Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

Macken, J. [S.C. No. 406/2009]
O’Donnell, J.
McKechnie, J.

BETWEEN

He recognised that the question of prosecutorial delay was one which had been the subject of very considerable scrutiny by the courts over a period of years and invoked Devoy v. D.P.P. [2008] 4 IR 235, in which Kearns J. carried out a lengthy and informative analysis of the applicable principles, and he cited those principles. Next the learned judge pointed to the fact that in the same case Kearns J. emphasised the exceptional nature of the remedy of prohibition in the context of the criminal justice process. He then dealt with the obligation on the court to have regard to the general presumption that if the matter were permitted to proceed, a trial judge would act fairly in respect of the appellant, citing The People (D.P.P.) v. Z [1994] 2 I.R. 476.

Having regard to the above principles, and applying them to the facts germane to the present case, the learned High Court judge found, first, that the prosecutorial delay in question was not so severe as to merit, of itself, an order of prohibition. In doing so, he noted that the delay between the 4th September, 2003, when the alleged offences were said to have occurred on the sale of the lorry to SBC Utilities Limited, and the 24th April, 2007, when the summonses were served, constituted a lapse of time deserving of the court’s attention, but found the period was not so egregiously lengthy as to entitle the appellant to the relief sought, without further consideration of the surrounding circumstances. The learned High Court judge then considered the obligation on the court to assess whether any specific prejudice had arisen as against the appellant which had affected, or would affect in the future, the appellant’s ability to mount a defence to the charges in question. On that issue, he found that there were no problems relating to the unavailability of witnesses, or of documentary evidence. He pointed to the fact that the appellant’s submissions on this issue were confined to general claims that the memories of employees may have, or had, dimmed, or become confused by subsequent events. In that regard, the learned High Court judge determined that this argument was not supported by the evidence before him, and, on the contrary, two of the appellant’s employees were capable of providing, on affidavit, for the purposes of the present judicial review proceedings, quite detailed recollections of the events surrounding the sale of the lorry. In such circumstances, he was unable to accept that any tangible or appreciable prejudice had arisen or been established.

In circumstances where the delay was insufficient to justify, of itself, an order of prohibition, and since the learned High Court judge found that there had been no demonstrable prejudice established, he next turned to the question of implementing the balancing test envisaged by the Supreme Court in Devoy v. D.P.P., supra. He drew attention to the exercise to be carried out by weighing the community’s entitlement to see that criminal offences do not go unpunished and a defendant’s right to an expeditious trial in due course of law, against the backdrop of the circumstances of the case as a whole. In that regard, the learned High Court judge found that there had been significant delay in the case and that that delay had not been contributed to by any fault on the part of the appellant. He found, however, that a considerable portion of the period in question prior to service of the summons, had been adequately explained in the affidavit of Mr. O’Dea sworn on behalf of the HSA, in particular to the effect that diligent investigations were taking place between April and October, 2004, and that almost the entire calendar year of 2006 was spent obtaining further evidence and responding to directions by the respondent in respect of the then likely prosecution of the appellant. He recognised that a period of 14 months, from October, 2004 until December, 2005 was explained merely by reference to a backlog of work within the HSA legal department, which he found not to be a satisfactory justification, and which amounted, prima facie, to a violation of the appellant’s right to an expeditious trial.

In these circumstances, what had to be considered, he said, was whether the prima facie breach of the appellant’s rights in respect of that period of time was sufficient to “overpower the community interest in the present case”. The learned High Court judge considered that the offences were undoubtedly serious ones, that there was ample jurisprudence in respect of incidences in which the supply of unsafe machinery and work equipment had directly resulted in the death or serious injury of employees in the conduct of their regular daily tasks, and that in the present case the lorry had already been involved in one fatal accident while in the hands of the first purchaser, Southern Midland. The prosecution of corporations and individuals who culpably engaged in the supply of such hazardous devices was a matter of utmost public importance. He did not accept that the period of blameworthy inordinate delay which did occur, which he found to amount to the above 14 months, was of sufficient gravity to warrant the prohibition of the appellant’s trial.

