THE SUPREME COURT

Keane C.J.
Murray J.
Geoghegan J.
165, 166 & 167/98

BETWEEN:

SUSAN GAVIN, MARY LYNCH
AND MARGARET DEEGAN

Applicants/Respondents and

THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE
	
	Respondent/Appellant

JUDGMENT delivered the 12th day of April 2000 by Keane C.J. (nem. diss.)

These are three separate applications for judicial review which were heard in the High Court by O'Higgins J. In his judgment delivered on the 12th May, 1998, he granted the applicants an order quashing the purported suspension of each of them from their positions in the Civil Service. From that judgment and order, the respondent has now appealed to this court.

[*2] The factual background to the applications, in so far as it is not in dispute, is as follows. Each of the applicants was, at the relevant time, a cartographer in the Ordinance Survey Section of the Department of Finance. These are permanent and pensionable positions and each of the applicants is a civil servant within the meaning of s. 1 of the Civil Service Regulation Act, 1956 (hereafter “the 1956 Act”). The Ordinance Survey Department is located in the Phoenix Park and provides inter alia a map sales service to members of the public. The map sales staff (including the applicants) are responsible for supplying maps and/or photographs on demand to customers. Orders are taken directly over the counter, by telephone or by post through the accounts department. The map sales staff are required to complete a receipt in respect of each transaction and to remit the cash and corresponding receipts to the accounts department on a regular basis. They are also required to maintain a record of these remittances and the accounts department also records the amount returned.

Early in February 1997, an internal audit was conducted in the map sales office. In affidavits sworn by Mr. Richard Kirwan, an official of the Ordinance Survey Department, in response to the affidavits of the applicants grounding the application for a judicial review, he deposed that, in the case of each applicant, the audit disclosed that she had a significant excess of cash over [*3] receipts and that there were receipts issued to customers which did not match the corresponding receipts submitted to accounts.

On the 21st February 1997, each of the applicants was asked to come to Mr. Kirwan's office.  The first named applicant (hereafter “Ms. Gavin”) and the third named applicant (hereafter “Ms. Deegan”) attended: the second named applicant (hereafter “Ms. Lynch”) was on sick leave and did not attend. At the meeting, Mr. Kirwan read to Ms. Gavin and Ms. Deegan a letter informing them that they were being suspended without pay and signed the letter in their presence. A letter in similar terms was sent by him to Ms. Lynch on the same day.

The letter of 21st February was in the following terms:-

“I am a person nominated under s. 3 of (the 1956 Act) to be a suspending authority.  As it appears to me that you are guilty of grave irregularity warranting disciplinary action and as it appears to me that the charge warrants investigation, I  hereby suspend you under the terms of s. 13 of (the 1956 Act) with immediate effect. [*4]

“You are permitted under s. 14 of (the 1956 Act) to satisfy the appropriate authority that by reason of the prolongation of the investigation into your case that undue hardship is being caused and that some payment be made to you for the mitigation of hardship while you are suspended.”

In the case of Ms. Gavin, that letter was responded to as follows by solicitors acting on her behalf on the 27th February 1997:-

“We act for Ms. Susan Gavin of 119 Ashlawn Park, Ballybrack, Co. Dublin who has passed us your letter dated 21st February 1997.
“We would be obliged if you would specify what you mean when you say that our client appears to you to be guilty of a grave irregularity warranting disciplinary action.
“We also understand that (you) told (our) client that the matter was now in the hands of An Garda Siochana and we would be obliged if you would indicate what station or unit are investigating this matter.”  [*5]

A letter was also written by the same solicitors on behalf of Ms. Lynch and it can be assumed that it was in similar terms.

Another firm of solicitors wrote on behalf of Ms. Deegan on the 26th February 1997 as follows:

“We are consulted by our above named client Mrs. Margaret Deegan with reference to her summary suspension without pay on the 21st February 1997. The letter of suspension refers to grave irregularities warranting disciplinary action. We are satisfied that her suspension was unlawful and unwarranted.	“Unless our client is reinstated forthwith she will now take such action as she may be advised without further notice to you.”

