The Supreme Court
182/2000
Murphy J.
Hardiman J.
Fennelly J

Mary Molloy
Plaintiff
And

The Right Honourable Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Dublin,
Clonmel Enterprises Limited and Bestobell Valves Limited
Defendants 
And

Ashworth Frazer Limited
Third Party

Judgment of Murphy J. delivered on the 28th day of June 2001, [Nem Diss]. 

The issue in this appeal is whether a third-party notice dated the 9th July, 1999, and served by Clonmel Enterprises Ltd., the above named second defendant on the above named third party, Ashworth Frazer Ltd. (Frazer), was served “as soon as is reasonably possible” within the meaning and for the purposes of s. 27 of the Civil Liability Act, 1961.
On the 14th December, 1994, Thomas Molloy died in a tragic accident. At the time of his death Mr. Molloy was in the employment of the second defendant. It is alleged that the second defendant had installed a water valve in an underground chamber at Lower Drumcondra Road for Dublin Corporation (the Corporation). At the time of his death Mr. Molloy, in company with fellow employees of the second defendant, was investigating and attempting to open the valve when the accident occurred. It appears that the accident arose because the spindle on the valve which was not protected by a collar, shot from its casing while Mr. Molloy was working on it. The valve in question was manufactured by the third defendants, Bestobell Valves Ltd. and supplied to the second defendant by the third party.

On the 20th May, 1996, Mary Molloy, the widow of the late Thomas Molloy, instituted proceedings by way of plenary summons claiming damages against each of the above defendants by reason of negligence and breach of statutory duty on their behalf. The statement of claim was delivered on the 7th April, 1997, setting out the history of the matter as already described and furnishing particulars of negligence which included the failure.-

“To ensure that the valve was fitted with a suitable spindle collar or other protective restraint so as to ensure that it was incapable of being ejected with force from the body of the valve.”

Defences were delivered on behalf of each of the defendants, that on behalf of the second defendant being delivered on the 4th June, 1998. By motion on notice dated the 20th May, 1999, the second defendant sought leave to serve a third party notice on the third party. That leave was duly granted by order of Johnson J. made on the 28th June, 1999, and in pursuance thereof, the notice was duly issued on the 9th July, 1999. By notice dated the 8th November, the third party applied - as it had advised the second defendant it would - for an order striking out the third-party notice on the grounds that the same had not been served in accordance with the Civil Liability Act, 1961, as amended. By order of the High Court (Butler J.) made on the 7th June, 2000. the third-party notice was struck out for the reasons set out in the agreed note of the ex tempore judgment of the learned judge delivered on that date. It is from that judgment and the order made thereon that the second defendant appeals to this court.
	The right to serve a third-party notice and the time limit within which the same is to be served is set out in s. 27(1) of the Civil Liability Act, 1961, in the following terms:

“A concurrent wrongdoer who is sued for damages or for contribution and who wishes to make a claim for contribution under this Part: -

(a)	shall not, if the person from whom he proposes to claim contribution is already a party to the action, be entitled to claim contribution except by a claim made in the said action, whether before or after judgment in the action; and
(b)	shall, if the said person is not already a party to the action, serve a third-party notice upon such person as soon as is reasonably possible and, having served such notice, he shall not be entitled to claim contribution except under the third-party procedure. If such third-party notice is not served as aforesaid, the court may in its discretion refuse to make an order for contribution against the person from whom contribution is claimed.”

	The regulatory provisions concerning the service of third-party notices set out in the Rules of the Superior Court, 1986, at O. 16, r. 2(2) are in the following terms:-

“The notice shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, be served within twenty eight-days from the making of the order, and with it there shall be served a copy of the originating summons and of any pleadings delivered in the action.”

Having regard to the fact that the defence of the second defendant was delivered on the 4th June, 1998 and the notice served on the 9th July, 1999, the issue which fell for consideration by Butler J. was whether the second defendant had complied with the statutory requirement of serving the third-party notices “as soon as is reasonably possible” as required by the express provisions of s. 27 of the Civil Liability Act, 1961.

