Neutral Citation No.  [2011] NIQB 9	Ref:     	McCL8097	
			
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down	Delivered:	11/02/11	
(subject to editorial corrections)*			

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
  ______

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (CROWN SIDE)
 ________

Pantridge’s (Frank) Application (Leave Stage) [2011] NIQB 9

IN THE MATTER of an Application by Frank Pantridge
for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
________

McCLOSKEY J

[1]	This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review by Mr. Pantridge, who represents himself.

[2]	The story of this litigation is readily ascertained by reference to the following documents appended to this short judgment:

(a)	“Small Claim Application Form” [Appendix 1].

(b)	The Applicant’s letter dated 5th January 2010 to the Society of Motor Auctions [Appendix 2].

(c)	The order of District Judge Wells, dated 11th June 2010 [Appendix 3].

(d)	The written decision of Judge Burgess, the Recorder of Belfast, dated 22nd September 2010 [Appendix 4].

(e)	The Applicant’s Order 53 Statement, dated 21st December 2010 [Appendix 5].

[3]	In short, the Applicant brought proceedings in the Small Claims Court against Wilsons Auctions Mallusk (“the auctioneers”- Appendix 1).  His complaint was that the auctioneers had sold his vehicle by private treaty (not by auction) at a significant under value, the alleged shortfall being some £1,400.  The auctioneers disputed this claim.  According to the evidence, following four failed auction attempts during which the reserve price of the vehicle was reduced by agreement of the parties, the auctioneers secured an offer to purchase by private treaty for the sum of £5,500, to which the Applicant agreed.  That the Applicant signified his consent to this sale is confirmed by the terms of his letter dated 5th January 2010 to the Society of Motor Auctions [Appendix 2]:

“The auctioneer then called me back later in the afternoon to say that he had found someone who was prepared to pay £5,500 for the car and he advised me to accept the offer …

I agreed to sell the car at that price …”.

This letter was a prelude to a mediation decision, dated 19th March 2010.  The mediator was Mr. Reeves LLB, a solicitor attached to the National Conciliation Service.  He found in favour of the auctioneers.  His mediation decision includes the following material passages:

“As the vehicle was not sold at auction the private treaty bid was put to Mr. Pantridge which he accepted …

Further it is accepted by both parties that Mr. Pantridge agreed that his vehicle should be sold for £5,500 …

Conclusion

I do not find that Wilsons Auctions have breached their duty to Mr. Pantridge …

If Mr. Pantridge was not happy with the price offered he always had the option of withdrawing the vehicle from the auction and selling it elsewhere.  I do not conclude therefore that Mr. Pantridge’s claim succeeds.”

[4]	The Applicant then initiated proceedings in the Small Claims Court [Appendix 1].  In the formulation of his claim, the essential complaint advanced was that the auctioneers had provided him with “misleading price information”.  Subsequently, he informed the court in writing that the causes of action which he was invoking were breach of duty of care, misrepresentation and professional negligence.  On 11th June 2010, District Judge Wells dismissed his claim [Appendix 3].  Following this, the Recorder of Belfast became seized of the matter.  The precise route whereby this occurred is unclear.  However, it would appear that the Applicant attempted to appeal against the order of District Judge Wells on a point of law (see the Recorder’s decision, paragraph 4 – Appendix 4).  In dismissing this appeal the Recorder stated, inter alia:

“I am more than satisfied that all issues of law, whether contractual, statute or common law were ventilated in the documents prior to the hearing and that the District Judge would have had them before him in order to consider his decision …

This court’s jurisdiction is confined to appeals on points of law …

I have looked at this matter anxiously, but have had to conclude that nothing has been disclosed or shown to me to allow me to conclude that I have jurisdiction under the legislation to hear this appeal”.

[5]	In his Order 53 Statement [Appendix 5], the Applicant seeks the following relief:

“The remedy of setting aside the decision of the District Judge and an order that the matter be referred back to the District Judge’s Court for a fresh hearing”.

At the hearing in this court (on 11th February 2011), the Applicant confirmed that he wished to challenge also the decision of the Recorder.  It is unnecessary to rehearse the grounds of challenge, as these are appended hereto.  The first two grounds of challenge enshrine complaints about the conduct of the auctioneers and have no judicial review dimension.  I construe the third (and final) ground to resolve to a contention that the decisions of the first and second instance courts who have determined the Applicant’s claim against the auctioneers are vitiated by irrationality.

 [6]	The test to be applied to this court, at this stage, is whether the Applicant has overcome the modest hurdle of establishing an arguable case.  I conclude without hesitation that he has not.  The evidence before this court fails to disclose any vestige of arguable irrationality or illegality or any other public law misdemeanour in the decisions of either District Judge Wells or the Recorder.  This is an undisguised attempt to mount an appeal on the merits, an impermissible exercise in this  court of supervisory jurisdiction. This is not an appellate tribunal.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed accordingly.

[7]	For the record, I add that this application was determined by the court ex parte, at an oral hearing attended by the Applicant.  The court did not consider it necessary for either of the tribunals concerned to be represented at this stage.  There will be no order as to costs.

I N D E X 

						Pages

APPENDIX   1 	-			  5-6

APPENDIX	2          -			   7

APPENDIX   3          -			    8

APPENDIX   4	-			  9-11

APPENDIX	5	-			   12