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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Clipper BCS LLP & Anor v Foley & Anor (Approved) [2025] IEHC 72 (11 February 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025_IEHC_72.html Cite as: [2025] IEHC 72 |
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APPROVED [2025] IEHC 72
THE HIGH COURT H.P.2024.0003633 BETWEEN CLIPPER BCS LLP and STEVEN PARKIN PLAINTIFFS AND JOSEPH FOLEY and BALLYHANE LIMITED DEFENDANTS JUDGEMENT of Mr Justice Nolan delivered on the 11th day of February, 2025 Introduction 1. It is often said that horse racing is the sport of kings, since it involves training young animals to become racing thoroughbreds and as a result, such animals can become extremely valuable. Sands of Mali ("the stallion") is such an animal and this case is a dispute as to its full ownership. 2. It is common case that the stallion, who was purchased for the relatively modest sum in the context of horse values, of £230,000, is now worth somewhere between £2 - 3 million. The Plaintiffs allege that they are the full owners of the stallion. The Defendants who own a stud farm, where it presently resides, allege that they own 50% of it and have refused to allow it to be moved to another stud.
The Proceedings 3. A Plenary Summons was issued sometime prior to the 31st of July 2024, in which the Plaintiffs sought damages for negligence and breach of contract and a declaration that the first named Plaintiff was the full owner of the stallion. Thereafter, they amended that summons, on an ex parte basis, to seek Mareva type injunctions, prohibiting the dispersal and dissipation of monies received by the Defendants, in respect of any coverings from five different stallions. The relief which they seek in this application is a mandatory injunction that the stallion be moved to a third party stud farm. 4. Prior to these proceedings, in May of 2024, the Defendants issued their own proceedings against the Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that the Defendants hold a 50% interest in the stallion, as well as other ancillary reliefs. The Defendants sought an appearance from the solicitors acting for the Plaintiffs, but none was forthcoming.
Background 5. The second named Plaintiff is a very wealthy businessman with an interest in sport. In particular, he has a lifelong interest in football and horse racing and as things stand, is the owner of stud farms in both Ireland and the UK. The first named Plaintiff is a limited liability company registered in the UK 6. The second named Plaintiff admits that, while he has a great interest in horses, his knowledge is limited and has come to rely upon the first named Defendant as his advisor. In a trade magazine of November 2023, exhibited in the affidavits, he is quoted as saying, in regard to the first named Defendant; "we're nearly family and I treat him like a brother... he's a superstar though. For somebody like me who's come into the industry with wealth, there aren't many Joe Foleys around. He's very straight, he wants the industry to be transparent and things to run properly.'' 7. In the face of that very generous compliment, it is disappointing and concerning that matters seemed to have deteriorated so significantly.
The Purchase of Sands of Mali 8. The second named Plaintiff says that in July of 2020, he together with the first named Defendant, attended the racing yard of Richard Fahey, a horse breeder in the UK. The stallion had concluded his successful racing career and was now on the market for sale. The first named Plaintiff says that he paid the purchase price of £225,000 plus VAT, on the 10th of August 2020. The sums were paid in two installments, the first sum of £225,000 by the second named Plaintiff and the while the second, being the VAT element, was paid by the first named Plaintiff. 9. Upon purchase, the stallion was transported to the stud of the Defendants, to commence his stud career in 2021. 10. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs say that they entered into a profit-sharing agreement with the Defendants, but not a partnership. There is no written documentation to confirm this arrangement, which is unusual in circumstances where the Plaintiffs complain bitterly of the lack of proper paperwork on the part of the Defendants. 11. The Plaintiffs say the terms were that the Defendants would manage the bookings of the stallion, would gather fees and arrange marketing, registration and other administration matters and would discharge his expenses and deduct these costs from the fees received. In addition, the Plaintiffs would receive 50% of the net income, while the Defendants would retain the balance and would be entitled to five free covers during the breeding season. Finally, detailed records would be furnished. 12. The Plaintiffs say the 50% of the net covering fee income was not in recognition of any ownership but was a recompense for the first named Defendants' services and advice in regard to the Plaintiffs' wider bloodstock operations in Ireland and the UK, but no more. 13. On the other hand, the Defendants put forward a very different narrative. The first named Defendant says that he became acquainted with the second named Plaintiff in August of 2008 and that they developed a strong friendship. He purchased the vast majority of the Plaintiffs' horses and managed their racing and stud careers. In total, he purchased nearly £35 million worth of horsing stock for the second named Plaintiff, making his bloodstock business "a superpower". 