The next issue considered by the learned High Court judge concerned an alleged breach of fair procedures in the conduct of the investigation. This arises out of one of the grounds for judicial review, the basis for which was in the following terms:-

“That the respondent failed to caution certain employees of the appellant company prior to the taking of statements in relation to this prosecution”.

In the foregoing circumstances, the learned High Court judge determined that the issue of the admissibility of the statements so procured should be left to the trial of the action, when it would be more appropriately dealt with by the trial judge.

Having regard to the foregoing, the High Court dismissed the application for judicial review by order made on the 17th July, 2009, (perfected on the 2nd September, 2009).

The Appeal
From the judgment and order the appellant appealed by notice of appeal dated the 7th October, 2009, grounded on a series of grounds (18 in all).

The appellant asserted that the learned High Court judge misdirected himself in law and upon the evidence and the balance of the evidence as follows:-

(1) In concluding that the applicant had abandoned its challenge to the constitutionality of s.50 of the Act of 1989;

(2) In construing the facts of the present case in light of the general principles contained in decisions on prosecutorial and systemic delay; and in failing to recognise that the principles on prosecutorial and systemic delay emerging from the Irish case law concerning child sexual abuse are the subject of separate jurisprudence;

(3) In finding that the delay between September, 2003 and April, 2007 did not appear to be so egregiously lengthy as to entitle the applicant to the relief sought;

(4) In failing to have any proper regard to the nature of the offence;

(5) In failing to recognise that the case was sui generis due to the reversal of the onus of proof provided for by s.50 of the Act of 1989 and that delay on the part of the prosecution necessarily disadvantages the accused due to the reversal of the onus of proof and, in light of this, that there ought to be a higher duty of reasonable expedition on prosecuting authorities;

(6) In finding that the appellant’s submissions were in essence confined to general claims that the memories of its employees may have dimmed or become confused by subsequent events and that the submissions on prejudice were not supported on the evidence before the court, and in finding that the ability of the appellant’s employees to provide detailed recollections on affidavit of the events surrounding the sale of the lorry were relevant to the offences;

(7) In failing to take into account that the respondent had treated the applicant throughout the investigation as though no investigation which might lead to prosecution was in train, by taking uncautioned statements from employees;

(8) In finding that a considerable portion of the period of delay was adequately explained; and that diligent investigations were taking place between April and October, 2004, in finding that the delay for the calendar year 2006 was explicable and/or reasonable and/or satisfactorily justified; and in finding that the only delay not satisfactorily justified was that between October, 2004 and December, 2005;

(9) In finding that the infringement of the appellant’s right to an expeditious trial was heavily outweighed by the public interest in ensuring that offences such as those at issue were fully prosecuted.

I am satisfied, first, that the only issues of law for consideration in this appeal arising out of the judgment of the High Court are those of delay and of an absence of fair procedures in respect of the absence of a caution, the two issues treated by the learned High Court judge. It is said in the course of the notice of appeal that the constitutionality of s.50 of the Act of 1989 is still extant, and that the learned High Court judge was wrong to consider that it was no longer the subject of the High Court proceedings. In the course of the written submissions the appellant points to the original grounds upon which relief was sought, which include a declaration as to the invalidity of s.50 of the Act of 1989. The only context in which s.50 arises in the appeal is based on the reversal of the burden found in that section, which factor, according to the appellant, ought to have had a particular influence on the assessment of the impact of any prosecutorial delay. I am satisfied that the learned High Court judge was correct in his conclusions concerning the status of the challenge to the validity of s.50 of the Act of 1989. I note, in any event, that no argument has been presented in the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant as to the constitutionality of that section, and there has been no oral argument before this Court in relation to the same, in which circumstance I am satisfied that the validity of the section is not an extant issue, at this time, in the appeal.