On 3rd March, the personnel officer of the Ordinance Survey Office wrote to Ms. Gavin's solicitors informing them that their letter had been referred to the Chief State's Solicitor for his attention. On the 18th March letters in the following terms were sent to each of the applicants:-
“I refer to my minute of 21st February informing you of your suspension from duty, under the terms of s. 13 of (the 1956 Act).
[*6] “A preliminary investigation in the map sales area has brought to light certain irregularities in the performance of your duties and evidence linking you to possible fraud. The internal audit which commenced on 5th February found that you had a significant excess of cash over receipts in your possession, for which you failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation. It was also found that in a number of cases, cheques which were in your possession could not be matched to any receipts issued by you or to any other receipts issued in map sales. There is also evidence that receipts issued by you to customers do not match the corresponding receipt which you submitted to accounts.
“If you wish to comment on the contents of this letter, you may do so in writing.
“The investigation of all aspects of this matter has been placed in the hands of the Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation.”

In the case of each of the applicants, they were informed that the respondent had approved the payment of two‑thirds of her salary during the period of suspension. [*7]

On the 10th March, 1997, an application for leave to issue proceedings by way of judicial review in respect of the purported suspension was made on behalf of Ms. Deegan and granted by the High Court. Similar applications were made on behalf of Ms. Gavin and Ms. Lynch on the 21st March 1997 and granted. Statements of opposition having been filed on behalf of the respondent in each case, and a notice of motion seeking the relief in question having been served on behalf of the applicants, the case came on for hearing before O'Higgins J.

The case presented on behalf of the applicants in the High Court was essentially that the respondent had acted ultra vires and without due regard for the applicants' constitutional rights in

(i)	purporting to suspend the applicant from her employment without pay and without according to her an opportunity of hearing the allegations made against her or challenging the same;

	(ii)      purporting to suspend the applicants without notifying them of the grounds for such suspension;

(iii)	purporting to suspend the applicants without due regard for fair procedures and to the applicant's right to earn a livelihood. [*8]

Having referred to the facts and a number of authorities, the learned High Court judge pointed out that s. 13 (2) of the 1956 Act provides that:

“a suspending authority may terminate the suspension of a civil servant suspended under subsection 1 of this section”.

He added:-

“It should be open, therefore, to a person concerned to approach the suspending authority and ask him to terminate the suspension under the powers of that subsection. In order so to do it would be essential that the person would have sufficient detail of the allegations. In the present case I am satisfied that the information given to the three applicants falls far short of being sufficient to enable them to make such representations. No convincing reason has been given for such failure, though in the case of one of the applicants it was stated that the matter was sub judice, and in default of adequate explanation for this failure, the applicants are entitled to succeed.”

The learned trial judge also cited the following observations from the judgment of Carroll J. in Ni Bheolain v. City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee and Others (unreported; judgment delivered January, 28th 1983):‑

[*9] “In less serious cases, however, it seems to me that suspension without some form of advance warning would be a denial of fair procedures.  If there is a possibility that some simple explanation sought in advance would obviate the necessity for suspension, then, in my opinion, there should be communication with the person involved.”

He added:-

“In the present case there might indeed have been reasons why there was no communication with the persons involved such as that envisaged by Carroll J. No reason has been given for the failure to seek such explanation.     On this ground also the (applicants) are entitled to succeed.”

On the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Aston, S.C. on behalf of the respondent submitted that where, as here, a decision was taken to suspend a civil servant so that an inquiry could be conducted into suspected irregularities, the normal rules of natural justice or fair procedures did not apply, since the person concerned was not being disciplined in the sense of being removed from office [*10] 
or subjected to some other sanction. In cases of this nature, the object of the suspension procedure would be frustrated if the person concerned had a right to be given notice of the charge, an opportunity of defending himself or herself and the other protections envisaged in In re Haughey (1971) I.R. 217. The applicants were in this case entitled to an adequate statement of the reasons for the suspension so that they could take such steps as might be necessary to cancel or alleviate the suspension and that had been done in this case. He cited in support the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Lewis v. Heffer and Others (1978) 3 All E.R. 354 and the judgment of Henchy J. in this court in Flynn v. An Post (1987) I.R. 68.

On behalf of Ms. Gavin and Ms. Lynch, Mr. Hartnett S.C. submitted that the suspension of his clients was clearly a disciplinary procedure and one of an extremely serious nature, since it not merely deprived them of their livelihood during the period of the suspension but also left them under a cloud of suspicion and was seriously damaging to their constitutionally guaranteed right to their good name. This was compounded in the present case by the fact that the terms of the letter of 21st February suggested that Mr. Kirwan had already decided that they were guilty of a grave irregularity warranting disciplinary action. [*11]

On behalf of Ms. Deegan, Mr. Horan adopted Mr. Hartnett's submissions. He further submitted that, in the case of his client, her uncontradicted evidence on affidavit demonstrated that she had provided a reasonable explanation of the alleged irregularities. While he did not contend that his client was entitled to the full range of fair procedures as In re Haughey, she was certainly entitled to specific details of the grave allegations being made against her and these had not been provided.

