Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. These are interpleader proceedings in which the sole issue is whether a Mercedes 250 motor car, registration number 95 D 42525, was, at the

2. There is no dispute as to the circumstances of the transaction in which the car was acquired. It was acquired from Evolution Limited, the consideration for the purchase being the sum of £4,000 together with the trade-in of a Mercedes 180 said to have been the property of Trecom Holdings Ltd. The purchase was negotiated on behalf of the purchaser by Mr. Bolger. The car was invoiced to the appellant and was registered in its name and also insured in its name. The real issue before the Court was by whom was the consideration provided. The case for the appellant was that the cash was provided by it and the trade-in was provided by

3. Trecom Holdings Limited. The case for CAB was at all times that the monies and the trade-in were the property of the third-named respondent. In the course of his judgment the learned trial judge held that the property in the car vested in the appellant. He then went on to consider where the beneficial interest lay. The relevant portion of his judgment on this issue was as follows:

4. Accordingly, the learned trial judge declared that the beneficial ownership in the car at the date of its seizure was vested in the appellant.

5. As against this judgment there has been an appeal and cross-appeal. In its appeal the appellant submits: (1) that the principle of a resulting trust was never argued before the learned trial judge. (2) That, if it had been, it would have been rejected, and (3) that the interest resulting to Mr. Bolger if created by an individual would have had to have been registered as a bill of sale. As it was not registered under the Provisions of Section 99 of the Companies Act, 1963, it was void. By its cross-appeal the first-named respondent submits that since the consideration for purchase of the car was provided by Mr. Bolger the car at all material times became the property of Mr. Bolger and as he was not acting as agent of Louisville, the property in the car could not have passed to that company.

6. The first ground of appeal raises the question whether counsel for CAB submitted that the car could be held upon trust for Mr. Bolger. If not, then a finding to this effect should not have been made in the absence of an opportunity for counsel for the appellant to submit the contrary.

7. This Court has had the advantage of seeing a transcript not only of the evidence adduced before the learned trial judge but also a transcript of the submissions made on behalf of the several parties. It is quite clear from that transcript that the main case for CAB was that the ownership of the car vested in Mr. Bolger. However, it is clear also that it was submitted on behalf of CAB that, if the learned trial judge took the view that the legal estate vested in the appellant, then nevertheless the beneficial ownership vested in Mr. Bolger upon a resulting trust. Apart from submitting that there could be no such thing as a resulting trust in a chattel

8. Counsel for the appellant now submits that had he been aware that CAB was relying upon the doctrine of resulting trust he would have made fuller submissions in relation thereto. In my view he ought to have known that this proposition was being relied upon by counsel for CAB as a backup position. He had every opportunity and was given every opportunity by the learned trial judge to meet this submission if he wished. He chose to do so by submitting baldly that no such principle applied to chattels. That was his decision. He cannot now say that the Court decided the matter without hearing him.

9. While it is not the case here, this submission raises the question whether a judge is ever entitled to decide a case upon a principle of law which was not argued. It is analogous to the question, whether this or

10. This case has really been decided by the findings of fact which I have cited. The application of these facts is governed by two simple propositions.

11. The property must pass to the person who pays for it because there is no one else to whom it can pass. Normally, the person is using his, her or its money. Where the money being used is that of another, as for example, a trust, then the property passes within the terms of the trust or other arrangement under which it is provided. But it does pass to those who provide the consideration.

12. Once acquired the property does not pass from the person who provided the consideration unless such person alienates it in some way. One of these ways is to put it into the name of another with the intention of making a gift. But before the property can so pass the intention must be established.

13. In the present case, Mr. Bolger was the buyer of the car. His own money and his own car provided the consideration. The car was put into the name of the appellant. If it is possible for legal title to a motor car to be in one person and the beneficial title in another, then in the absence of evidence of a gift or any inference or presumption of advancement the beneficial interest would remain in the buyer. If it is not possible for the title to be split between legal and equitable interests then the entire title, in the absence of any evidence of a gift or any inference or presumption of advancement, the entire title would remain in the buyer.

