THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS 

CASE REF:	6082/09IT

CLAIMANT:  		Claire McColgan		

RESPONDENT:  		Andras House Limited		

DECISION

The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is dismissed.

Constitution of Tribunal:

Chairman:			Mr I. Wimpress

Panel Members:		Mr J. Patterson
				Mr J. Kinnear

Appearances:

The claimant was unrepresented and appeared on her own behalf

The respondent was represented by Mr Randal of Peninsula Business Services

The Claim and the Response

1.	The claimant alleges that she was unfairly dismissed by the respondent.  The basis of the claim did not emerge clearly from the claim form but in essence the claimant's case was that the reasons given for her dismissal on the grounds of misconduct were not genuine and that she was dismissed because the respondent wanted to reduce staff hours for financial reasons.  In its response the respondent denied that the claimant was unfairly dismissed and contended that she was fairly dismissed for misconduct.  The response outlined a number of disciplinary cases taken against the claimant the last of which resulted in the claimant's dismissal.  The proceedings originally included a claim of victimisation and named Vicki Green and Lee Madden as respondents.  This claim was rejected at the pre-acceptance stage and the claim was thereby confined to unfair dismissal.  It is not disputed that Andras House Limited is the claimant’s employer.  In these circumstances we are satisfied that the appropriate course is to dismiss Vicki Green and Lee Madden from the proceedings and amend the title accordingly.

Sources of Evidence

2.	The tribunal received a substantial bundle of documents from the respondent and heard oral evidence from the claimant, Mrs Victoria Green, Mr Eamon King and Mrs Lorraine Walker.

Issues

3.	At the beginning of the hearing the parties helpfully agreed a list of issues as follows:

(1) 	What was the reason for the dismissal of the claimant?  [The respondent contended that the reason was conduct, a potentially fair reason pursuant to Article 130 (2)(b) of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996].

(2) 	Had the respondent a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the claimant of that misconduct at the time of its decision?

(3) 	Had the respondent reasonable grounds at the time of its decision on which to sustain its belief in the misconduct of the claimant?

(4) 	At the stage the respondent took the decision to dismiss, had the respondent carried out as much of an inquiry/investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances? 

(5) 	Was dismissal a fair sanction in the circumstances?

(6) 	Was the claimant afforded an effective right of appeal in the circumstances?

The Facts

4.	The claimant commenced employment on 17 January 2005 as a reservation supervisor with the respondent which owns a number of hotels in the greater Belfast area.  The claimant was based in the Ramada Hotel at Shaw’s Bridge, Belfast.

5.	In 2008 the respondent decided to centralise its reservations in Andras House.   A new post of Central Reservations Manager was created.  Both the claimant and Mrs Green applied for this post.  Mrs Green was successful.  

6.	The respondent’s staff handbook included a disciplinary section.  Provision was made for the categorisation of misconduct offences into three categories; minor misconduct, major misconduct and gross misconduct.  Major misconduct was defined as including failure to carry out all reasonable instructions or follow the Company rules and procedures.  At page 25 of the staff handbook it was provided that the relevant disciplinary authority for taking disciplinary action including warnings and dismissal was the HR Manager or nominated representative or a person with higher seniority.

7.	On 6 August 2008, the claimant incorrectly updated the booking reservation system which resulted in the respondent turning away customers and thereby incurring a loss of £27,000.00.  When the claimant discovered this error on 24 November 2008 she failed to inform a senior member of management.  The claimant was invited to an investigation meeting on 25 November 2008.  

8.	On 27 November 2008, the claimant was late for work and failed to hand in a report on time.  The claimant accepted that from November 2008, Mrs Green was under pressure to provide correct reports and that the claimant was obliged to assist her to so by following the correct procedures. The claimant attended a disciplinary hearing on 2 December 2008 and was subsequently issued with a warning.  The claimant was informed that she had the right to appeal against this decision but did not avail of it.  Following the meeting the claimant requested more training and this was provided by Mrs Green on 9 December 2008.  

