United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI-2022-002976
	First-tier Tribunal No: DC/00033/2021

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

 

On 3 ^rd of April 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

 

Between

 

SORAN SAADI ABDALAZIZ

(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)

Appellant

and

 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, Counsel instructed by Parkview Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 14 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

 

1.              An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal and continued by Judge Perkins at the previous hearing before the Upper Tribunal. We can see no reasoned basis for the continuation of such an order and thus the anonymity order is discharged.

2.              This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant's appeal, following the setting aside, in a decision of Judge Perkins dated 15 November 2024, of the decision of First-tier Tribunal Lodato in which he allowed the appellant's appeal against the decision to deprive him of his British nationality under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981.

 

Background

 

3.              The appellant claims that he was born at home on 25 February 1982 in Azadi, Kirkuk, Iraq. He left the country at the age of 15 and travelled to Iran where he remained for two years. It was at this time that he assumed the identity of Alan Abdullah Sherifi.

4.              The appellant arrived in the UK on 1 November 2001 and claimed asylum. He gave the name he had used in Iran. He claims that, while he knew he was 19 years old, he could not provide a date of birth. His date of birth was recorded as 1 November 1984, making him 17 years old.

 

5.              The appellant was refused asylum but granted exceptional leave to remain as, relying on the 1 November 1984 date of birth, it was assumed he was under 18 years of age. The appellant applied to extend this leave, but his application was refused.

 

6.              On 10 February 2007 the appellant was granted indefinite leave to remain based on the case of SSHD v Bakhtear Rashid [2005] EWCA Civ 744. The appellant went on to obtain British citizenship on 17 September 2008.

 

7.              In his application for British citizenship the appellant used the name Alan Abdullah Sherifi and the date of birth 1 November 1984.

 

8.              The appellant married his wife in Sulaymaniyah on 13 February 2012. Their children were born in 2014, 2018 and 2019. The appellant's wife joined the appellant in the UK, and she obtained indefinite leave to remain on 5 October 2021.

 

9.              The appellant's genuine identity is Soran Saadi Abdalaziz born on 25 February 1982. His Iraqi documents state that he was born in Sulaymaniyah.

 

10.          By decision dated 18 March 2021 the respondent decided to deprive the appellant of his British nationality under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. The respondent asserted that the appellant had obtained his British citizenship fraudulently.

 

11.          By decision dated 5 April 2022 Judge Lodato allowed the appellant's appeal. He found that the condition precedent was not established.

 

12.          The respondent challenged the decision of Judge Lodato and permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Roots.

 

13.          By decision dated 15 November 2024 Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins found material errors of law in the decision of Judge Lodato and set aside the decision in its entirety. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-determination.

 

14.          Thus, the Appellant's appeal came before us for remaking.

The Hearing

 

15.          The scope of the remaking and the relevant issues were discussed with the representatives. Mr McVeety confirmed that the issue of good character and false details on the application for naturalisation remained a live issue, despite this not being the focus of the case before the First-tier Tribunal. He indicated that the respondent would be relying on the Upper Tribunal case of Onuzi (good character requirement: Sleiman considered) Albania [2024] UKUT 144 (IAC).

 

16.          Mr Greer was asked if the change of emphasis by the respondent placed the appellant in any difficulty. The possibility of an adjournment was mooted. Mr Greer confirmed that the case would proceed and that he was ready and able to deal with the issues as agreed.

 

17.          Considering the respondent's change in tack, Mr Greer agreed that the appellant should give evidence in relation to his appeal. No interpreter had been requested. The appellant agreed to give evidence in English. There were times that the appellant appeared to be struggling. Mr Greer was afforded the opportunity to take instructions from the appellant. It was confirmed by Mr Greer that the appellant's specific instructions were that he understands and wished to proceed in English.

18.          The appellant adopted his witness statement dated 22 November 2021.

 

19.          The appellant confirmed that he told the police officer on arrival in the UK that he did not know his date of birth, but he knew he was 19 years old. He confirmed that he was assigned the date of birth 1 November 1984 by the authorities in the UK, and so he just kept it. He was aware he was initially granted leave for one year and that he would then go to court when he was 18. He stated that his documents came saying he was 17 and so he just went with it.

