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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> IN the matter of KK [2010] JRC 220 (09 December 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2010/2010_220.html Cite as: [2010] JRC 220 |
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[2010]JRC220
royal court
(Samedi Division)
9th December 2010
Before : |
Sir Philip Bailhache, Kt., Commissioner, sitting alone. |
Between |
The Minister for Health and Social Services |
Applicant |
And |
A |
First Respondent |
And |
B |
Second Respondent |
And |
C |
Third Respondent |
IN THE MATTER OF KK
Advocate V. Myerson for the Minister.
Advocate C. R. G. Davies for the First Respondent.
Advocate N. S. H. Benest for the Second Respondent.
Advocate D. Gilbert for the Third Respondent.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. On 9th July, 2010, the Court, presided over by the Bailiff, ordered that a guardian for the children be appointed under Article 75 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 ("the 2002 Law"), and made certain other orders in relation to the Minister's application for an interim care order. The children were not made parties to the proceedings, nor was a lawyer appointed to represent their interests. The Court no doubt considered that the children's interests would be sufficiently protected at this stage by the guardian.
2. Since that date, a number of further directions hearings have taken place at which the Court has been assisted by the observations and submissions made by the guardian, C. On 29th September, 2010, the guardian informed me that he would find it helpful to have access to legal advice from time to time. I accordingly ordered that the Minister should procure that independent legal advice be made available, and the Act of the Court of that date recorded that the Court On 18th November, 2010, I was informed by Miss Myerson for the Minister that there was confusion as to the nature of the order made on 29th September and I was requested to deliver a short judgment in explanation of it. This I now proceed to do.
3. Although the decision has attracted a certain amount of controversy, the policy of this Court in relation to the appointment of lawyers to represent the child or children in public law proceedings has been clearly laid down in Re B [2010] JRC 150. The law itself confers a discretion upon the Court. Article 75(1) of the 2002 Law provides:-
4. Confusion appears to have arisen as to the functions of the person appointed under Article 75(1)(b) largely because it has been assumed that such persons (usually termed "guardians") were in the same position as guardians ad litem appointed under section 41(1) of the Children Act 1989 in England. That assumption is understandable but misconceived. As the Court stated in Re B at paragraph 14:-
The phraseology employed by the draftsman of Article 75(1) may not be ideal, but the assisting and befriending of the child was intended to enable the Court to hear an independent view as to what was in the best interests of the child. That is the function of the guardian.
5. Article 75 of the 2002 Law makes it clear that the Court may order:-
As practice has developed, it is plain that the Court has not interpreted these powers as being disjunctive. It has on occasions appointed a guardian to assist and befriend the child as well as appointing a lawyer to represent the child. A lawyer appointed under Article 75(1)(a) will act on the instructions of the child, and will thus generally only be appointed when the child is of sufficient maturity to give those instructions. A guardian, by contrast, has a duty to assist and befriend the child, but also has a professional duty to the Court to give objective advice as to what is in the best interests of the child. That may not always coincide with what a child (of sufficient maturity and understanding) considers to be in his or her own best interests. Such a conflict would be one reason why the Court might exercise its powers under both sub paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 75(1). As the Court stated at paragraph 55 of its judgment in Re B, the conclusion that a child needed legal advice would ordinarily require that he or she be made a party to the proceedings.
6. Occasionally, the guardian appointed under Article 75(1)(b) will himself or herself require legal advice. At paragraph 52 of the judgment in Re B, the Deputy Bailiff gave examples of situations where such a need might arise. And, as stated at paragraph 53, the lawyer appointed to the guardian in such circumstances would act on the guardian's instructions and not those of the child.
7. There is a measure of flexibility here. Sometimes, although I hope rarely, the lawyer appointed to the guardian might take the front seat and act for him or her in the same way that the Minister's Advocate articulates the views of the Minister and her officials in the Children's Service. I state "rarely" because persons appointed as guardians will almost invariably be experienced and competent professional people, well able to perform their functions and to present their opinions and conclusions to the Court without the need for legal assistance. Experience in this case has shown that it is desirable, when the Court appoints a lawyer to the guardian, that the Court should make it clear exactly what functions are intended to be performed by the lawyer. My intention in this case was that the lawyer should have a limited and reactive function. The guardian had informed me that he occasionally felt at a disadvantage in discussions with other professionals involved in these proceedings by reason of his lack of legal knowledge. He wanted to have access to legal advice from time to time. I considered that request to be proportionate and reasonable. My order on 29th September, 2010, authorised the guardian, at his discretion, to seek and obtain legal advice whenever he deemed it necessary to do so. If the guardian felt that, in relation to a particular issue or particular issues, it would be desirable that the Advocate should appear in Court on his behalf, it would be open to him to instruct the lawyer accordingly. It would not be appropriate, however, for the Advocate to be routinely instructed to appear in Court merely to articulate a position or the views of the guardian which could be perfectly well expressed by the guardian in person. Nor would it be appropriate for the Advocate to receive as a matter of course documentation or communications from lawyers for the other parties, other than at the express request of the guardian. The guardian remains firmly in the front seat. I was, and remain, content to leave decisions as to when and to what extent to seek legal advice and assistance to the discretion and good sense of the guardian.