Jersey Unreported Judgments

2001/141A

ROYAL COURT

(Samedi Division)

 

29^th June 2001 

 

 

 

 

 

Application by the defendant to stay the proceedings on the ground that the matters in dispute should be referred to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement.

Question of the permitted width of an arbitration provision.

 

Advocate D.J. Benest for the Plaintiff

Advocate J.P. Speck for the Defendant

 

 

judgment

 

the deputy bailiff:

1.        This is an application by the defendant to stay the proceedings on the ground that the matters in dispute should be referred to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement.  It raises an interesting question as to the permitted width of an arbitration provision.

The nature of the proceedings

2.        On 16th July 1997 the plaintiff entered into a written brokerage agreement with the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to provide advisory and brokerage services in connection with investment by the plaintiff in securities issued by the Russian Government or by any Russian commercial enterprise.  The agreement is governed by English law.  The defendant is a company incorporated in Jersey. 

3.        By an order of justice dated 4th January 2001 the plaintiff has brought a claim against the defendant on essentially two grounds:-

(i)        It is alleged that the defendant induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract by two false representations which were made fraudulently by an agent of the defendant;

(ii)       The plaintiff having provided US$650,000 to the defendant for the purposes of investment in Russian securities, it is said that the defendant did not so invest the money but, in breach of its obligations under the contract, used and diverted the money for its own purposes. 

4.        We have to say that the order of justice as pleaded does not begin to come near the required standard of particularity for an allegation of fraud.  General assertions of fraudulent conduct are made with no supporting allegations of fact.  Furthermore, although the body of the order of justice states that the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the agreement is null and void because of the defendant's fraud, no such relief is sought in the prayer of the order of justice, which confines itself to seeking rescission of the contract and/or damages. 

5.        We would remind practitioners of a fundamental rule of pleading, namely that general allegations of fraud are not permitted.  Any pleading which alleges fraud must set out the facts matters and circumstances relied upon to show that the party charged has or was actuated by a fraudulent intention.  The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be stated fully and precisely, with full particulars.  Furthermore, it is of course the duty of counsel not to enter a plea of fraud on the record unless he or she has clear and sufficient evidence to support it.  In fairness to Mr Benest, we should add that he assured us that he had not forgotten this latter duty and had carefully considered the evidence produced to him before launching the proceedings.

6.        It follows that, even if a stay is not granted, the plaintiff will have to amend his order of justice substantially so as to make clear the basis for the allegation of fraud and the correct nature of the relief sought.  Nevertheless, both parties were agreed before us that we should deal with the matter on the basis of the substance of each party's case, rather than the form of the pleadings at present.  We have therefore considered the application on the footing that the plaintiff alleges fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the defendant and seeks a declaration that, as a result, the agreement is void ab initio. 

7.        In fairness to the defendant, we should point out that the allegations are strongly denied; but the truth or otherwise of the allegations is not relevant for the purposes of this application. 

The basis of the application for a stay

8.        Clause 8.2 of the Agreement is in the following terms:-

"8.2     Dispute Resolution.  Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question of its existence, validity or termination, shall first be the subject of amicable negotiations between the Parties.  If after 30 calendar days the Parties have not resolved the dispute, either Party may refer the dispute to, and the Parties hereby agree to the jurisdiction of, the London Court of International Arbitration, according to its rules.  The arbitration tribunal shall consist of one arbitrator select pursuant to such rules.  Arbitration shall proceed and all documents shall be presented in the English language.  Any award of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on the Parties".

9.        Article 6 of the Arbitration (Jersey) Law 1998 as amended, provides as follows:-

"If any person to an arbitration agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to those legal proceedings may at any time before the expiration of a period of three weeks from the date on which the action was placed on the pending list or en preuve apply to the court to stay the proceedings; and the court, unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings."

10.      The defendant argues that the case is straightforward.  There is an arbitration agreement and there must therefore be a stay of these proceedings as required by article 6 of the 1998 Law.

11.      The Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that, because the plaintiff's claim alleges that the contract in which the arbitration clause appears is void, the matter cannot be referred to arbitration.

Is the arbitration clause permissible?

