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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> NBE, Re a Decision of the AIT [2008] ScotCS CSIH_62 (26 November 2008) URL: https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2008/CSIH_62.html Cite as: 2009 SLT 557, [2008] ScotCS CSIH_62, [2008] CSIH 62, 2008 GWD 39-587 |
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EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lord Eassie Lord Menzies Lord Emslie |
[2008] CSIH 62
XA25/06
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD EASSIE in Application for leave to Appeal
by N B E ( Appellant; against A decision of the Asylum
and Immigration Tribunal promulgated on _______ |
Alt (The Secretary of State for the Home Department); Lindsay;
Solicitor to the Office of the Advocate General for
Introduction
[1] The appellant
is an Eritrean national who arrived in the
[2] Before the
adjudicator the appellant advanced a claim to remain in the
[3] The Secretary
of State then appealed to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal ("IAT") against the
adjudicator's allowance of the human rights appeal. In terms of section 101 of the 2002 Act
appeal to the IAT was confined to an appeal on a point of law. The appeal by the Secretary of State was not
determined prior to the coming into operation of the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal ("AIT") and accordingly it became subject to the transitional
provisions regarding pending IAT appeals.
For present purposes nothing really turns on those provisions since it
is accepted by both parties to this appeal that on a reconsideration by the AIT,
as a first and essential requirement, the AIT had to decide whether the
adjudicator had made a material error of law - rule 31(2)(a) of the Asylum
& Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005. The AIT held that the
adjudicator had made a material error of law;
it then proceeded to allow the appeal by the Secretary of State; and to reverse the
adjudicator's decision. (There was no
cross appeal by the current appellant respecting the adjudicator's refusal of
the asylum claim). The central issue in
this appeal is whether the error claimed in the Secretary of State's grounds of
appeal, and subsequently accepted by the AIT, was properly a material error of
law.
The adjudicator's decision
[4] With that introduction to this appeal it
is convenient to turn to the basis of the adjudicator's decision, in so far as
devoted to the human rights claim. In
the course of her evidence before the adjudicator, the appellant disclosed that
when she left
[5] First, there
was an Amnesty International document dated
"45. There
was produced to me an Amnesty International document being an extract from the
full annual report and this indicated that torture continued to be used against
some political prisoners and as a standard military punishment. Army deserters and conscription evaders were
said to be tortured in military custody.
They were said to be beaten, tied hand and foot in painful positions and
left in the sun for lengthy periods.
Reference was made to prisoners being kept in overcrowded shipping
containers, in unventilated, hot and unhygienic conditions and to prisoners
being denied adequate food and medical treatment.
46. The
Amnesty document from which I am quoting is dated 26th May, 2004 and
in relation to refugees it says that most of the 100,000 or more Eritrean
refugees in Sudan resident there for up to 30 years appealed against losing
their refugee status as a result of the UNHCR cessation of refugee status in
2002 for pre-1991 and 1998-2000 war refugees.
Amnesty noted that some 232 Eritreans who were deported by
There was also a UNHCR document of January 2004, which also included
discussion of the fate of the Eritreans deported from
"50. There
was produced to me the UNHCR position on return of rejected asylum seekers to
51. According
to the UNHCR document 233 persons were deported from
52. I
appreciate that Article 3 involves a high threshold but I consider that if
someone were at risk of suffering incommunicado detention and being treated in
the manner referred to in the UNHCR document in relation to those returned from
There were also reports from the US State Department and a
"53.
[6] In addition
to those documents there was before the adjudicator a recent decision by the
IAT, chaired by the Honourable Mr Justice Ouseley, namely MA (Female draft evader)
"47. There was produced to me a copy of the decision of the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal in 00098. Paragraph 16 of the Tribunal
determination refers to the UNHCR 'position on the return of rejected asylum
seekers to
48. The
Tribunal said in paragraph 17 of their determination that UNHCR had concluded
that the human rights situation had deteriorated in the last two years, that
the deportees from Malta may have faced persecution and that it could not be
excluded that future deportees would not face persecution (sic). Asylum claims were
said to require careful consideration and UNHCR had recommended against the
forced return of failed asylum seekers and in favour of them being granted
another form of temporary protection.
49. The
Immigration Appeal Tribunal said that the UNHCR recommendation for temporary
protection while the situation was reviewed in mid-2004 was weighty."
"55. I
consider that there is a real risk that these appellants on return might be
treated in the same way as the individuals who were deported from
The appeal/reconsideration
[8] As already mentioned, the Secretary of
State sought and was granted leave to appeal against the allowance of the human
rights claim. The grounds of appeal are
in these terms:
"1. It
is submitted that the objective evidence described at paragraphs 48, 49 and 50
does not demonstrate a real risk or reasonable likelihood of mistreatment
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR to this claimant and in the event of her
return to Eritrea. The adjudicator has
thus applied the wrong standard of proof in allowing this appeal.
