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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Ewing v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] ScotCS CSOH_13 (30 January 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2009/2009CSOH13.html Cite as: 2009 GWD 8-134, [2009] CSOH 13, [2009] ScotCS CSOH_13 |
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF
SESSION [2009] CSOH 13 |
|
A515/08 |
OPINION (2) OF LORD BRODIE in the cause TERENCE
PATRICK Pursuer; against TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED Defenders: ________________ |
Pursuer: Party
Defenders: Lindsay; Ledingham Chalmers LLP
[1] In terms of interlocutor dated
[2] The pursuer began by acknowledging that
there was authority to the effect that a requirement, such as is found in Rule
of Court 38.5, to obtain leave to reclaim from the judge whose decision it
is proposed to challenge is not contrary to the guarantee of a fair trial which
is provided by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Umair v
Umair 2002 S.C. 153. The pursuer went on to explain that if
granted leave he proposed to argue that the requirement that he find caution
was disproportionate and accordingly in contravention of his Article 6
rights because it effectively prevented access to the courts. The pursuer reminded me that the order had
been made at an early stage in the proceedings.
There had been no recovery of documents.
The Record had not closed.
Although the amount ordered was less than the defenders had sought, it
was nevertheless a large sum. He was
quite unable to pay it. Indeed, if the
sum ordered had been £1,500 rather than £15,000 he would still have been unable
to pay it. There were issues in the
present case that had not yet been considered by the Inner House and for that
reason alone it would be appropriate to grant leave to reclaim. It would be his submission to the Inner House
that I had erred in my assessment of his case but even so, I had accepted that
he had made out a case of defamation, albeit subject to a defence of Reynolds privilege. Quantification of that claim would be a
matter for a jury. In the whole
circumstances it was appropriate that leave to reclaim should be granted.
[3] Mr Lindsay, while recognising that
the matter was one for my discretion, submitted that the application should be refused. He reminded me that in the event that decree
of absolvitor was granted in terms of Rule of Court 33.10 by reason of the
pursuer having failed to lodge caution it would then be open to the pursuer to
reclaim as of right and that this would open up all previous
interlocutors: McCue v Scottish Daily Record
& Sunday Mail 1999 S.C. 332. So far as the pursuer's complaint that the
defenders' application for an order for caution had been made prematurely was
concerned, Mr Lindsay pointed to the fact that the adjustment period had
been near to its end and reminded me that the purpose of obtaining an order for
caution was to protect a party against a future expense, thus the longer he
delayed in his application the longer he would be unprotected. It could not be said that £15,000 was an
excessive sum given the likely cost of taking the action the length of a Procedure
Roll debate. As far as the complaint of
contravention of Article 6 of the Convention was concerned, it was
Mr Lindsay's submission that my making an order for caution was consistent
with the authorities and in particular Monarch
Energy Ltd v Powergen Retail Ltd
2006 S.L.T. 745 and Miloslavsky
v UK [1996] EMLR 152. Critically, the decision to make an order for
caution was a matter for the discretion of the Lord Ordinary. Nothing which had been said by the pursuer
indicated that in the present case that discretion had not been exercised
properly.