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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> AG v Green (Royal Court : Hearing (Criminal)) [2025] JRC 104 (22 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2025/2025_104.html Cite as: [2025] JRC 104 |
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Application for a restraining order
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Before : |
Sir William Bailhache, Commissioner, and Jurats Dulake and Powell |
The Attorney General
-v-
Trevor Robert John Green
L. Sette, Crown Advocate.
Advocate A. E. Binnie for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
THE COMMISSIONER:
1. On 18 November 2023, the Complainant, a manager at Morrisons store at Castle Quay, called the Defendant in for a meeting to discuss some issues which she had with him as his line manager. They were sufficiently serious that she had had advice from the Human Resources department, but nothing out of the ordinary. Such meetings take place in an employment situation across the island and in the western world routinely every day. But on this occasion, the Complainant suffered a life-changing assault. It could have been, and nearly was, a life-ending assault. Although these sentencing remarks inevitably place some emphasis on the Defendant, we emphasise that the Complainant, the victim, had done nothing wrong and suffered the injuries she did simply in going about her work and doing her job.
2. The meeting did not go well and the Defendant told her he was going home. He left the room and went to collect a kitchen knife. Without warning, he set upon the Complainant in a confined storeroom and stabbed her, as she put it, "like I was a piece of meat", at least eight times about the head, neck and body. The Complainant somehow managed to get out of the storeroom and was assisted by staff members. The police and ambulance were called. Before she lost consciousness as a result of her wounds, the Complainant felt blood running down her neck.
3. Fortunately, the paramedics were able to apply trauma first aid to her but even so, due to the volume and the pulsating nature of the blood loss, it was apparent that among the Complainant's injuries she had an arterial bleed and that she needed to be taken to hospital immediately as her life was in danger and that this was a time critical situation. Her blood pressure was critically low. The wound carrying the most severe risk was a three centimetre stab wound to the right side of her neck that tracked down into the subclavian artery, subclavian vein and jugular vein. The track was estimated to be between five and ten centimetres deep.
4. The neck injury was bleeding profusely when the Complainant arrived at the hospital and she lost a lot of blood as a result. She went into cardiac arrest twice.
5. In the meanwhile, the Defendant had, it appears, calmly washed the knife and left it in the sink. He then departed the scene through a side door, walked across the beach to Belcroute Bay where he was arrested by police some two hours later. When the police arrived he identified himself as the man they were looking for and he was calm and compliant in following their instructions.
6. The Defendant was charged with attempted murder, and in the alternative with grave and criminal assault. He pleaded not guilty on the basis that the Court ought to return a special verdict under Article 72 of the Mental Health Law 2016 ("the 2016 Law"), but if the Court were not minded to do so, he would plead guilty to attempted murder. We heard evidence which amounted to a comprehensive set of admissions, some CCTV evidence from within the Morrisons store which showed the assault itself, and evidence from two psychiatrists, both of them registered under the 2016 Law and each of them having impressive professional qualifications.
7. Perhaps unusually the opinions expressed by both experts were substantially the same. The Defendant is suffering, and was suffering at the time of the assault, from persistent delusions amounting to a mental disorder within the meaning of the 2016 Law. Dr Hillier, the psychiatrist appointed by the Crown, expressed the view that the Defendant might also be suffering from schizophrenia, another mental disorder within the meaning of that law. There is a possibility he ought to be screened for autism; that notwithstanding, they both agreed that the Defendant knew well what he was doing at the time and what the likely consequences of his actions were, but the nature of the delusions was such that he could not stop himself from behaving as he did.
8. In the light of their evidence, it would seem that there can certainly have been no doubt that the Defendant would have been found guilty of a grave and criminal assault and indeed there was every indication that he was likely to have been convicted for the offence of attempted murder. However, we cannot really improve on the analysis contained in Dr Hillier's report where he says this:
"In my experience it is a recognised hallmark of a civilised society that those who are vulnerable or unwell require a different consideration; for example when an individual is suffering from certain severe mental disorders such that they carry out behaviours that are substantially driven by it, these individuals are detained in hospital in the interests of their own health, safety, or for the protection of others until they have been able to receive treatment such that their illness has recovered and they are able to return to a fulsome life.
It is also my experience that many societies also operate a principle in relation to mentally disordered offenders which recognises that violence and offending can be a manifestation of severe untreated mental disorder, and that under certain circumstances they should not be punished for their crime, but rather treated, both for humanitarian reasons, but also for pragmatic ones, since the treatment is the best short, medium and long term way to reduce the risk posed, as well as the risk of recidivism.