Section 13 of the 1956 Act is as follows:-

 “(1)    a suspending authority may suspend a civil servant if,-
(a)	it appears to that suspending authority that the civil servant has been guilty of grave misconduct or a grave irregularity warranting disciplinary action, or
(b)	it appears to that suspending authority that the public interest might be prejudiced by allowing the civil servant to remain on duty, or
(c)	a charge of grave misconduct or grave irregularity is made against the civil servant and it appears to that suspending authority that the charge warrants investigation. [*12]

(2)	A suspending authority may terminate the suspension of a civil servant suspended under subsection (1) of this section.”

A “suspending authority” is defined by s. 3 as 
“(a) 	the appropriate authority in relation to that civil servant, 
(b) 	a person who, by virtue of subsection (2) of this section, is for the time being a suspending authority in relation to that civil servant.”

It is no longer in dispute in this case that Mr. Kirwan was at the relevant time a suspending authority in relation to each of the three applicants.

Section 14(1) provides that
“Where a suspending authority terminates the suspension of a civil servant by restoring him to duty and the appropriate authority is satisfied that the civil servant has not been guilty of misconduct or irregularity (including misconduct and irregularity charged against him after suspension), the civil servant shall be paid ordinary remuneration in respect of the period of suspension.” [*13]

Where that subsection does not apply, subsection 2 provides that:-

“(a)	the appropriate authority, if satisfied that considerations of equity so require, shall direct that ordinary remuneration, in whole or part, as the appropriate authority may direct, shall be paid to the civil servant in respect of the period of suspension,
(b)	before the appropriate authority decides not to give a direction under paragraph (a) of this subsection or decides to give a direction under that paragraph for payment of part only of ordinary remuneration, the civil servant shall be given an opportunity of making to the appropriate authority any representations he may wish to offer.”

The “appropriate authority”, in the case of a civil servant appointed by the Government, is the Government and, in relation to any other civil servant, the Minister of State by whom the power of appointing a successor to him would for the time being be exercisable, in this case, the Minister for Finance. The court was not informed as to whether the “appropriate authority “ in the present case was the Government or the Minister for Finance, but nothing would appear to turn on this. [*14]

Section 14(4) provides that:-

“(a)    Save in accordance with subsections (1), (2) or (3) of this section, a civil servant who is suspended shall not be paid remuneration in respect of the period of suspension.
 (b)    Where a civil servant is suspended and satisfies the appropriate authority that, by reason of the prolongation of the investigation into his case, undue hardship is being caused, nothing in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall prevent the appropriate authority from authorising, for the mitigation of hardship, payment of such proportion as that appropriate authority thinks fit of the remuneration which would, but for his suspension, have been payable to such civil servant.”

As already noted, in the present case, subsection 4(b) was operated in favour of each of the applicants.

It is clear that the suspension of a person from their employment for a specified period because of irregularities or misconduct on his or her part can constitute a form of disciplinary action which would entitle the person affected to be afforded natural justice or fair procedures before the decision to suspend [*15] him or her is taken. The consequences of such suspension can be extremely serious for the person concerned, involving not merely their right to earn a livelihood but also their right to have their good name protected. In John v. Rees (1969) 2 All E.R. 274, Megarry J., in a passage cited by the learned High Court judge said:‑
“... in essence suspension is merely expulsion pro tanto. Each is penal, and each deprives the member concerned of the enjoyment of his rights of membership or office. Accordingly, in my judgment the rules of natural justice prima facie apply to any process of suspension in the same way that they apply to expulsion.”

However, that was not a case in which the suspension was being imposed so that an enquiry could be undertaken as to whether disciplinary action should be taken against the person concerned and, if so, the nature of such a sanction. That distinction was emphasised by Lord Denning M.R. in Lewis v. Heffer and Others, a decision to which the attention of the learned High Court judge does not appear to have been drawn. Having cited the passage from the judgment of Megarry J., he went on:-

“These words apply, no doubt, to suspensions which are inflicted by way of punishment, as for instance, when a member of the Bar is suspended from practice for six months, or when a solicitor is [*16] suspended from practice. But they do not apply to suspensions which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a Government department or in a business house; and a man maybe suspended on full pay pending enquiries. Suspicion may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself and so forth. The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at once. The work of the department or the office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The others will not trust the man. In order to get back to proper work, the man is suspended. At that stage the rules of natural justice do not apply: see Furnell .v. Whangarei High Schools Board. (1973) AC 660.”