12.      Mr Benest, on behalf of the defendant, argues that in no circumstances can an arbitrator ever be given a power to adjudicate upon the validity of the contract in which the relevant arbitration provision appears.  He contends that that is the position here.  In support, he relies upon dicta to be found in Heyman -v- Darwins Limited (1942) 1 All ER 337.  That case was concerned to resolve conflicting judicial decisions over the effect on an arbitration clause of the repudiation of the contract in which it appeared, consequent upon a repudiatory breach of contract by one of the parties.  Did the arbitration provision come to an end if the contract was repudiated?  The House of Lords held that, if drafted widely enough, the arbitration clause remained effective.  The decision is therefore not directly relevant to the issue before us but there are obiter dicta upon which both sides rely. 

13.      Mr Benest relied upon the dicta of Viscount Simon L.C. and Lord MacMillan (with whom Lord Russell agreed).  Viscount Simon L.C. said at 343:-

"An arbitration clause is a written submission, agreed to by the parties to the contract, and, like other written submissions to arbitration, must be construed according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which it is made.  If the dispute is as to whether the contract which contains the clause has ever been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the submission.  Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio (because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal), the arbitration clause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself is also void."

Lord MacMillan said at 345:-

"If it appears that the dispute is as to whether there has ever been a binding contract between the parties, such a dispute cannot be covered by an arbitration clause in the challenged contract.  If there has never been a contract at all, there has never been as part of it an agreement to arbitrate; the greater includes the less.  Further, a claim to set aside a contract on such grounds as fraud, duress, or essential error cannot be the subject matter of a reference under an arbitration clause in the contract sought to be set aside."

14.      Mr Benest found further support for his submission in the case of Ashville Investments Limited -v- Elmer Contractors Limited (1988) 2 All ER 577.  The actual decision in that case was that an arbitration clause conferring jurisdiction in respect of any dispute 'in connection' with a contract was wide enough to encompass a claim to rectification on the grounds of mistake made by one or both of the parties at the time the contract was entered into and a dispute over a misrepresentation or negligent misstatement which induced the contract.  Again, therefore, the case is not directly in point but there are dicta on the point raised by Mr Benest.  Thus May L.J. said at 585:-

"Insofar as the claim for damages for misrepresentation is concerned, we were referred to Monro -v- Bognor UDC (1915) 3 KB 167.  In a contract for the construction of certain sewage works the arbitration clause referred to disputes which might arise between the parties "upon or in relation to or in connection with the contract".  The question which came before this Court was whether an action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation should be stayed on the grounds that it was within the scope of the arbitration clause.  Pickford LJ held that there should be no stay on the basis that as a matter of construction the action brought was neither on the contract nor in relation to or in connection with it.  Bankes LJ, while agreeing with Pickford LJ in the result, so decided on this basis ([1915] 3KB 167 at 172):

"... that the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff is asserting that he was induced by fraud to enter into the contract, and that as a consequence the contract never was binding".

In other words if the claim based on fraud had been left to the arbitrator he would have been asked in reality to adjudicate on his own jurisdiction, which is never permissible, as Heyman -v- Darwins Limited [1942]... makes clear. 

In these circumstances, if Monro's case could be relied on as supplying any precedent in the present case, I would respectfully prefer the ratio of Bankes LJ ...".

15.      Balcombe LJ, at 589, was of the same view in respect of the judgment of Bankes LJ referred to above:-

"These last words indicate a ratio for the decision which is clearly right: an arbitrator cannot have jurisdiction to decide that the contract under which he is appointed is void or voidable, since by so doing he would be destroying the very basis of his own position.".

Bingham LJ was of like mind when he said at 591:-

"A non-statutory arbitrator derives his jurisdiction from the agreement of the parties at whose instance he is appointed.  He has such jurisdiction as they agree to give him and none that they do not.  The only inherent limitation is that he cannot make a binding award as to the initial existence of the agreement from which his jurisdiction is said to derive."