 

20.          The appellant confirmed that he first returned to Iraq in 2009, and that he went to Sulaymaniyah. He stated that he always went to Sulaymaniyah, and that he had never been to Kirkuk since becoming British as he was scared. It was put to him that his witness statement refers to him going to Kirkuk Registry Office and the appellant confirmed that he had in fact been there once in 2012.

 

21.          The appellant confirmed that the details he put on his application for naturalisation were not true. He stated that he feared returning to Iraq and so kept the date of birth on his Home Office documents.

22.          Following the conclusion of the evidence, both parties made submissions.

 

Submissions

 

23.          Mr McVeety submitted that the appellant had deceived the respondent about his age. He highlighted that the appellant had an obligation to inform the authorities that leave given as a child was not appropriate.

 

24.          The appellant had always maintained he was born at home in Kirkuk, but the Iraqi 1957 Registration Document states that he was born in Halabja, Sulaymaniyah, and the marriage certificate refers to Sulaymaniyah as well. Further, the appellant always went to Sulaymaniyah when he returned to Iraq. He submitted that it is not credible that the appellant is from Kirkuk.

 

25.          Mr McVeety submitted that the appellant had deceived the respondent throughout regarding his identity. He submitted that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the appellant is from Sulaymaniyah and not Kirkuk.

 

26.          Furthermore, the appellant failed the good character requirements. The appellant had used a package of deception regarding his identity, including his name and date of birth. Mr McVeety acknowledged that whether there was an innocent explanation or dishonest deception was a matter for the Tribunal, but he submitted that it was clearly dishonest deception.

27.          Mr Greer relied on his skeleton argument dated 11 March 2025. He submitted that the appellant's evidence regarding the Iraqi documents is consistent with the relevant country information and expert evidence in AAH (Iraqi Kurds - internal relocation) (CG) [2018] UKUT 212 (IAC). He submitted that there was no fraud as the appellant was from Kirkuk.

 

28.          In relation to good character, Mr Greer referred to the test of dishonesty as detailed in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67, as adopted in relation to deprivation decisions in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201. He submitted that the appellant's account of the encounter with the police on his first arrival in the UK was reliable. The appellant was not aware of his true date of birth until after he obtained British nationality, when he returned to Iraq and saw the registry entry. He submitted that it is plausible that a police officer would make their own summary assessment of the appellant's age. Mr Greer submitted that it was perfectly reasonable for the appellant to continue using the date of birth that officials in authority in the UK had given him. He submitted that this demonstrates respect for the authorities and is not dishonest.

 

29.          Mr Greer submitted that the appellant had not engaged in fraud as his behaviour was not dishonest on the information available to him at the time.

 

30.          In relation to Article 8, Mr Greer highlighted the delay in this case. The relevant information came to the respondent's attention a significant time ago in 2014. The initial referral was in 2015 but there was no decision until 2021. During this period the appellant's wife had come to the UK and become British. Their children are British. He submitted that deprivation would be disproportionate.

 

31.          After hearing the submissions, we reserved our decision.

 

Law

 

32.          Section 40 of the BNA 1981, so far as is material, provides:

 

Deprivation of citizenship

 

(1) In this section a reference to a person's "citizenship status" is a reference to his status as-”

(a) a British citizen,

...

(3) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of-”

(a) fraud,

(b) false representation, or

(c) concealment of a material fact.

 

33.          The right of appeal from a decision to deprive a person of British citizenship is provided for by section 40A of the BNA 1981. That provides:

 

Deprivation of citizenship: appeal

 

(1) A person-”

(a) who is given notice under section 40(5) of a decision to make an order in respect of the person under section 40, or

(b) in respect of whom an order under section 40 is made without the person having been given notice under section 40(5) of the decision to make the order,

may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal.

 

34.          The Court of Appeal has recently clarified the approach to deprivation appeals in Chaudhry v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 16. Paragraph 54 states:

For these reasons in my judgment the proper approach to an appeal under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is: (i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981; (ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); (iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and (iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.