I therefore propose to deal with the matter exclusively on the basis of the judgment of the High Court. The appellant submits, and, it is assumed, also submitted in the High Court, that the respondent was in a position, or ought to have been in a position, to have assembled all relevant materials within a short period of time after the alleged offence, which period the appellant places at nine months, commencing from early September, 2003. It is said that this is supported by the fact that Mr. O’Dea, on behalf of the HSA, averred on affidavit that he became aware of the apparent non-compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1989 in April, 2004. It is contended that since that was so, the respondent had wrongly delayed for a further three years before serving summonses on the appellant, and that during this period of inordinate delay the appellant had no notice of the alleged offences, and that statements were taken without any indication that the appellant might be prosecuted.

Counsel for the appellant analyses the judgment and the learned High Court judge’s application of the principles enunciated in Devoy v. D.P.P., supra., following on from the American case, Barker v. Wingo [1972] 407 U.S. 514. In that regard, the appellant contends that the learned trial judge fell into error because he failed to take account of the unique nature of the offences with which the accused was charged, and that the case law makes it clear that the nature of the offence must be taken into account, citing D.P.P. v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236, and Noonan v. D.P.P. [2008] 1 IR 445. In particular, on the question of delay, counsel refers to the acknowledgement in the latter case of the fact that lengthy periods of delay are the subject of separate jurisprudence where they concern issues arising in child sex abuse cases. Secondly, counsel contends that due to the varied nature of offences, and the circumstances leading to their commission, a single test for analysing prosecutorial delay is inappropriate, and argues that in Barker v. Wingo, supra., the US Supreme Court emphasised that there could be no inflexible rule, since every case must be dealt with on an individual basis. Thirdly, while recognising that mere delay, per se, does not give rise to an entitlement to an order prohibiting a trial, and therefore an additional factor must be present, the question which the High Court judge ought to have considered was whether or not in the present circumstances there was such an additional factor. In that regard, counsel for the appellant cites an extract from the judgment of Finlay C.J. in D.P.P. v. Byrne, supra. in the following terms:-

“… instances may occur in which a delay between the date of the alleged commission of an offence and the date of a proposed trial identified as unreasonable would give rise to the necessity for a court to protect the constitutional right of the accused by preventing the trial, even where it could not be established either that the delay involved an oppressive pre-trial detention, or that it created a risk or probability that the accused's capacity to defend himself would be impaired. This must lead of course to a conclusion that, on an application to prohibit a trial on the basis of unreasonable delay, or lapse of time, failure to establish actual or presumptive prejudice may not conclude the issues which have to be determined.”

“In any proceedings for an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or requirement to do something so far as is practicable or so far as is reasonably practicable, or to use the best practicable means to do something, it shall be for the accused to prove (as the case may be) that it was not practicable or not reasonably practicable to do more than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement, or that there was no better practicable means than was in fact used to satisfy the duty or requirement.”

Apart from the foregoing arguments on the question of prejudice, the appellant contends that the learned High Court judge was also incorrect when he found that there was no tangible or appreciable prejudice arising in the circumstances of the present case. Counsel argues that prejudice must always be viewed as a relative concept, and that having regard to the lengthy delay which occurred, the rights of the accused have been severely impaired, when compared to the position which would have arisen had the trial been conducted with due expedition. It is said in the present case that there should have been no difficulty in relation to the laying of charges, in particular since the HSA received instructions from the respondent to prosecute the appellant for various offences, contrary to s.6 of the Act of 1989, in November, 2003. It had to be accepted, therefore, that the investigation was neither particularly complex nor detailed, and that the failure to move with greater expedition cast the appellant in the impossible position of having to prove that certain sensors were in place on a vehicle in 2003, or that it was neither practicable, nor reasonably practical, to do more than was, in fact, done on the use of the machines upon their sale by the appellant. This is particularly so in circumstances where no indication was given by the HSA, despite several interviews with the appellant’s employees, that it might be prosecuted for such offences until 2007, and especially as the vehicle had been inspected on six occasions between September, 2003 and June, 2004, without any of these inspections, including those by an expert, revealing the absence of sensors. Where the appellant had done nothing to contribute to the delay, a factor recognised by the learned High Court judge, and where there was sufficient information to prosecute the appellant at a much earlier date, it is legally unacceptable that the appellant is informed it is being prosecuted for an offence, in respect of which it carries the probative onus, three and a half years after its commission.