16.      Mr Speck, on the other hand, relied upon the dicta of Lord Wright and Lord Porter in Heyman.  Lord Wright said at 350:-

"The word 'repudiation' has also led to difficulties because it is an ambiguous word constantly used without precise definition in contract law.  I do not attempt an exhaustive list of the senses in which the word has been used, but I may give some instances.  Repudiation of a contract is sometimes used as meaning that the defendant denies that there ever was a contract in the sense of an actual consensus ad idem.  If that is the case, a submission of disputes under the contract never comes into operative existence any more than the contract to which it was to be ancillary.  Short of this, one party, though not denying that there was the appearance of assent, might claim that the consent was vitiated by fraud or duress or mistake or illegality, and in that sense it is often said that he repudiates the contract.  There, again, it would be a question of construction whether the collateral arbitration clause could be treated as severable and could be invoked for settling such a dispute."

Lord Porter gave the matter the most detailed consideration and he said as follows at 357:-

"Meanwhile, I think it essential to remember that the question whether a given dispute comes within the provisions of an arbitration clause or not primarily depends upon the terms of the clause itself.  If two parties purport to enter into a contract and a dispute arises as to whether they have done so or not, or as to whether the alleged contract is binding upon them, I see no reason why they should not submit that dispute to arbitration.  Equally, I see no reason why, if at the time when they purport to make the contract they foresee the possibility of such a dispute arising, they should not provide in the contract itself for the submission to arbitration of a dispute as to whether the contract ever bound them or continues to do so.  They might, for instance, stipulate that, if a dispute should arise as to whether there had been such fraud, misrepresentation or concealment in the negotiations between them as to make a purported contract voidable, that dispute should be submitted to arbitration.  It may require very clear language to effect this result, and it may be true to say that such a contract is really collateral to the agreement supposed to have been made, but I do not see why it should not be done."

Later on at 360 he said the following:-

"Where the contract itself is repudiated in the sense that its original existence or its binding force is challenged, e.g., where it is said that the parties never were ad idem or where it is said that the contract is voidable ab initio (e.g., in cases of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake) and that it has been avoided, the parties are not bound by any contract and escape the obligation to perform any of its terms including the arbitration clause, unless the provisions of the clause are wide enough to include the question of jurisdiction."

17.      For the reasons set out below, we do not believe that, when properly construed, the dicta of Viscount Simon, Lord MacMillan and the Court of Appeal in Ashville are inconsistent with those of Lord Wright and Lord Porter.  We think the latter were merely envisaging the possibility of a wider type of arbitration clause than was in the mind of the former.  But if they are inconsistent, we have to say that we prefer the view of the latter.  If A and B enter into a contract with a conventional widely drawn arbitration clause conferring jurisdiction on the arbitrator for all disputes arising 'in connection' with the contract, we accept that, if a dispute arises as to whether the parties ever entered into the contract at all or whether the contract may be declared void ab initio on such grounds as fraudulent misrepresentation etc., the arbitrator cannot decide that question because his right to do so would depend on the very contract whose existence is in dispute.  In that sense he cannot decide upon the existence of his own jurisdiction.

18.      But suppose that A and B go further and specifically envisage the possibility of a dispute arising as to whether an agreement between them had in fact been reached or whether, if apparently reached, any such agreement could be declared void because of fraudulent misrepresentation, illegality, etc..  Suppose that they specifically agree that if any such dispute arises, they wish to have that dispute resolved by an arbitrator and not by the courts.  Why should they not be able to so agree?  We see no reason of public policy which might operate to prevent such an agreement taking effect.  Indeed, as Lord MacMillan said in Heyman at 345:-

"Arbitration clauses in contracts vary widely in their language, for there is no limitation on the liberty of contracting parties to define as they please the matters which they desire to submit to arbitration."

Furthermore, as Bingham LJ said in Ashville, judicial attitudes have become much more favourable towards arbitration than was the case many years ago. 

19.      In our judgment, as Lord Porter suggested, an arbitration clause drawn as set out in the foregoing paragraph is in reality a separate or collateral contract to the main contract notwithstanding that it appears in the body of the main contract.  The parties have purportedly entered into a main contract with an arbitration provision for dealing with disputes arising in connection with that contract.  However the parties have also entered into a collateral contract to the effect that, if there is a dispute as to whether the main contract ever existed (i.e. did the parties reach agreement) or as to whether it can be declared void (e.g. because of fraudulent misrepresentation) the parties agree that an arbitrator (rather than the courts) will decide that issue. 