14. He says that not only was he his adviser in relation all things equestrian, but he was a newly appointed director of a number of companies associated with his horse empire, which was announced in early 2024. 15. He says that he initially purchased the stallion in August 2020 and exhibits a Stallion Sale Agreement, dated the 10th of August 2020, which shows the purchase price as £225,000, signed by him and Peter Swann on behalf of the vendor, the Cool Silk Partnership. 16. He says that he had been looking at the stallion for a number of months before that, but that the second named Plaintiff had shown no interest. It was only after he had agreed to purchase him, did the second named Plaintiff agree to take a 50% interest in him. This was achieved by the Plaintiffs paying the entire invoice plus VAT and the Defendants crediting the sum of €120,000 against the outstanding account in respect of pre training and boarding fees due in respect of other horses that they had at the Defendants stud. They rely on a text message, dated the 20th of November 2023, as evidence of an acknowledgement by the second named Plaintiff of a 50/50 partnership arrangement between them, where he said:- "I am finding a home for St. (space traveler) and Asymmetric. I'll do a deal with you on SOM" (Sands of Mali). 17. In regard to the allegation that there are very significant sums due by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, the first named Defendant says that a reconciliation took place in around April of 2021, which showed the credit of €120,000 in their favour. 18. He says that his acquisition of 50% of the stallion was public knowledge and was made clear to Mr. Richard Fahey, who has confirmed this by way of letter exhibited and an affidavit of Mr. Barberini, an ex-employee of the Plaintiffs, who says that the second named Plaintiff told him that he had bought a half share in the stallion. Further, the ownership of the stallion was recorded at Weatherbys, (the well-known and highly respected global authority on horse racing and breeding, who issue horse passports), as "the Sands of Mali Syndicate, care of Ballyhane". All of which he says which runs entirely contrary to any argument that the Plaintiffs are the full owner of the stallion. He denies there was a profit-sharing agreement and says that the accounts clearly showed the division of the stud fees on a 50/50 basis.
The Breakdown in the Relationship 19. In October of 2023, the second named Plaintiff's accountant produced a document which stated that the stud fees due to the Plaintiffs were close to €6 million. 20. Matters reached a crescendo on the 19th of March 2024. The second named Plaintiff has described this as a "heated conversation". He said that he requested the first named Defendant to facilitate the transfer of the stallion to Starfield Stud in Mullingar. Two other stallions were transported, but not this one. 21. However, the Defendants' version is somewhat different. In their solicitor's letter of the 27th of June 2024, they say that the second named Plaintiff became enraged and demanded that further monies be paid to him. He threatened the first named Defendant and his family, unless the sum of €1.5 million was paid immediately. He became extremely aggressive to the extent that the first named Defendant made a complaint to the Gardaí and he increased his security at home. The Plaintiffs deny entirely that any threats were made or that there was any need to increase security. This matter, however, is not something that can be determined on affidavit. The Plaintiffs' Submissions 22. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants are only entitled to 50% of the net income achieved. 23. They complain that the Defendants have not properly accounted for what they have received. As noted above, they are highly critical of the lackadaisical manner in which the Defendants do their business. They complain that there is a failure to execute contracts in regard to the covering of mares, and that the paperwork is lacking. They say that this is reflective of the "word of mouth" way in which the first named Defendant conducts his business. 24. They point to the sales invoice issued by the Cool Silk Partnership to Branton Court Stud LLP and say that the Defendants' argument in relation to the credit of €120,000 is not evidence of a 50/50 partnership, since this does not even represent 50% of the price paid for the stallion. They dispute the Weatherbys record as being simply wrong. 25. Mr. Beatty SC for the Plaintiffs argue that, for a number of reasons, the injunction application is appropriate. These include that the Plaintiffs have the evidence of sole ownership, the Defendants nonpayment to the Plaintiffs of their due share of covering fees, the Defendants poor record keeping in relation to business dealings and the Defendants failure to ensure that industry standard contracts were agreed and signed in advance. 