THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

CASE REF:	1051/13
1054/13

CLAIMANTS:		Caroline Maria Byers
				Michelle Malcolmson

RESPONDENTS:	1.  Department of Finance and Personnel
	2.  Patricia Montgomery

CASE REF:	2041/13
2042/13

CLAIMANTS:		Caroline Maria Byers
				Michelle Malcolmson

RESPONDENT:	Department of Finance and Personnel

DECISION ON A REVIEW
The tribunal, on a review, confirms its decision issued on 7 May 2015 in the above matter.

Constitution of Tribunal:
Employment Judge:		Employment Judge D Buchanan
Members:				Mrs S Doran
					Mr I Atcheson

Appearances:
The claimants in person (Mrs Byers made submissions on behalf of herself and Ms Malcolmson).
The respondents were represented by Mr Mark McEvoy, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by the Departmental Solicitor’s Office. 

1.	By a decision recorded in the register of decisions and issued to the parties on 7 May 2015 the tribunal, as constituted above, unanimously dismissed the claimants’ claims against the respondents of victimisation contrary to the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 and being subjected to a detriment contrary to the Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2000.

2.	By correspondence of 20 May 2015, a copy of which is set out at Appendix A, the claimants sought a review of that decision.

3.	(i)	The ground on which a review is sought is that set out in Rule 34(3)(e) of 
		Schedule 1 of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2005, namely that the interests of justice require such a review.

(ii)	While tribunals previously adopted a restricted view of an application on this ground for review, we accept, having regard to the “overriding objective” set out in Rule 3 of the 2005 Rules and the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal on the corresponding English Rules then in force in the case of Williams –v- Ferrosan Ltd [2004] IRLR 607, it is now permissible for tribunals to take a broader and less technical approach to the power to review their decisions on this ground.

4.	(i)	However, the claimants in their review application, stated that there 
had been “a misdirection .... on the evidence”, and Mrs Byers, in her opening submission at the review hearing, stated that the tribunal had misdirected itself on the law, that its decision was perverse, and that it had made a decision that no reasonable tribunal would have made.

(ii)	The tribunal, after considering the submissions of the parties, is satisfied that it considered all the evidence in this case and reached its decision having regard to that evidence.  It is not in any event obliged to set out every piece of evidence adduced before it.

(iii)	The claimants disagree with our findings of fact and the conclusions drawn from them, which they are entitled to do.  The tribunal, equally, is entitled to make its own findings of fact on the evidence, and to reach conclusions.  The claimants’ unhappiness with the eventual outcome is not a ground for review, and notwithstanding what we have said at paragraph 3(ii) above, it is asking a lot of a tribunal to set aside its decision on the ground of perversity.

5.	We do not accept that our decision was perverse.  The appropriate course for the claimants is to pursue this matter by way of an appeal.  That is something which they have now done.  Had we considered that it was appropriate to proceed by way of a review, we wish to make it clear that the tribunal does not accept some of the assertions which the claimants have set out as the basis for their application, and we would re-emphasise that the claimants’ credibility, or lack of it, played a significant part in our decision.

6.	We confirm our decision made in this matter on 7 May 2015.

Employment Judge 

Date and place of hearing:	

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties:

APPENDIX A

Claimants’ review application of 20 May 2015.