![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> NAK, Re A Decision Of The Asylum And Immigration Tribunal [2007] ScotCS CSIH_69 (05 September 2007) URL: https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2007/CSIH_69.html Cite as: [2007] ScotCS CSIH_69, [2007] CSIH 69 |
[New search] [Help]
EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lord EassieLord WheatleySheriff Principal Bowen |
XA114/06[2007] CSIH 69OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD EASSIE in APPEAL under section 103B of the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by N.A.K. Appellant; against A decision of the Asylum
and Immigration Tribunal _______ |
Act: Forrest; Drummond Miller
Alt: Miss Carmichael; Solicitor to the
Advocate General for
[2] The appellant
is a Pushtu speaking Afghan. He arrived
in the
[3] For present
purposes we do not need to rehearse the appellant's account in full
detail. But a brief summary is as
follows.
[4] In 1998, when
the Taliban were largely in control of
[5] Following
that episode the appellant and some others of the Hizbi-Islami went into hiding
from the Taliban. After the removal of
the Taliban from power following the invasion of
[6] The appellant
also explained that, in addition to what might be described as the wider politics, there is a land dispute in the background. Three named individuals in political
opposition to the appellant and his father were in dispute over ownership of
some of the appellant's family's land.
These individuals obtained favour in the new Government by making
allegations against the Hizbi-Islami and especially the appellant. In his absence they were successful in
obtaining possession of the disputed land.
[7] To put that
summarised account into a broader context, it is apparent from the background
materials before the Immigration Judge, to various parts of which we were
alerted in the "reading list" suggested by counsel for the appellant, that
following the demise of the pro-Soviet regime (but prior to the appellant
joining the Hizbi-Islami) the Hizbi-Islami was very active in the battle for
power, its opponents including both the Taliban and also the grouping known as
the Northern Alliance. (At paragraph 75
of his decision the Immigration Judge refers, but in a different context, to inter alia an account in a report by the
Afghan Justice Project of the part played by the Hizbi-Islami in the fighting
for the control of
[8] Against that
background the appellant considers that he is under threat were he to return to
Afghanistan from both the Taliban, who, though no longer holding power, remain
a significant force, and also from the forces of the new Government.
[9] The
Immigration Judge expressed certain adverse views on the credibility of the
appellant on the basis that in the course of his oral evidence (given via an interpreter) he had said that the
Hizbi-Islami was not a violent group and had not attacked coalition forces in
Afghanistan, whereas it was evident from the background materials that the
Hizbi-Islami had been and was a violent organisation. However, despite those reservations, the
Immigration Judge was well prepared to accept the appellant's evidence that he
had been a commander in the Hizbi-Islami.
Having made that acceptance, the Immigration Judge further concluded
(paragraph 82) that given the violent nature of the Hizbi-Islami and the
appellant's prominence in its organisation there were serious grounds for
considering that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge. The
Immigration Judge went further and inferred that the appellant had indeed
committed such a crime. On that basis
the Immigration Judge held that the appellant was excluded from the protection
of the Refugee Convention by virtue of Article 1F(b).
[10] Before us
counsel for the appellant made plain that the Immigration Judge's conclusion
that the appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention
by Article 1F(b) was not under challenge. This appeal is directed towards the
Immigration Judge's rejection of what might be termed the Human Rights
Convention claim.
[11] The
Immigration Judge rejected the latter claim for protection on a basis which
might be very shortly described as being the lack of evidence of a specific
factual basis, apart from membership of Hizbi-Islami, for thinking that the
appellant might be at real risk of ill-treatment from the new Government. As respects risk from the Taliban, the
Immigration Judge recognised their presence in the south and east of
[12] Counsel for
the appellant advanced a number of criticisms of the decision of the
Immigration Judge on this aspect of the case before him. In particular, among those criticisms was a challenge
to the soundness of the way in which the Immigration Judge had approached the
decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal of 29 July 2004 in RS (Hezebe Islami - expert evidence)
Afghanistan [2004] UKIAT 00278 which had been placed before the Immigration
Judge by the appellant. In respect of
the submission based on that case which was advanced by the appellant, the
Immigration Judge says, at paragraph 93 of his decision:
"In that case there was an expert
opinion from Dr. Lau (who clearly impressed the Tribunal) that the particular
Appellant was at real risk of serious ill harm.
I note that the Appellant in RS
had been arrested, interrogated and mistreated by the
The treatment by the Immigration Judge of the decision of the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal in RS was
the principal ground upon which the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal gave leave
to appeal to this court.
"Having read his report, noted his
qualifications and heard him give evidence we find Dr. Lau to be an impressive,
authoritative and careful expert witness.
We give considerable weight to his opinions."
The Immigration Appeal Tribunal thereafter set out the full
terms of Dr. Lau's written opinion.