Finally, the appellant contests the acceptance by the trial judge of the reasons offered by Mr. O’Dea on behalf of the HSA for the delay which, in fact, occurred. This criticism is made on the basis that, in the initial period, the investigations undertaken do not appear to have been essentially for the purposes of bringing charges, and this is supported by the fact that statements were taken from employees of the appellant without cautions being administered. Secondly, complaint is made of the reliance by the judge on the serious backlog of work in the legal unit of the HSA stemming from the absence of resources. Counsel for the appellant argues that this is not an acceptable explanation. He invokes, in that regard, an extract from the judgment of Hardiman J. in Noonan v. D.P.P., supra., to the effect that it is little consolation to a person whose trial has been inordinately delayed, that this delay, or part of it, is due to systemic delays due to under resourcing, since the result for an accused is the same in any event. Counsel for the appellant finally challenges the explanation for the further period of delay which was referred to by Mr. O’Dea as covering exchanges of correspondence with the Chief Prosecution Solicitor and further meetings with representatives of the appellant, and says that although it was accepted by the learned High Court judge that there were diligent investigations taking place between April and October, 2004, the appellant was not furnished with statements setting out what had transpired at those meetings, or their relevance to the prosecution. In such circumstances, it is contended that these additional meetings and further correspondence are entirely irrelevant in the context of the prosecution.

The respondent counters the foregoing challenges to the High Court judgment on the basis that, while accepting there is a clear right to an expeditious trial, the learned High Court judge was correct in saying that the delay was not so egregiously lengthy as to entitle the appellant to the relief sought without any further consideration of the circumstances in question. It is pointed out that the appellant makes no complaint of any delay relating to the period after the appellant was charged, but confines the objection to the period giving rise to a failure to initiate charges within a reasonable time after the alleged commission of the offences, on the basis that this has seriously prejudiced the appellant. The right to an expeditious trial, it is submitted, does not commence on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and therefore the date of the 4th September, 2003, is not the appropriate date. That right commences, on the contrary, when an accused person is charged with an offence, or when the prosecuting authorities are in a position to charge an accused, but do not do so. This position is clarified in the judgment in O’Flynn v. District Justice Clifford [1988] I.R. 740, in which Gannon J. stated that there was an important distinction between the stage before charge, when the matter of a suspected crime is being investigated, and the stage after an accused person has been charged, and so is subject to the directions of a court. In that case Gannon J. had explained the distinction between these two periods and the consequences flowing from them. This same theme is found in the judgment of Finlay C.J. in Hogan v. The President of the Circuit Court [1994] 2 I.R. 513. The respondent in its written submissions, as supplemented by counsel, also makes reference to Cahalane v. Murphy [1994] 2 I.R. 262, delivered shortly before the Hogan decision, in which statements of principle are found which were subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in McFarlane v. D.P.P. [2007] 1 IR 134 in which Hardiman J. stated at p.140:

“The delay of which the applicant complains is entirely pre-charge delay. Since the evidence on which to bring a charge was not available until just before he was in fact charged there appears to be no basis for the applicant to complain about that delay.”

Mr. O’Dea was not cross-examined or challenged on the content of his affidavit, whose averments the learned High Court judge was entitled to accept. When the file was transmitted to the respondent in December, 2005, further information was sought prior to the respondent making a decision whether or not to initiate a prosecution, which included statements taken from witnesses in March, 2006 and April, 2006, and from a further party in late April, 2006, all of which statements are contained in the book of evidence and are being relied upon by the prosecution. In such circumstances, and having regard to the evidence adduced before the trial judge, the respondent submits that there is no evidence the respondent could have directed that the appellant be charged at a date earlier than the date upon which he was, in fact, charged.