Much of the written submissions and the oral argument to this court was directed to the scheme and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1961. There can be little doubt as to what that scheme and purpose was. The legislature was understandably desirous of avoiding a multiplicity of actions. Instead of defendants against whom awards had been made instituting further proceedings against other parties liable to them in respect of the same set of facts - and indeed those defendants in turn perhaps instituting even more proceedings against others - the Oireachtas sought to establish a situation in which the rights and liabilities of all parties arising out of a particular set of circumstances would be disposed of in the same proceedings. It is for that reason that a defendant was given the right, with the approval of the court, to serve a third-party notice on a potential defendant so that any claim against him could be disposed of at the same time as that of the claim against the actual defendant. This procedure had attractions for all of the parties and was desirable in the public interest. Nevertheless, the legislature did not preclude an unsuccessful defendant in the original proceedings from instituting a substantive action against some other party who the actual defendant contended was liable to him either in tort or in contract. What the Act of 1961 did provide, was that where the actual defendant in the original proceedings failed to avail of the third-party procedure by serving the third-party notice “as soon as is reasonably possible” and resorted to his original cause of action, the relief which he might have claimed therein was subject to the statutory discretion of the court to refuse to make an order for contribution in his favour.

	The effect of the section was explained by Finlay C.J. in delivering judgment in Board of Governors of St Laurence ‘s Hospital v. Staunton [1990] 2 I.R. 31 at p. 36, with which the other members of this court agreed, when he said:-

	“I am quite satisfied upon the true construction of that sub-section that the only service of a third-party notice contemplated by it and, therefore, the only right of a person to obtain from the High Court liberty to serve a third-party notice claiming contribution against a person who is not already a party to the action, is a right to serve a third-party notice as soon as is reasonably possible. A defendant in an action seeking to claim contribution against a person who is not a party to the proceedings cannot serve any third-party notice at any other time, other than as soon as is reasonably possible.”

The terms in which the time limit was expressed do appear severe. The use of the word “possible” rather than the word “practicable”, as is invoked elsewhere, suggests a brief and inflexible time limit. It might suggest that if it is physically possible to serve the appropriate notice within an identified period, that any further delay would be impermissible. However, such a draconian approach would be inconsistent with the nature of the problems to be confronted by a defendant and of the decisions to be made by him or his advisors. The statute is not concerned with physical possibilities but legal and perhaps commercial judgments. Proceedings cannot and should not be instituted or contributions sought against any party without assembling and examining the relevant evidence and obtaining appropriate advice thereon. It is in that context that the word “possible” must be understood. Furthermore, the qualification of the word “possible” by the word “reasonable” gives a further measure of flexibility. As Barron J. pointed out in McElwaine v. Hughes (Unreported, High Court, Barron J., 30th April, 1997) at p. 6 of the unreported judgment:-

“Clearly the words ‘as soon as reasonably possible’ denotes that there should be as little delay as possible, nevertheless, the use of the word ‘reasonable’ indicates that circumstances may exist which justify some delay in the bringing of the proceedings.”

	The onus is on the person seeking leave to serve the third-party notice to prove the application is brought within the statutory time limit. Again, it was Barron J. who pointed out in McElwaine v. Hughes also at p. 6 that:-

“Since the obligation is on the defendant to serve the notice within a reasonable time, it seems to me that the onus of proof of showing that the delay, if delay there is, was not unreasonable is upon the defendant.”

	The second defendant sought to explain and justify the delay which has occurred by reference to criminal proceedings which were instituted on the 4th August, 1995, against the first defendant, the second defendant and the third party under the Safety. Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989. Those proceedings were heard in November, 1998 and the two defendants and the third party were duly convicted by Judge Malone in the District Court on the 9th February, 1999. One of the offences of which the third party was convicted was described in the summons in the following terms:-

“That you, the said accused, being a person who imported and supplied an article, namely a Bestobell gate valve, for use at work, did, on the 14th December, 1994. fail to take such steps as were necessary to secure that the persons supplied by you with the said article, namely Clonmel Enterprises Ltd. and Dublin Corporation, were provided with adequate information about the use for which it was designed or had been tested, and about any conditions relating to the said article so as to ensure that, when in use, dismantled or disposed of, it would be safe and without risk to health.”

