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Jersey Unreported Judgments |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> In the matter of Freddie and Arthur (Care order) [2015] JRC 037 (20 February 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2015/2015_037.html Cite as: [2015] JRC 37, [2015] JRC 037 |
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Care order - application by the Minister for an interim care order.
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Before : |
J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner and Jurats Marett-Crosby and Olsen |
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Between |
Minister for Health and Social Services |
First Plaintiff |
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And |
A (the mother) |
First Respondent |
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And |
B (the father) |
Second Respondent |
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IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF FREDDIE AND ARTHUR (CARE ORDER)
Advocate C. R. G. Davies for the Applicant.
Advocate A. T. H. English for the First Respondent.
Advocate A. D. Field for the Second Respondent.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. On 7th January, 2015, the Minister's application for a care order in respect of Freddie (this is not his real name) (who is aged 10) and Arthur (this is not his real name) (who is aged 8) was adjourned, pending the commissioning of various reports and assessments. It was agreed between the parties that the threshold for the making of an interim care order under Article 30 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 ("the Children Law") was met, but at the outset of the hearing, the position of the first respondent ("the mother") and the second respondent ("the father") was that an interim supervision order would suffice.
2. Freddie was born when the mother was 16 and the father 19, with Arthur following two years later. Their relationship broke down in December 2008. The mother has since married, and has a daughter by that relationship. The father has also since married, and has a son by that relationship.
3. The mother has a learning and physical disability which impacts upon her capacity to meet the demands of parenting the children. The father has a diagnosis of an autistic spectrum disorder as well as physical health problems which impact upon his capacity to meets the demands of parenting the children.
4. Freddie and Arthur have been exposed to numerous changes in their living and care arrangements (including short periods in voluntary care) and almost continuous disputes, allegations and counter allegations between the parents and their wider families. Private law proceedings have taken place in 2009/10 and 2013 during which psychological and educational psychological assessments were commissioned. Dr Bryn Williams, the psychologist, concluded that both children were vulnerable. Freddie was considered to have fairly significant learning difficulties combined with clearly evidenced emotional behavioural problems. Arthur has a diagnosis of ADHD, combined with significant learning difficulties and clearly evidenced emotional and behavioural problems.
5. In October 2014 the family registrar was sufficiently concerned about the welfare of the children and for the possible need for a care or supervision order to make an order under Article 29 of the Children Law requiring the Minister to undertake an investigation into the children's circumstances. That investigation was undertaken by Jayne Louise Isaac, senior social work practitioner within the Children's Service, and in her comprehensive report of 6th December, 2014, she concluded that the children were being subjected to significant harm and would continue to experience significant harm without an application to the Court to consider their welfare now and into the future. She recommended that an application for an interim care order be made which would allow the Minister to share parental responsibility and enable the Children's Service to manage contact arrangements, whilst undertaking appropriate assessments and considering the long term needs of the children.
6. The report sets out in detail the physical, emotional, sexual harm and neglect which in Jayne Isaac's opinion the children were suffering from or being exposed to, which we do not need to set out again in this judgment. It is true that many of the allegations remain unsubstantiated at this stage, but she suggested that these were highly vulnerable children, living within a high adversity environment with little to no resilient factors - "Nothing has changed for these children".
7. What was clear, and all the parties agreed that from the report and from the evidence we heard from the current social worker, Sabrina Charpentier (in place since September 2014) and Rachel Stroyan, the author of the interim care plan to whom the case would be transferred if an interim care order was imposed, and from the newly appointed guardian, Eleanor Green that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the circumstances with respect to the children are as mentioned in Article 24(2) of the Children Law, namely that they were suffering or were likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given to them or likely to be given to them if a care order or a supervision order was not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give the children.
8. The interim care plan was that the children's current care arrangements should remain in place pending an interim psychological assessment on their placement. Those arrangements are that they live with the mother (and her husband and their daughter) with regular overnight contact with the father (and his wife and their son).
9. Although Eleanor Green had been newly appointed, she had previously acted as the Court welfare officer in respect of the private law proceedings and she therefore came to the hearing with considerable experience as to the background. She told us that the children, over whom there had been long term concerns, were doing very badly, even taking into account their individual difficulties. They were not being parented properly and someone needed to take charge. The parents were so consumed by the allegations and counter allegations that they were unable to take decisions. In her view, it was important for the Minister to have parental responsibility, which a supervision order would not grant him, so that safeguarding the children was not left to the parents. The Minister had, in any event, already "assisted and befriended" the children and indeed the parents, as evidenced by the extensive list of support services and interventions described in paragraph 109 of Jayne Isaac's report, from which it would appear that little positive change had been effected for the children.