26. Further, he alleges there has been an underperformance in the management of the Plaintiffs' stallions stud career, that there are issues in regard to the welfare of the stallion and the fact that the relationship of trust has broken down. If the court were to refuse the relief, he argues that their property rights would be frustrated, which would constitute a gross violation of those rights. There is no indication that the Defendants will make any payments due to them in respect of past or future covering fees and therefore, his clients will continue to suffer pecuniary loss. 27. He argues that the balance of convenience favours vindicating their property rights, pending the hearing, in circumstances where there is no evidence that the parties ever agreed to the Defendants holding the stallion and that the Plaintiffs wish him to be settled in a new stud location in advance of the 2025 breeding season, which commences in mid-February. 28. Bearing in mind that this court cannot decide matters of conflict on the affidavits, he says that the court should approach the matter on the of basis of the Defendants' high point, namely that they own 50% of the stallion. 29. He says that there is no lien on it, that the partnership, if any, is at an end and point to the provisions of the Partnership Act 1890 and case law on the point. 30. In relation to the law, he acknowledges that in seeking mandatory interlocutory injunctive relief, they must show at least a strong case that they are likely to succeed at the hearing of the action, and that they have such a strong case (Maha Lingam v. Health Service Executive [2005] IESC 89). 31. In regard to that strong case, he points to clear financial irregularities, as his clients sees it. He brought me through, in some detail, various emails and statements of account, going from July 2021, where the first named Defendant points to a "line in the sand" statement as of the 30th of April 2021, showing a sum of €14,000 due to the Defendants. This, however, is contradicted by a subsequent statement in November of 2023, which shows that €912,483 is due to the Plaintiffs. 32. In regard to the stallion's welfare, he says the Plaintiffs cannot be certain that its health will not be at risk. He points to an incident in 2023 when it had an accident and that another stallion, "Dandy Man", unfortunately had to be put down and that they were not kept informed. 33. Finally, he points to a lack of sperm count in relation to another horse, which had been at the Defendants stud. This, he says, is indicative of a failure to spot the development of a cyst which would affect that stallion's ability to cover a mare successfully. However, again all these matters are matters for the hearing of the action. 34. The strongest case that the Plaintiffs make is that there is no dispute that they are at least 50% owner and that they paid 100% of the contract price. They say that there is a unity of possession and point to an extract from Wiley on Irish Land Law (6th Ed., 2021). In his oral submissions, Mr. Beatty says that his clients have no control over the horse and that that cannot be fair. He believes that the status quo ante is that the relationship is at an end. On that basis, the horse should be moved to a third-party stud. 35. Interestingly, in relation to the text message "I will do a deal about SOM", Mr. Beatty says that he has no instructions, notwithstanding that the second named Plaintiff, was sitting right behind him. 36. In regard to the risk of injustice, as described by Clarke J. in Charleton v Scriven [2019] IESC 28, he submits that there is no risk of injustice because the stallion will still stand at an independent stud and will earn covering fees, the net proceeds of which can still to be divided amongst the parties. Should a full hearing decide that the Defendants are entitled to their claimed 50% ownership, the horse can be moved back which he says is unlikely. 37. The Plaintiffs plead an implied term that at the end of the contract the horse must be released and this clearly would apply, even taking the Defendants' case at its height, however, again, this is clearly a matter for the trial. 38. In seeking interlocutory injunctive relief, the Plaintiffs rely on the well-known Campus Oil principles, and to the restatement of those principles in Shelbourne Hotel Holdings Ltd v Torriam Hotel Operating Co Ltd [2008] IEHC 376, Lingham v HSE [2005] IESC 89 and Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v Clonmel Healthcare Ltd [2019] IESC 65. 39. In Merck Sharp & Dohme O'Donnell J. (as he then was) at para. 64 said:- "Any application should be approached with a recognition of the essential flexibility of the remedy and the fundamental objective in seeking to minimise injustice, in circumstances where the legal rights of the parties have yet to be determined." 40. In this regard, and in defence of their property rights, the Plaintiffs rely on the decision of Clarke J. in AIB PLC v Diamond [2012] 3 IR 549, where he said that courts were always anxious to guard property rights in the context of interlocutory injunctions. Here, the Plaintiffs will be frustrated in the exercise of their property rights in respect of the stallion. The Defendants' Submissions 41. In response, the Defendants say that the law is not on the Plaintiffs' side. They argue that a mandatory order will only be made if the court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have established a strong case that they are likely to succeed at trial (Maha Lingam v. Health Service Executive [2005] IESC 89 (at para. 10)). 