![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
Jersey Unreported Judgments |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> In the matter of O [2011] JRC 111 (09 June 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2011/2011_111.html Cite as: [2011] JRC 111 |
[New search] [Help]
[2011]JRC111
royal court
(Samedi Division)
9th June 2011
Before : |
J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner, sitting alone. |
Between |
Minister for Health and Social Services |
Applicant |
And |
(1) A (the mother) (2) B (the father) O (Acting through her Guardian E). |
Respondents |
IN THE MATTER OF O
Advocate V. Myerson for the Minister.
Advocate C. Hall for the Father.
Advocate S. A. Franckel for the Mother.
Advocate B. J. Corbett for O.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. On 25th May, 2011, I directed that this matter proceed to a final hearing on 27th - 29th July, 2011, without a fact finding hearing concerning the allegations made by D that the father committed a grave and criminal assault on him outside the family flat in St Helier on 1st November, 2010.
2. An interim care order was granted in respect of O on 15th January, 2010, following the release of her parents from HMP La Moye in light of the mother's heroin use and the father's criminal activities which placed her at risk of suffering significant harm.
3. O was initially placed in foster care with daily contact being permitted in accordance with a plan agreed by all the parties. Rehabilitation to the care of her parents took place successfully and O returned to their care on 19th July, 2010. A second child, C was born in 2010, and the family have remained living together since that date.
4. The father was arrested and charged with a grave and criminal assault on D on 2nd November, 2010, and was remanded in custody. He entered a plea of not guilty. He was committed to and indicted before the Royal Court on 4th March, 2011, when bail was granted and the trial fixed for 17th May, 2011.
5. On 17th May, the prosecution accepted the father's plea of not guilty and the Court pronounced a verdict of not guilty, discharging the father from the proceedings.
6. My understanding is that the prosecution accepted the father's plea of not guilty because D was not prepared to give evidence against him. In any event, the fact that the criminal court has found the father not guilty does not prevent this Court from seeking to establish the facts applying the lower civil burden of proof, namely on a balance of probabilities. It is quite possible that even where a criminal court applying the higher criminal burden of proof has returned a verdict of not guilty, a civil court applying the civil burden of proof, namely the balance of probabilities, may find that the assault did take place.
7. If it were to order a fact finding hearing in relation to this matter, then that would take place on 27th-29th July, 2011, with the final hearing on 1st-3rd November, 2011. If no fact finding hearing was directed, then the final hearing would proceed on 27th-29th July, 2011.
8. These proceedings in respect of O have already been delayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the father. The parties were directed on 12th January, 2011, to attend before the Bailiff's Judicial Secretary to list a further directions hearing and final hearing dates within seven days of the conclusion of the criminal proceedings which they have done - hence the directions hearing before me on 25th May, 2011.
9. The decision whether or not to conduct a fact finding hearing is a matter of judicial discretion (see A County Court-v-DP, RS, BS (by the Children's Guardian) [2005] 2 FLR 1031 and The President's Guidance in relation to Split Hearings dated May 2010 issued by Wall J the President of the Family Division). My power to exercise that discretion as a single judge was not discussed at the hearing but the fact that the matter was listed before me as a single judge indicates that all counsel were of a view that this was a matter to be dealt with by a single judge, in my view rightly so. Under Article 15(1) of the Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, the Bailiff (or Commissioner in his place) shall be the sole judge of law and under Article 1(a), questions of procedure are deemed to be questions of law. In my view, deciding whether or not there should be a fact finding hearing is part of the process of assembling the evidence upon which the issues in the proceedings will be tried and is therefore a matter of procedure.
10. Useful guidance on the use of fact finding hearings is contained in The President's Guidance in relation to Split Hearings:-
11. The factors relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion were identified by McFarlane J in A County Court-v-DP, RS, BS (by the Children's Guardian as follows:-
12. Applying this guidance to the facts, the incident in question concerns the father and a third party, D. It has not related to O's direct treatment by her parents but to their lifestyles and any harm which might occur to O as a result. Her interests in having the facts of the incident determined, if considered to be in her interests, must be balanced against other factors. One direct effect upon O, if a fact finding is deemed desirable, will be the automatic delay in achieving the final outcome of these proceedings. The final hearing will necessarily be delayed from the current listed dates in July until November.
13. The criminal trial was listed for three days, and accordingly if a fact finding within these proceedings is considered appropriate, a three day listing will be required. In addition to the use of court time and its attendant costs, the cost to the public purse of the Minister's and O's legal representation and the involvement of the Guardian should be borne in mind,
14. D apparently refused to give evidence in the criminal proceedings but in any event, even if summonsed to attend Court, he may well be a hostile witness and the likelihood of a fair trial which would result in the determination of this issue is therefore poor.
15. Even without a fact finding hearing the fact that D has made an allegation that he was assaulted by the father is a fact which the Court can in any event properly take into account. The weight to be attached to it will be a matter for the Court. It is demonstrative of O's circumstances while back in the care of her parents and is therefore relevant to the appropriateness of future plans for her.
16. A key factor is that irrespective of whether or not there was a grave and criminal assault, it was common ground between the parties that O's removal from her parents would not be sought. The issue for disposal is likely to concentrate on whether a supervision order or family assistance order will be more appropriate. In other words, the case can properly be decided without a fact finding hearing.
17. None of the parties sought to persuade me that a fact finding was necessary. Indeed the parties agreed with the submission of the Minster that the evidential outcome of such an exercise was unlikely to be determinative of the issue in question and it was accordingly likely to have little effect upon the outcome of the proceedings. In the premises, and in the exercise of my discretion, I directed that there should be no fact finding hearing and that the matter should proceed to a final hearing in July.