Next, the respondent argues that the learned trial judge correctly relied on and applied the principles governing prosecutorial delay as enunciated in Devoy v. D.P.P., supra,, in P.M. v. Malone [2002] 2 IR 560, and other cases, all of which approve the principles set out in Barker v. Wingo, supra. It is said that it is in the context of the pre-trial interests, identified in the latter case, that the appellant’s case should be considered. The respondent adopts the analysis carried out by Kearns P. in the Devoy case as correctly representing the law, including any additional factor to be taken into account. However, the additional factor which the appellant, wrongly in the contention of the respondent, seeks to have considered, is the nature of the offence itself. The respondent submits that the nature of an offence is relevant only insofar as the investigation of more complex cases can take longer than more simple cases. It is not, however, connected with the appellant’s pre-trial interests. As to the appellant’s argument that the so-called reversal of the onus of proof in s.50 of the Act of 1989 is a unique factor, the respondent contends that such a factor is not contemplated by the principles in Barker v. Wingo, supra., as adopted in this jurisdiction. Where a burden passes to a defendant, moreover, as it may lawfully do, he is obliged to discharge that burden only on the balance of probabilities, as is clear from Hardy v. Ireland [1994] 2 I.R. 550.

It is also important, the respondent says, to understand precisely the principles that are applicable in the case of prejudice arising due to the absence of an expeditious trial, so as to put in context the absence of any validity to the arguments propounded on behalf of the appellant. The respondent accepts that actual prejudice does not have to be established in order for a trial to be prohibited. Other factors, such as pre-trial stress and anxiety, can be sufficient, in appropriate circumstances, to permit a trial to be prohibited. The case of O.H. v. D.P.P. [2007] 3 IR 299, invoked by the appellant, is not germane to this appeal, the respondent contends, as no stress or anxiety was found to exist there. In the present case, there is no question of pre-trial incarceration, as the appellant is an unlimited company and no element of stress or anxiety comes into play. Insofar as directors of the company may suffer, no stress or anxiety was deposed to on their behalf by the appellant. This may well be because the appellant indicated it was surprised to be charged. There could therefore be no question of any party having suffered from any anxiety prior to that point, arising from delay. The appellant, although asserting real and substantial prejudice, does not meet the test for any such prejudice. It was clear from the evidence tendered that there were no difficulties with the memory of either employee in relation to the circumstances surrounding the sale of the lorry, and the evidence of other parties, as sworn to on affidavit, does not support any factual prejudice of the type found in proceedings of this nature.

In the foregoing circumstances, it is argued that the learned High Court judge, having applied the proper principles to the issues arising in the course of the High Court proceedings, had made no error in law.

Decision
I am satisfied that the learned High Court judge dealt with the issues arising in the course of the High Court proceedings on the basis of appropriate legal principles, entrenched in the established jurisprudence on the question of delay, whether arising in specific classes of offences (such as sexual assault cases), or in general. The principles are readily listed. First, in the case of inordinate and inexcusable delay, the Court will look at the nature of the offences, the reasons for the delay, the timescale involved, and whether the delay has been of such a gross nature as to support, without more, a presumption of prejudice. It is clear from the evidence adduced, and even from the arguments made on behalf of the appellant, that the present case does not in any way meet the type of delay which might give rise, without more, to presumptive prejudice. It is true, of course, as counsel for the appellant points out, that in the case of sexual assaults, a particular and separate jurisprudence has developed by reason of the nature of those offences and the effects that these may have on, usually, young vulnerable boys and girls and, in consequence, their inability to disclose the offences for many years after they occur. Presumptive prejudice has been found to arise in some such cases where there has been delay of thirty, thirty-five, forty or more years. Not all cases, however, with lengthy periods of delay having been established, necessarily or inevitably result in a finding of presumptive prejudice. The determination of this will depend on the circumstances of each case. What can be said, however, is that where the delay is extremely lengthy, such as of a nature of the periods mentioned above, a court will look with very considerable circumspection to see whether or not it is possible for an accused to be guaranteed a fair trial. On the jurisprudence, the determination by a court will not be limited purely to the right to an expeditious trial, but will frequently overlap with the right to a fair trial, taking into account the effect on that latter right of any accumulated periods of delay, including those arising before summonses issue or charges are laid. For that reason, it is not always correct to find that delay prior to charges being laid can always be disposed of by reference to cases where pure prosecutorial delay is invoked, and determined.

