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Cite as: [2003] ScotCS 214

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MacAuley v. Clark [2003] ScotCS 214 (11 July 2003)

EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

Lord Marnoch

Lord Philip

Lord Wheatley

 

 

 

 

 

A2322/01

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD MARNOCH

in

RECLAIMING MOTION FOR PURSUER

in the cause

GARY G. MACAULEY

Pursuer and Reclaimer;

against

DR. M. LYNDA CLARK, Q.C., M.P., The Advocate General for Scotland as representing the Ministry of Defence

Defender and Respondent:

_______

 

 

Act: I.G. Mitchell, Q.C., L.C. Kennedy; Russel & Aitken (Pursuer and Reclaimer)

Alt: Clancy, Q.C.; Morton Fraser (Defender and Respondent)

11 July 2003

[1]      This is a reclaiming motion against an interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary dated 8 November 2002 in terms of which the Lord Ordinary dismissed the action against the defender. The leading conclusion in the action in its presently amended form is "For declarator that the pursuer's discharge from the army on 5 December 1997 was rescinded on 29 July 1998". It is not disputed that the pursuer was discharged from the army on 5 December 1997 and the only basis for the alleged rescission is a letter written to the pursuer by a Lieutenant Colonel Parrott, dated 29 July 1998, which is in the following terms:

"I wrote to you on 9 June 1998 to say that I had completed my investigation of your redress of compliant but that, at the direction of Army HQ Scotland, I was seeking advice on a number of points. That process has now been completed.

I have decided that, while the correct procedures were followed, your administrative discharge, following a positive compulsory drugs test, was based, in my belief, on a flawed interpretation of the relevant regulations. I have therefore concluded that your redress of complaint should be allowed and your administrative discharge should be rescinded.

I do not have the authority to initiate the necessary administrative procedures to action my decision on your redress of complaint. I have therefore passed the matter to Army HQ Scotland for their action as required. I have sent a copy of this letter to Army HQ Scotland and I have asked that they contract you in due course."

[2]     
In the event, the Lord Ordinary held that, having regard to the terms of section 180 of the Army Act 1955, as amended, and certain subordinate legislation in the form of Queen's Regulations, the pursuer's complaint about his discharge had been wrongly referred to Lieutenant Colonel Parrott who had no proper authority to consider, let alone decide on, its substance. Before us Mr. I.G. Mitchell, Q.C., for the pursuer and reclaimer, conceded that the Lord Ordinary had been correct in making these findings. However, Mr. Mitchell addressed to us for the first time a new argument to the effect that these were not conclusive against the pursuer. According to Mr. Mitchell the letter of 29 July, read in isolation, bore, ex facie, to be a decision on the merits of the pursuer's complaint and, since that was a decision ostensibly affecting the pursuer's rights within the field of administrative law, it had to be given effect unless, and until, reduced by the court. It was, however, made clear by Mr. Mitchell, and indeed in the grounds of appeal, that any attempt by the defender to seek reduction ope exceptione would be opposed.

[3]     
Assuming, for present purposes, that the letter in question, read in isolation, is of the character desiderated by Mr. Mitchell, the real question comes to be whether he, Mr. Mitchell, is well-founded in the proposition that there is some principle of administrative law which requires it to be given effect (even although known to be written without authority) unless and until reduced by the court. As Mr. Clancy, Q.C., for the defender and respondent, pointed out, on no view could the letter itself be said to effect a rescission of the discharge so that ordinarily one would not expect reduction to be necessary.

[4]     
The sole authority relied on by Mr. Mitchell in support of his proposition turned out to be certain obiter dicta of the Lord Chancellor (Hailsham) in London and Clydeside Estates Limited v. Aberdeen District Council 1980 S.C. (H.L.) 1 at pages 27-28 and 30-31 of the Report. We have read these dicta carefully but are quite unable to find in them any support for Mr. Mitchell's far-reaching argument. In the passages in question the Lord Chancellor is at pains to point out that where there has been a failure to comply with a statutory provision in the field of administrative law rigid classifications in terms of "mandatory" and "directory", "void" and "voidable" and "nullity" should be avoided, the object being always to decide the

"legal consequence of non-compliance on the rights of a subject viewed in the light of a concrete state of facts and a continuing chain of events".

In that context the Lord Chancellor had earlier commented that in the case before the House the Certificate of Alternative Development which was under attack could be described as "vitiated" because it failed to comply with a mandatory requirement but that it did not follow that the subject could safely disregard it as not having been issued. It had, therefore, been right in that case for the "subject", who was the appellant, to have sought its reduction. However, with all due respect for the ingenuity of Mr. Mitchell's argument, there is, in our opinion, nothing in all of that to suggest that a subject in the position of the present pursuer is entitled to found a substantive claim on a document known by all concerned to have been issued without any statutory authority and, indeed, in the face of all the relevant statutory provisions. The plain fact of the matter is that, as the Lord Ordinary explains in his Opinion, Parliament set up a series of appellate tribunals to deal with complaints such as that in question and Lieutenant Colonel Parrott was not one of these. It is therefore impossible to view any purported decision emanating from him as being properly a decision on the pursuer's complaint.

[5]     
For all of these reasons we shall refuse the reclaiming motion and adhere to the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary. In so doing we reiterate the Lord Ordinary's observation that there appears to be no reason why the pursuer should not, even now, ask for his complaint to be referred up the appellate "ladder", as far, indeed, as the Defence Council. Before us counsel for the defender confirmed that that was so.


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