42. In Thistle Bloodstock Limited v Irish Horseracing Regulatory Board and Ors. [2020] IEHC 96, Allen J. was considering an application involving a dispute in relation to the ownership of a horse. He noted that both parties claimed property rights, and, in the circumstances, the court had to balance the risk of injustice. Therefore, notwithstanding that he was convinced there was a bona fide issue to be tried, the balance of convenience was against granting the injunction. 43. Mr. Farrell SC for the Defendants argues that both parties accept that the value of the horse has increased significantly under the care of the Defendants and in those circumstances, the status quo ante should apply, where there is a presumption in favor of preserving things as they are. He rejects the Plaintiffs attempt to redefine the status quo ante. 44. He argues that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied the court that they have discharged the burden of establishing a strong case. He points to a number of matters which are raised in the affidavits to support this submission. These include the manner of payment for the stallion and the sales invoice are both entirely consistent with the Defendants' evidence with respect to how it came to be acquired. The 50/50 division of the income as being reflective of a profit-sharing agreement and a co-ownership relationship. 45. While the Plaintiffs point to the sales invoice, the Defendants' point to the Stallion Sales Agreement in August of 2023. 46. The text message from the second named Plaintiff is entirely consistent with the Defendants' case, where he says that he would "do a deal" in relation to the stallion as well as the Weatherbys' ownership record as well as the letter from Mr. Fahey and the affidavit of Mr. Barberini. 47. Mr. Farrell says that damages are clearly an adequate remedy, and the Plaintiffs have not addressed this point. In relation to the balance of convenience, he says that moving a horse is potentially problematic and that there is a detrimental effect surrounding any publicity of the horse moving to a third party stud. Yet, there is no such potential reputational detrimental effect for the Plaintiffs. 48. In relation to the welfare of the horse, he says that other horses that move have not improved and that it is in the interest of both parties to ensure that the stallion remains fit and well and covers as many mares as possible. 49. He points to various of arguments in the affidavits that in fact, the first named Defendant knows far more about horses and has far greater expertise than the second named Plaintiff. 50. In regard to Dandy Man, the horse was 20 years old, where the natural life expectancy is between 18 and 22 years old and that this cannot be evidence of a risk to the stallion's welfare. 51. He says that the books and records were never challenged at the time and that the Plaintiffs are engaging in a retrospective analysis, looking for flaws. 52. In regard to the undertaking as to damages, he points to the fact that two of the plaintiffs' studs are on the market. He says his client has serious concerns as to what he believes is a "fire sale" of the Plaintiffs' assets. He questions whether the Plaintiffs are in fact a mark for their undertaking as to damages. 53. Finally, he points to a lack of disclosure in the affidavit, which makes no reference to the Defendants' proceedings, or to the threats of violence, but he acknowledges that the correspondence does. He has a particular concern in relation to the failure to disclose the mortgaging of the stallion, at a time when there was clearly a dispute between the parties about its ownership, a dispute which the bank was not told about, as far as he is aware.
The Law 54. The parties are in agreement in relation to the criteria which the Plaintiff must establish in order to succeed to seek mandatory relief. I can do no better than to quote a passage of Murray J. in Ryanair v Skyscanner [2022] IECA 64 where he said:- "Since the decision in Maha Lingam v. Health Services Executive the Irish case law has been emphatic that an applicant for mandatory interlocutory relief must establish more than a 'serious issue to be tried'. In his judgment in that case, Fennelly J. expressed the test as follows (at para. 10): '... it is well established that the ordinary test of a fair case to be tried is not sufficient to meet the first leg of the test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction where the injunction sought is in effect mandatory. In such a case it is necessary for the applicant to show at least that he has a strong case that he is likely to succeed at the hearing of the action. Most recently, the Supreme Court has framed the requirement for such a case in terms of its being 'particularly strong and powerful' (Clare County Council v. McDonagh [2022] IESC 2, [2022] 1 ILRM 353 at para. 91). The proper focus, it seems to me, is upon two questions: (a) Is the cause of action relied upon by the Plaintiff a defined and recognised one? If not and if the claim is one of significant legal novelty, the claim may be arguable, but it may not usually ground mandatory relief. (b) Are the facts relied upon by the Plaintiff to establish that cause of action either undisputed, or supported by evidence that is credible to the extent that it can be described as 'strong'? (and see AIB plc v. Diamond [2011] IEHC 505, [2012] 3 IR 549 at p. 576)". (emphasis added) 55. Therefore, as a starting point, in order for the Plaintiffs to succeed in obtaining their mandatory order, they must show that they have a strong case which is likely to succeed at trial.