Whilst there is an association between violence and mental disorder, it does not follow that all violence is caused by mental disorder, that all people who suffer from mental disorder are violent, or that all violence carried out by people with a mental disorder is caused by that disorder. People with mental disorders are capable of forming intent independently from their mental illness, particularly if it is of a nature that means that it is not always present (i.e. episodic rather than chronic or pervasive)."
9. We entirely accept that this thinking forms the rationale for Article 72 of the 2016 Law which, in respect of any offence, permits the Court to enter a special verdict rather than a finding of guilt.
10. There were elements on the facts in this case which, to a layman, might well have suggested that the Defendant knew perfectly well what he was doing and what he had done, and thereafter acted in such a way as to cover that up - washing the knife, which it is thought he did, leaving the scene and revealing himself to be extremely calm and undisturbed by the whole event. Nonetheless, we accepted the evidence of both experts that these features were entirely consistent with the delusional disorder from which the Defendant suffered.
11. The Crown did not oppose the delivery of a special verdict as was requested by the Defendant and in our view there is no doubt that that was the correct approach. We find formally that the Defendant carried out the act which would have formed the basis of the charge but we concluded on the evidence of the psychiatric experts that, at the time of carrying out the act, the Defendant was suffering from a mental disorder to such a substantial degree that he ought not to be held criminally responsible for doing so.
12. The Defendant has not been acquitted of the charge of attempted murder - and indeed, his plea was that if no special verdict had been entered he would plead guilty to that charge. For the purposes of Article 72 of the 2016 Law, we therefore do not acquit him but, having heard submissions and the psychiatric evidence, we conclude that it would be right to make a treatment order under Article 65, coupled with a special restrictions order under Article 68, without limit of time. The reasons for those orders are as follows.
13. There is no doubt that this offence was extremely serious. Victim personal statements are frequently important in helping a victim of crime manage his or her emotions which flow from that status. It is sometimes the case that that is their primary usefulness. On rare occasions, and this is one, the victim impact statement brings home the brutality of the assault and emphasises its life-changing nature and we quote from it:
"When I woke up from coma, the first thing I saw was my sister's face. Her reassuring voice told me that I was in the hospital, but those words quickly faded as the horrifying memories overwhelmed me. I vividly recall his face, the man who attacked me, clenching his teeth as he stabbed me, treating me like a mere object. The terror of that moment is etched into my mind as if it happened just moments ago. The pain I endured during and after the attack was indescribable. I have scars all over my body, painful reminders of that brutal day. I can still feel the warmth of my blood pouring down my neck, the panic of not being able to breath, and the overwhelming fear that I was about to die.... These vivid sensations and memories haunt me regularly, dragging me back into that moment of horror. Since that day my physical ability to work has been taken from me. I now live with chronic pain and limited mobility in my arms, making it nearly impossible to perform even the simplest tasks. I also deal with tinnitus, a relentless ringing in my ears, which disrupts my focus and peace. Additionally the paralysis of my vocal cord has robbed me of ability to communicate effectively leaving me feeling isolated and frustrated. Beyond the physical scars, I am burdened with post-traumatic stress disorder. Flashbacks and nightmares trap me in a cycle of fear and anxiety, making it nearly impossible to feel safe again. The workplace, which one provided me with purpose and fulfilment, has now become a source of dread. I am terrified of being around people, afraid that I might relive that trauma again.... While I am grateful to be alive, the reality is that my life has been irrevocably changed. I often wrestle with feelings of anger, loss, and deep sadness over what I have lost, not just my physical capabilities, but the joy and meaning that my work used to bring me...."
14. The victim's personal statement is supported by a victim impact report which the Court has seen from Dr Jamie Connor, a consultant clinical psychologist. He confirms that the Complainant has experienced profound and life-altering physical consequences as a result of the attack, with lasting impairments to her mobility, strength, speech and overall health. One of the most significant physical challenges is the removal of half her collar bone, which has left her with chronic pain, restricted movement in her right shoulder and hand and reduced grip strength making daily tasks significantly more difficult. In addition, she experiences persistent tension and pain in her neck which worsens throughout the day.