35.          In relation to good character, the Upper Tribunal decision in Onuzi (good character requirement: Sleiman considered) Albania [2024] UKUT 144 (IAC) is relevant. The headnote states:

1.        Each case is fact sensitive. In the absence of a statutory definition of 'good character', the starting point is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether a person is of good character for the purpose of granting citizenship under section 6(1) and Schedule 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981 ('BNA 1981').

 

2.        Any negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character is likely to be directly material to the assessment of the statutory requirement, whether it played a role in the application for naturalisation itself or took place before the application.

 

3.        In the majority of cases where negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character has been dishonestly concealed from the Secretary of State, the fact that the negative behaviour might not have been directly relevant to an earlier grant of leave is unlikely to make any material difference to the assessment under section 40(3) BNA 1981. It is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether the negative behaviour might have made a material difference to the assessment of good character under section 6(1) BNA 1981 had the information been known at the time.

 

4.        The omission of a fact that might have cast doubt on whether a person is of good character when they applied for naturalisation is likely to be material to the question of whether a person 'obtained' citizenship by the dishonest concealment of a material fact for the purpose of section 40(3) BNA 1981.

 

5.        The concept of a chain of causation being broken is only likely to be relevant in cases where there was full disclosure and the Secretary of State exercised discretion to grant leave to remain or naturalisation while in full possession of the facts.

 

6.        The decision in  Sleiman was based on limited argument and should be read in the full context of the statutory scheme and other relevant case law.

 

Analysis & Remaking

36.          In remaking the decision in this appeal, we will follow the approach for Tribunals as detailed by the Court of Appeal in Chaudhry v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 16.

(i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981;

37.          It is submitted by the respondent that there are two matters which demonstrate that the appellant obtained his British citizenship by the fraud. The first is the appellant's declaration that he was born and raised in Kirkuk which resulted in him being granted indefinite leave to remain. The second matter is the continued use of a false name and date of birth throughout his dealings with the respondent, culminating in the appellant using those false details on his application for naturalisation.

38.          It is for the respondent to prove to the balance of probabilities that there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981.

 

39.          The appellant has consistently claimed from his arrival in the UK in 2001 until the hearing before us that he was born in Kirkuk. The appellant has never been able to provide any documentary or other independent evidence that he was born in Kirkuk.

 

40.          A surprising omission from the evidence before us was the appeal determination regarding the appellant's initial asylum claim. This is referenced in the decision dated 2 November 2004 refusing the appellant's application for further leave to remain. It is stated that "it was stated in your appeal determination that your account as a whole, as well as your claim of living in Kirkuk, were not believed (Appeal Determination, para 9 &10)."

 

41.          It was not suggested by the parties that this was not an accurate statement regarding the asylum appeal determination. However, the determination was not produced, and, more confusingly, the respondent accepted that the appellant was from Kirkuk when the appellant was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2007 based on the case of SSHD v Bakhtear Rashid [2005] EWCA Civ 744.

 

42.          The crux of the respondent's policy applied to the appellant which entitled him to the grant of indefinite leave to remain was that the appellant only needed to demonstrate that he was "from" Kirkuk. To benefit from the policy, it was not necessary for the appellant to have been born in Kirkuk, just for the appellant to have been living in Kirkuk prior to fleeing Iraq.

 

43.          It is submitted by the appellant that the Iraqi documents produced, when taken at their highest by the respondent, only indicate that the appellant was born in Sulaymaniyah, and they do not prove, on balance, that the appellant was not "from" Kirkuk. The appellant further submits that the Arabisation policy in Iraq at the relevant time and the specific information about the registration system in Iraq mean that the Iraqi documents indicating the appellant was born in Sulaymaniyah are not actually probative of him having been born there.

 

44.          The appellant relies on the expert evidence detailed in the decision of the Upper Tribunal in the case of AAH (Iraqi Kurds - internal relocation) (CG) [2018] UKUT 212 (IAC). We find that this evidence does not offer the significant support for the appellant's case that is claimed.

 

45.          Mr Greer in his skeleton argument placed emphasis on this: "there have been isolated examples of the state interfering in the registration process for political reasons, for instance Saddam Hussain authorised the transfer of many thousands of records during his move to "Arabise" Kirkuk." He submitted that the appellant being registered in Sulaymaniyah rather than Kirkuk is "exactly what would be expected."

