to the medical assessor's opinion, then this triggers the procedural safeguards pleaded.  It is at least arguable that certain of the observations made by the High Court in C.O'B. v. Chief Appeals Officer provide support for the Applicant's alternative argument.

48.         Accordingly, and having regard to the low threshold governing the leave application, the Applicant is granted leave to apply for judicial review.

 

 

 

 

Conclusion and form of order

49.         For the reasons explained at paragraphs 27 to 37 above, it appears that the Applicant has no right of appeal to the High Court pursuant to section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.  In the seeming absence of any alternative remedy, I am satisfied that the Applicant has established—to the prima facie threshold which governs a leave application—that the only effective remedy which the Applicant could obtain would be an order by way of judicial review.  This provisional conclusion has been reached for the purpose of an ex parte leave application only and without the benefit of full argument.  Accordingly, leave to apply is granted subject to the proviso that the Respondents are entitled to agitate the question of whether the impugned decision is amenable to statutory appeal.

50.         For the reasons explained at paragraphs 38 to 48, and having regard to the low threshold governing the leave application, the Applicant is granted leave to apply for judicial review.  The legal costs of the leave application and the written legal submissions are reserved.

51.         Finally, the issues of statutory interpretation presented by these proceedings are ones which have been raised in a number of other judicial review proceedings.  The hearing of the within proceedings will be expedited with a view to their representing a pathfinder or lead case.  Accordingly, the following case management directions are given.  The Applicant is to issue and serve an originating notice of motion (together with this judgment, the pleadings and the affidavits to date) on the Respondents within seven days of today's date.  The Respondents are to file their opposition papers within four weeks thereafter.  The proceedings will be listed for further directions on Tuesday 29 April 2025 in the Judicial Review List.

 

 

Appearances

Derek Shortall SC and Maeve Cox for the applicant instructed by Lavelle Partners LLP