Discussion and Decision 56. The first issue that I need to address is whether they do have set out a strong case that is likely to succeed, or a strong and powerful case, to use the words of Clare County Council v McDonagh. The Plaintiffs complain of a serious lack of paperwork in relation to the contracts for the covering of mares and a lack of proper reporting. However, both parties have been together for well in excess of a decade. The papers are full of the laudatory comments made by the second named Plaintiff concerning the first named Defendant. Indeed, it transpires that one is the godfather of one of the others' children. It is clear that something catastrophic took place in relation to their relationship, culminating in a complete fracture in March of 2024. Bearing in mind the millions of euro which was part of their world, the paucity of paperwork is quite shocking, but it was part of their world and for years the Plaintiffs took no issue with it. Therefore, it seems to me to be somewhat strange for them now to take such an issue. I am persuaded by the argument in regard to paperwork or lack of it, that it is a retrospective interpretation or analysis and was not a significant cause of concern until November of 2023. This is clearly a matter which will require to be determined at the hearing of the action. 57. I find it hard to understand why the Plaintiffs place such great emphasis on the sales invoice yet ignore the Stallion Sale Agreement. For the purposes of this analysis and this analysis only, I have to take into consideration the affidavits of Mr. Fahey, who sold the stallion and Mr. Barberini, who was the bloodstock advisor and consultant to the second named Plaintiff, both of whom confirm that they were aware of the Defendants 50% interest in it. 58. Whilst there is little doubt that the money was put up by the Plaintiffs, the precise nature of the arrangement is clearly in dispute. That is the dispute which will have to go to a trial. I cannot reconcile these two versions of events. In those circumstances, it seems to me that this case falls squarely within the second area of focus, which Murray J. refers to in the Ryanair case. The facts relied upon by the Plaintiffs here are not undisputed and are not supported by evidence that is credible to the extent that it could be described as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that on that ground alone, the Plaintiff cannot succeed. 59. If I am incorrect on that analysis, then it seems to me that following the tests set out in Merck, Sharp & Dohme, I must turn to the next issue; namely whether damages are an adequate remedy. 60. As I was being brought through the various emails and statements of account by Mr. Beatty, it seemed clear that a central part of this case is a dispute about the fees earned and the expenses incurred. That is what seems to have given rise to the first wrinkle in the extraordinary strong relationship between the main combatants. If that is the case, then it will be determined by how much is owed to the Plaintiffs, having deducted the expenses of the Defendants, if any. 61. It also seems to me that the issue of the ownership of the stallion is a matter which also can be compensated for in damages. If it were to transpire that the Plaintiffs are correct and are able to show that in the period of time between the bringing of this application and the hearing of the action, that there has been loss, then that is a loss which clearly can be compensated for by an award of damages. 62. I do not accept the argument that because we are dealing with a chattel, the stallion, that some higher duty applies. I accept the argument as set out in Wiley, quoted in the submissions, as to the unity of possession. Indeed, it seems to me that that quote is particularly pertinent where the common thread of co-ownership is that each owner has as much right to hold possession as the other. 63. Therefore, taking the Defendants case at its height, as I must in this application, they have a 50% interest in the stallion. I do not think that that translates into a clear obligation that the stallion should be put in third party hands. Whilst the Defendants argue that the moving of a stallion is not without risk, there is no evidence to support that view either. Neither is there any evidence that either side would not be mark in damages and therefore to that extent, I reject the Defendants suggestion that the Plaintiffs are engaged in a fire sale. Nonetheless, it seems to me that damages are an adequate remedy, for both parties. 64. However, if I am incorrect in relation to that, then I must move to the issue of the balance of convenience. I do not think the court can ignore the laudatory comments of the second named Plaintiff about the first named Defendant's expertise and skill sets. In those circumstances, it is hard to accept the argument that somehow or other the welfare of the horse and his performance is in jeopardy by it staying where it is. 65. However, the associated publicity around this application clearly could have a detrimental effect upon the Defendants' reputation, if I were to direct his removal. This is something which I can take into consideration. But as Mr. Farrell put it, there is no consequential reputational detrimental effect to the Plaintiffs if the order is not made. 66. As part of this analysis, it seems to me that the issue of the status quo ante is something that I am required to deal with. As Murray J. said in the Ryanair case; - "Generally, the status quo ante is the state of affairs prevailing at the point immediately before the commencement of the action or, in the event that the application is unreasonably delayed between the issue of the summons and the hearing of the motion, the position as at the point of application (Bean 'Injunctions' (13th Ed. 2018) at para. 3.23). However, the inquiry as to what the status quo ante is must be defined by the relief being sought by the Plaintiff." 