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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Reilly v Procurator Fiscal, Cupar [2012] ScotHC HCJAC_76 (11 May 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2012/2012HCJAC76.html Cite as: [2012] ScotHC HCJAC_76 |
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord CarlowayLord Menzies
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XJ398/12
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD CARLOWAY
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
MARIE REILLY
Appellant;
against
PROCURATOR FISCAL, CUPAR
Respondent: _____________ |
Appellant: A Ogg, solicitor advocate; Drummond Miller (for Ward & Co, Perth)
Respondent: Hughes, AD; Crown Agent
9 May 2012
[1] On 5 March 2012, at a trial diet at Cupar Sheriff Court, the appellant pled
guilty to behaving in a threatening or abusive manner contrary to section 38(1)
of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. The locus of the offence
was an area immediately outside the courtroom.
[2] The appellant had been, and is, engaged in
a civil action pursuing a former partner in relation to property. The former
partner had also previously been the victim in a fire raising incident, which
had resulted in the appellant being sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.
She had set fire to curtains in their former mutual home. At the time of the
present offence, the partner had been consulting with his law agent when the
appellant approached and called him a rapist, paedophile, thief, liar and sundry
similar expressions. The Sheriff took a serious view of the incident given the
locus. He imposed a Community Payback Order, as an alternative to custody,
involving supervision and a Restriction Of Liberty Order, as unpaid work in the
community was not an option. The period selected for the RLO was
162 days, which was reduced from 6 months for the early plea, and the
restriction itself was that the appellant remain at home from 7pm to 7am each night.
[3] The appellant has a previous conviction for
assault to injury in 2007, which attracted an admonition. She also has a
conviction for a breach of the peace, which was dealt with at the same time as
the fire raising offence. More recently, as was indicated in the social
enquiry report, the appellant has been involved in an assault on her own daughter
who is aged only 14. The court was advised that the appellant has pled
guilty to that offence, which involved pulling the child out of a car. A psychiatric
examination followed and the report indicated a borderline personality
disorder, but no psychiatric recommendation.
[4] So far as the appellant's personal
situation is concerned, she married in 1996 and has two teenage girls from that
union. The marriage was troubled and ended prior to the appellant forming a
relationship with the partner already referred to. That relationship too was
troubled and ended in 2007. Thereafter the appellant remarried and has a
further child aged 3. She separated from her husband in late 2011. The three
children are all currently in foster care. The appellant has been a veterinary
nurse in past, but is unable to work at present because of her mental and
physical health.
[5] It was submitted that the Sheriff erred in
his treatment of the seriousness of the offence, which was said to be at the
low end of the scale for a statutory breach of the peace. It was indicated
that the restriction was causing the appellant inconvenience in that it
prevented her and her current partner from going out walking and attending to
her horses which are stabled nearby. It also prevented any holiday
excursions.
[6] The court is unable to agree with the
submission that this offence was at the low end of the scale. The significance
of the matter is that it occurred in the precincts of the court itself. The Sheriff
was bound to take a serious view of that kind of conduct occurring in the
context of a civil litigation. The court appreciates that there will be some inconvenience
to the appellant from the Restriction Of Liberty Order, but that was the
purpose of imposing it in the first place as an alternative to custody. This
appeal is therefore refused.
rfc