15. The victim's ability to communicate has been permanently affected due to damage to her vocal cords. The attack has exacerbated pre-existing migraines to a severe and debilitating level. Her mobility has been significantly impaired, particularly on her right side, affecting her balance and leading to frequent falls. Her independence has been severely reduced. The impact is not only upon her but on her immediate family. She relies heavily on her husband and sister for daily living activities. Her husband has had to reduce his work hours to care for her, and the attack has disrupted their long-term plans, particularly regarding family planning. The psychologist confirms that her symptoms are consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder, including hypervigilance, avoidance, intrusive thoughts, emotional numbing and dis-associative reactions.
16. Very bravely, the Complainant came to Court to listen to the process which led to the special verdict and sentence. In a very small way, we were able to witness for ourselves the consequences that the assault has had upon her.
17. Since the Defendant was taken into Brockfield House in the United Kingdom, he has been the subject of an intensive medical regime which includes not only medication but also some psychological treatment. We are told that he is making some progress. Dr Bisht, the defence psychiatrist, thought that he had made 50% or 60% progress towards bringing his delusions under control. However, neither psychiatrist was prepared to express an opinion as to the length of time which should elapse before the Defendant could be released safely into the community. That would depend upon his compliance with the medication and on the other progress he was able to make while in hospital. Dr Hillier, placing some reliance on the fact that the Defendant had suffered from the delusional disorder at least since 2015 and maybe longer, considered that this period of time was likely to carry with it a similar period before the experts could regard the Defendant as no longer causing a risk to the public. Dr Bisht said that there was a good prognosis but it was too difficult to say how long it would take to get to recovery - typically three to five years as a minimum, but difficult to say how long. He considered that the Defendant would need to take medication for the rest of his life, and, although at some stage he might be released into the community, he would require some monitoring to ensure that the medication was taken.
18. In our view, the risks to the public are such that a treatment order is absolutely essential, and we have no doubt that the treatment order should take effect only with special restrictions, pursuant to Article 68 of the 2016 Law, without limit of time. In accordance with Article 68(2) we have considered the nature and gravity of the offence, which is so tellingly revealed by the personal impact statement and the victim impact statement to which we have referred. We note that the Defendant has no previous history of violence, and indeed has no previous convictions of any consequence at all. Nonetheless we are satisfied that the risk of the Defendant committing further offences if he remains at liberty is currently severe. Both psychiatrists, who gave evidence before us, advanced the opinion that a restriction order was necessary given the gravity of the offence, and indeed both were of the opinion that if the Defendant were returned to prison, then his ongoing compliance with the medication requirements and the ongoing need for psychological assistance might be at risk because he would not be housed in a system equipped to monitor with sufficient regularity the taking of that medication. Furthermore, there might be a risk to prison officers and other inmates.
19. For these reasons, we consider that a treatment order is necessary and a restriction order without limit of time should apply. The Defendant is to remain where he is currently placed namely at Brockfield House Medium Secure Unit, and the restriction order shall only cease to have effect on the Court being satisfied, on an application made for that purpose by the Defendant or the Attorney General that restrictions in respect of the Defendant are no longer required to protect the public from serious harm.
20. Advocate Binnie submitted that notwithstanding Article 68(6) of the 2016 Law, the Court ought to direct that the responsible medical officer for the Defendant should examine him at intervals of less than twelve months and report the result of each such examination to the Attorney General. The purpose of that order would be to ensure that the Defendant was not detained for any longer than was necessary. We were directed to the decision of the Superior Number in AG v McMillan [2025] JRC 040 where the Court gave a direction that reports be provided twelve months after the treatment order with special restrictions, and at six monthly intervals thereafter. It is not clear from the judgment what the reasons were for that order and we take it as being fact specific to that case. In our view, the offending in the present case is so serious that we see no reason to reduce the period of mandatory reporting which Article 68(6) envisages. Our decision in this respect is not effected by the mitigating factors which Advocate Binnie put before us - unplanned offence, no previous convictions, a person of good character and hard worker, a man of gentle nature who had expressed remorse, and a person who had been compliant with the doctors - which do not outweigh the gravity of the offence and the psychiatric evidence we have heard in our assessment of the risks which the Defendant poses to the public at least in the medium term and maybe in the long term.
21. We turn to the last matter which is that of the possibility of a restraining order under Article 8 of the Crime (Public Order) (Jersey) Law 2024 ("the 2024 Law").