10. The mother and father did not give evidence before us and when it came to submissions, Advocate English, for the mother, told us how distressed she had been by the evidence she had heard. She had not appreciated just how badly the children were doing. Rather than arguing against the imposition of an interim care order and for a supervision order, she now wished to rest on the wisdom of the Court as to which order should be made. The only difference from her perspective was that an interim care order, giving as it does parental responsibility to the Minister, placed the mother "on the back foot" in the sense that it would enable the Minister to remove the children from her care placing the onus upon her to challenge that removal through the Court. Advocate Field, for the father, made submissions to the same effect.
11. The key difference between a care order and a supervision order was explored by the Court in the case of In the matter of O [2012] (1) JLR Note 3 where it was held:-
12. In that case, the parents had made such progress that they had been making all the decisions for the child concerned without the Minister having to use the parental responsibility vested in her pursuant to the interim care order; in essence, the parents could safeguard the child without sharing parental responsibility with the Minister. The Children's Service was able to work with the parents and a care order might be seen to be punitive.
13. By way of contrast, in the case before us, the relationships between the parents and their families and the Children's Service have been fraught, with complaints against individual social workers that have made meaningful dialogue and intervention with the families at times very difficult. As the senior social work practitioner within the team responsible for supervising the social workers, Jayne Isaacs was concerned that the parents and their partners had continually responded negatively to any direct challenge that had been made, which is when complaints about social workers have tended to be made. There is, therefore, no working relationship between the parents and the Children's Service, which would enable the parents to safeguard the children without sharing parental responsibility with the Minister.
14. We noted this in respect a letter dated 3rd December, 2014, from the Positive Behaviour Support Team who have been supporting Arthur:-
"Through our involvement we have been very concerned with the relationships between Arthur's parents, the countless allegations and counter allegations involving police investigations, child protection proceedings and the Family Courts. During the last sixteen months there has only been a brief period where the families have co-operated with each other and maintained an amicable relationship. Recent core group meetings have been volatile with professionals being brought into family disputes.
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The ongoing disputes and accusations even whilst under Child Protection proceedings for emotional harm, is a direct indication that the parents do not seem to understand the harm they are causing their children. Clinical work to resolve behavioural problems with Arthur under such circumstances is impossible as the behaviour itself may be a manifestation of the emotional trauma surrounding this family."
15. We had regard to the welfare checklist, assisted by the reports of Jayne Isaac and Sabrina Charpentier, and the no order principle, but we concluded that this was a case where, in order to safeguard the children, an interim care order was necessary.
16. Advocate Field had a number of concerns in relation to the contact arrangements set out in the interim care plan. The first relates to the Children's Service requiring a written undertaking from the father that he will maintain responsibility for all aspects of the main care for the children (when with him) and not permit his wife to be left unsupervised with either of them at any time. This was made in the context of a current police investigation in relation to disclosures Arthur made in respect of the father's wife having physically assaulted him with a spoon. As the father and his wife live in the same house, this could mean, taken literally, that he could not, for example, leave the children and his wife alone in the kitchen whilst he went to the bathroom. Advocate Davies confirmed, however, that the father would be deemed to be supervising the children provided he was in the home with them. What he was not expected to do was to leave the home with his wife remaining there alone with the children or to allow his wife alone to take the children away from the home. The police investigation into this alleged assault appears to have been going on since September 2014, and the delay is understandably causing considerable distress within the family. We therefore asked the Minister to ask the police to bring this investigation to a conclusion as soon as possible.
17. Secondly, the interim care plan provided that the contact between the paternal grandmother and the children would be supervised and that all contact with their paternal cousin should cease. The reason for this was that the children's service were concerned that the majority of the alleged sexualised incidents involving the children had taken place whilst in the care of the paternal grandmother and involved their paternal cousin. While the paternal grandmother provided support to the father in the care of the children, supervision would allow an assessment of the relationship between her and the children to be undertaken and for the children (including the paternal cousin) to be safeguarded. We saw no reason to question this.
18. Thirdly, the interim care plan provided that should any incidents of a serious concern occur or should there be any further injuries to either child that cause concern as to their origin, the Minister would seek to remove them from parental care into temporary foster care. Advocate Field was concerned that the parents should have reasonable notice of any such proposed removal (other than in the case of a genuine emergency). The interim care plan did make provision for any change in the placement of the children to be undertaken in a planned way with the parents receiving notice both of the requisite care planning meeting convened to consider such a change and a further three working days thereafter to enable them to seek legal advice and apply to the Court if necessary. Rachel Stroyan explained that it was the ethos of the Children's Service to preserve the family and there would be no knee-jerk reaction to the interim psychological assessment on placement. Any removal would have to be planned and the impact upon the children assessed. The parents would be given proper notice and time to get legal advice.
19. In the circumstances, the Court, having found that the threshold under Article 30 of the Children Law had been met, approved the care plan and imposed an interim care order.