 

46.          The difficulty with this submission is the lack of detail in that one sentence from the expert evidence in AAH. There is no detail as to when precisely this happened, other than it must have been during the reign of Saddam Hussain. It is safe to presume that it was Kurds whose records were transferred, as this related to the policy of Arabisation. However, there is no detail as to which records were transferred and where they were transferred to. Finally, although there is reference to "many thousands of records" being transferred, there is no detail as to the percentage of records transferred.

 

47.          Therefore, although this evidence does offer some support for the appellant's claim, we find that the evidence is limited in its scope.

 

48.          Mr Greer also relied on the following extract from AAH: "Dr Fatah explained that an individual is considered to be 'from' the governate or district where his family registration is held. Where that is, subject to certain exceptions outlined below, will usually be where his or her father was registered. Thus an individual may be legally 'from' a place where he has never in fact been. His place of birth is largely irrelevant."

 

49.          The consequence of this evidence is that, if the appellant's father were registered in Sulaymaniyah, then, even if the appellant were born in Kirkuk, he would be registered with his family in Sulaymaniyah.

 

50.          There are difficulties with this evidence as far as the appellant is concerned. The evidence details that a birth would need to be registered at the Civil Status Affairs office where the father's registration is held. However, the evidence does not state that the place of birth will be recorded as the place where the birth is registered. It is accepted that in Iraq place of birth is "largely irrelevant" to where a birth is registered. However, that is not evidence that the place of birth is recorded as the place of registration.

 

51.          One of the exceptions detailed in AAH is that "once a man reaches adulthood and founds his own family, he will have his own page, upon which all the relevant information about his wife and descendants will be entered." On the appellant's naturalisation application, the appellant's father's place of birth is detailed as Kirkuk, and the appellant claims that the family always lived in Kirkuk. Thus, other than the rather speculative possibility of the transfer of records under Arabisation, it would appear likely that the appellant's father, who it is claimed reached adulthood and founded his own family in Kirkuk, would have been registered in Kirkuk.

 

52.          Overall, the evidence from AAH referenced by Mr Greer does offer some support for the appellant's claims, but we find that the evidence is far from conclusive and, in reality, offers only limited support for the appellant's claims.

 

53.          However, it is for the respondent to prove to the balance of probabilities that the appellant has fraudulently claimed to be from Kirkuk.

 

54.          The evidence relied upon by the respondent is the 1957 Registration Certificate and the marriage certificate, as well as the appellant's travel history.

 

55.          The 1957 Registration Certificate details that the appellant's place of birth is Halabja, Sulaymaniyah. The marriage certificate gives details from the appellant's Civil Status Identity Document which confirms that his province is Sirwan, Sulaymaniyah.

 

56.          In the letter from his solicitor's dated 29 January 2019 it is stated that the appellant had travelled to the Kurdistan region of Iraq on 12 occasions between April 2009 and July 2018. The appellant confirmed that he always travelled to Sulaymaniyah, which is where he met and married his wife.

 

57.          It is of note that, in his oral evidence, the appellant initially denied having ever visiting Kirkuk since becoming British and only admitted to the one visit there when his witness statement was put to him. It is appreciated that the security situation in Kirkuk was unstable during the period 2009 to 2018. However, it is surprising that, if all the appellant's immediate and wider family were from Kirkuk as he claims, the appellant would not make any visits to Kirkuk in an attempt to reestablish contact with his family.

 

58.          Mr Greer submitted that, whatever could be said about the appellant's place of birth, none of the evidence relied upon by the respondent supports the hypothesis that the appellant did not live in Kirkuk prior to him fleeing Iraq. We find that it is wholly artificial to try to separate issues of place of birth and where the appellant lived prior to fleeing Iraq. The only evidence that the appellant was "from" Kirkuk is the evidence of the appellant and he has always claimed that he was born in Kirkuk. Thus, we find that, if the evidence relied upon by the respondent fundamentally undermines the appellant's claim to have been born in Kirkuk, then it equally undermines his claim to have been "from" Kirkuk.