22. The order which the Crown suggested we consider was in these terms:
23. Pursuant to Article 9 of the 2024 Law, any breach of the order, if made, would render the Defendant liable to imprisonment for up to five years.
24. Advocate Sette was naturally cautious in his submissions on this point, given the terms of Article 8(1) of the 2024 Law which provides:
25. It was pointed out that there could be doubt as to whether the Defendant had been convicted, because a special verdict had been entered. He also drew out attention to Article 8(2) which states that "the Court may, in addition to any other order or penalty that it may make or impose make a restraining order against the person to whom the application relates if paragraph (3) is met".
26. We note that the treatment order is not a penalty but it is undoubtedly an order.
27. As to Article 8(3), the Court has to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is appropriate to make a restraining order for the purposes of protecting the victim of the offence from conduct by the defendant that would, if carried out, amount to harassment of the victim or likely to cause her to be in fear of being subjected to violence.
28. The Court has no doubt that the terms of Article 8(3) are met. As is clear from the victim's personal statement and the victim impact statement, the attack has profoundly affected her psychological wellbeing, and anything this Court can do by way of a restraining order seems to us to be something we should put into effect to the extent that it is lawful to do so.
29. We naturally understand that our jurisdiction to make the order is not free from doubt. The particular provisions we are now considering have as their provenance the Crime (Disorderly Conduct and Harassment) (Jersey) Law 2008 which, at Article 5(1) is in similar terms. There is however no definition of "convicted" in either that legislation or in the 2024 Law. Neither is there any definition to be found in the Interpretation (Jersey) Law 1954 which might bear on this subject.
30. In our view, it is appropriate to adopt a purposive construction of Article 8(1). First of all, we note that the Defendant has not been acquitted of the offences with which he is charged. Secondly, were it not for the psychiatric evidence which justifies the special verdict, there is absolutely no doubt that the Defendant would have been convicted at the very least of a grave and criminal assault. Whatever arguments might have been advanced on his behalf in relation to the discharge of the Crown's duty to prove a specific intent in the charge of attempted murder, those difficulties would not have arisen in relation to the alternative count of grave and criminal assault where a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts. Indeed the psychiatric evidence in this case was that the Defendant would have both understood and intended the consequences of his acts - his motivation, which is different from his intention, as Dr Hillier put it in effect meant that he could not exercise a rational choice in respect of his actions but it did not mean that he did not intend them. His psychiatric condition leads to the special verdict, but it does not mean that, absent the special verdict he would not have been convicted. Absent the special verdict, that would have been the position.
31. The purpose of the law is to ensure that a restraining order is made in circumstances where it is appropriate to do so. Here it is undoubtedly appropriate to do so, the test in Article 8(3) being clearly met. For as long as the Defendant remains subject to detention pursuant to the treatment order, he of course will not pose any risk to the victim - but it remains a possibility that he will be released at some point, and the victim will have - almost certainly, on the victim impact statement and personal impact statement, currently does have - a legitimate concern that she may be at risk if he is released. The making of a restraining order therefore meets the objectives of the 2024 Law and we consider that we can treat the Defendant as convicted of an offence notwithstanding the special verdict which has been entered.
32. For these reasons we do not consider the existence of the treatment order with a special restrictions order prevents us from making a restraining order under the 2024 Law and we have therefore made it in the terms set out at paragraph [22] above.
33. If we are wrong in our construction of the 2024 Law and the Court has no jurisdiction thereunder to make a restraining order - and it may well be appropriate that the States considers an amendment to Article 8 to ensure that any doubt on the making of a restraining order where a special verdict has been entered is removed - we consider that it is within our inherent jurisdiction to make such an order, albeit that would take effect not for the purposes of creating a criminal jurisdiction for any breach of the order but rather a jurisdiction in civil contempt. We therefore make the same order on that alternative basis. We have also noted that the Defendant has not objected to the making of a restraining order, nor has he objected to an order made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction, but indeed has, through his counsel, volunteered an undertaking to the Court in terms identical to the restraining order which is set out above. If he were to breach the terms of that order therefore, even if no criminal liability arises because, contrary to our view on the purposive interpretation of Article 8 of the 2024 Law no jurisdiction is available thereunder in the absence of a conviction, the Defendant would be committing a civil contempt for which he is liable to be brought before the Court and punished. We are informed by Advocate Binnie that that has been carefully explained to him prior to her being instructed to give the undertakings to the Court on his behalf which she has.