9.	Further disciplinary action was taken against the claimant at the beginning of January 2009.  The claimant was charged with failing to monitor and manage optional bookings on the reservation system correctly and failing to inform management of such deviations as are required by reservation procedures.   As a result the claimant was again invited to a disciplinary hearing on 15 January 2009.  The outcome of the meeting was that the claimant was issued with a final written warning.  The claimant was informed that she had the right to appeal against this decision but again did not avail of it. 

10.	A meeting was also held on 15 January 2009 to discuss the need to reduce 40 hours in the Reservations Department and 40 hours in the Sales and Marketing Department in order to avoid redundancies.  After the meeting the claimant heard nothing further about this problem.  Unbeknown to the claimant one of her colleagues, Mrs Krystina Livie, who was on maternity leave at this time and had decided not to return to work after her maternity leave. Mrs Livie advised the respondent of her decision by email to Mrs Green on 26 January 2009.  While the email was regrettably not produced by the respondent until the final day of the tribunal hearing, the claimant did not seek to dispute its contents. As Mrs Livie’s post was full time this took care of the need for a 40 hour reduction.  

11.	A further failing with regard to deviation procedures occurred in early February 2009.  This resulted in further disciplinary proceedings and the claimant was invited to a disciplinary hearing on 9 February 2009.  On receipt of this letter in the Human Resources Office the claimant used loud and inappropriate language and this resulted in a further disciplinary letter being issued on 6 February 2009 which added this matter to the concerns to be discussed at the meeting on 9 February 2009.

12.	The disciplinary hearing took place as arranged on 9 February 2009.  While the outcome of the disciplinary hearing was being awaited, the claimant issued a grievance letter on 12 February 2009.

13.	On 23 February 2009, the respondent issued its decision on the disciplinary matter.    The letter referred to the claimant's previous final written warning and stated that the claimant could have been dismissed for her repeated failure to follow the reservation procedure but that instead of dismissing her, the respondent had decided to give her one further chance.  

14.	Following an investigation of the claimant's grievance the respondent advised the claimant by letter dated 6 March 2009 that there were no sufficient grounds to substantiate the grievance.  

15.	In March 2009, the respondent received a complaint from a longstanding client, the Scottish Bowls Club, about the claimant's mismanagement and handling of its reservation booking.  Mrs Green wrote to the claimant on 25 March 2009 and invited her to attend a disciplinary hearing on 30 March 2009.  The letter specified the matters of concern as follows:

“It is alleged that the company has received a verbal complaint from one of its long standing regular clients regarding the mismanagement of a reservation booking, namely a booking for 60 rooms required at the Ramada Hotel, Belfast over the period between 12th and 23rd March 2009 in a potential loss of business to the company of £32,000 approximately.  It is further alleged that the client also raised a complaint that they had not been contacted by Claire regarding a dinner booking required for 60 guests on 21st March 2009.  The client stated that they felt very frustrated when making a booking confirmation on several occasions due to poor communication from Claire.”

	The letter warned the claimant that as she already had a final written warning on file her employment may be terminated if she was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation.  The claimant was also advised of her right to be accompanied by a fellow employee or trade union official. 

16. 	The meeting took place as scheduled.  The claimant was accompanied by a colleague, Mr Stephen Madden.  Mrs Green gave the claimant a full opportunity to explain her actions. The claimant’s explanation was partly that communication had been lacking on both sides as between the claimant and the client, Mrs Easton.  The claimant’s explanation unfortunately made matters worse for her as it included the disclosure that she had failed to obtain a signed contract or financial security against the booking made by the Scottish Bowls Club.  After the meeting had been closed, a further charge was added based on this disclosure.   As a result Mrs Green then wrote to the claimant on 7 April 2009 and invited her to attend a reconvened hearing on 16 April 2009.  Mrs Green set out the new charge as follows:

“It is alleged that you had taken charge of a large booking for the Scottish Bowls Club and that on three occasions you failed to obtain a signed contract or to obtain financial security against the booking.  If proven, this is a clear breach of the company’s Deviation Procedures which could have had a detrimental affect on the business as the booking was not secured.” 