While the opinion was of course instructed as respects the particular
case of the appellant in RS it
necessarily expresses general expert opinion evidence on the situation in
"11) The
war against terrorism in
12) In
my opinion, the timing of the arrests does not in any way indicate that the
appellant has made it up and in my opinion, based on my knowledge of the events
in
13) Secondly,
I have been asked whether his continuing fear of return to
14) In
my opinion it is difficult to discount the appellant's fear as irrational only
because his own association with the Hezb-I-Islami ceased some time ago. It appears that members of the
[14] In so far as
the Immigration Judge dismissed the present appellant's fears that he would be
at risk from the Taliban on the view that the appellant would be safe in
"16) Thirdly,
I have been asked to comment on the availability of the option of internal
flight. In my opinion internal flight in
Additionally, we note the terms of part of paragraph 17:
"17) Fourthly,
I have been asked to comment on the ability of the government to protect
him. I think that the current government
has little interest in protecting suspected terrorist. In any event, the legal system is virtually
non-existent and I very much doubt that it would be able to protect the
appellant against threats from within the
[15] As was
submitted by counsel for the appellant, it is not evident from the terms of the
decision of the Immigration Judge whether the Immigration Judge gave
consideration to what was said by Dr. Lau respecting the prevailing state of
affairs in Afghanistan and the risks arising generally to members and former
members of the Hizbi-Islami from inter
alios agencies and parties such as those referred to in paragraph 11 of the
opinion with the incentives to which reference is made in paragraph 14 of the
opinion. The Immigration Judge appears
to set apart the terms of the decision of the Immigration Appeal in RS on the basis of what he describes as
its "different factual matrix", without making any reference to the expert views
of Dr. Lau on matters more generally.
For her part, counsel for the respondent stressed that there were
factual differences between the situation of the appellant in RS and the appellant in the present
case. Given those factual distinctions
it was understandable, she said, that the Immigration Judge might discard RS as being of no assistance.
[16] For our part
we note that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (paragraph 2) stated that
because they required to remit for reconsideration, the case of RS would not be a country guidance case
but that it was reported "for the information relating to Hezbe Islami and in
particular the opinions of Dr. Lau" (para. 21). Reporting the case for that reason is
consistent with our view that Dr. Lau's opinion is not wholly "fact specific"
to the position of the appellant RS
but contains expert guidance of general utility in considering the position of
former members of the Hizbi-Islami.
Self-evidently cases involving Hizbi-Islami applicants will have factual
differences. In RS the appellant had been simply a member of Hizbi-Islami (although
his brother had been a commander) and both had abandoned all political activity
following the Taliban's assumption of power.
By contrast, the present appellant's evidence of having been a
commander, with the prominence which that involves, was accepted by the
Immigration Judge. His flight was
preceded by the death of his father and brother, who had also been members of
the Hizbi-Islami, and the bomb attack on the house in which he had been
staying. We have difficulty in seeing
that these differences of factual detail can elide the need to give
consideration to what is said by Dr. Lau as to the situation, in general, of
members past and present of the Hizbi-Islami.
[17] In so far as the
present appellant fears that he is at risk not only from agencies acting for
the current regime, but also from the Taliban, we note that in dismissing the
latter risk on the view that the present appellant might be safe in Kabul the
Immigration Judge appears to make no reference to Dr. Lau's views on internal
relocation.
[18] In these
circumstances we have come to the conclusion that in apparently setting apart RS on the basis that there was a
particular difference in factual matrix, the Immigration Judge erred, and that the error can be categorised as an error of
law. The exercise of distinguishing RS on its particular facts was not, in
our view, the appropriate exercise.
Given particularly that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal decision was
expressly reported for the general guidance which might be derived from Dr.
Lau's expert opinion evidence respecting membership of the Hizbi-Islami, which guidance
we do not see to be irrelevant to the present case, we consider that the
Immigration Judge ought to have addressed it on that basis. He does not appear to have done so. Put another way, it appears that the
Immigration Judge may not have given proper consideration to a relevant factor,
namely that general guidance. We
consider that the appeal thus succeeds.
[19] Counsel for
the appellant did not suggest other than that, if the appeal were successful,
there should be a remit to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal for a further
reconsideration. Counsel for the
respondent agreed that, on the hypothesis of the appeal being successful, such
was the appropriate disposal. But since
the rejection of the claim for asylum under the Refugee Convention by reason of
Article 1F(b) was not challenged, the reconsideration
should be limited accordingly.
[20] Given that we
are persuaded that the appeal succeeds and that parties are agreed that
reconsideration is the appropriate procedural outcome, it is unnecessary for us
to consider such other criticisms as were advanced by counsel for the appellant
respecting the decision of the Immigration Judge.
[21] We shall
accordingly allow the appeal against the decision of the Immigration Judge in
so far as the Immigration Judge dismissed the appeal on Human Rights grounds
and we shall remit to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal for reconsideration
of the appellant's case respecting those grounds.