14. Since in each case the beneficial interest could only pass from Mr. Bolger to the appellant on proof of such intention, it is not strictly necessary to decide whether there can be a resulting trust in a chattel such as a car.

15. For the purpose of this case, it is necessary to see on what basis it is said that the beneficial title passed to the appellant. On behalf of the appellant it is said to have been by way of advancement i.e. by way of a gift.

16. For a gift to have been made, it is necessary to have evidence establishing that intention on the part of the donor, in this case Mr. Bolger. While an advancement is based upon presumed intention, such a proposition, i.e. of presumed intention, is untenable as between an individual, whether shareholder, employee or officer of a company, and such company. If there is a gift, this intention must be proved.

17. It is at this stage that the second principle to which I have referred applies. Mr. Bolger in his evidence gave varying accounts as to the sources of the consideration for the purchase of the car, to show how the property in it vested in the appellant. None suggested that he had paid

18. For this case to be made now, the appellant would have to rely upon the finding by the learned trial judge of the source of the funds by which the car was bought, which he denied. Whether in the ordinary case he would be permitted to do so would be dependent upon the view taken by the trial judge as to the reason for not accepting his evidence. A party should only be deprived of reliance upon the facts as found in extreme cases where to allow such party to do so would be to defeat justice. Where the evidence given is not believed, there is then effectively no evidence before the Court from which that party can succeed.

19. I make no finding as to whether the appellant can rely upon this finding of fact in the present case since it is unnecessary to do so.

20. The appellant seeks to rely upon the finding of fact to allege the inference of a gift. But to do so there must be evidence and there is none to that effect adduced on behalf of the appellant. Nor can it rely upon an inference or other probability to that effect by virtue of the car being put into its name. To do so, it must rely upon evidence that that is what was intended. Not only is there no such evidence, but it is contrary to the evidence adduced on its behalf.

21. In its submission, the second-named respondent says at paragraph 2 as follows:

22. Subparagraph (i) of that submission is incorrect. Mr. Bolger never gave evidence to the effect that he had represented that he was buying the car for the company.

23. Subparagraph (ii) is factually accurate but does not as a matter of law transfer any beneficial interest from Mr. Bolger to the appellant.

24. Subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) are equivocal. Once the evidence establishes that the purchase price was paid by Mr. Bolger, this does not transfer any beneficial interest to the appellant.

25. At the trial, the appellant’s case failed on the facts whereas the case for CAB succeeded. The case now being made by the appellant was never made. It would be wrong to allow it to be made now, particularly, as

26. For these reasons, the appellant cannot place the property in the car in Louisville by reason of a gift. The entire of this reasoning was dependent upon the legal position allowing a chattel bought by one person and placed in the name of another to be held by that other upon trust for the former.

27. The case for the appellant that it did not was much overstated. It was also wrong. The log book has never been regarded as a document of title. The person named therein need not be the owner. In other words that person either has no interest or a bare legal title. In my view, it is the latter. The person named is not held out as the owner, but such person is held out as the person whom others may treat as the owner.

28. The present position is no different. The principles of equity grew up to deal with similar situations. It would clearly be inequitable that someone who buys property should lose it because it is put in the name of another without the intention of thereby transferring ownership. It is admitted that such equitable principles apply to personalty as well as to realty. There can be no basis for distinguishing between types of personalty.

29. The next submission on behalf of the appellant is that the beneficial interest is void since it has not been registered as a charge pursuant to the Provisions of Section 99 of the Companies Act, 1963. There is no merit in this submission. A trust is not a charge.

30. There is no need to deal with the cross-appeal since it relates to the issue of agency. Having found that Mr. Bolger was never the agent of Louisville, this disposed of any issue relating to the beneficial interest.

31. The finding did not, however, prevent the learned trial judge from holding that by putting the car in the name of Louisville the latter required a bare legal title.

32. The appeal will be refused.