 

59.          Drawing all the threads together and considering all the evidence in the round, we find that, on balance, the respondent has proven that the appellant was not born in Kirkuk and that he was not living in Kirkuk prior to fleeing Iraq. We have carefully considered the expert evidence in AAH, but we do not accept that this significantly impacts the evidence relied upon by the respondent. In our judgment, the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that, on balance, the appellant was not only born in Sulaymaniyah, but that is where he is from and where all his connections are in Iraq.

 

60.          We find that the respondent has proved, on balance, that the appellant fraudulently claimed to be from Kirkuk.

 

61.          The second matter is what Mr McVeety described as the appellant's "package of deception" that he used throughout his dealings with the respondent, including the use of a false identity on his application for naturalisation as a British citizen.

 

62.          Despite some half-hearted reservations in his evidence, the appellant knew that he was not born in 1984. He also knew that he had initially been granted leave to remain as the respondent believed that he was under 18 years of age. The appellant knew that this was not true.

 

63.          The appellant also knew that the name that he had given to the respondent was not his real name. He provided the respondent with the name that he claims he adopted in Iran.

 

64.          Effectively, the issue, as summarised succinctly by Mr McVeety, is whether the use of the incorrect name and age has an innocent explanation or was dishonest deception.

 

65.          The law regarding dishonesty in deprivation cases was confirmed in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201. At paragraph 28 the Court of Appeal stated:

 

"A finding of dishonesty in the application for naturalisation is needed so as to justify deprivation. In Ivey, Lord Hughes set out the test for dishonesty (see paragraph [74]). The Court of Appeal in R v Barton and another [2020] EWCA Crim 575 ("Barton") sitting as a five judge panel, confirmed that this approach applied in the criminal context. As the Court in Barton explained at paragraph [84], the test involves two stages: (i) What was the individual's actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts; and (ii) was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people? The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in LLD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] NICA 38 ("LLD") at paragraph [62] summarised the approach in the following terms:

 

"When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual's knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.""

 

66.          Mr Greer emphasised that the appellant did not know his actual date of birth until he returned to Iraq after he had been granted British citizenship. He submitted that the appellant's evidence that on arrival he told the police officer he was 19 years old and that it was the police officer who recorded the date of birth as 1 November 1984 is reliable, plausible evidence that should be accepted. Mr Greer submitted that the appellant's adoption of that date of birth, provided by the British authorities, showed respect for authority. He submitted that there had been no dishonesty.

67.          As stated previously, the appellant knew he was not born in 1984, and he knew that he was not 17 years old when he was first granted leave to remain. His evidence demonstrated that he was aware that he had been granted leave by the respondent due to being considered under 18 years of age. The appellant knew this not to be true.

 

68.          The appellant also knew that his real name was not Alan Abdullah Sherifi. We have also found that the appellant knew that he was not born in Kirkuk but was born in Sulaymaniyah.

 

69.          Despite being an adult when he arrived in the UK and having legal representation throughout his dealing with the respondent, the appellant made no attempt to inform the respondent of his correct details.

 

70.          Despite Mr Greer's interesting submissions, we find that it is inherently implausible that the appellant informed the police officer that he was 19 years old, yet the officer then made their own summary assessment of the appellant's age and recorded his date of birth as 1 November 1984.

 

71.          Initially in his oral evidence the appellant stated that he told the police officer that he was between 17 and 19 but then confirmed that it was correct that he had told the officer he was 19 years old. This encounter occurred a long time ago when the appellant was only a young man. However, we find that the appellant is not telling the truth about what happened. We find that it is far more likely that the appellant told the police officer he was 17 years old, despite knowing that he was in fact 19 years old.

 

72.          The evidence is clear that the appellant was aware that he should not have been granted leave to remain as a child. However, the appellant did nothing to correct this. He was happy to take advantage of the untruth regarding his age.

 

73.          The appellant then persisted with the use of the incorrect name and date of birth throughout all his dealings with the respondent and he made no attempts to correct the records.

 

74.          Mr Greer submits that this in fact shows the appellant's respect for the UK authorities as he accepted the date of birth that they had assigned him. This is an ingenious submission, but we reject it. The appellant knew that at best his age had been recorded incorrectly (although we find that he deliberately gave the wrong age), and he knew that he had been granted leave due to the incorrect age being recorded. We do not accept that the appellant's failure to correct the record shows respect for the authorities; in fact, we find quite the opposite.