But whatever the extent of the delay, or the backdrop against which it is to be assessed, the principle remains very much the same. It seems to me that, even allowing for the fact that trials have (or have not) proceeded in the case of sexual assaults, after lengthy periods of delay, on the basis of the particular jurisprudence attaching to those types of cases, taking the delay evidence in the present case, it is not possible to conclude that a period of delay of four years, even if that was all blameworthy, can be considered, ipso facto, as one causing presumptive prejudice in this case, such as to automatically prohibit a trial. All the more so where the delay of 15 months is established as being the relevant period. I am satisfied that the learned trial judge committed no error in law in concluding, on the facts of the present case, that the delay, of itself, was not such as to give rise to an automatic entitlement to an order of prohibition.

That means that the next issue which arose for determination, properly speaking, was whether specific or particular prejudice had been suffered or would likely be suffered, by the appellant in its ability to mount a defence to the criminal charges in question by reason of inordinate blameworthy delay. In that regard, the learned trial judge pointed out, correctly, that there was no question relating to the possible unavailability of witnesses, or indeed of documentary evidence. The absence of witnesses was never an issue in the proceedings, and nor was there any suggestion that adequate documentary evidence would not be available. The learned High Court judge correctly pointed to the fact that the appellant’s submissions were confined to claims that the memories of employees were dimmed, or might be dimmed, or were confused, or might become confused, by the subsequent events arising. He also found that, on the evidence, this contention was not supported.

In the argument on appeal what is contended for, however, is that the prejudice to the appellant should have been assessed by reference to the position which would have arisen had there been no delay in bringing the charges, and, in effect, getting on with the hearing. It seems to me that this would be a reasonable approach to take, and is supported by the case law invoked on behalf of the appellant, including P.P. v. D.P.P. [2000] 1 IR 403 and others. But the question which arises in that context is, where is the evidence to support the implicit allegation that the trial would have been more readily defended by the appellant had it been brought sooner than otherwise is the case? There is no material adduced as to how or why that might be so. In that regard, the appellant puts forward no evidence upon which to conclude that it would be so, apart from claiming that there is a difficulty, at this remove, in establishing whether or not sensors were in place on the vehicle which was sold in 2003, or that it was not practicable or reasonably practical to do more than was in fact done in relation to the vehicle, or in relation to giving instructions as to the operation of the vehicle. The appellant contends, for example, that the vehicle was inspected on several occasions between September, 2002 and June, 2004 (although the offence is one alleged to have taken place in September, 2003) and that even though that inspection included one by Palfinger Ireland Limited, holding itself out to be an expert in relation to cranes, none of these inspections revealed an absence of sensors. However, that evidence, if adduced, is not necessarily evidence prejudicial to the appellant.

The appellant alleges, however, that a unique factor which exists in this case, arising from the burden placed on the appellant pursuant to the provisions of s.50 of the Act of 1989, could, and should have, affected the foregoing exercise, but was not considered by the learned High Court judge. Had it been, it would have had a material impact on the decision in favour of granting an order of prohibition. There is, however, nothing improper in law in reversing an evidential burden in the manner contained in Section 50. Express statutory exceptions to the principle that the burden rests at all times on the prosecution have been recognised in Irish law. The burden arising under s.50 is one similar to that placed on defendants under various legislative schemes and, of itself, could not justify a prohibition order against the trial of the appellant, even when combined with delay.

