THE SUPREME COURT
Hamilton C.J.
Lynch J.
Barron J.
378/97
MURPHY

V

THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

JUDGMENT delivered on the 19th day of July 1999 by BARRON J. [Nem. Diss.]

This case has given rise to the need to reaffirm the principles enunciated in Reddy v. Bates [1983] IR 141.

That case sought to deal with a situation whereby it was perceived that juries were not carrying out their function properly in relation to loss of future earnings. This was particularly so in those cases where the

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evidence could establish that the plaintiff would never be able to resume his pre-accident employment or would be limited permanently in obtaining special payments in relation to it, e.g. overtime.

What it was sought to avoid was that in such circumstances the jury would simply multiply the then weekly loss of earnings by the appropriate actuarial figure without at the same time taking into account that the earnings might not have been earned week by week for the rest of the plaintiff’s working life.

What Reddy v. Bates did was to draw attention to the uncertainties of life. The plaintiff might have been prevented from earning in any event by such mishaps as ill-health or an economic downturn. Griffin J. at [1983] IR 146-147 drew attention to the fact that an uncritical use of the actuarial figure would fail to take into account any risk of unemployment, redundancy, illness, accident or the like. It would assume that the

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plaintiff, if uninjured, would have continued to work, week-in and week-out, until retirement.

There is nothing novel in this. A plaintiff must prove his case which includes establishing his loss. Of course, the defendant might admit that he would have earned his pre-accident weekly wage together with inflationary increases week-in week-out for the rest of his working life. However, this might be contested. When it is, then the actual loss must be established by evidence in the ordinary way and the Tribunal of Fact - now usually a judge sitting on his own - must determine the issue.

In like fashion, if the plaintiff is able to work at a different employment, the case may be made that for similar reasons the return from such employment may be interrupted. Again, it is for the Tribunal of Fact on appropriate evidence to determine the issue.

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It is not until these determinations have been made that the application of actuarial evidence becomes appropriate. Such evidence merely enables the Court to determine the value at the date of judgment of losses which will only arise in the future and to which discount must be applied because the loss is made good at the date of the judgment rather than as it arises from week to week or at any other time in the future. There is no relationship between the implementation of the principles of Reddy v. Bates and the admission of actuarial evidence. It might even be suggested that having regard to the manner in which such evidence is usually given that the trial judge having decided the loss and to what date might then ask to be told the appropriate actuarial figure. This would also avoid misconceived objections to an actuary giving evidence, since it highlights that such evidence is dependent upon findings of fact rather than the reverse.