Mrs Green also advised that she would also be addressing a few further points regarding the allegations that were the subject of hearing on 30 March 2009.  Mrs Green also repeated the matters of concern set out in her letter of 25 March 2009 and advised that both matters were viewed by the respondent as potentially serious misconduct.

17.	The reconvened hearing took place as scheduled.  The claimant was again accompanied by Mr Madden.  Mrs Green went over the issues thoroughly with the claimant who was given a full opportunity to give her explanation of the events and put forward any mitigating circumstances.  As part of her explanation, the claimant mentioned that she was off sick from 27 February 2009 to 4 March 2009 but this only accounted for 4 days out of an 11 day delay.  The claimant indicated that she was happy with the way that she had dealt with the booking but accepted that she had taken too long to reply to the client.  In relation to the second issue the claimant’s explanation was that she had not pursued the contract and the lack of financial security against the booking because it was a regular client whom she trusted to see it through and pay the monies in full.  At the conclusion of the reconvened hearing Mrs Green advised the claimant that she would consider the evidence carefully and give her decision in writing.

18.	On 27 April 2009, Mrs Green wrote to the claimant and advised her of her decision which was to dismiss the claimant with immediate effect.   Although it was Mrs Green’s decision as the nominated representative it was also confirmed by her line manager, Lee Madden.  In the letter of dismissal Mrs Green rehearsed the charges and the claimant’s explanations and stated that she considered the explanations unsatisfactory.  Mrs Green continued as follows:

“The company wrote to you on 23rd February 2009 to give you a further chance to show your true potential.  Within this letter the company set out its expectations and requested an immediate improvement.  However, you have once again failed to communicate effectively with a client namely the Scottish Bowls Club regarding a dinner booking for 60 guests.  We note that you were off sick, however when you returned to work you did not reply immediately to the email taking 4 working days to respond to the client’s request.  As a result of your late response the client had no alternative to follow up on the dinner booking themselves with the company receiving a complaint from the client regarding the mismanagement of the booking placing future bookings with the Scottish Bowls Club at possible jeopardy.

Once again you have breached the company’s Deviation Procedures by failing to notify your Line Manager of a deviation.  The deviation to procedures being that you failed to notify your Line Manager that you were unable to obtain a signed contract and financial security against a large booking for the Scottish Bowls Club.  As a result of your actions this left the company vulnerable with no course of redress should the client have cancelled the booking.

As a consequence therefore, and in view of the fact that you are already on a Final Written Warning for conduct issued to you on 20th January 2009, I have decided that your employment should be terminated with immediate effect.”

	Mrs Green concluded the letter by advising the claimant that she had the right of appeal to Mr Gerard King, the Financial Controller.

19.	The claimant appealed the decision by letter dated 30 April 2009.  The stated ground of appeal was that the sanction of dismissal was too severe.  The appeal hearing was convened on 8 May 2009 and was heard by Mr King.  The claimant was again accompanied by Mr Madden.  The claimant made the case to Mr King that she was being singled out and that she had never known a complaint against anyone to go to disciplinary action straight away.  Rather the claimant would have expected to be pulled to one side by her manager and spoken to. The claimant sought to distinguish these proceedings from the three previous disciplinary proceedings in that they did not arise from complaints made by customers.  She also made the point that if the contracts in relation to the Scottish Bowls Club had not been mentioned by her at the first disciplinary hearing with Mrs Green on 30 March 2009 she would not have been dismissed.  The claimant also indicated that she believed that dismissal was an easy way out for Mrs Green as redundancy had been mentioned in January.  At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr King indicated that he would consider the evidence and give his decision in writing within a few days.

 20.	On 15 May 2009 Mr King wrote to the claimant and informed her that he was upholding Mrs Green’s decision to dismiss the claimant.  Mr King set out his reasons as follows:

“The treatment of the issue of the alleged complaint against which you appealed, was handled fairly and justly by the company in accordance with its disciplinary procedures as set out in the staff handbook.  I believe that the key issue in relation to this complaint was a lack of communication between yourself and your line manager and yourself and the customer.  On review of your employee records it is evident that this issue of poor communication had been the subject of previous disciplinary meetings with yourself dated 30th March 2009, 9th February 2009 and 2nd December 2008.  Therefore I conclude that the termination was justified and cannot find evidence to support your view that the alleged complaint was a stand-alone incident without precedent.”