 

75.          Considering all the facts, we find without hesitation the appellant's conduct to be dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. The appellant knowingly misled the respondent regarding his name and age (and his place of birth), and he gained a material immigration advantage because of his deception. We find that the appellant was dishonest in his dealings with the respondent, and that he was dishonest in his application for naturalisation.

 

76.          In conclusion, we find as a fact that there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981.

 

(ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1);

 

77.          The respondent stated that the appellant's dishonest deception regarding where he was from in Iraq resulted him in obtaining indefinite leave to remain which was causative of him obtaining British citizenship.

78.          Furthermore, the respondent stated that the appellant's dishonest deception regarding his identity on his naturalisation application meant that the respondent was not able to consider the good character requirements, which the appellant would have failed to meet had the true facts been known. The respondent stated that the appellant used deliberate and material fraud to obtain British citizenship.

 

79.          We find that the appellant's deception regarding where he was from in Iraq was material to the grant of indefinite leave to remain which led to him naturalisation as a British citizen. Thus, the respondent's decision on causation cannot be impugned on public law grounds. The respondent's decision was rational, reasonable and lawful.

 

80.          In relation to the good character issue, the negative behaviour of the appellant that might case doubt on whether he is of good character was dishonesty concealed from the respondent. As detailed in Onuzi, "Any negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character is likely to be directly material to the assessment of the statutory requirement, whether it played a role in the application for naturalisation itself or took place before the application... It is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether the negative behaviour might have made a material difference to the assessment of good character under section 6(1) BNA 1981 had the information been known at the time."

 

81.          The appellant dishonestly omitted facts that might have cast doubt on whether he is of good character when he applied for naturalisation. We find that the respondent was entitled to deem that this was material to the appellant obtaining citizenship by deception. The respondent's decision cannot be impugned on public law grounds. The respondent's decision was rational, reasonable and lawful.

 

82.          In conclusion, the decision of the respondent on causation was lawful.

 

(iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); 

 

83.          The respondent confirms in her decision letter that she has considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's representations made by his solicitors, before exercising her discretion to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship.

84.          The appellant has not put forward any arguments as to why the respondent's decision to deprive him of his citizenship was unlawful in public law terms.

 

85.          We have considered all the relevant information and conclude that the respondent's exercise of discretion cannot be impugned on public law grounds. The respondent's decision was rational, reasonable and lawful.

 

(iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.

 

86.          The appellant's submission in relation to Article 8 were mainly contained in Mr Greer's skeleton argument.

87.          It is argued that the consequences of being left without leave to remain, even for a relatively short period, would have a serious impact on the appellant's private life in the UK. It is highlighted that the appellant is the main breadwinner in the family and so if he were unable to work for a period, then this would have a detrimental impact on the appellant and his family.

 

88.          The respondent's delay is also referenced. It is said that the respondent became aware of the 1957 Registration Certificate in 2014 and that an initial referral to the respondent's Status Review Unit was made in May 2015. However, no decisive action was taken to deprive the appellant of his nationality until the respondent's decision dated 18 March 2021.

 

89.          It is submitted these factors mean that the deprivation of the appellant's British citizenship is a disproportionate breach of the appellant's rights as protected by Article 8.

 

90.          It is correct that the respondent's first referral to the Status Review Unit was on 1 May 2015. However, an investigation letter was then sent to the appellant on 24 November 2018, and the appellant's representatives responded by letter dated 29 January 2019. Thus, the delay is not as significant as the "5 years and 10-and-a-half-month" as stated by Mr Greer in his skeleton argument.

 

91.          There is certainly a degree of delay. There was three and a half years between the referral to the Status Review Unit and the dispatch of the investigation letter. There was then a shorter delay of just over two years between the appellant's representative's letter and the final decision.

 

92.          The initial delay between May 2015 and November 2018 is understandable considering that all those dealing with these matters were awaiting the handing down of the Supreme Court decision in R (on the application of Hysaj and others) (Appellants) v SSHD (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 82. Judgment in this case was given in December 2017, and the respondent needed to reassess her policies and processes. Thus, Mr Greer's submission that there is "no explanation" for the delay in acting against the appellant is not a fair or accurate summary of the circumstances.

