A75/05-06(DLA)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992

SOCIAL SECURITY (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1998

DISABILITY LIVING ALLOWANCE

Application by the above-named claimant for
leave to appeal to a Social Security Commissioner
on a question of law from a tribunal's decision
dated 2 August 2005

DETERMINATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

I refuse leave to appeal.

REASONS

Having considered the circumstances of the case and any reasons put forward in the request for a hearing, I am satisfied that the application can properly be determined without a hearing.

There is no arguable case that the tribunal’s decision was wrong in law.

The tribunal was properly constituted.  The tribunal analysed the evidence rationally and in accordance with common sense.  It made all necessary findings of fact material to its decision.  There was evidence to support each of those findings.  On those findings of fact, the tribunal was entitled to make the decision that it did.  There is nothing to suggest that the tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the law.  The full statement of the tribunal’s decision contains a detailed explanation of the reasons why the tribunal made the decision that it did.  There was no breach of the principles of natural justice.  

In particular, it must be understood that the GP’s report was based on notes which were also available to the tribunal, and while the report may not have been based on an examination or prepared by the GP who was the most informed and knowledgeable about the claimant, the report is still a valid piece of expert evidence.

Also there was sufficient evidence before the tribunal for it to base its decision and, in the circumstances, it is not reasonably arguable that the tribunal ought to have sought additional evidence.

It is noted that there was no request for an adjournment, and no additional evidence was provided or sought.

It is relevant that a Commissioner ought only to entertain an appeal against a tribunal’s decision on matters arising out of findings of fact if there was sufficient foundation to argue that those findings were both demonstrably unfounded and capable of having affected the outcome.

It must also be borne in mind that, in this and every similar case, a tribunal is entitled to draw its own inferences and reach its own conclusions and however profoundly a Commissioner, as an appellate tribunal on an appeal from a tribunal on a point of law, may disagree with its views of the facts, he or she is not able to upset that tribunal’s conclusions unless:

(a)	there is no or no sufficient evidence to found them – which may occur when the inference or conclusion is based not on any facts but on speculation by the tribunal, or

(b)	the primary facts do not justify the inference or conclusion drawn but lead irresistibly to the opposite conclusion, so that the conclusion reached may be regarded as perverse.

In this case I neither express disagreement nor agreement with the tribunal’s inferences and conclusions.  However, even if I were in disagreement, that does not render the decision erroneous in point of law as the tribunal’s conclusions are based on sufficient evidence, its assessment of the evidence was reasonable and the primary facts found justify the conclusion.

(Signed):	J A H Martin QC

Chief Commissioner

6 June 2006