67. Here, the Plaintiffs are looking for a number of different reliefs, only one of which relates to an order directing the transfer of the stallion to another stud. The primary reliefs are declarations and damages for conversion and detinue, which prompted the amended summons. 68. Therefore, it seems to me that the true status quo ante or the state of affairs prevailing at the point immediately before the commencement of the action was that the stallion resided at the Defendants stud, and not that the relationship between the parties has broken down, as the Plaintiffs urge. There was no evidence that the stallion is subject to any detrimental environmental issue or that his health is in any way affected by it remaining there. I do not accept the argument that because there may have been some issue with the sperm count of another stallion or what happened to Dandy Man, reflects a potential similar risk to the stallion. There is no evidence to suggest there is any health risk associated with keeping it at the stud of the Defendants. In those circumstances, therefore, it seems to me that the state of affairs prevailing at present is the one which should remain. 69. The final issue which was argued in front of me related to the ability of the Plaintiffs to give an undertaking as to damages. Just because the Plaintiffs have decided to divest themselves of some of their properties, does not mean that they are engaging in a fire sale or are in financial difficulties. There is no evidence to suggest that they are not a mark for such damages. 70. However, that leads me to another point namely, the issue of lack of disclosure. There were three issues which I was concerned with at the outset. The first is the alleged threat of violence made by the second named Plaintiff against the first named Defendant. It seems to me that this is not a matter that I can consider at this stage. Clearly that is a matter for the trial of the action. 71. The second issue is the failure to disclose the first set of proceedings in the affidavit. I would have thought that it would be something which would have been to the fore in the affidavit. However, I accept that Mr. Beatty, who moved the application on an ex parte basis for short service, disclosed the existence of the Defendants proceedings to the court. 72. The third issue which the court was concerned with was the failure to disclose that the stallion has, in effect, been mortgaged to JP Morgan, to a value of £3,000,000. This certainly seems to me to be a matter which should have been disclosed, particularly in circumstances where it is not at all clear that JP Morgan was informed that there was a dispute as to the full ownership of it. However, that seems to have occurred after the issuing of both sets of proceedings. Either way, in the circumstances where this matter has not been urged upon me and bearing in mind my findings on the issues of a strong case, the adequacy of damages and the balance of convenience, I do not need to decide this matter on that basis.
The Court Order 73. While it seems clear to me that the Plaintiffs have not established the requisite factual matrix upon which a court could make a mandatory order, that does not mean that they have not raised an issue in relation to both the financial earnings and expenses of the stallion and its potential welfare. 74. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is appropriate that I should direct that the stallion stays in the stud of the Defendants till the hearing of the action, but on condition that they allow a vet, nominated by the Plaintiffs, to examine the stallion on a frequent basis. It would seem to me that it would be appropriate for the stallion to be examined at least once every six weeks by such a vet, but that is a matter which can be arranged between the parties. If for some reason it cannot, then I will give liberty to the parties to come back to court at which stage I will make appropriate directions. 75. It also seems to me that the Defendants must account to the Plaintiffs, not only for the monies earned by the stallion, from now till the trial of the action, but also for the expenses incurred on an ongoing basis. My preference would be that account would be furnished on a monthly basis. If for some reason this causes administrative difficulties again, I will give liberty to the parties to come back to court, at which stage I will make appropriate directions. 76. Finally, it seems to me that this is a case which requires to be case managed. In those circumstances I shall make directions as to the close of pleadings and the issue of discovery. 77. Accordingly, I will discuss with counsel the nature of the orders which should be made. I shall put the matter in for mention before me on Thursday the 20th of February at 10:00.