In his approach to determining whether or not the appellant had established any actual prejudice, the learned trial judge assessed the evidence before him and did not err in his conclusion that the appellant had not supported the allegation of prejudice by the production of any material evidence. This was a finding on the evidence, and his conclusions of fact, or the inferences drawn, were fully within jurisdiction. In truth, in the course of the appeal, while the findings of the judge are challenged, his entitlement to consider the evidence adduced to the High Court and to make findings or conclusions arising from that evidence were not challenged. His conclusions in that regard have not been undermined by any material or argument put forward in the course of this appeal, nor can I find any basis upon which the terms of s.50 of the Act of 1989 affects the matter in such a way as to alter the conclusion of the trial judge on the issue of prejudice.

The learned trial judge’s next approach, correctly in my view, was to consider in such circumstances whether or not the balancing exercise to be carried out was one which, upon a proper consideration of the relevant factors, should militate in favour of prohibition of the trial. This approach is clearly endorsed by the case law of this Court, including in the judgment of Kearns J. in Devoy v. D.P.P., supra., in which a considerable analysis was made of the principles governing prosecutorial delay, following on from the decision in P.M. v. Malone, supra., and P.M. v. D.P.P. [2006] 3 IR 172, in turn relying, at least to some extent on Barker v. Wingo, supra. In the P.M. case, although setting out in some considerable detail certain principles gleaned from Barker v. Wingo, supra., it is important to recognise that the judgment goes on to state that the principles are not different to any significant degree from those already contained in Irish decisions on prosecutorial delay. These cover not only principles developed specifically relating to charges concerning sexual offences, but also those applicable to more general categories of offences, applying equally to cases where so-called systemic delay is under consideration, in light of the fact that all forms of inordinate blameworthy delay may affect an accused in the same way.

It is also important to recognise the exceptional nature of the remedy of prohibition in the context of the criminal justice process, a matter also considered in Devoy v. D.P.P., supra., and mentioned in several other cases, including D.C. v. D.P.P. [2005] 4 IR 281, in which it was pointed out that prohibition is a remedy “to be granted only in exceptional circumstances”. Kearns J. in Devoy at p.255 stated:-

“… any court called upon to prohibit a trial must give due weight to the gravity and seriousness of the offence when exercising this jurisdiction. It must analyse the causes for delay with great care, weighing up and balancing the role of both the prosecution and the applicant and their respective contributions to delay. In this context not every delay is significant and not every delay warrants the description of being blameworthy to such a degree as to trigger an enquiry by the court under P.M. v. D.P.P. or Barker v. Wingo. …”

The final matter to be determined is the allegation that there was wrongdoing on the part of the respondent, or more correctly, the investigative authority, the HSA, in failing to inform or warn two employees of the appellant, or the appellant itself, that it would be sued or that prosecutions were under consideration when statements were taken from the two employees without prior cautions. The arguments on this issue are set forth earlier in the judgment. Part at least of the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant appears to be based on some form of estoppel, although not pressed strongly. If that is a correct interpretation of the argument, I am satisfied that no estoppel argument could be raised in relation to this issue. On the more material argument, namely, that this was improper, having regard to the offences in issue and their nature, I am satisfied that the learned High Court judge was correct not to accept this as a basis for a prohibition order, and I am equally satisfied as to the legal basis upon which he refused to do so, namely, that such an issue is classically and essentially one to be disposed of at the trial. Any argument based on the admissibility of evidence procured in the absence of a caution is a matter for the trial judge, and is not a good ground for acceding to an order of prohibition. It is not necessary to recite the case law, already referred to above, since the matter is well established at this time.

In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that the learned High Court judge was correct in his conclusion that prohibition was not an appropriate order in the circumstances of the present case.

I would dismiss the appeal and affirm the order of the High Court.