21.	After her dismissal the claimant sought alternative employment but with limited success.  The claimant went to Spain in the summer of 2009 and obtained employment in a restaurant on 1 July 2009.  The claimant had anticipated remaining in this employment until at least the end of the holiday season in October 2009 but in the event she was not retained beyond August 2009 due to economic conditions.  Thereafter, the claimant returned to Northern Ireland and has been actively seeking employment but has not yet secured a job.  During her periods of unemployment the claimant was in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance.

The Law

22.	It was not in dispute that the respondent had been dismissed and that the statutory provisions governing the determination of the fairness of the dismissal are found in Article 130 of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 which provides as follows:

"130.—(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— 

(a) 	the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the
dismissal, and

(b) 	that it is either a reason falling within paragraph (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.

(2)  A reason falls within this paragraph if it— 

…. (b) relates to the conduct of the employee,

(4)  Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of paragraph (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— 

(a) 	depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and

(b) 	shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case."

23.	In Dobbin v Citybus Ltd [2008] NICA 42 the Court of Appeal provided guidance as to how an industrial tribunal should approach the task of determining the fairness of a dismissal.  The judgment of Higgins LJ reads as follows:

[48]…The equivalent provision in England and Wales to Article 130 is section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 which followed equivalent provisions in section 57 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

[49]	The correct approach to section 57 (and the later provisions) was settled in two principal cases - British Homes Stores v Burchell [1980] ICR 303 and Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1983] ICR 17 – and explained and refined principally in the judgments of Mummery LJ in two further cases - Foley v Post Office and HSBC Bank Plc (formerly Midland Bank Plc) v Madden reported at [2000] ICR 1283 (two appeals heard together) and J Sainsbury v Hitt [2003] ICR 111. 

[50] In Iceland Frozen Foods Browne-Wilkinson J offered the following guidance – 

‘Since the present state of the law can only be found by going through a number of different authorities, it may be convenient if we should seek to summarise the present law. We consider that the authorities establish that in law the correct approach for the industrial tribunal to adopt in answering the question posed by section 57(3) of the [Employment Protection Consolidation) Act 1978] is as follows:

(1) 	the starting point should always be the words of section 57(3) themselves;

(2) 	in applying the section an industrial tribunal must consider the reasonableness of the employer's conduct, not simply whether they (the members of the industrial tribunal) consider the dismissal to be fair;

(3) 	in judging the reasonableness of the employer's conduct an industrial tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer;

(4) 	in many, though not all, cases there is a band of reasonable responses to the employee's conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take another;

(5) 	the function of the industrial tribunal, as an industrial jury, is to determine whether in the particular circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band the dismissal is fair: if the dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair.’

[51]	To that may be added the remarks of Arnold J in British Homes Stores where in the context of a misconduct case he stated -  

‘What the tribunal have to decide every time is, broadly expressed, whether the employer who discharged the employee on the ground of the misconduct in question (usually, though not necessarily, dishonest conduct) entertained a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee of that misconduct at that time. That is really stating shortly and compendiously what is in fact more than one element. First of all, there must be established by the employer the fact of that belief; that the employer did believe it. Secondly, that the employer had in his mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief. And thirdly, we think, that the employer, at the stage at which he formed that belief on those grounds, at any rate at the final stage at which he formed that belief on those grounds, had carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. It is the employer who manages to discharge the onus of demonstrating those three matters, we think, who must not be examined further. It is not relevant, as we think, that the tribunal would themselves have shared that view in those circumstances. It is not relevant, as we think, for the tribunal to examine the quality of the material which the employer had before them, for instance to see whether it was the sort of material, objectively considered, which would lead to a certain conclusion on the balance of probabilities, or whether it was the sort of material which would lead to the same conclusion only upon the basis of being “sure,” as it is now said more normally in a criminal context, or, to use the more old-fashioned term, such as to put the matter “beyond reasonable doubt.” The test, and the test all the way through, is reasonableness; and certainly, as it seems to us, a conclusion on the balance of probabilities will in any surmisable circumstance be a reasonable conclusion’.”