In this case, the applicants were not, of course, suspended on full pay, but, under the relevant statutory provision, were paid a proportion of the remuneration to which they would normally be entitled on the grounds of hardship. I am satisfied, however, that the distinction drawn in that case [*17] accords both with the general approach of the law and with common sense and should be applied to the present case.

That is not to say that natural justice and fair procedures have no role in the present case:  that would be to ignore the right of the applicants to make representations to the suspending authority with a view to having the suspension terminated pursuant to s. 13 (2) of the 1956 Act.

In Flynn .v. An Post (1987) IR 68, the rights of a person in respect of whom the power to suspend conferred by s. 13 of the 1956 Act had been exercised were considered by this court. In that case, the plaintiff, who was a postman, had been suspended because he was suspected of having misappropriated five packages entrusted to him. Following the suspension, the plaintiff s solicitors wrote claiming their client was innocent of what was alleged against him, questioning the validity in law of the suspension and demanding a full hearing within 14 days. Following further correspondence and the threat of proceedings on behalf of the plaintiff, the solicitor to An Post wrote to the plaintiffs solicitors to say that the Director of Public Prosecutions had instructed him to prosecute the plaintiff on indictment and that in those circumstances he (the solicitor) would be unable to engage in further correspondence. The criminal proceedings were duly initiated, but the plaintiff [*18] also initiated proceedings in the High Court claiming that the suspension was ultra vires. The plaintiff applied for, but was refused, an interlocutory injunction in the High Court: subsequently, he was tried on indictment and acquitted on all counts by the jury. The High Court proceedings ultimately came on for hearing and the plaintiff s claim for relief was dismissed by the High Court. In that court, and again on the hearing of the appeal in this court, two grounds inter alia were advanced in support of the plaintiffs claim, viz.
(1)	that the suspension was void ab initio because the plaintiff was not informed adequately of the reasons for his suspension; and
(2)	that the suspension became invalid because of the failure by An Post to accord the plaintiff, within a reasonable time, a full and proper hearing of the complaint of misconduct on which the suspension rested.

A majority of the court (Finlay C.J., Walsh, Hederman, and McCarthy JJ.) were in favour of allowing the plaintiffs appeal on the second of these grounds. However, both McCarthy J. (who delivered the majority judgment) and Henchy J. (who dissented as to the second ground), were of the view that natural justice had been complied with in respect of the plaintiff having been informed of the reason for his suspension and having been afforded an [*19]
opportunity to answer the charge of misconduct upon which the suspension rested. McCarthy J. said that:-
“The learned trial judge held as a fact that the plaintiff was informed of each of the five packages alleged to be misappropriated by him, including how two of them had been 'planted' on him. It was not suggested that this finding of fact was unsupported by evidence; rather it was contended that the allegation should have been spelt out in some more elaborate form and a greater opportunity of dealing with them have been afforded to the plaintiff. There is no substance in this allegation; a postman in the plaintiffs position could not but have been clearly aware of what was being alleged against him; there is ample support for this view in his own written statement.”

Henchy J. said:-
“I readily accept that where there is a suspension without pay in circumstances such as applied here, the fundamentals of justice require that the suspended person be given at the time, or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, an adequate statement of the reasons for the suspension, so that he may take such steps as may be thought necessary to cancel or alleviate the suspension. [*20]
However, in this case, Costello J., having seen and heard the
witnesses, accepted Mr. Cosgrave's version of events in preference
 to that of the plaintiff and was quite satisfied that the plaintiff was told, and well knew, why he was being suspended. That conclusion of fact cannot be disturbed by this court; in any event it is well borne out by the letters and other documents in the case.”

It is clear that both McCarthy J., by implication and Henchy J., expressly, accepted that a person against whom the provisions of Section 13 are invoked is entitled, because of the requirements of natural justice and fair procedures, to be informed of the reasons for his or her suspension so as to enable him or her to make such representations as he or she wishes to make to the suspending authority so that the suspension may be terminated. I would respectfully agree with that view of the law.

