

## No 2.

A gift of non-entry belonging to a woman, having *tractum futuri temporis*, falls not under her husband's *jus mariti*.

1582. June.

PENNYCOOK *against* COCKBURN.

A WOMAN called Pennycook, and spouse to umquhile Mr John Spens, burgess of Edinburgh, pursued one Cockburn for the deliverance of the gift of non-entrie, alleging the same to appertain to her as lawful cessioner and assignee made to the same. It was *answered* by this Cockburn, That he ought not to be compelled to deliver the same, because her said umquhile spouse, Mr John Spens, during his lifetime, disposed the said gift to the defender, and so the said gift was his own proper evident, and ought not to be delivered. To this was *answered*, That the said umquhile Mr John Spens had no power to dispoone the same without the consent of his wife, but for his own lifetime; but that she, after his decease, could not be prejudged, but ought to be put in her own place against the same, being done without her consent and advice. The matter being reasoned amongst the Lords, some were of opinion, that *maritus* being *dominus omnium bonorum, liberam disponendi habebat facultatem durante matrimonio, et quod illius dispositio, tam constante matrimonio, quam postea, cum effectu manebit*. Others were of the contrary opinion, and that it was daily practised before the Lords, that the husband's disposition of any thing appertaining to his wife, without her consent and advice, took no longer effect but during the time of the marriage, *et quod post mortem mariti revivesceret uxori quicquid quod consensus fuit prius a marito uxoris*.—THE LORDS, after long reasoning, voted for the most part, that the said gift and disposition, made by the husband during the time of the marriage, without consent of the wife, ought not to prejudge her after his decease.

*Fol. Dic. v. I. p. 385. Colvil, MS. p. 333.*

1693. February 7.

FOTHERINGHAM of Pourie *against* The EARL of HOME.

## No 3.

It was found that the *jus mariti* did no more carry an obligation falling due after the dissolution of the marriage, than the *jus relicte* would carry it, or the gift of single escheat, unless the condition did exist, and was purified before the denunciation or gift.

THE LORDS repelled the first two dilators, that the bonds, which were the grounds of the confirmed testament, were registered, the one after the granter's death, and the other *a non suo judice* in the Bailie-court books of Dundee, where Ogilvy of Muiry, the granter, never dwelt, and so were no more but copies; in regard the confirmed testament itself was a sufficient active title, and though the fiscal had confirmed, he had a title. They also repelled the 3<sup>d</sup> dilator, that the assignation from the executor was but of the nature of a factory, and so *testamento non executo* it expired; because this was no part of the inventory of Muiry's testament, but only another way of conveyance from Yeoman to Duncan, for making up the title. They also repelled the 4<sup>th</sup> dilator, that they had confirmed a sum of Finlater's as executors-creditors; and found this to be *jus tertii* to the Earl of Home; but the Lords demurred on that defence, that the Laird of Ayton's bond to his mother, and Muiry her husband, was a conditional bond, and was never purified, nor existed in Muiry's lifetime, and so could not