 

93.          The delay of over two years in making the final decision in this case is regretful, but this is a serious matter with significant consequences, and it is reasonable for the respondent to take time to consider all the issues before reaching her detailed and comprehensive decision.

 

94.          We find that the delay in this matter does not amount to a significant period of inaction by the respondent. The delay does not reduce the public interest in the deprivation of the appellant's citizenship by anything other than the smallest amount. We find that the delay in this case does not undermine the obvious strong public interest in depriving the appellant of a status of fundamental importance to which he was not entitled.

 

95.          The difficulties that the appellant and his family will potentially suffer during the so-called "limbo period" could have a significant detrimental impact on the appellant and his family. However, the evidence on this issue is limited.

 

96.          It is stated that the appellant is the main breadwinner for the family. The appellant has provided pay slips and bank statements from 2021. It appears that the appellant was at that time the director of MCR Driveways Ltd, and he had been undertaking that role since August 2016 with an annual salary of £10,000. It is of note that the credits to the appellant's bank account from MCR Driveways Ltd are almost double the amount stated on his payslips. It is possible that the additional funds are dividends, but there is no evidence provided relating to this.

 

97.          Therefore, it is extremely difficult to make an informed assessment of the impact on the appellant and his family of a period without leave. There is no current evidence of the appellant's employment status or that of his wife.

 

98.          We have considered the relevant case law on this issue, including the Upper Tribunal decision in Muslija (deprivation: reasonably foreseeable consequences) Albania [2022] UKUT 337 (IAC). The relevant part of the headnote states:

 

"(4) Exposure to the "limbo period", without more, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of an individual retaining fraudulently obtained citizenship. That means there are limits to the utility of an assessment of the length of the limbo period; in the absence of some other factor (c.f. "without more"), the mere fact of exposure to even a potentially lengthy period of limbo is a factor unlikely to be of dispositive relevance."

 

99.          In this case there is nothing more than exposure to the "limbo period" relied upon by the appellant. There is no evidence of any severe or significant detrimental impact on him or his family.

100.      In any event, there is a need to avoid an unduly proleptic analyses of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the deprivation of citizenship and it is not appropriate to undertake an analysis of, or to include as a material part of the assessment, the likelihood of the appellant being granted leave to remain in the UK or being removed from the UK. Having said that, it seems to us that this is a case where, on its face, it is very unlikely that the appellant would be facing removal from the UK (he has a British wife and children and has lived in the UK for over 23 years).

 

101.      The focus, in any event, is upon the impact of the loss of British citizenship and the period of uncertainty during the "limbo period" when the appellant will have no leave and no status. The respondent states in the decision letter that that period would be about eight weeks from the making of the deprivation order. The decision was made in March 2021 and time scales for decision-making may have changed and indeed lengthened since then, but we have no evidence from either party to suggest a different period.

 

102.      As detailed above, there is a dearth of information regarding the appellant's current financial situation and thus the potential impact of a period without leave.

 

103.      As for the best interests of the appellant's children, there is no reason why their situation would be affected by the appellant's loss of British citizenship. Neither they nor their mother would lose their British citizenship.

 

104.      The children would be able to continue with their education and would be entitled to assistance with housing and other financial matters as previously. There is no reason why their financial situation would change in any material way.

 

105.      There is no medical or other evidence in relation to any possible emotional harm that could be caused to them by the deprivation proceedings. Indeed, there is no evidence of any material considerations in assessing their best interests which would be of weight in the proportionality balancing exercise.

 

106.      In the circumstances the appellant has provided no evidence to show that the consequences of the loss of his British citizenship would have any material impact on him and his family other than by way of the anxiety caused by the period of uncertainty and upheaval, and certainly nothing that would outweigh the public interest in depriving him of a citizenship obtained through deception and to which he was not entitled.

 

107.      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has failed to show that depriving him of his British citizenship would be disproportionate and in breach of his Article 8 rights.

Notice of Decision

 

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant's appeal.

 

C R Cole

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

31 March 2025