Before one can come to a conclusion as to how those legal principles should be applied to the present case the facts must be considered in more detail.
In her affidavit, grounding her application for judicial review, Ms. Gavin said that, some days after the arrival of the auditors, she was asked to attend at a conference room where she met Mr. Patrick McCarthy and Ms. Ann Maher [*21] from the Valuation Department. She (Ms. Gavin) was in the company of a union representative. She said that it was indicated to her that this was “a general enquiry” and that there was no suggestion that this was a hearing into any alleged irregularity by herself. She said that she was asked various hypothetical questions in relation to receipts and money not tallying and was asked how this could happen. She said 

“I was not asked any questions in relation to any specific incident or specific transactions and there was no suggestion made that I was under suspicion in relation to any specific transaction or any specific irregularity.”

She then said she heard nothing further until 21st February when she was given the notice of suspension.

That account of events was, however, disputed by Mr. Kirwan in his affidavit. He said that the auditors had specifically asked the applicant about her excess of remittances over receipts and that she had explained that she had an unreceipted cheque for £156.00. She said that this cheque was for an urgent order which had been filled and, as the photo was apparently for a court case she expected that the customer would contact the Ordinance Survey at some stage in the future seeking the presence of a member of staff to attend court and [*22] that she intended issuing the receipt when the customer got in touch again with the office. Mr. Kirwan added:-
“I am advised and so believe that no hypothetical questions were asked. The questions related primarily to the excess of cash over receipts in her possession.”

In a replying affidavit Ms. Gavin accepted that she had been asked about a specific transaction and her account of what happened in relation to it in the subsequent affidavit was broadly similar to that given by Mr. Kirwan. She added
 “If I had realised that the meeting with the auditors was part of an investigation into alleged wrongdoing when I then (sic) have asked for specific details or particulars of the allegations being made against me and I would have been in a position to contradict any allegation of dishonesty being made. At no time was I aware that I was under suspicion and I was told specifically that this was an informal meeting.”

In her affidavit grounding her application for judicial review, Ms. Lynch also deposed to having attended, accompanied by a union representative, a meeting with the auditors in February 1997. She said that she was told that this [*23] was an informal meeting in order to clarify things and there was no suggestion made that any wrongdoing was being alleged against her. She said that she was asked about cash and receipt books and whether it was possible that one could have a situation where the cheques received did not correspond with the receipts. She said that this was possible and that she was also told that she was “up money” in that the cash she received exceeded the amount in the receipt book on one particular occasion. She said that no date or time was given but that she indicated that she had mentioned to her superintendent some six weeks prior to this that this had occurred. She added that 
“nothing further was said to me and there was no suggestion whatsoever that any allegation was being made against me.”

Again, this version of events was disputed in Mr. Kirwan's affidavit. He said:-
“I am advised and so believe that the internal auditors did specifically ask (Ms. Lynch) about her excess of remittances over receipts and three unreceipted cheques. The applicant said that she had accepted an amount of £395 for a special order from a football club some months before for which she had not issued a receipt. She could not remember whether the money was paid in cash or by cheque. She was able to recall the specific amount [*24] because she had to consult with the Chief Superintendent regarding the price of this special order. She expected the club would revert to her for a receipt at a later date and that the money was being held back so that she could issue the receipt should the Club request it.”

No replying affidavit to this affidavit was sworn by Ms. Lynch.

Ms. Deegan, in her affidavit grounding her application for judicial review, said that, at the meeting with the auditors, she confirmed that she complained in the past in relation to what she perceived as “inadequate cash handling procedures” in her department and she identified the individuals to whom she had made these complaints. She said that she answered all the questions as accurately as she could and that there was no intimation of any concern with her performance or conduct at any time.

In his affidavit, Mr. Kirwan did not dispute Ms. Deegan's account of events, although he did say that in her case, the audit had found that she had a significant excess of cash over receipts and that there were receipts issued to customers which did not match the corresponding receipts submitted to accounts. [*25]

