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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions >> F P McCann Ltd Department for Regional Development [2019] NIQB 100 (12 December 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2019/100.html Cite as: [2019] NIQB 100 |
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Ref: COL10699
Neutral Citation No: [2019] NIQB 100
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Delivered: 12/12/2019
2010 No. 41557
BETWEEN:
Plaintiff;
Defendant.
COLTON J
"(a) The complexity of the statutory scheme.
(b) The lack of clarity in the statute, or in any case law as to what was required by Regulation 30(6)(c) that the parts of the offer considered to be abnormally low were verified with the plaintiff.
(c) That the defendant sought, at considerable cost, the assistance of a highly respected, competent and experienced specialist firm to carry out the necessary assessment of tenders and to advise it accordingly.
(d) The fact that the defendant had, in compliance with the Regulations, on two occasions, sought explanations from the plaintiff as to the parts of the offer that were considered to be abnormally low which the court found to be lawful and reasonable.
(e) That the defendant, its servants and agents, had difficulty understanding the extent of the requirement to verify, and made a bona fide error in arriving at its conclusions in this regard, which is excusable.
(f) That asking the plaintiff to confirm that their productivity and unit rates provided for drainage, earthworks, pavements and structures would be used as the basis for agreeing target costs could have led to little, if any, further information as the tender documents had already made this clear.
(g) That the defendant sought to make allowance for the fact that the tendered matters related to a portion of the expected contract works and therefore the defendant did make a good faith attempt to assess a forecast out-turn costs using the plaintiff's tendered rates.
(h) Insofar as matters that did not contribute to the CEP's view that the offer was abnormally low were mentioned in the CEP report, this was an unfortunate drafting error that would have been apparent by reference to the entirety of the report.
(i) Insofar as the CEP did not intend that all matters referred to in its report contributed to its view that the offer was abnormally low, there is no reason to seek clarification of other matters mentioned.
(j) This court had concluded that the question of the ability to agree a target cost on the basis of the tendered figures was a legitimate concern. This concern at the time the decision was made has been vindicated by subsequent evidence that demonstrated:
(i) The lack of any meaningful pricing strategy on the part of the plaintiff.
(ii) The indications from the contemporaneous evidence that the plaintiff's intention was to obtain the contract using the lowest rates that it considered to be credible and then seek to arrive at a target cost based on its real prices.
(k) It was appropriate to have regard to the question of the A5 tender process as the defendant's attitude to risk was not something that could be limited to consideration within the terms of a single contract having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was a member of joint ventures in relation to contracts that could be awarded for both the A5 and the A8.
(l) That the defendant did seek to confirm bitumen prices for pavements and, albeit that the court concluded that the defendant fell into error when coming to its view, via Mr Scullion, the court concluded that Mr Scullion had come to a genuine view.
(m) That, as the court found, the plaintiff's bitumen prices were sustainable. This meant that the difference between the plaintiff's prices for pavement were even lower than the defendant considered them to be in its assessment and therefore the variation between the plaintiff and other tenderers was even larger than appreciated.
(n) Overall this court found that the facts were capable of sustaining the conclusion that the bid was abnormally low with a consequence that it was open to the defendant, properly advised, to come to the view that the whole offer was in effect abnormally low and accordingly that the defendant was not wrong or guilty of manifest error in this regard.
(o) That the errors found by the court were errors in the process adopted by the defendant which were made in good faith and without any intention or design to disadvantage the plaintiff and which did not undermine the central finding that it was within the defendant's discretionary power to find that the offer was abnormally low. To this extent, the errors were not a grave disregard of the limit of the defendant's discretion. The errors were involuntary and unintentional.
(p) As such the errors found by the court did not have a manifest effect on the exercise of its discretion and thus the outcome of the process."
"Lord Clyde identified the following factors, though the list was not exhaustive: (1) The importance of the principle which has been breached; (2) The clarity and precision of the rule breached; (3) The degree of excusability of an error of law; (4) The existence of any relevant judgment on the point; (5) The state of the mind of the infringer, and in particular whether the infringer was acting intentionally or involuntarily (i.e. whether there was a deliberate intention to infringe as opposed to an inadvertent breach); (6) The behaviour of the infringer after it has become evident that an infringement has occurred; (7) The persons affected by the breach, including whether there has been a complete failure to take account of the specific situation of a defined economic group; and (8) The position taken by one of the Community institutions in the matter.
He said that the application of the 'sufficiently serious' test 'comes eventually to be a matter of fact and circumstance'; no single factor is necessarily decisive; but one factor by itself might, particularly where there was little or nothing to put in the scales on the other side, be sufficient to justify a conclusion of liability."
"[84] As is well known, Lord Clyde set out in his opinion a non-exhaustive series of factors which fall to be weighed in the balance. I will be considering these subsequently. What it is important to recognise at this stage is that:
(i) The test is objective (p 554D) (If a government acts in bad faith that is an additional factor which falls objectively to be considered);
(ii) The weight to be given to these various factors will vary from case to case, and no single factor is necessarily decisive;
(iii) The seriousness of the breach will always be an important factor.
Although not expressly mentioned by Lord Clyde I would add that in a minimal/no discretion type of case it will be easier for the claimant to prove the requisite degree of seriousness."
- Matters which were expressly excluded as contributing to the recommendation in fact did or may well have contributed to the actual decision taken by the defendant to reject the plaintiff's bid.
- BBMC were not given the opportunity to explain matters which ultimately contributed to the decision to reject the tender which constituted a breach of Regulation 30(6)(a) which placed an obligation upon the defendant that before it could come to any decision that a tender was "abnormally low" it must request "in writing an explanation of the offer or of those parts which it considers contribute to the offer being abnormally low."
- The defendant took into account issues in relation to the plaintiff's involvement in the A5 tender process without ever informing BBMC of this or giving it an opportunity to deal with any issues of concern.
- The defendant failed to comply with its obligation to verify the offer or parts of the offer which were allegedly abnormally low as expressly required by Regulation 30(6)(c).
"[36] If the Authority has not complied with its obligations as to equality, transparency or objectivity, then there is no scope for the Authority to have a 'margin of appreciation' as to the extent to which it will, or will not, comply with its obligations."