20.      When analysed in this way, we do not think that what was suggested by Lord Porter is in any way incompatible with what was said by Viscount Simon, Lord MacMillan or by the Court of Appeal in Ashville.  It is clear that the latter were all envisaging a conventional arbitration clause which forms part of the main contract.  If the existence of main contract is in dispute, so is the existence of the arbitration clause.  It follows that the arbitrator does not have the right to consider the validity of the main contract because to do so would be to adjudicate on his own jurisdiction.  But where the parties have expressly agreed to confer jurisdiction upon the arbitrator to decide upon the existence or validity of the main contract, they are taken to have done so by a collateral contract and no question arises as to the existence or validity of that collateral contract.  It takes effect exactly according to its terms.  Its existence or validity is unaffected by any decision as to the existence or validity of the main contract.  There is therefore no question of the arbitrator adjudicating upon his own jurisdiction, which arises under the collateral contract.   He is only adjudicating upon the existence or validity of the main contract. 

21.               We therefore hold that it is a matter of construction of the relevant arbitration provision as to whether it confers jurisdiction upon the arbitrator to decide questions relating to the existence or validity of the contract in which it appears as well as more conventional disputes arising in connection with the contract.  We accept that clear words are required to confer such a jurisdiction upon an arbitrator but, if the words are clear, then the jurisdiction exists.

Does the dispute in this case fall within the arbitration clause?

22.      Clause 8.2 begins by stating that it covers any dispute arising "... in connection with this Agreement ...".  It is clear from the authorities that this is one of the widest forms of wording for conventional arbitration clauses.  As Bingham LJ helpfully put it in Ashville at 593:-

"Any dispute or difference unconnected with the parties' contractual relationship is not subject to the arbitration agreement.  Any other dispute or difference is."

In Ashville the Court held that a claim arising out of mistake or out of negligent or innocent misrepresentation was 'not unconnected' with the parties' contractual relationship and therefore fell within the arbitration provision.  However it was clear that such wording does not normally confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator to decide whether the contract in question is void ab initio because of, for example, fraudulent misrepresentation.  This is because the arbitration provision forms part of the main agreement and will therefore stand or fall depending upon the validity of the main agreement.  The arbitrator therefore cannot adjudicate upon his own jurisdiction.

23.      But the arbitration provision in this case goes further because it expressly adds the words "... including any question of [the Agreement's] existence, validity or termination ...".  Mr Benest was initially inclined to argue that the use of the word 'including' meant that the words which followed could not be wider than or add anything to the words which had gone before.  In the end, however, he accepted that this argument was not tenable and we think he was right to so agree.  Words used in a contract are to be given some meaning wherever possible.  In our judgment the wording is absolutely clear.  The arbitration provision specifically applies to any dispute as to the existence or validity of the Agreement.  We do not think that it could be clearer and the use of the word "including" is neither here nor there.  It is not necessary for us to decide on the exact meaning of the words 'existence' and 'validity'.  Indeed, they may have varying meanings depending on the context.  But one's starting point is to say that the "existence" of a contract concerns matters such as whether the parties ever reached agreement in the first place (i.e. were they ad idem?); whereas the "validity" of a contract is apt to cover claims (such as fraudulent misrepresentation, illegality, etc.,) which might have the effect of rendering what appears on the face of it to be a contract void ab initio i.e. invalid.  The plaintiff's claim in this case is to the effect that the apparent contract is to be declared void because of fraudulent misrepresentation and we have no doubt that this is a dispute which relates to the validity (failing which, the existence) of the contract.  It therefore falls within clause 8.2. 

24.      We should add, for the sake of completeness, that we have not heard argument on whether, under English Law, fraudulent misrepresentation entitles the Court to declare the contract void ab initio rather than to rescind it.  All parties have proceeded on the assumption that it does and we have considered the case on that basis. 

25.      In his skeleton argument Mr Benest argued that, although the plaintiff's claim was at present framed by reference to contractual grounds, it could be reformulated so as to be based upon unjust enrichment, constructive trust or equitable fraud and that, in that case, the claim would not be a dispute arising in connection with the contract, nor would it relate to the existence or validity of the contract.  During the course of the hearing he abandoned that contention and we think that he was right to do so.  To use Bingham LJ's terminology, can it really be said that, just because a different label is put on the plaintiff's claim, it becomes "unconnected" with the parties' contractual relationship.  Of course not.  However the claim is put and whatever label it bears, it arises because the parties purported to enter into a contract and there is now a dispute which has arisen in connection with that purported contract.  Whatever the label, the claim is therefore one which is "not unconnected" with the parties purported contractual relationship or with the existence or validity of the purported contract.

26.      There was some discussion as to which part of article 6 of the 1998 Law was material for the purposes of this hearing.  Because the order of justice alleges that the agreement is null and void by reason of fraudulent misrepresentation, there was some suggestion that the Court had to consider whether it was "... satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void".  Mr Benest accepted that the burden of showing this was on the plaintiff and he further accepted that he could not satisfy such a burden at this stage of the proceedings.  All parties therefore concentrated on the argument that the dispute was not with regard to a "... matter agreed to be referred ..." to arbitration.  For the reasons which we have given, we have no doubt that the dispute is with regard to a matter agreed to be referred.  Furthermore, because an arbitration clause conferring jurisdiction upon an arbitrator to consider the existence or validity of the main contract is to be regarded as a separate collateral contract, the question of the relevant arbitration agreement being null and void does not arise.  The allegation of nullity relates only to the main contract; it does not arise in relation to the collateral arbitration agreement. 

27.      In summary, for the reasons given above, we hold that clause 8.2 of the Agreement is an arbitration agreement which covers the dispute raised by the order of justice.  It is asserted by the defendant (and not contradicted by the plaintiff) that the question at issue has been the subject of amicable negotiation which have not been resolved within thirty days.  Accordingly, the defendant, having stated that it wishes to go to arbitration, the Court is bound to order a stay of the proceedings, subject only to the provisions of article 28(2) of the 1998 Law. 

Article 28(2)

28.      Article 28 of the 1998 Law provides as follows:-

"(2)     Where an agreement between any parties provides that disputes which may arise in the future between them shall be referred to arbitration, and a dispute which so arises involves the question whether any such party has been guilty of fraud, the Court shall, insofar as may be necessary to enable that question to be determined by the Court, have power to order that the agreement shall cease to have effect ..."

"(3)     In any case where, by virtue of this Article, the Court has power to order that an arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect ... the Court may refuse to stay any action brought in breach of the agreement."

29.      In our judgment, the only possible interpretation of these provisions is that, notwithstanding the mandatory terms of Article 6 of the Law, they allow the Court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement (and therefore not grant a stay) where a question of fraud arises. 

30.      The Jersey provisions are almost identical to s.24(2) and (3) of the Arbitration Act 1950 of the United Kingdom.  We have been referred to three English cases on the interpretation of the English provisions, namely Russell -v- Russell (1879) 14 Ch D 471, Camilla Cotton Oil Co -v- Granadex S.A. (1976) 2 Lloyds LR 10 and Cunningham-Reid -v- Buchanan-Jardine (1988) 2 All ER 438.  Russell is not a case based on s.24(2) or its predecessor but the principles laid down in that case have been held by the subsequent cases to apply in respect of the statutory provisions.

31.      The principles which we derive from the cases can be summarised as follows:-

(i)    Before a Court will refuse a stay where fraud is alleged, there must be a concrete and specific issue of fraud raised by the case.  There must be prima facie evidence to support the allegation, not a mere bandying about of allegations. 

(ii)   Once that threshold is crossed, a discretion then arises as to whether to refuse a stay on the ground that the dispute involves fraud.  However, where the party against whom fraud is alleged opposes the stay so that he may clear his name in public before the court, the court will, almost as a matter of course, refuse a stay so that he has that opportunity.

(iii)           Where the party alleging fraud opposes a stay, this will not normally be sufficient of itself, even if the evidence of fraud is strong, for the Court to refuse a stay.  As Bingham LJ put it in Cunningham-Reid at 446:-

"The parties in this case incorporated an agreement to arbitrate in their contract at a time when they did not know who would be claiming what against whom and at a time when they no doubt reasonably anticipated there would be no claim to arbitrate at all; it was an agreement which they made for better or worse, for richer or poorer, and the ordinary duty of the Court is to give effect to the parties' own agreement.  The desire of a party alleging fraud against another to have a trial in open Court would not ordinarily amount to a sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement so as to bring the case within s4."

The underlying thinking behind this approach was well summed up by Jessel MR in Russell at 477 when he said:-

"Does the party charging the fraud desire [to exclude arbitration] or the party charged with the fraud desire it?  Where the party charged with the fraud desires it, I can perfectly understand the Court saying, 'I will not refer your character against you will to a private arbitrator'.  It seems to me in that case it is almost a matter of course to refuse the reference, but I by no means think the same consideration follows when the publicity is desired by the person charging the fraud.  His character is not at stake, and the other side may say, 'The very object that I have in desiring the arbitration is that the matter shall not become public.  It is very easy for you to trump up a charge of fraud against me, and damage my character, by an investigation in public'.  There is a very old and familiar proverb about throwing plenty of mud, which applies very much to these charges made by members of the same family, or members of the same partnership, against one another in public.  It must be an injury, as a rule, to the person charged with fraud to have it published, and I must say that I am by no means satisfied that the mere desire of the person charging the fraud is sufficient reason for the Court refusing to send the case to arbitration."

32.      It may be argued that this Court should simply adopt these principles as part of Jersey law on the grounds that our statutory provisions are much the same.  However there are two matters which would suggest that the approach of this Court should not be identical:-

(i)        The English courts were dealing with a discretionary power to stay (s.4 Arbitration Act 1950) whereas Article 6 of the 1998 Law provides for a mandatory stay where there is an arbitration agreement.  The presumption in favour of granting a stay would therefore appear to be somewhat stronger than in the cases before the English courts.

(ii)       Jersey Law places great weight upon the maxim "La convention fait la loi des parties".  Accordingly very good reason needs to be shown why the Court should relieve the parties of the consequences of an arbitration agreement into which they have entered of their own free will. 

Our view is that the general principles set out above are equally applicable in Jersey save that the burden upon the party opposing a stay (whether that be the person alleging fraud or against whom fraud is alleged) is somewhat higher in Jersey than it is in England.

33.      However, we are dealing here with a contract governed by English Law and we therefore approach the matter on the basis of the principles set out in paragraph 31 above.  We are in no doubt that we should not exercise our powers under Article 28(2) or (3) so as to disapply the arbitration provisions and refuse a stay.  In the first place, there is no concrete and specific issue of fraud raised by the pleadings.  We have referred earlier to the defects of the pleading and the fact that no particulars of the alleged fraud are given.  It is indeed a case of mere bandying about of allegations of fraud.  It follows that the necessary threshold for the Court to exercise its discretion under Article 28(2) has not been reached. 

34.      In the second place, even if this defect were to be cured, this would remain a case where it is the party alleging fraud who opposes a stay and wishes to keep the matter before the Court.  But no reason is given other than the fact that fraud is alleged.  As Cunningham-Reid made clear, this itself is insufficient reason.  We see nothing in this case which would justify us departing from the normal approach referred to in Cunningham-Reid and we can see no good reason why the plaintiff should not be held to the arbitration agreement into which he freely entered.

35.      Accordingly, for the reasons which we have given, we order a stay of these proceedings.

Authorities

Arbitration (Jersey) Law 1998: Articles 6, 28.

Heyman-v-Darwins, Ltd (1942) 1 All ER 337.

Ashville Investments, Ltd-v-Elmer Contractors, Ltd (1988) 2 All ER 577.

Monro-v-Bognor UDC (1915) 3 KB 167.

Russell-v-Russell (1879)14 Ch D 471.

Camilla Cotton Oil Co-v-Granadex S.A. (1976) 2 Ll. LR 10.

Cunningham-Reid-v-Buchanan-Jardine (1988) 2 All ER 438.

Overseas Union Insurance Ltd-v-AA Mutual International Insurance, Ltd. (1988) 2 Ll. LR 63.

Stevens & Sons-v-Timber and General Mutual Accident Insurance Association (1993) 45 Ll. LR 43.