2. The
adjudicator inferred at paragraph 52 that returnees to
3. At
paragraph 55 the adjudicator has not explained why the claimant would face any
risk of Article 3 mistreatment on her return to
4. It
is submitted in light of the foregoing that the adjudicator has erred in law
and that the approach of the Tribunal in SE
Eritrea [2004] 00295 is to be preferred".
[9] At this point
it is appropriate to note that between the date of the hearing before the adjudicator
and the promulgation of the adjudicator's decision on 17 November 2004,
the IAT published a decision SE
(Deportation - Malta - 2002 - General Risk) Eritrea CG [2004] 00295. The Tribunal in that case had before it most
of the materials before the Tribunal in MA
but also some additional, more recent, material. Reaching a different assessment of those
materials from that reached in MA,
the differently constituted Tribunal in SE
stated (paragraph 27) that:
"(1) We do not consider that the
Tribunal determination in MA was intended to establish that all
returnees to
(2) the Tribunal position on this issue before and after this
decision remains that the mere fact of being a returnee to
[10] While the
Secretary of State's grounds of appeal made reference to this decision, it was of
course not before the adjudicator at the hearing, having only been published after
the date of the hearing. In its decision
in the present case, to which we shall come in greater detail, the AIT said
expressly, in paragraph 9, that the oversight of the adjudicator to note
the decision in SE following the
closure of the hearing (which, if he had noted it, would have indicated a need
to reconvene the hearing), did not amount to a separate error in law. Before us, counsel for the Secretary of State
similarly did not suggest that the omission of the adjudicator to note the
publication of this decision after the date of the hearing and to re-open the
hearing constituted any error of law.
[11] Accordingly,
whether the adjudicator committed what may properly be categorised as an error
of law has to be assessed having regarding only to what was available to him at
the time of the hearing, which did not include the Tribunal decision in SE.
[12] Parties were at
one in considering that the basis on which the AIT in the present case bore to
identify a material error of law by the adjudicator was to be found essentially
in paragraph 6 of its determination to the following effect:
"We consider that the respondent's
grounds of appeal are made out. There
are manifest shortcomings in the Adjudicator's reasoning. While his determination does contain an
explanation for why he considered that the Maltese returnees had met with
persecutory treatment, he nowhere explains the basis of his assessment that the
two appellants would meet a similar fate.
Secondly, to the extent that he sought to base himself on Tribunal case
law, he was correct to note that the Tribunal Country Guideline case of MA had
expressed concern about the significance for returnees of the fate of the
Maltese returnees. But that decision was
not authority for the proposition that all returnees or female returnees of
draft age were at risk. As the Tribunal has
noted in subsequent cases, SE, GY (
The AIT then went on to say in paragraph 7 that a factor
contributing to the adjudicator's "misreading" of MA was his failure to
note the SE case, but as already mentioned, the AIT then confirmed its
view that the failure to note that case was not a "separate" error in law.
[14] In essence,
counsel for the appellant disputed that there was no evidential basis for the
adjudicator's decision that returning the appellant to
[15] Likewise in
essence, the submission for counsel for the Secretary of State came to be
firstly that the adjudicator had failed to give adequate reasons for
considering that this appellant was at risk.
In that respect counsel sought to examine some of the reported content
of the materials available to and discussed by the adjudicator, and by the
Tribunal in SE. The adjudicator, he said, had failed to have
regard to the information that the women, children and elderly were released,
although he accepted that on some reports that only occurred after three months
of detention. The second principal
submission was to the effect that the adjudicator was wrong to think that the
decision in MA might apply to anyone
other than a clearly identified "draft evader". In other words, he advanced a contrary view of
MA, adopting SE.
Discussion
[16] As an important element in its conclusion
that the adjudicator had fallen into a material error of law the AIT in the
present case advanced the view that the adjudicator had misread or
misunderstood the decision in MA. According to the AIT, that decision applied only
to "draft evaders", and was not authority for the view that all female
returnees of draft age were - at the time of the hearing - at risk. We find it convenient first to consider this
aspect of the of the AIT decision.
[17] As counsel for
the appellant pointed out to us, in MA
the applicant for asylum advanced her claim on the basis that she had been
required to report for compulsory national service, and had thus been called
up, before she left
[18] Having noted
the adjudicator's willingness to treat the claim on alternative bases, the IAT in
MA thereafter discussed the claim to
protection under the refugee Convention on those alternative bases. It reached its conclusion that the claim
under that convention should be rejected in paragraph 22:-
"22. The
Appellant would not be persecuted for a Convention reason; her claim to a religious objection has
been properly rejected and there is no complaint which can be made about
that. There is no evidence that her
illegal exit and failure to respond to the call up papers would lead her to
have any political opinion imputed to her which would put her at risk of
persecution. The issue is whether she
would be at real risk of treatment which breached Article 3."