	This passage was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in its recent decision in the case of Rogan v South Eastern Health and Social Care Trust [2009] NICA 47.

Submissions

24.	The claimant understandably did not seek to advance detailed legal submissions and confined her closing remarks to two main points.  Firstly, she contended that the decision to discipline her was motivated by a desire to dismiss her through the disciplinary process rather than by making her redundant.  Secondly, she contended that Mr King did not investigate her appeal as thoroughly as he should have.

25.	On behalf of the respondent, Mr Randal submitted that there was clearly sufficient evidence to support the respondent's contention that the true reason for dismissing the claimant was conduct, a potentially fair reason under Article 130 of the 1996 Order and that the claimant's contention that it was to do with a need to make a redundancy was misconceived.  In this connection, Mr Randal drew attention to the following matters:

(i)  	It was agreed by both parties that there was a business need to reduce 40 hours in the reservations department.

(ii)  	There was a meeting to discuss the problem on 15 January 2009.

(iii)  	Ms Livie's communication of her decision not to return to work after her maternity leave took care of the need for a 40 hour reduction.

(iv)  	The claimant's evidence that no-one got back to her about redundancy after the meeting on 15 January 2009 is supportive of the respondent's contention that there was no redundancy situation.

(v)  	If there had been a redundancy situation and the correct procedures had been followed the claimant would have received no more than 8 weeks pay which would equate to no more than £2,000 whereas the internal disciplinary procedures followed by the respondent had cost considerably more.  Although there was no direct evidence as to the actual cost of the disciplinary procedure, Mr Randal submitted that it was clear that a significant process was involved.

(vi)  	Centralisation occurred as a result of the reorganisation of the respondent's business.  The claimant had a clear disciplinary record prior to this occurring but had difficulty with new procedures that were introduced.  The claimant received warnings in November 2008 and December 2008.  As a result she was given extra training in December 2008.  Further disciplinary action was taken in January 2009 and February 2009.  Finally, the claimant was disciplined again in April 2009 and was dismissed following an appeal.  During the course of the various meetings over this period the claimant accepted her failings.  The claimant also acknowledged that she knew the procedures very well and in her evidence to the tribunal contended that she did not need any training.  

(vii)  	The claimant accepted Mrs Green's evidence that from November 2008, she was under pressure to provide correct reports and that the claimant was obliged to assist Mrs Green to produce such reports by following the correct procedures but she failed to do so.  

(viii)  	The claimant suggested that the procedure was too quick and over officious and that it would have been better for her manager to have had conversations with her rather than moving straight to discipline.  Mr Randal invited the tribunal to accept that this was a sensible course for the respondent to adopt in order to protect its position by following the accepted procedures as provided for in the respondent's handbook.  Mr Randal drew attention to the meticulous verbatim record of the disciplinary proceedings which clearly demonstrated that the charges against the claimant had been properly investigated and the claimant's acceptance of the matters put to her.  

(ix) 	Accordingly, when the respondent was making its decision after the April 2009 meeting it clearly had a reasonable belief after a reasonable investigation which led to the decision to dismiss the claimant.  The sanction of dismissal was prescribed in the respondent's handbook and was clearly within the band of reasonable responses open to the employer and that even if the tribunal does not agree with the decision it should not seek to replace the decision with its own.  

(x)  	Mr Randal also placed reliance on paragraphs 21 to 23 of the Rogan judgment as to how tribunals should consider the disciplinary process.

(xi)   	Mr Randal also drew attention to page 25 of the handbook which is supported by the evidence of Mrs Green, Mrs Walker and the claimant that Mrs Green received final confirmation from Mr Madden, a more senior member of staff and Mrs Green’s line manager, to dismiss the claimant.  Mr Randal submitted that this was entirely in accordance with the procedure set out in the handbook.         