The District Judge found as a matter of fact that the third party had not furnished to the first defendant or the second defendant what the judge described as the “crucial document known as WP4” which contained the installation and maintenance instructions in relation to the valve. In the affidavit grounding the application for leave to serve the third-party notice Ms. Margaret M. Carey, the solicitor for the second defendant, explained the relevance of the criminal proceedings and the finding aforesaid of the judge of the District Court in the following terms:-

“I say and am instructed that the second defendant awaited the outcome of these criminal prosecutions before deciding whether to seek leave from this honourable court to issue a third-party notice. I say and believe that if the third party had succeeded in making out a defence of a substantive nature to the charges made against it in the aforesaid criminal proceedings, the service of a third-party notice would have served no purpose. I accordingly, say that it was both reasonable and prudent for the second defendant to have waited between the date of the delivery of the defence herein on the 4th June, 1998 and the outcome of those proceedings before making this application.”

In the written and oral submissions to this court, counsel for the second defendant repeated that argument and drew attention to the fact that the postponement of an application for leave to issue third-party proceedings because of outstanding litigation - and that litigation between other parties -was upheld by this court in Gilmore v. Windle [1967] I.R. 323 and that a delay which was explained by defendants awaiting a reply to a notice for particulars and a statement of evidence was likewise held by this court to explain adequately the time which had elapsed before the application for leave was made (see Connolly v. Casey [2000] 1 I.R. 345). Counsel for the third party did draw certain distinctions between the facts of those cases and the instant case. Gilmore v. Windle was readily distinguished on the basis that the outstanding proceedings in that case related to the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the Civil Liability Act, 1961, which was then still a comparative novelty and had caused difficulties for practitioners unfamiliar with its operation. A significant feature of Connolly v. Casey was the identification of an error in the approach by the High Court to the decision of the defendant to await replies to the notice for particulars. It was not, as Denham J. pointed out, essential or even material to ascertain whether the replies to the notice were significant. The issue was whether it was appropriate in the circumstances of that case to await the replies, whatever material they might provide. In any event, the question whether a defendant has discharged the onus imposed upon him of proving that the application for leave is brought “as soon as reasonably possible” will depend upon the examination of the facts of each particular case as was pointed out in Connolly v. Casey.

In the present case, all of the defendants obviously investigated the cause of the accident to enable them to defend the criminal and civil proceedings against them. There is no doubt that by 1995, at the latest, they were fully familiar with the condition of the Bestobell valve and the fact that it had not been fitted with a spindle collar It was that fact which formed the greater part of the particulars of negligence alleged against the third party in the third-party notice.

Apart from the information obtained by the examination of the valve, its own inquiries would have advised the second defendant as to the material furnished to them by the third party in relation to the equipment. However, insofar as the District Court criminal proceedings were helpful or relevant to the second defendant in determining whether to institute proceedings against the third party, the fact is, as Mr. Peter Lennon set out in para. 6 of the affidavit sworn by him on the 19th January, 2000, that the summonses and books of evidence and statements of the prosecutor were available to all of the parties not later than October, 1995. The second defendant itself was aware or should have been aware that it was not provided with appropriate information concerning the special features of the valve. Its belief in that regard was supported by the investigations made by the inspector on behalf of the National Authority for Occupational Safety and Health, Fionan de Barra, who prosecuted the third party for its failure to supply such information. The statement of Mr. de Barra’s evidence was available to the second defendant. The application for leave to issue third party proceedings was not postponed because of any want of information or evidence.

	In the affidavit of Margaret M. Carey, sworn on the 4th February, 2000, she explained the effect of the District Court proceedings in the following terms:-

 “As a result of the District Court proceedings, the second defendant’s state of knowledge with regard to the evidence of the third party’s involvement was considerably enhanced and, whilst Mr. Lennon takes exception to my referring to the criminal case. I do so to illustrate that, prior to those hearings, the second defendant was very much in the dark as regards the precise involvement of the third party and would not have been justified, in my view, in initiating third-party proceedings on a speculative basis. Following the hearing, it was in no doubt that a strong case could be made out and I believe it was reason able to await the outcome of the prosecution in all of the circumstances.”

Ms. Carey is clearly correct in saying that the District Court proceedings “enhanced” the second defendant’s state of knowledge and, following those proceedings, the second defendant was in a position to make a “strong case”. These were advantages which accrued to the second defendant by postponing its decision to institute the third party proceedings but the quest for certainty or verification must be balanced against the statutory obligation to make the appropriate application “as soon as reasonably possible”. In my view, it was indeed possible for the second defendant, on the information available to it, to make a prudent and responsible decision several months before the application was brought before Johnson J. In those circumstances the second defendant failed to comply with the statutory requirement and the trial judge was correct, in my view, in setting aside the third party order. I would dismiss the appeal.