[19] The IAT then turned
to the human rights aspect of a possible breach of Article 3 ECHR and said
this:
"23. The
UNHCR recommendation for temporary protection while the situation is reviewed
in mid 2004 is weighty. But the
material which is the most troubling is that which concerns the forced return
from
24. At
present it appears to us from that evidence that there is a real risk that the
Appellant would be subjected the same treatment as those deported from
25. Accordingly
her appeal against the refusal of asylum is dismissed and her appeal in
relation to human rights is allowed."
[20] We have much
difficulty in understanding why what was said in those paragraphs must be read
as applicable only to "draft evaders" - that is to say, those who had left
[21] The view which
we thus take of the decision of the IAT in MA
does not accord with what a differently constituted panel of the IAT stated
respecting the MA decision in its later
determination in SE. For the reasons already indicated (in
contrast to what is said or indicated at paragraph 19 of the decision in SE), we do not consider that on a proper
reading of the MA decision the
references in paragraphs 6 and 20 of the MA
decision, occurring in the discussion of the asylum claim, are properly to be
carried forward into the very different area of the human rights claim which
was upheld on reports of the fate of those deported from Malta. In our view, on a reasonable reading of the
decision in MA, what was said in that
respect was not confined to "draft evaders" but applied more generally.
[22] Our attention
was drawn to the first sentence in paragraph 20 of the Tribunal's decision
in SE -
"As already noted, the objective
materials before the Adjudicator when he dealt with this case, albeit they did
contain references to and commentary on the 2002 events affecting some 220
Maltese returnees, did not compel a conclusion that returnees generally were at
risk...."
This sentence is possibly ambiguous as to whether it refers
to the adjudicator in SE or the adjudicator
in MA but, in either event, we agree
with counsel for the appellant in his submissions to us that the question for
the tribunal in SE was not whether
the materials before the tribunal in MA
"compelled" a conclusion, but the very different question whether the materials
entitled the Tribunal in MA to draw
the conclusions which the Tribunal drew.
Further, and importantly, it is to be observed that the guidance which that
Tribunal sought to give in SE
proceeded albeit on a somewhat "fudged" basis on the basis of further, more
recent, materials respecting the situation in Eritrea.
[23] We therefore
reject the contention that the adjudicator dealing with the present appellant's
claim committed an error of law in his reading, or his interpretation, of the
relevant part of the IAT determination in MA. Notwithstanding what the Tribunal in SE subsequently stated in that later
decision, with the possible benefit of further materials, we consider that the adjudicator
in this case was entitled to found upon the reasoning in MA as being supportive of his decision.
[24] The remaining
ground upon which it is said that the adjudicator fell into material error of
law is a complaint of deficiency in the giving of reasons as to why the
appellant was at risk, were she to be returned.
This ground is in many ways interlinked with the contention that the adjudicator
mis-read or mis-interpreted the reasoning of the Tribunal in MA in so far as it dealt with the human
rights aspects of the claim by MA.
[25] In our view
the adjudicator's decision in the present case is perfectly intelligible and no
informed reader could be in any real doubt as to the basis of his
decision. As respects his consideration
of the human rights aspect of the case he had before him the various reports
which we mentioned earlier. It is
evident that he had particularly in mind the fate of those deported from Malta
as discussed in the reports before him, especially the UNHCR report and the
UNHCR recommendation against all forced return of asylum seekers for the time
being. As we have already indicated, the
deportees from
[26] For all of
these reasons we do not consider that the adjudicator's decision was flawed by
any material error of law. The appeal
must therefore be allowed.
[27] There was
discussion before us as to the appropriate disposal in the event of our
allowing the appeal. Counsel for the Secretary
of State moved us, in that event, to remit the case to the AIT for
consideration de novo on the basis
that the adjudicator's decision was as he put it "not a very satisfactory decision". Quite what he meant by that
was a topic upon which he appeared unwilling to elaborate. Counsel for the appellant submitted that in
the event of the AIT's decision being erroneous, technically one had to
consider whether the Secretary of State's grounds of appeal properly raised any
legitimate issue which had not been dealt with by the AIT and which might merit
reconsideration by the AIT. But, in the
event, were we to decide as we have effectively held, there was no substance in
the grounds of appeal and bearing in mind the difficulties of litigating
matters decided four years ago, it would be proper for the Court to exercise
its power under section 103B(4)(b) and simply decide that no error in law
existed.
[28] We are unmoved
by the submission from counsel for the Secretary of State that matters should
be remitted to the AIT on the basis that the adjudicator's decision was "not a
very satisfactory decision". We do not
consider that there is anything in the Secretary of State's grounds of appeal which
in any way goes beyond the issues argued before us. Accordingly, we simply decided that the
adjudicator's decision was not vitiated by any error of law and should stand ex tunc.
We say nothing about its practical standing now in light of the changing
circumstances in
Decision
[29] We conclude that we should grant leave to
appeal, allow the appeal and simply quash the decision of the AIT of