In her replying affidavit, Ms. Deegan gave further details of the system as to receipt books which, she said, operated in the map sales department at the relevant time. She said that the receipt books consisted of blank sequentially numbered receipt books which were made available to staff who signed for the same. It was, however, the practice for the maps sales staff to utilise one another's receipt books and to sign out receipts from books other than their own. She also said that, in so far as the requirements to account, maintain records and remit to the accounts department were concerned, this was carried out though the receipt book and that she always retained cash for receipt in sales as a “float” to enable her to give change to customers. She said that, in order to generate a cash sales float, she always retained some cash and sales receipts in her cash drawer and this would accordingly have accounted for some small portion of her sales to the accounts department in arrears. She said that it was customary practice for her to supplement the cash retained in her cash drawer with personal monies to provide a cash float, when insufficient cash was available and that the management were aware of this practice. She said that, as a result, she never had a nil balance in her cash drawer since she maintained a float of change for customers at the counter who made cash purchases. She also said that other staff members would have used her cash receipt books over the years together with her cash drawer and that, [*26] accordingly, she had not control over her receipt books at any time despite her making complaints to her superintendents. She also said that the receipt books were of indifferent quality, had been the subject matter of complaints over the years by the staff and, in particular, were “poorly carbonised” and fell apart very easily. She said that, as a result, it was virtually impossible to ascertain what the original receipt recited and that this created particular difficulty when completing the returns. Frequently, one had to resort to memory in order to complete the details of transactions.

Ms. Deegan reiterated that she had not been given the precise details of the precise irregularities under investigation and that she had not engaged in any wrongdoing. She also gave details of two cases in which she said that, for specified reasons, she had not recorded transactions pending receipt of information and that, to that extent, her cash sales were in excess of the receipts.

The issue in this case is, accordingly, as to whether each of the applicants was deprived of the opportunity to make representations to the suspending authority in order to have their suspensions terminated because they did not know in sufficient detail the nature of the grave irregularity warranting [*27]
disciplinary action and investigation referred to in Mr. Kirwan's letter of 21st February.

Undoubtedly, if the letters of February 21st had been given to the applicants without any prior warning or intimation as to the nature of the irregularity referred to, there would be no answer to the applicants' claim that they were unable to make representations to the suspending authority in order to have the suspension terminated. That was emphatically not the position in the case of any of the applicants. In the case of Ms. Lynch and Ms. Gavin, they have accepted that, not merely were they told that the auditors were investigating an apparent discrepancy between the cash received by them and the receipts issued by them: they were asked about specific transactions where such discrepancies appeared to have occurred. I am bound to say that I find the argument advanced on their behalf that, because the letter of 21st February did not refer to the queries raised by the auditors at the meetings early in February the applicants would, as a result, have been in a state of uncertainty as to what was being alleged, disingenuous in the extreme. Both applicants must have been well aware when the letter of 21st February arrived that it was referring to the inquiry carried out by the internal auditors and to nothing else. Indeed, both applicants set out what subsequently transpired to be a significantly incomplete account of the meeting with the auditors in their affidavits [*28] grounding the application for judicial review, thereby accepting by implication that they were well aware that this was what had prompted the letter of February 21st informing them of their suspension. In each case, moreover, they were informed by the letter of March 18th of the nature of the irregularity being alleged against them.

The case of Ms. Deegan is somewhat different, since the affidavit of Mr. Kirwan contained no express averment that she was informed at the meeting with the auditors that there was, in her case, an excess of cash over receipts. However, again, she cannot have been under any misapprehension as to the reasons for her suspension, since the letter of the 18th March expressly stated that there was, in her case, a significant excess of cash over receipts in her possession, that cheques in her possession or returned by her to accounts could not be matched to receipts issued by her or to other receipts issued in map sales and that receipts issued by her did not match the corresponding receipts which she submitted to accounts.

I am, accordingly, satisfied that each of the applicants in this case was aware of the nature of the irregularities being alleged against them which, in the view of the suspending authority, warranted their suspension so that disciplinary action could be considered and an appropriate investigation [*29] undertaken. They were not in any way precluded from making such representations as they thought fit to the suspending authority in order that the suspension might be terminated and, I am, accordingly, satisfied that the conclusion reached by the learned High Court judge that they were not in a position to make such representations and that this was a violation of the principles of natural justice and of fair procedures was not justified by the uncontested evidence in the case.

I should add that the court was also informed that criminal proceedings had been in fact instituted against each of the applicants, that the jury had acquitted Ms. Lynch of the charges against her and that, in the case of Ms. Gavin, a nolle prosequi had been entered by the Director of Public Prosecutions in respect of the charges against her. The prosecution against Ms. Deegan is still pending, it would appear. However, this court is solely concerned with the state of affairs when the applicants instituted the proceedings by way of judicial review which were ultimately determined in their favour by the High Court. Whether any of the applicants would have been in a position to establish that the suspensions, because of the passage of time, had ceased to be valid having regard to the decision in Flynn v. An Post, is not a question which concerns this court. [*30] 

I would allow the appeal in each case and substitute for the order of the

High Court an order dismissing the applicants' claim.