(xii) 	In the alternative Mr. Randal invited the tribunal to consider the percentage risk that the claimant would have been dismissed in any event potentially fairly for an unrelated reason.  Mr Randal submitted that there was evidence to support the contention that the claimant would have been dismissed within 8 weeks being the time that it would have taken for the disciplinary procedure to run.  Mr Randal relied on the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Software 2000 v Andrews and Others [2007] EAT/0533/06.

(xiii)  	Mr Randal also invited the tribunal to consider contributory fault which he submitted should be at least fifty percent based on the claimant's admissions.

(xiv)  	With regard to mitigation, Mr Randal submitted that the job that the claimant took up in Spain on 1 July 2009 had been expected to last to October 2009 at least but that due to economic conditions she had been let go. Mr Randal submitted that in taking this job, the respondent's liability for loss ceased and that the claimant was obliged to mitigate her loss and on this basis the respondent could not be held liable for any loss after she had been let go and that it would not be just and equitable to do so.  

Conclusions

26.	Returning to the agreed issues our conclusions are as follows:

(1)  What was the reason for the dismissal of the claimant?  

      On its face the disciplinary process that led to the claimant’s dismissal related to her conduct.  However, it was the cornerstone of the claimant’s case that the respondent dismissed her in order to avoid having to make her redundant and on this basis the claimant called into question the motives of those involved in the disciplinary process.  The claimant now very fairly accepts there was no need to make anyone redundant given Mrs Livie’s decision to resign rather than return from maternity leave.  Although this was not known to the claimant at the time that she launched these proceedings, this fact fatally undermines this aspect of the claimant’s case.  We must therefore approach the remaining issues on that basis. The respondent’s failure to advise the claimant that there was no longer any need to reduce hours as a result of Mrs Livie’s decision demonstrates poor communication with staff.  Had the claimant been informed that there was no longer any need to reduce hours, she would not have been labouring under this misapprehension when she decided to instigate these proceedings.

(2)	  Had the respondent a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the claimant of that misconduct at the time of its decision?

We are entirely satisfied that the respondent had a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief based on reasonable grounds that the claimant was guilty of the misconduct alleged.  In so finding we note that was not disputed by the claimant that a client complained to the respondent about the mismanagement of a booking by the claimant and that she had failed to notify her line manager that she had been unable to obtain a signed contract and financial security against the booking in question

(3) Had the respondent reasonable grounds at the time of its decision on which to sustain its belief in the misconduct of the claimant?

On the same basis we are satisfied that the respondent had reasonable grounds for its belief that the claimant was guilty of the misconduct alleged.  The respondent’s decision was also informed by its investigation of the matter and it is to this that we will now turn.

(4) At the stage the respondent took the decision to dismiss, had the     respondent carried out as much of an inquiry/investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances? 

Mrs Green conducted a thorough enquiry into the subject matter of the charges and undertook a rigorous and detailed examination of the facts and afforded the claimant every opportunity to put her side of the case. The claimant has sought to challenge the motives of those responsible for dismissing her but there is simply no objective evidence to substantiate her belief and as indicated above the claimant’s suspicions regarding the motivation of the respondent were unfounded.  It is also significant that he claimant accepted that she was guilty of errors in procedures. 

      (5)  Was dismissal a fair sanction in the circumstances?

We are satisfied that the decision to dismiss the claimant was well within the band of reasonable responses.  While it might be viewed as harsh when considered in isolation the claimant had been the subject of three previous disciplinary proceedings, all arising from poor communication, within a short space of time including a final written warning and the respondent’s decision to dismiss the claimant cannot be impugned.
 
(6)  Was the claimant afforded an effective right of appeal in the circumstances?

      The claimant exercised her right of appeal to Mr King and he afforded the claimant a scrupulously fair hearing which enabled the claimant to bring out all of her complaints about the disciplinary process, even though the written notice of appeal was confined to an appeal against the severity of the sanction imposed.  Mr King’s letter upholding the decision addressed all the key points and his decision cannot be criticised as unfair.  As with Mrs Green’s initial decision the decision was well within the band of reasonable responses.

27.	The claim must therefore be dismissed.

	 

Chairman:

Date and place of hearing: 28 January 2010 and 10 - 11 February 2010, Belfast

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: