![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
Jersey Unreported Judgments |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> In the matter of CJR 22-Aug-2006 [2006] JRC 116 (22 August 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2006/2006_116.html Cite as: [2006] JRC 116 |
[New search] [Help]
[2006]JRC116
royal court
(Samedi Division)
22nd August 2006
Before : |
Sir Philip Bailhache, Kt., Bailiff, and Jurats Le Brocq and Bullen. |
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 43(17)(d) OF THE MENTAL HEALTH (JERSEY) LAW 1969
AND IN THE MATTER OF C. J. R.
Advocate C. M. B. Thacker for C. J. R.
The Solicitor General (partie publique).
judgment
the bailiff:
1. This application raises a short but important point of law in relation to the extent of the powers of a curator appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 1969, to which we shall refer as the 1969 Law. The hearing took place in private but, in accordance with the principles laid down in JEP v Qatar [2002/227], we are giving this judgment in open Court.
2. The application came before the Court, sitting in Chambers on the 11th August 2006 on the application of Advocate Thacker, as curator of C.J.R, to whom we shall refer as "the Interdict". Consent was sought from the Jurats, pursuant to Article 43(17)(d) of the 1969 Law, for certain medical treatment to be administered to the Interdict. The Deputy Bailiff expressed some doubt as to whether this fell within the purview of that statutory provision and the Court adjourned the application and convened the Attorney General as partie publique. The matter was referred to the Solicitor General, to whom the Court is most grateful for her research and legal submissions.
3. The brief history is that Advocate Thacker was appointed as curator of the Interdict on the 16th July 1999. The Interdict is now 51. He was at one stage a patient in St Saviours Hospital, but is now a resident at a residential home which has the day to day care of him. The Interdict is suffering from a form of cancer and needs treatment. The precise form of treatment is a matter for consideration and would, ordinarily, have been a matter for decision by the Interdict himself. The Interdict is, however, unable by reason of mental disorder to make an informed decision of this kind. The medical authorities referred the matter to the curator who made an application to the Court seeking the Jurats' consent. The question is whether the Court has the power to receive an application of this kind under its curatorship jurisdiction.
4. Prior to the coming into force of the 1969 Law, a curator was generally only appointed if the person of unsound mind owned property which needed to be administered. When the individual had no property, responsibility for caring for his person would devolve upon the family or, in the absence of any family able to undertake that duty, upon the Connétable of the Parish. Authority for that proposition is to be found in Cooper v President of the Public Health Committee and Ors [1966] JJ 685 at 691. In that case Bois, Deputy Bailiff, stated that it was never possible to appoint a curator to the person alone, and that it was not until the enactment of the Loi (1907) Sur les Curatelles that it was possible to appoint a curator to the property alone except where the reason for the appointment was the prodigality of the ward. As a matter of generality however, at customary law a curator had responsibility for the property and person of an interdict.
5. The Solicitor General has drawn our attention to a number of cases where the Court has distinguished between its jurisdiction over the person and property of an Interdict. In re: Le Monnier [1910] Ex 341, the Court restored the rights of the interdict over his person while maintaining the authority of the curator to manage his property. Similarly In re: Le Couter [1910] Ex 499, the curatelle was continued in relation to the goods and property of the interdict alone.
6. Upon the enactment of the 1969 Law, the law relating to curatelles was swept away. Article 43(2) provides that,
Article 43(1) provides, however, that the grounds upon which a curator might be appointed to manage and administer the property and affairs of a person are the same grounds as those on which, prior to the coming into force of the Law, a person might have been placed under interdiction in respect of his or her person or property or in respect of the person's property alone.
Article 43(5) of the 1969 Law imposes duties upon the Attorney General to make an application to the Court for the appointment of a curator The oath sworn by a curator is in the following terms - of the person believed to be incapable of doing so.
8. Turning to the other relevant provisions of the 1969 Law, Articles 6 and 7 provide for the admission of a patient to hospital and for his detention there for observation or for treatment respectively. Clearly in such circumstances the responsibility for determining what medical treatment ought to be administered lies with the hospital authorities in accordance with the general law.
9. Articles 14 to 16 of the 1969 Law provide for the reception of persons into guardianship. Article 14, so far as it is relevant, provides -
10. Article 16(1) provides -
11. When the papers relating to the curator's application under Article 43 for the Jurats' consent to medical treatment were received by the Attorney General, they included a letter from a consultant psychiatrist to the consultant in haematology and blood, which contained the following passage -
"He [the Interdict] could be made subject to guardianship, however this would only have power over where a person resides and attendance at training centres."
12. This view is, in our judgment, incorrect. Article 16(1) provides that the approval of a guardianship application confers upon the guardian "" The powers and duties of a father in relation to a child include the giving or withholding of consent to medical treatment. That was decided in In re: an Infant [1995] JLR 296 at 305. It is true that the judgment refers to the parents rather than to the father, but in the context of this provision of the 1969 Law it is the guardian who possesses parental rights and duties in relation to the patient.
13. The clear intention of the legislature when the 1969 Law was passed was to remove from the curator any responsibility for the person of an interdict. The curator's duties are to manage the property and affairs of the interdict. He is not concerned, other than in a broad moral sense, with the physical well being and destiny of the interdict; that remains the responsibility of the interdict's family or the Connétable as père de la paroisse, or perhaps the institution in which the interdict resides. If particular decisions in relation to the Interdict's medical treatment or physical well being require to be taken and the Interdict is not a detained patient under the provisions of Article 6 or 7 of the 1969 Law, the prudent course of action may well be to apply for the appointment of a guardian. The guardian would undoubtedly have the authority to take such decisions.
14. We do not of course exclude the power of the family, in appropriate circumstances, to take decisions in relation to interdicts requiring medical treatment. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this case, to determine with precision the type of decision which might require the appointment of a guardian, nor is it necessary to lay down the precise ambit of the authority of members of the family or the next of kin to give consent to medical treatment. It is clear, however, that the medical people concerned with the care of this Interdict feel the need for some further authority before they can embark upon the requisite medical treatment.
15. We think that the appropriate course of action for those concerned with the care of the interdict is to seek the appointment of a guardian under the 1969 Law. It is clear that the curator does not have the requisite authority to grant a consent of this kind. Mr Thacker generously accepted the force of the arguments deployed by the Solicitor General and told the Court that he did not wish to pursue his application. We conclude that the application for the appointment of Jurats to be appointed to consider the merits of the proposed course of action must therefore be refused.